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Abstract
Any organization whose business model is based on production relies, and is
dependent, on providers of raw material which it transforms into products. Cus-
tomers’ demand for products, and thus the producing firm’s demand for raw
material, generally are not static but change with economic cycles, marketing,
entries and exits of competitors, and changing consumer behavior, to name but
a few factors. A variety of forecast methods support organizations in their ef-
fort to be prepared for demand changes, yet uncertainty about the volumes the
market will demand cannot be fully eliminated. The design and management of
supply networks has therefore increasingly shifted in the focus of attention as
they provide levers for organizations to cope with variability.
This thesis aims to augment theory and practice in the management of sup-
ply networks by providing a different perspective, a new angle, from where to
analyze and to steer the buying firm’s inbound material stream. A bottleneck
perspective will be developed in the course of the thesis, and it will be com-
plemented by the identification and discussion of distinct bottleneck manage-
ment activities, each of which comprised by a multitude of individual measures.
Some of these measures fulfill very particular roles, and some serve multiple
roles at once, so that the context in which to use these measures is important.
Moreover, the discussion of supply networks and activities aimed at secur-
ing supply provides clarification as to the popular notions of supply chains and
Supply Chain Management (SCM). It will be demonstrated how these concepts
collide with actual network structures as well as with common practice.
A comprehensive review of literature brings together insights from research
fields as diverse as manufacturing systems, systems theory, complexity, and
network theory. This review provides the backbone for the development of a
i
tentative conceptual model that will guide the processes of data collection and
analysis. The insights from the data analysis and how they relate to the existing
body of knowledge are used to devise the foundation of a theory of bottleneck
management in supply networks.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Statement
1.1.1. Introduction
Firm borders are increasingly difficult to define and at the same time in some re-
spects less important than they used to be. Complex products are manufactured
in different locations by various firms which, in turn, are supplied by a host
of suppliers from different countries. After manufacturing, these products are
distributed to diverse remote areas. The different steps of value-creation thus in-
volve multiple actors in various locations, tied to each other through operations,
many of which could be summarized under the umbrella term logistics. Tak-
ing into account multi-product strategies, a variety of different firm networks
emerge with different degrees of overlap. Firms in such networks are subject
to influence from other firms both in the same network and in other networks
to which only indirect ties exist that are neither intended nor purposely main-
tained. And yet the impacts evolving from this type of relationships can be of
equal magnitude and importance as from direct and intentionally created rela-
tionships.
The result is a dense network of mutually dependent actors. A variety of
parameters can be used to describe the characteristics of individual network po-
sitions that may or may not be one determinant of performance. A core theme of
this thesis is that performance of individual firms will vary, not only based upon
internal decisions and resources, but also with respect to other firms’ decisions
and resources, which the focal firm seeks access to. There is no widespread
and generally accepted framework as to what the factors are that will determine
individual firm performance the most in complex networks of interdependent
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actors.
This dissertation focuses on the physical material flow between organizations
in supply networks as the object of interest. Reliable supply is not taken for
granted by many supply management professionals, and, in fact, a broad vari-
ety of factors exerts influence the successful and timely completion of produc-
tion and delivery. Organizational responses to those factors will be identified
and discussed. Locations where impediments arise to the normal functioning
of a system are often referred to as bottlenecks, though this term has not been
widely used in the context of supply networks. The bottleneck metaphor will
be elaborated on in Section 2.3. It turns out to be a useful base concept for
the development of archetypal activities and principles relating to the improve-
ment of material flow. This thesis will create a more complete picture of causes
and effects on supply performance in manufacturing networks. By laying the
groundwork for a theory of bottleneck management in supply networks it will
provide a frame of reference that will support decisions with respect to impor-
tant determinants of successful supply relationships.
1.1.2. Problems and Needs in Industrial Practice
Any organization whose business model depends on the production of goods
requires raw material as input to its production process. This raw material is
normally provided by suppliers. Most suppliers are external organizations; even
in cases where suppliers are internal and belong to the same organization, the
physical location may be as distant. It is only the first echelon of raw mate-
rial producers, such as mining companies, that does not receive the main share
of material from suppliers but extracts it as natural resources from the Earth’s
crust. Yet, even these companies are dependent on supply of tools, machines,
human resources, knowledge, commodities, and scientific contributions. And
they require a market to sell the goods they extract. There are no self-sufficient
organizations.
The general need to receive raw material and other forms of supply has led
to the development of theories, concepts, tools, and techniques that help orga-
nizations manage their inbound material stream. Cheaper and faster means of
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transportation have made companies less dependent on local sources of supply;
at the same time, increasingly many companies go international, which, again
reduces their local dependency. Both developments, however, seem to make
them more vulnerable to the cyclical swings of the world market as well as to
irregular peaks and recessions.
Material flow is preceded and accompanied by information flow: production
of goods tends to follow demand for those goods. A customer’s order thus
often triggers a whole series of events at a multitude of other organizations,
which remains largely unseen both by the customer himself as well as by the
organization serving the customer. Yet, successful operation at each echelon
of the network of organizations which contribute to the production of the final
product is a requirement for the customer order to be met eventually. If only one
component is missing, most products cannot be produced and delivered.
The inability to deliver a product interrupts the cash flow of a producer; cash
flow tends to follow material flow. Money is lost for the moment – and money
can be lost in the future as potential follow-up transactions will not occur. Cus-
tomers might switch their preferred supplier, and the reputation of being unre-
liable may prevent potential customers from doing business with that organiza-
tion. The cause of the interruption of material flow may lie entirely outside the
control of an organization; nonetheless chances are the organization will have
to deal with the consequences on its own, will face “punishment” by the cus-
tomer and possibly loss of future business, the latter of which may be the more
significant problem yet remains impossible to quantify. As an example for the
magnitude of losses incurred by supply shortages, the fast-growing Indian car
industry could have produced 20% more cars in 2010 if the supply of tires had
met demand, according to some estimates (AutomotiveWorld.com 2011).
Loss of current and future business is but one type of impact producers face.
Interruptions of supply lead to idle time in production plants. The implications
differ for each organization. In some cases, only little additional cost is in-
volved if operations are discontinued. In other cases, the cost can be significant
as continuously running processes are interrupted, requiring lengthy periods of
production ramp-up – and thus additional delay – once the inbound material
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flow could be reestablished. Any type of delay increases process variability. In
most production processes, there is some type of process dependency, too. That
is, process steps have to be performed in a certain order. The combination of
variability and dependency in processes leads to perturbations and slows down
the entire production process for a period of time that can be significantly longer
than the original period of interruption (Goldratt & Cox 2004). Companies al-
ready operating at high capacity utilization will face severe difficulties catching
up with demand once they fall behind.
The recent example of Takata, the Japanese supplier of automobile inflators,
illustrates the case (Gough et al. 2014-11-18, Niedermeyer 2014): defective
airbags supplied by Takata have caused the recall of millions of cars after sev-
eral fatalities became public, and further recalls are pending. If the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration of the United States decides to force
a recall of all US cars equipped with potentially faulty Takata airbags, it will
take the company two years to produce enough replacement airbags just for the
United States (Niedermeyer 2014). Without sufficient supply from Takata, car
makers will be unable to solve the safety problem. Takata itself faces capacity
constraints as the company has to balance production of replacement inflators
for cars that have been recalled with production of inflators for continuing sup-
ply of production of new automobiles. The significant surge in demand will
pose equal challenges on some of Takata’s suppliers. Without all companies in-
volved being able to meet the higher demands, car companies will be unable to
repair recalled cars at a sufficiently high rate and customers will remain exposed
to the threat of malfunctioning inflators.
High demands on existing production capacity – often a consequence of vari-
ability induced by shortages of supply and the resulting need to catch up with
demand – often come with side effects. Quality can suffer as maintenance of
tools and quality control are skipped for the sake of higher throughput. Machine
defects and quality problems resulting from such practice further exacerbate the
capacity problem. Quality defects may be detected immediately, but they might
also remain undetected for long periods of time, creating situations such as the
one at Takata described above.
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The preceding discussion illustrates some of the problems related to questions
of stable supply. The consequences of supply interruptions can be manifold and
severe. The greater the share of value outsourced, the more an organization
becomes dependent on reliable supply and vulnerable to irregularities. While
the paradigm of economic growth has remained largely uncontested in practice,
the paradigm concerning the means to achieve growth has changed. Many or-
ganizations have become “flat” and create only a fraction of the value within
their legal boundaries of what they used to, giving a larger share of value – and
higher importance – to suppliers. The difference between Ford’s vertically inte-
grated River Rouge plant and today’s operating principles at the same company
could hardly be bigger (Welch & Nayak 1992). At the same time, inventory has
come to be considered a liability rather than an asset, creating fertile ground for
projects aiming for its reduction, thereby reducing a buffer against variability
while increasing the number of factors that give rise to higher variability.
Therefore, the importance of reliable supply has become one of the central
tenets of modern production companies. Production companies cannot operate
reliably without reliable supply. Supply-related problems can cascade along the
entire supply network. This project aims to make a contribution to organiza-
tions’ ability to better manage their inbound material stream, thereby meeting
one essential requirement for successful business.
1.1.3. Academic Gap
A review of the literature in related fields creates the appearance that the re-
search community to date has not developed a satisfying theoretical foundation
for bottleneck management in supply networks; the bottleneck perspective ap-
pears to be under-appreciated.
Research on Supply Chain Management (SCM) is plentiful. In a nutshell,
the majority of research endeavors may boil down to the question how to match
supply and demand so as to improve the financial situation of the organizations
involved in the supply network. In order to achieve this end, researchers have
focused on a broad variety of topics in SCM, such as information sharing and
collaboration (e.g., Barratt 2004, Holweg et al. 2005, Slone et al. 2007), se-
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lection of the right supply chain strategy (e.g., Fisher 1997, Pagh & Cooper
1998, Mason-Jones et al. 2000, Harland & Knight 2001, Lee 2002, Christopher
et al. 2006), sourcing strategies (e.g., Novak & Eppinger 2001, Lonsdale 2001,
Roehrich 2008), performance measures and incentives (e.g., Beamon 1999,
Narayanan & Raman 2004, Shepherd & Günter 2006, Slone et al. 2007), and
power in supply relationships (e.g., Cox et al. 2001, Kumar 2005, Crook &
Combs 2007). Some academics, even though only few, do discuss the manage-
ment of supply networks from a bottleneck perspective. Mizgier et al. (2013)
discuss several centrality measures from network theory and compare their abil-
ity to identify bottlenecks in supply networks. Their analysis is entirely based
on structural properties of the network. The authors introduce a tool “for the
quantification of losses due to supply chain disruptions from single suppliers”.
It seems impossible, however, to create any roughly precise quantitative estima-
tion of losses without looking into supply relations, contingency measures, and
demand characteristics in greater detail. The vein of this article is similar to that
of, e.g., Craighead et al. (2007) and Choi & Kim (2008) in that these authors
use structural measures from network theory to make predictions about risk in
supply networks or, more generally, about supplier performance.
Academics and practitioners alike were influenced by Goldratt’s Theory of
Constraints (ToC) for the management of bottlenecks in production systems
and business processes. Several authors attempt to relate concepts and ideas
from ToC to supply networks. Lockamy III & Draman (1998) claim to in-
troduce a “constraint-based approach for effective supply chain management”
which turns out, however, to be a rather superficial discussion of ToC’s “5 Step
Thinking Process”, its scheduling logic and its buffer management in the con-
text of supply networks. The authors retreat to normative claims concerning the
need for more supply network members to “recognize and embrace the global
perspective” (as opposed to their own local optima). That is, the authors do
understand each supplier as a whole as a potential bottleneck, yet they do not
follow up this idea but merely recite often-heard normative claims. Simatupang
et al. (2004) focus on collaboration in supply networks and attempt to provide
means to break constraints that prevent organizations from effective collabora-
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tion. The constraints the authors discuss are conceptual or “mental” rather than
physical, however, and they influence companies’ collaboration decisions rather
than their material flow. Serdar-Asan (2009) uses ToC tools such as Evaporat-
ing Cloud diagrams and Current and Future Reality Trees to express complexity
problems in supply networks. She does not, however, adopt a bottleneck per-
spective for the physical flow of material through the supply network. Although
the analogy between the management of bottlenecks in production systems –
as treated in the Theory of Constraints – and the management of bottlenecks
in supply networks – the topic of this thesis – seems striking, not much more
seems to have evolved out of ToC for supply networks than a literal translation
of the concepts and thinking processes, which is not satisfying because of the
differing contextual conditions (cf. Section 3.7).
The field of Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) is focused on risk of
disruption of supply relationships. Researchers discuss topics such as types of
risk in supply networks (e.g., Zsidisin 2003, Christopher & Peck 2005), de-
velopment of risk management tools (e.g., Harland et al. 2003), risk factors
(e.g., Peck 2005, Wagner & Bode 2006), risk assessment (e.g., Blackhurst
et al. 2008), risk management processes (e.g., Hallikas et al. 2004), and quan-
titative risk models (e.g., Tang 2006). That is, some of the problems authors
in SCRM address are closely related to some of the problems discussed in this
thesis, albeit from a different perspective. Although various authors develop
tools, mitigation strategies and methodologies for the management of risk in
supply networks – with management translating into identification, avoidance,
and mitigation – the common approaches found in the literature do not invoke a
prioritization of bottlenecks over non-bottlenecks, nor do they even induce dis-
crimination. Moreover, the methodologies seem to fall short of addressing more
specific aspects of physical material flow and generally tend to look at supply
network risk at a more abstract level.
Hence, there seems to be a research gap in the broad vein of management of
supply. Most scholarly work appears not to view supply networks as systems
with multiple internal as well as cross-border interdependencies. Problems of
material flow are not addressed with the same rigor as can be found in Op-
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erations Management with various competing and complementary production
paradigms (e.g., Lean and Agile). A bottleneck perspective on supply networks
has not evolved. The gap exists despite the fact that such a perspective could
provide new, valuable insights and a platform for the development of practical
management approaches. The bottleneck concept supports prioritization, both
of nodes and of measures, and a methodology for bottleneck management would
facilitate access to and use of appropriate measures. There is a need for a struc-
tured approach that supports the stabilization of physical material flow between
firms in a network so as to reduce the chance of interruptions in production
processes and to maintain production and delivery schedules.
1.2. Research Aims and Objectives
This thesis is to reduce the academic gap outlined above and to improve and
facilitate information access of industrial organizations.
The general aim of this PhD dissertation is (1) to complement
and enrich the knowledge on and understanding of bottlenecks in
general and of bottlenecks in supply networks in particular, (2) to
lay the groundwork for a theory of bottlenecks in supply networks,
(3) to create structured and methodological access to the manage-
ment of bottlenecks in supply networks, (4) thereby facilitating ac-
cess to this field for industrial organizations.
To accomplish this aim, research questions will be defined which will guide the
study. The research questions will be defined in Section 4 after a careful review
of the relevant literature was completed and before the study is continued with
gathering of empirical data.1 They represent the more specific objectives of the
1As Gillham (2005, p. 158) puts it: “You cannot sensibly ask questions of an area of research
until you know something about it”. Therefore the literature review is intended to identify im-
portant concepts which can lead to more pointed research questions that will guide empirical
data collection and data analysis. In many papers and theses, research questions are defined
at the outset. Medawar (1964) addresses the problem between the apparent chronological
order of the research process as suggested in many research papers and the actual process of
scientific discovery. For this thesis, it was decided to reflect the actual research process in
order and structure of the document.
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study, leading towards the more general aim.
The research aim provides the basis for a tentative conceptual model of bot-
tleneck management in supply networks. The review of literature provides the
basis for chapters 2, 3, and 4. In these chapters, the theoretical underpinning for
the conceptual model and for the collection and analysis of empirical data shall
be created.
1.3. Philosophical Perspective
This research project is to be understood as having been conducted within a
postpositivist research paradigm. The paradigm selected for this work has im-
plications for the research method chosen and for the interpretation and gener-
alizability of its results. As Guba & Lincoln (1994, p. 108) propose,
“The basic beliefs that define inquiry paradigms can be summarized
by the responses given by proponents of any given paradigm to
three fundamental questions, which are interconnected in such a
way that the answer given to anyone question, taken in any order,
constrains how the others may be answered.”
These three questions are
1. The ontological questions: what is the form and role of reality?
2. The epistemological question: how can the relationship between researcher
and the researched object be described?
3. The methodological question: how can the researcher attain knowledge?
The ontological position of postpositivism is commonly referred to as critical
realism. That is, postpositivists believe there is one reality (which is a defining
difference to constructionists who reject this notion; Easton 2010, p. 123), yet
due to fallibility and imperfection of the human mind it is not possible to fully
and correctly apprehend and describe it (Guba & Lincoln 1994). Or as Sayer
(1992, p. 5) describes in his characterization of critical realism:
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“The world exists independently of our knowledge of it. Our knowl-
edge of that world is fallible and theory-laden. Concepts of truth
and falsity fail to provide a coherent view of the relationship be-
tween knowledge and its object. Nevertheless knowledge is not
immune to empirical check, and its effectiveness in informing and
explaining successful material practice is not mere accident.”
In fact, the fallibility of the human mind is Sayer’s (2000, p. 2) core argument
for the independence of the existence of the world and our understanding of it:
“What reason have we for accepting this basic realist proposition
of the mind-independence of the world? I would argue that it is
the evident fallibility of our knowledge – the experience of getting
things wrong, of having our expectations confounded, and of crash-
ing into things – that justifies us in believing that the world exists
regardless of what we happen to think about it.”
One aim of the research endeavor is to accumulate knowledge so as to able to
explain phenomena and to increase one’s ability to make predictions about the
future (Guba & Lincoln 1994, p. 113). As Easton (2010, p. 122) points out,
“The most fundamental aim of critical realism is explanation; an-
swers to the question ‘what caused those events to happen?’” This
question implies that relations of cause and effect exist in critical
realism: “Objects (. . . ) having structures (. . . ) and necessarily pos-
sessing causal powers and liabilities (. . . ) will, under specific con-
dition c1 (. . . ) result in an event e1 (. . . ), or alternatively under
specific condition c2 (. . . ) will result in an event e2 (. . . ).”
The author adds, however, that this kind of clear-cut formal description is un-
likely to be applicable in the real world. Nonetheless it can serve as “a logical
framework to guide case researchers”. In fact, causal explanations will play an
important role in this study. Questions of interest relate, for instance, to the ac-
tions organizations take in order to stabilize their inbound material stream (i.e.,
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“what do they do so as to cause inbound material stream to be stable”) and to
the conditions under which they take them.
The above discussion of the ontology of postpositivism – critical realism –
already hints at the answer to the epistemological question. The researcher aims
to approximate knowledge of the reality, accepting that due to his flawed mind
he will not be able to fully see and apprehend it. Guba & Lincoln (1994) remark
that “objectivity remains a ‘regulatory ideal’” (p. 110). Replication of findings
can serve as evidence that the findings approximate the truth until falsified.
As to the methodological question, postpositivism pays attention to contex-
tual information as well as to the meaning social actors ascribe to actions. That
is, it appreciates the interpretivist character of statements (as made, for instance,
in interviews). As Easton (2010) puts it:
“Critical realists accept that there are differences between the em-
pirical, the actual and the real, and that data are collected from peo-
ple as well as from, and about, material things. As a result they ac-
cept that any explanations are necessarily fundamentally interpre-
tivist in character. In particular when analysing respondent based
data the researcher faces the problem of the double hermeneutic
(Woodside et al. 2005) .”
Simply put, the data analysis of case study research which uses interviews as
a way of collecting information combines etic and emic interpretation of the
events of interest and what caused them to happen as the researcher interprets
the information he received by his interviewee which themselves are already
an interpretation of the actual events. This setup emphasizes the importance of
measures to ensure validity.
1.4. Methodology
1.4.1. Theory Building
This dissertation aims to establish a theoretical foundation for the management
of bottlenecks in supply networks.
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It is worth discussing the constituents of a good theory in order to specify
this aim in greater details. Furthermore, editors of renowned scientific journals
have indicated that rejection rates of articles they receive is significant due to
weaknesses in theory building (Whetten 1989, Sutton & Staw 1995). Theory-
building is one of the two “general objectives of research” (Wacker 1998, p.
371).2 It seems sensible then to reflect on this criticism and to adopt the crucial
concepts of good theory in this thesis.
Bacharach (1989, p. 498) defines theory as a “statement of relationships be-
tween units observed or approximated in the empirical world.” These statements
are valid within a set of boundaries. “In more detailed terms, a theory may be
viewed as a system of constructs and variables in which the constructs are re-
lated to each other by propositions and the variables are related to each other by
hypotheses”3 (cf. Fig. 1.4.1).
Sutton & Staw (1995, p. 378) propose that theory “emphasizes the nature of
causal relationships, identifying what comes first as well as the timing of such
events. Strong theory, in our view, delves into underlying processes so as to
understand the systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or nonoccurence.”
Whetten (1989) suggests that a complete theory needs to be built on four con-
stituents: What, How, Why, and the boundary definitions (Who, When, Where).
2The other general objective of research, according to Wacker (1998), is fact-finding. This de-
scription of the two-parted nature of research is in accordance with Dubin (1969, pp. 7-9):
“Theorizing is an integral part of empirical investigation, just as empirical analysis has mean-
ing only by reference to a theory from which it is generated. (...) It is only on the grounds
of empirical test that the theorist-model builder may be distinguished from the theologian.”
He specifies the relationship between theory building and empirical research (p. 8): “Coming
from theory to [empirical] research, attention is focused on truth, the nature of reality, the pro-
cesses of knowing, and the logic of meaning statements. Starting from [empirical] research
and moving towards theory, attention turns to such issues as measurement in all its phases,
translation of propositions into operational terms, and the reliability of empirical indicators”.
3Bacharach (1989) distinguishes propositions and hypotheses based upon their specificity:
„While both propositions and hypotheses are merely statements of relationships, propositions
are the more abstract and all-encompassing of the two, and therefore relate the more abstract
constructs to each other. Hypotheses are the more concrete and operational statements of
these broad relationships and are therefore built from specific variables.“ Hypotheses are de-
rived from propositions. A construct „may be viewed as a broad mental configuration of
a given phenomenon, while a variable may may be viewed as an operational configuration
derived from a construct“ (Bacharach 1989, p. 500). This view on the differences between
propositions and hypotheses is shared by Whetten (1989).
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Figure 1.4.1. – Components of a theory (Bacharach 1989)
What stands for the factors that lead to the specific outcome or phenomenon
the theory aims to explain. Such factors can be the units of analysis of research.
More specifically, What is concerned with the properties of things of interest
rather than with the the things of interest as wholes. The reason lies in the
biological limitations of the researcher which lets him choose certain proper-
ties of the real life systems that he is able to observe and to comprehend. The
fact that a researcher will select certain properties of real things to implement
them in his model while (possibly unconsciously) ignoring other properties not
only suggests that things as such are not as important for theory-building as
the properties of things are, but also allows the researcher to speculate on the
existence of additional properties not directly observed yet, which gives rise to
creative theory-building (Dubin 1969, pp. 30 et seq.). Furthermore, the things
(or “units”) to whose properties we are referring with the question What can be
elements or they can be classes of elements which share certain properties (Du-
bin 1969, pp. 47 et seq.). The problem here is related to the question as to which
of the two general research perspectives – a reductionist view or a systems view
– is to be adopted for the problem at hand. Research on Complex Adaptive Sys-
tems (CAS; cf. Section 2.5.4) suggests that a reductionist perspective can fail
to explain effects that occur due to the interaction of units over time that exhibit
complex behaviour. Dubin (1969) suggests that there are no laws governing or
13
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connecting the interaction between different levels of details. The research do-
main this project is embedded in demonstrates how one might refer to different
levels of composition for the explanation of effects observed in practice. The
researcher may refer to behaviour observed on the organizational level, on the
departmental level, or on the personal level; he may find explanation in the par-
ticular social or cultural setting individuals inside the organization are part of.
In fact, organizational theories that have been developed in order to explain the
behaviour and strategy of organizations do refer to levels of detail as different
as psychology of individuals members of the organization (e.g., opportunism in
Transaction Cost Economics and Principal-Agent Theory) on the one hand and
the unpredictable environment of the organization (as in, e.g., Transaction Cost
Economics and Resource Dependence Theory) on the other hand. To be consis-
tent in the level of aggregation or composition throughout the analyses without
giving up possible insights that may be hidden in a higher level or lower level
view may be one of the more difficult challenges in comprehensive research
projects.
How such factors then are related is described by How, i.e., the factors are
linked and often (albeit not necessarily) causality is invoked. Dubin (1969)
refers to this as the law of interaction. These two elements, What and How, de-
scribe the functioning of the theory, i.e., they describe how the factors and their
relationships to each other lead to a certain phenomenon. Thus, they provide
the basis for propositions and hypotheses. Propositions and hypotheses do not
include explanation, i.e., they are “statements about what is expected to occur,
not why it is expected to occur” (Sutton & Staw 1995, p. 377). The accuracy
of a proposition has to be ensured independent of its empirical truth; “[t]he sole
test of the accuracy of a proposition is whether or not it follows logically from
the model to which it applies” (Dubin 1969, p. 171). Hypotheses “mirror the
proposition of the model” (ibid., p. 212) in that they employ empirical indicators
to express in numbers what the proposition states qualitatively. For instance, a
proposition may predict “friendliness”, “high participation”, “strong identifica-
tion” of a group of people under specific conditions; a hypothesis would then
utilize the appropriate empirical indicators to allow measurement and thus em-
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pirical validation of the proposition. By employing a different indicator for the
same variable of interest a different hypothesis will be derived from the same
proposition (Dubin 1969, pp. 211 et seq.).
Most emphasis, however, is put on Why. While What and How describe the
factors and the relationships among them, Why provides the explanation, i.e.,
Why addresses the inherent assumptions the theorist makes about the causal
logic that lies within the relationships between the factors. If Why is overlooked
and the theorists focuses on What and How only, then the supposed theory lacks
the potential to make predictions about the future; if predictions about the fu-
ture are derived from past empirical data, disregarding the logic that has led to
a particular phenomenon in the past, i.e., without making explicit the inherent
assumptions about causal relationships, then we are dealing with “brute em-
piricism” (Sutton & Staw 1995). The importance of the Why is underlined by
Sutton & Staw (1995, pp. 375-376): “The key issue is why a particular set of
variables are expected to be strong predictors.”4
Clearly defined boundary conditions (Who, When, Where) “constitute the
range of the theory” (Whetten 1989, p. 492) and are “[o]ne indication that
4It should be mentioned that the elements What, How, Why, and the boundary conditions which
together constitute a theory, are treated differently by other researchers. In the context of so-
cial science, Dubin (1969, pp. 9 et seq.), for instance, maintains that there are two distinctive
objectives of research which are “not often achieved together”: understanding of interaction
(which refers to “Why”) and prediction of outcomes (which refers to “What” and “How”).
In contrast to (Sutton & Staw 1995), Dubin (1969) claims that the notion that “if we are to
make accurate predictions about social phenomena, we have to know the processes built into
these phenomena and the characteristics of all possible outcomes toward which the processes
move” is a “pious value position that bears little relation to the practice of social scientists”
(pp. 9-10). Possibly, then, the constituting elements of a theory as proposed by (Sutton &
Staw 1995) with (full) knowledge about the relationships between the factors of a model
could be conceived of as an ideal situation that, in practice, is difficult to achieve. As with
the definition of a system (cf. Section 2.5.4), a model should include those elements which
are considered important for the understanding of reality and/or the creation of predictions.
“Important” means the elements are useful (cf. Mintzberg (1979) as quoted on page 17) and
are able to explain and determine the effect of interest to the largest extent. The creation of
a model apparently cannot require full knowledge of all elements of a real world system and
the relationships among them as otherwise there would be no necessity to examine it further.
Hence, for this thesis work Dubin’s (1969) contention is interpreted as a practical suggestion
that it will not be worthwhile seeking full understanding of the system of interest in the early
iterations of the theory-building process and instrad utilize empirical data gathered throughout
this process to improve the model and develop it into a theory in the course of the project.
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strong theory has been proposed” (Sutton & Staw 1995, p. 376). Stating the
boundaries of a theory provides information about its generalizability. By re-
laxing the conditions (or reducing the criteria) that determine the boundary, the
boundary will expand and the model will gain greater generality (Dubin 1969,
pp. 141 et seq.). By the same token, several models with narrow boundaries
can lead to one more general model. Dubin (1969, p. 142) provides an example
of models of different types of relationships, such as mother-child relationship,
doctor-patient relationship, teacher-student relationship, etc. Through identifi-
cation and separation of isomorphic boundary-determining conditions of these
different individual models it is possible to create one more general model of
two-person relationships.
Also, testing the theory under different conditions – even when the testing
is limited to thought experiments – can provide useful information that can be
fed back to evaluate the What, How, and Why (Whetten 1989, p. 493). In
addition to explicitly stated boundaries the theory might also be bounded by the
researcher’s implicit values (Bacharach 1989, p. 498).
The question of generalizability – or more generally: scope – is closely in-
tertwined with the research method that leads to the theory’s development. In
deductive reasoning, the conclusion will always be true if the premisses of the
inference are true; the premisses entail the conclusion. In contrast, in inductive
reasoning, the premisses of the inference do not entail the conclusion, i.e., even
if the premisses are true, the conclusion might still be false (Okasha 2002). In
fact, inductive reasoning often means generalization from a limited set of ob-
served units to the entire population of units of this kind. Wacker (1998) states
that research (or science) is called formal or analytical when it is conducted ac-
cording to deductive rules whereas it is called empirical when inductive methods
are used.5
Mintzberg (1979, p. 584) maintains that deduction “is the less interesting, less
challenging part” of science. Countering Popper (1968), he suggests that useful
research often requires generalization. Generalization, however, may come on
5Wacker (1998) credits Sax (1968) for this statement. Unfortunately, he does not provide bibli-
ographic data for this reference.
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the expense of accuracy and it might be necessary to trade-off one for the other
(Weick 1979, 1995). Such “[c]ontradictory demands for both strong theory and
precise measurement” pose a major problem for researchers who submit their
papers for publication in certain journals (Sutton & Staw 1995, p. 381). Empha-
sis on validation and internal consistency lead researchers to narrow the scope
of their theories, sometimes rendering theories trivial (Weick 1989, van de Ven
1989).
Mintzberg (1979, p. 584) continues:
“The fact is that there would be no interesting hypothesis to test
if no one ever generalized beyond his or her data. Every theory re-
quires that creative leap, however small, that breaking away from
the expected to describe something new. There is no one-to-one
correspondence between data and theory. The data do not generate
the theory – only researchers do that – any more than the theory
can be proved true in terms of the data. All theories are false, be-
cause all abstract from data and simplify the world they purport to
describe. Our choice, then, is not between true and false theories so
much as between more and less useful theories. And usefulness, to
repeat, stems from detective work well done, followed by creative
leaps in relevant directions.”
Runkel & Runkel (1984) note that many authors in the social sciences in the
titles of their publications modestly try to avoid the impression they aim to con-
stitute a theory and thus understate their case. Because the term theory suggests
uncertainty about its own validity by its very definition as well as by the way
it is generally used, Runkel & Runkel (1984) encourage authors to “use theory
whenever they are theorizing” (p. 129). Similarly, Weick (1995, p. 386) sug-
gests that scientists should not confine themselves to the dichotomy of “theory”
versus “not theory” but instead understand theory as a continuum.
Gillham (2005, p. 159) notes:
Writing a research report is an act of reconstruction and of intel-
lectual discovery. What can be left to be discovered? After all, you
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are familiar with all the elements, have checked and inspected them
perhaps dozens of times.
But in social research, particularly that of a qualitative character,
the real discoveries are not of startling new facts (there aren’t many
of those) but conceptual: seeing familiar aspects of our social world
differently, making sense of it in an original way” (emphasis in
original).
Though Gillham (2005) refers to social research, the point he makes may ap-
ply to other branches of reseach, too. This dissertation revolves around areas
of research which have received significant researcher attention for more than
two decades and which thus are well-explored. The original element of this dis-
sertation lies in the combination of such research areas (e.g., of Supply Chain
Management, complexity science, network theory, and bottlenecks) and in the
transfer of concepts from other research areas (e.g., from research on bottle-
necks in factories to bottleneck management in supply networks). What is hoped
to be discovered are valuable new insights into the problems of supply network
management. More specifically, it is hoped that the creation of the foundation
of a “formal” disciplin of bottleneck management that provides a new perspec-
tive on supply network management as well as a frame of reference for methods
to manage bottlenecks will be achieved. That is, rather than testing theory this
dissertation aims to create theory inductively.
1.4.2. Research Design
Yin (2009, p. 26) defines the research design as follows:
“In the most elementary sense, the design is the logical sequence
that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research ques-
tions and, ultimately, to its conclusions.”
He emphasizes five components of the research design (ibid, pp. 27 et seq.):
1. “a study’s questions;
2. its propositions, if any;
18
1.4. Methodology
3. its unit(s) of analysis;
4. the logic linking the data to the propositions;
5. the criteria for interpreting the findings.”
This study’s questions will be defined later in this thesis (Section 4.7) after a
review of the relevant literature will have been conducted. At this point, the
general aims and objectives of the project have already been defined (cf. Section
1.2).
In Section 1.3, it was explained that critical realism aims to improve the abil-
ity to explain phenomena and it was said that explanation is indeed one of the
goals of this study. Another defining characteristics of this project, however,
is its exploratory nature. While the subject of this thesis is at the interface of
several, generally well-researched, fields, it is centered on more specific under-
researched aspects of these fields. A good share of the effort of the empirical
data collection is dedicated towards the identification and exploration of actual
organizational practices. There is no such formalized discipline as bottleneck
management in supply networks yet, so that to a good extent the “topic is the
subject of ‘exploration’“ (Yin 2009, p. 28).
That is, this study does not aim to refute or verify propositions or hypotheses.
Instead, it tries to accrete the knowledge around the management of inbound
material streams and of bottlenecks that affect such streams. It aims to explore
existing practices, the reasoning behind and the limits to such practices, and it
attempts to explain what it could explore.
The unit of analysis of the multiple-case study are the interviewed companies’
strategies, measures, and limitations in the management of inbound material
flow as well as the causes of bottleneck emergence. As indicated in Section
1.4.1, this element of theory is typically addressed with “What questions” (cf.
Section 4.7 for the research questions). The companies in the study are referred
to as case companies. There are many more aspects of the case companies that
could be studied to create a more detailed account of the factors of the events
and actions of interest, yet the boundaries have to be narrowed so as to be able
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to focus on a manageable amount of data within the given constraints of this
project.
The “logic linking the data to the propositions” refers to the “analytic strat-
egy” which Yin (2009) calls “one of the least developed and most difficult as-
pects of doing case studies” (p. 127). In order to be able to devise such a
strategy, however, one would need to have a fairly precise expectation of how
the actual data collected at the case companies will look like. Although semi-
structured interviews were chosen early in the research process as primary mode
of data collection, it remained unclear of what format the data would be until the
interviews were conducted. It was unclear, for example, whether interviewees
would allow audio recording of the interviews and possibly provide additional
material such as archival records or data base extracts. Recorded interviews
would allow subsequent transcription and coding – sparse handwritten notes
would not or not to the same extent. The analytic strategy to be chosen thus
remained undefined at the outset of the project. First attempts to make sense of
the data collected were made early during the process of data collection. At that
point, it became clear that transcription and coding with key words would likely
yield the best results so that this method was chosen. The key words emerged
from the review of literature which resulted in the conceptual model (cf. Chap-
ter 4). The conceptual model provided the underlying structure and logic of the
interview questionnaire which greatly facilitated the analysis and interpretation
of data as it also provided the structure for the development of case descriptions
for each individual case company and later enabled comparison across the case
companies. Cross-case synthesis was chosen as an approach in Phase III of the
data analysis. More information about the case analysis is provided in Chapter
5.
The fifth element Yin (2009) proposes should be part of the research design
is a definition of the criteria for the interpretation of the case study data. As
two examples he mentions statistical analysis and discussing rival explanations.
Statistical analysis will not be conducted in this thesis as valuable information
needed to address the research aims and objectives are likely to be qualitative
in nature and context-sensitive. As to rival explanations, the partly exploratory
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nature of this project prevents the definition of rival explanations as it prevents
the definition of propositions at the outset of the project. Rival explanations for
the phenomena observed can therefore only be developed once the data analysis
has been advanced. The existence of rival explanations is addressed in Section
6.5.3.
Edmondson & McManus (2007, p. 1156) provide a simpler account of the
research design. They define four elements:
1. “Type of data to be collected
2. Data collection tools and procedures
3. Type of analysis planned
4. Finding/selection of sites for collecting data”
The authors discuss the methodological fit of the elements of research (e.g.,
research question, research design, goals of data analyses) and the maturity of
the research field. As to the maturity of the research field, they distinguish
between nascent, intermediate, and mature states of the field. Depending of the
maturity, the research requires different approaches.
As previously indicated, the subject of interest is an under-researched aspect
at the interface of several research fields. In other words, the research problem
investigated in this project can be described as nascent or at most as being lo-
cated at the boundary between nascent and intermediate. The research design
needs to be defined accordingly. It was decided to treat the problem as nascent.
The type of data to be collected for a nascent research problem is mostly qual-
itative in nature. It is not clear from the beginning what information needs to
be included in the study. Interviews represent an adequate tool for data collec-
tion for this type of problem. The fit between type of data and maturity of the
research problem is depicted in Figure 1.4.2.
As to the data analysis, Edmondson & McManus (2007) suggest “thematic
content analysis coding for evidence of constructs” for nascent problems. This
advice was followed in the data analysis.
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Figure 1.4.2. – Fit Between Type of Data and Maturity of Research Problem (Ed-
mondson & McManus 2007, p. 1168)
As to the selection of sites for collecting data, it was tried to get access to
case companies from different industries and of different size. Furthermore,
the companies had to have a supply network necessary for their primary value-
creation processes (i.e., they have to receive goods to use them as input to their
production processes or to provide a service). The selection of case companies
is described in greater detail in Section 5.4.
Summarizing, at the outset of the research project the research design could
not be completely described based on the criteria proposed by Yin (2009) but it
could be – and had been – defined based on the criteria proposed by Edmondson
& McManus (2007).
1.4.3. Research Approach
As pointed out in Section 1.4.1, the central purpose of this thesis is to develop
theory. In Section 1.1, it was argued that a research gap exists. This study
aims to reduce or close the gap by providing complementary theory and thereby
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enhance the existing body of knowledge.
A multiple-case study has been chosen as the method to create the empirical
data base from which theory will be developed inductively. According to Yin
(2009) , the case study method is an appropriate mode of research if focus is
set on the questions How and Why something occur or is as it is (cf. Section
1.4.1). The case study method thus represents a useful tool for building theory
and appears to be an adequate tool within the realm of critical realism. The
research process follows what Sayer (2000) calls an intensive research process
which is “primarily concerned with what makes things happen in specific cases”
(p. 20).
The case study method is employed to collect qualitative data. Semi-structured
interviews are used as the primary data collection mode. The interviewer takes
the role of the “disinterested scientist” (Guba & Lincoln 1994, p. 112) and nei-
ther provides advice nor actively participates in the business of the case com-
panies. Semi-structured interviews are intuitively appealing a data collection
mode in this project as they allow both to uncover new aspects in the research
domain and to learn, for instance, about the reasoning behind the selection of
certain measures for bottleneck management or more generally to follow up the
themes identified in the first (theory) part of this thesis. That is, semi-structured
interviews support both the exploratory and the explanatory aspects of this re-
search. Structured interviews would limit the data collection for they do not
support the exploratory component while unstructured interviews would do just
this but are likely to render any structured cross-case analysis difficult. The ex-
ploratory element of the case study research will be judged successful if it can
support the creation of a theory upon which organizations can build in order to
stabilize inbound material flow in their supply network.
1.4.4. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 1 – the present chapter – contains an introduction to the research
topic, a statement of the research problem, and information about research phi-
losophy, design, and approach.
23
1. Introduction
Chapter 2 presents a review of relevant literature. The review taps relevant
streams of literature adjacent to this topic. The introduction to this chapter
includes explanations as to the selection of topics reviewed. The first topic
(shortly) discussed is manufacturing systems. It was tried to extract relevant
information that may have implications for the existence and the management
of bottlenecks.
Bottlenecks are then discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3. A review of
existing definitions of bottlenecks is followed by the proposal of a new and
arguably better definition. It was then tried to classify types of bottlenecks and
states of bottlenecks before the section ends with a discussion of the impact
caused by bottlenecks.
Next, the topic of complexity is investigated in Section 2.4. Different au-
thors have related complexity to the field of Supply Chain Management (SCM)
and both the academic discourse as well as industrial practice suggest that the
existene of complexity does have implications for the management of supply
networks. The wider discussion of complexity leads to an introduction to sys-
tems theory and systems thinking.
The last part of Chapter 2 dives into a more general theory of networks and
finally into supply networks. Definition and conceptualization of networks are
discussed. Moreover, the popular field of Supply Chain Management is re-
viewed with respect to the validity of some of its claims and, maybe more im-
portantly, with respect to the validity of its two most prominent underlying con-
ceptions: supply chains and management. Some aspects of networks, such as
power and dependency, are discussed before the section closes with a discussion
of the classification of supply networks.
Chapter 3 continues with the review of literature on more specific concepts
that are thematically related to bottleneck management or have the potential to
provide useful concepts for the development of a theory of bottleneck manage-
ment in supply networks. Some of the topics discussed are traditionally un-
related to supply networks but are focused on manufacturing and material flow
within one factory. Some are part of the SCM canon or related to it. The chapter
closes with a comparison of two types of material flow systems: the traditional
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factory and the supply networks.
Chapter 4 summarizes some points of the extensive review of literature and
derives a conceptual model. Categories of bottleneck management activities are
defined as well as categories of causes for bottleneck emergence. The chapter
closes with a tentative conceptual model and with the research questions.
Chapter 5 introduces the multiple-case study as the method for collection
of empirical data. It lays out the selection criteria for the case companies and
explains the structure of the interview questionnaire.
Chapter 6 contains the findings of the empirical data collection. The findings
are presented and discussed in three phases. Phase I includes case descriptions
for each company. The case data is structured along the categories that was
developed in the conceptual model and based on which the interview question-
naire was built. Phase II presents the cross-case comparison along the same
categories. These first two phases of the data analysis are descriptive and ex-
ploratory in character. Phase III relates the case data to some important concepts
identified in the literature review and attempts to provide explanations as to why
the case companies do what has been found they do. This phase of the data anal-
ysis is explanatory in character.
Chapter 7 draws together the findings of the data analysis in Chapter 6 so
as to provide an overview of all the important elements for a basic theory of
bottleneck management in supply networks.
Chapter 8 concludes this research project.
Figure 1.4.3 illustrates structure and flow of the thesis.
1.5. Summary
The first chapter introduced the reader to the general problem of bottlenecks
in supply networks and stated the research need. General aims for this project
were defined and the selection of the philosophical research perspective was
explained. Finally, research methodology and structure of the thesis were out-
lined. The purpose of this chapter is to provide transparency as to the approach
and reasoning this researcher has followed.
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2.1. Introduction
This is the first of two sections in this thesis where literature on various topics is
reviewed. This section covers fundamental research topics whereas the second
part of the literature review in Section 3 will cover more particular concepts that
evolved out of industrial practice. The choice of topics selected for the review
and the way the topics are presented may call for explanation.
Among all research fields in the broad vein of Operations Management (OM),
it is probably in the field of manufacturing planning that the bottleneck concept
has received most attention. The popularity of the concept in that particular
field can be attributed to the Theory of Constraints which, in spite of attempts to
“promote” it as a general approach for anything from marketing to project man-
agement , has been most influential in manufacturing. Manufacturing systems
can be quite diverse, and so are the requirements on raw material supply to feed
these systems. The short review of manufacturing systems thus serves these
to identify important characteristics of and differences between manufacturing
systems and to better understand the interface of manufacturing and supply. The
review of manufacturing systems be conducted in Section 2.2.
The bottleneck concept itself requires a thorough review. Since it represents
the backbone of this project, its conceptual clarification is a necessity. The
metaphorical term bottleneck has been used in a wide variety of circumstances
and arguably so without paying much attention to the value the concept could
provide quite apart of its use as a synonym for drag force or a scarce resource.
An in-depth investigation into the bottleneck concept shall be conducted in Sec-
tion 2.3. For a clear understanding of the term and how it relates to the other
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theoretical subjects discussed the reader is referred to page 38 where a definition
is provided before he proceeds.
Complexity is a term the researcher will almost definitely encounter when
reading contemporary publications on anything related to the management of
supply. Complex seems to be a characteristic often associated with supply net-
works and their management, probably not least due to growth of global trade
and global production networks after the end of Cold War. The dimensions of
such networks and the activities related to their functioning are difficult to grasp
for laymen, and so the term complexity is slapped on them, as seemingly on
anything that is complicated and thus difficult to understand (cf. Section 2.4.2).
Its vagueness in everyday use notwithstanding, complexity as a fundamental
concept has attracted many smart minds, and it seems worthwhile investigating
in what these have to say about the concept and its possible implications on the
management of supply networks. This will be done in Section 2.4.
Organizational networks provide the setting for the topic of interest. Supply
networks are one type of organizational networks which bear many more in-
teresting concepts than is apparent from their simplified treatment in the field
of Supply Chain Management. Some elementary theory of networks shall be
discussed before supply networks are introduced as one particular of networks.
More specific aspect of networks shall be included, too, so as to enrich the the-
oretical base from which to draw. Organizational networks shall be discussed in
Section 2.5.
The above short discussion explains the choice of topics selected for the lit-
erature review. As might have become apparent from the discussion, the se-
lection seems almost natural. It will be noted that the topic of interest, bottle-
neck management in supply networks, is located at the interface of the research
fields described above. Some of these research fields are partly overlapping or
complementary whereas others exist mostly independently of each other. The
selection of topics for the review was guided by the presumption that a synop-
tic investigation in adjacent yet independent fields of research is likely to yield
a workable knowledge base for theorizing. Reframed as a question, it would
have been asked what research fields were likely to provide insights in the topic
28
2.2. Manufacturing Systems
of bottleneck management in supply networks, either by providing analogies,
tools, ways of thinking, or practical application in industrial settings.
It remains unclear at this stage of the project to what extent a theory of bot-
tleneck management in supply networks can benefit from each of the topics se-
lected for the review, yet one can be hopeful that fruitful ideas can be identified
eventually.
2.2. Manufacturing Systems
2.2.1. Introduction
Although this dissertation deals with bottlenecks in supply networks, it seems
necessary to discuss some aspects of factory-internal manufacturing systems.
The reason being that ultimately the supply network’s role is to support the focal
firm’s manufacturing process. Characteristics of the internal material flow sys-
tem thus arguably at least partly determine characteristics of the supply network.
Furthermore, a discussion and classification of manufacturing systems will sup-
port field research as the characteristics of manufacturing systems will be used
for the selection of case study firms and for the analysis of field data. Arguably,
the emergence of bottlenecks in supply does not have the same impact on each
type of manufacturing firm in each type of supply network. The wide spectrum
of different manufacturing environments requires that for this dissertation an en-
vironment had to be selected to focus on; including all types of manufacturing
environments seems infeasible. Nevertheless, when characteristics and impli-
cations are clearly defined, the discussion of one type of manufacturing system
and supply network can inform management of other types. Thus, a thorough
discussion of characteristics of manufacturing systems and supply networks will
support the generalization of findings (McCarthy 1995).
2.2.2. Classification Criteria of Manufacturing Systems
There is a variety of criteria that have been used to distinguish and classify man-
ufacturing systems. According to Carper & Snizek (1980), there are “virtually
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Figure 2.2.1. – Typology of Process Industries (Fransoo & Rutten 1994, p. 52)
as many different ways to classify organizations as there are people who want
to classify them” (p. 70).
An early attempt to classify production systems was made by Woodward
(1965). She identified three types of production systems and related each to
one type of management structure (in terms of centralization and level fo bu-
reaucracy). Her three types of production systems are
• small batch and unit production
• large batch and mass production
• Continuous process production.
The work by Woodward (1965) is frequently cited and has been updated by
other scholars (e.g., Hull & Collins 1987).
Fransoo & Rutten (1994) elaborate on the differences within the process
industry. They establish the two extreme poles process/flow production and
batch/mix production between which there is a continuum of differences (cf.
Figure 2.2.1). The authors thereby simplify some earlier typologies of produc-
tion processes in which two dimensions – production process (ranging from “job
shop” to “flow shop”) and customization of the product (ranging from “custom”
to “commodity”) – are defined to only one dimension. Fransoo & Rutten (1994)
justify this simplification by pointing out the strong correlation of the two axes
(customized products tend to be produced in job shops whereas commodities
tend to be produced in flow shops) with the values lieing on a curve with a slope
of 45° (similar to Figure 2.2.3).
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They describe seven predominant criteria along which the differences can be
established. The criteria are
• throughput time (process/flow: low; batch/mix high),
• determination of capacity, routing options for products, and volume flex-
ibility (process/flow: clear determination of capacity/one routing for all
products, no volume flexibility; batch/mix: difficult determination of ca-
pacity, complex routing options, many configurations),
• product complexity (process/flow: low; batch/mix: higher),
• added value (process/flow: low; batch/mix: high),
• impact of changeover times (process/flow: high; batch/mix: low),
• number of production steps (process/flow: low; batch/mix: high), and
• number of products (process/flow: small; batch/mix: large).
Generally, process/flow production tends to require large and expensive produc-
tion assets since large quantities of output are demanded, as the authors main-
tain, whereas lower output demanded suggests batch/mix production.
Another important point Fransoo & Rutten (1994) raise concerns the number
of different inputs and outputs in process industries and in discrete manufac-
turing industries. They propose that in discrete manufacturing, the number of
inputs tends to be high, whereas the number of outputs tends to be low. That is,
several components make up one product at the end of the production process.
In process industries, this ratio is reversed: the number of inputs is low whereas
the number of different outputs is high. When products experience greater dif-
ferentiation, then the number of different outputs increase in either case. The
concept is illustrated in Figure 2.2.2.
A well-established classification was introduced by Hayes & Wheelwright
(1979). They use the two criteria process structure and product structure to
classify manufacturing systems (cf. Figure 2.2.3). Their underlying assumption
is that a mismatch between product structure and process structure is likely to
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Industries (Fransoo & Rutten 1994, p. 49)
cause inefficiencies. A position on the diagonal represents the “natural” choice
(Hayes & Wheelwright 1979) for most manufacturing companies, and a position
significantly above or below the diagonal may lead to unintended distortions,
especially when chosen unconsciously.
The different characteristics of the two criteria reflect stages of product and
process life cycle. Production starts off in a flexible way – Hayes & Wheel-
wright (1979) refer to this process stage as “fluid” – and develops into a stan-
dardized and automated stage as the product matures and volumes increase.
Each stage of the life cycle is linked to different management foci. As prod-
uct and process maturity increase, more attention is given to process efficiency
while flexibility tends to decline. In that respect, companies closer to the lower
right-hand corner of the diagram arguably are more sensitive to interruptions in
supply. Increased awareness and the existence of strategies to prevent, as well
as contingency plans to resolve, supply shortages thus are likely to be more im-
portant than for companies that are located closer to the upper left-hand corner.
McCarthy (1995, p. 45) suggests classifying production according to differ-
ent types of complexity1:
• “Product complexity: An indicator of the degree of manufacturing dif-
ficulty associated with the product (number of parts, number of connec-
1Cf. Section 2.4 on page 48 for a more detailed discussion of complexity.
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tions, product variety and volumes, etc.). A primary influence on struc-
tural and dynamic complexity.
• Open Complexity: The complexity of the environment that the manufac-
turing system must interact with (customers, suppliers, legislation, etc.).
Also, a primary influence on structural and dynamic complexity.
• Structural Complexity: An internal complexity relating to the static/structural
aspect of the manufacturing system. It is associated with hierarchy, size,
flow structures, etc.
• Dynamic Complexity: Related to structural complexity, but deals with the
activity and time aspects (operational) of the manufacturing system. De-
scribes the interaction between resources (material, machines, labour).”
The description of these four types of complexity suggests that the first two
types are independent variables of complexity whereas the latter two types are
dependent variables as they are determined by the first two types. Indeed, prod-
uct characteristics determine the number and type of operations that need to be
applied in order to create the desired output. Product complexity, as described
by McCarthy (1995) in terms of number of parts, connections, product vari-
ety, volumes, and other characteristics, determine (not fully, but to considerable
extent) what organizational resources are needed and how they should be orga-
nized. Additionally, the environment poses certain requirements on the organi-
zation. Besides customers, suppliers, and legislation, competitors are a major
stakeholder that may have influence on how the firm will organize itself. Like-
wise, dynamics of the production process depend on the type of product and
its (complexity) characteristics as well as on the environment, e.g., customer
demand and industry standards.
Melcher et al. (2002) classify production systems in a 5x5 matrix along the
two dimensions
• “level of technology of production systems” as a technological variable
and
• “workflow interdependence” as an organizational variable.
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The result are 25 theoretical variations between the two extreme poles “low-tech
job shop (residential construction)” and “CIMS2-dedicated focused automated
factory (Saturn Auto Plant)”.
2.2.3. Implications for Bottleneck Criticality
The variable Hayes & Wheelwright (1979) use to describe the maturing of pro-
cesses – a continuum between flexibility and efficiency – is a rather common
way to characterize processes. In their development of a taxonomy of supply
networks, Harland et al. (2001) use a similar variable to describe supply net-
works between the two poles dynamic and routinized with the former tending
“to compete primarily on innovation rather than cost” (p. 24) and the latter
focusing on cost-efficient and reliable processes. The implications for bottle-
neck management are similar for manufacturing systems and supply networks:
when efficiency is a primary success factor, then the emergence of material flow
bottlenecks arguably has higher criticality than in flexible systems where asset
utilization tends to be lower and also of lower importance.
Many products include components that come from firms which can be cate-
gorized as belonging to the process industries. Fransoo & Rutten (1994) suggest
that in case of batch/mix production in process industries the identification of
quality problems in production generally require that the entire production batch
is scrapped whereas in discrete manufacturing processes the defective compo-
nents often can be singled out. This implies that in process industries quality
problems by tendency will lead to more capacity wasted for rework than in
manufacturing of discrete parts. Hence, if production already runs at capacity,
more delay is likely to be induced in process industries as compared to discrete
manufacturing.
2CIMS stands for “Computer Integrated Manufacturing System” (Melcher et al. 2002)
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2.3. Bottlenecks
2.3.1. Introduction
The following sections introduce the concept of bottlenecks. It is central to this
thesis as several arguments will be build upon it.
This chapter begins with an introduction of the bottleneck metaphor and the
definition of the term. In order to define the term (or maybe better: in order
to avoid creating a new definition) a broad set of literature was reviewed that
uses the bottleneck concept. It was found that many authors neglect to provide a
definition, which is unfortunate since those authors who do provide a definition
in many cases seem to be divided over an exact definition so that a lack of
conceptual clarity results. Hence, a new definition was provided.
The text continues with a classification of different types of bottlenecks.
There seems to be no comparably comprehensive classification in the current
literature. It is hoped that the classification adds to clarity and understanding of
the concept. For the most part, the empirical analysis later in this thesis does not
explicitly draw on the classification, however, although several elements of the
classification were implicitly incorporated. Examples are “location” and “ori-
gin” of bottlenecks, the first being a primary differentiator between bottlenecks
that fall within the responsibility of supply management and those which do
not, and the latter being incorporated into the definition of bottlenecks as well
as into the categorization of causes of bottleneck emergence. The “Locus of
Control” turns out be an important distinction as several bottlenecks the case
companies have encountered are indeed outside their organizational reach and
control. “Exploitation options” have influenced the conception of the bottleneck
management activities that are introduced later.
The chapter ends with a short discussion of bottleneck states. The discussion
is to add further clarity to the bottleneck concept. Again, these states were not
explicitly used in the later analysis of company data. Nonetheless, this classifi-
cation of bottleneck states can be related to the discussion of causes for bottle-
neck emergence and it can be used to “prime” bottleneck analysis in practice so
as to select the most appropriate measures.
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Overall, this chapter, while not extensive, represents an important part of the
theoretical underpinning of this work. It will provide the reader with several
important concepts required to understand and fully embrace the remainder of
this thesis.
2.3.2. What are Bottlenecks?
The term bottleneck is frequently used both in everyday language and in science.
Apparently, the bottleneck metaphor is perceived as useful circumscription for
something (or someone) which (who) is responsible for a lower than possible
outcome. Accordingly, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary provides three defi-
nitions of bottleneck that fit to the given context: “1 a: a narrow route. b: a point
of traffic congestion. 2 a: someone or something that retards or halts free move-
ment and progress” (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary 2013a). Whereas the
first two definitions (1 a and b) are oriented towards traffic problems, the third
definition is more general.
Bottlenecks are an important topic in a variety of scientific disciplines. Ex-
amples are disciplines as diverse as traffic planning, computer network band-
with allocation, population bottlenecks and reduction in gene pool variation,
and production planning and control. One might assume that given the ubiqui-
tous nature of the bottleneck theme a good understanding of what bottlenecks
are (i.e., a common definition) has evolved. Surprisingly, though, a recurrent
statement in the literature – at least in the discpline of production planning and
control – is that a common definition of bottlenecks does not exist. Therefore, a
review of literature on bottlenecks with respect to the definitions used – or more
specifically: the definitions explicitly stated – seems necessary. A summary ta-
ble containing multiple publications with and without proposed definitions of
bottlenecks can be found in Appendix A.
Reviewing literature on bottleneck management and related fields, it seems
that there is actually no strong disagreement on common elements of a defi-
nition. Rather than disagreeing on one definition of bottlenecks, it seems that
many authors confuse the definition of bottlenecks with the methods to detect
bottlenecks (e.g., Lawrence & Buss 1995, Wang et al. 2005, Jain et al. 2000).
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Frequently one can find within the same publication statements such as “A bot-
tleneck is (defined as) a machine that impedes system throughput”, “There is no
consensus as to how exactly a bottleneck can be defined”, and “Bottleneck def-
initions can be based upon machine utilization and system throughput sensitiv-
ity”, or similar, partially contradicting, combinations of statements. Lawrence
& Buss (1995), for instance, based on a short survey of definitions found in
the literature, propose “three principal definitions of bottleneck resources” (p.
342): short-term definition, inventory definition, and production definition. The
“inventory definition” aims at the identification of bottlenecks based upon the
queue waiting in front of a station whereas “short-term definition” and “produc-
tion definition” are essentially the same and aim at high utilization as character-
istic of a bottleneck. From the definitions it can be seen that the authors con-
fuse what a bottleneck is with how it can be identified. According to Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, a definition is “a statement expressing the essential
nature of something” (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary 2013b). If the var-
ious bottleneck detection methods as hinted at by pointing out high utilization,
long queue length, long waiting time etc. lead to different results while the
actual bottleneck may possibly remain undiscovered, then such descriptions of
possible bottleneck characteristic do not seem to be adequate definitions. Since
it turns out not to be feasible to find one acceptable definition of bottlenecks on
this level of details, the level of details incorporated into the definition may need
to be reduced. The following definition is proposed:
Definition 1. The bottleneck of a system is the element (node or edge) that lim-
its the system in attaining higher throughput beyond a certain threshold. This
threshold is determined by the bottleneck’s physical throughput capacity, orga-
nizational rules, or operational practices.
This definition avoids the use of any additional term of ambiguous meaning
that would require immediate definition.3 It is more general than, for instance,
3There has been extensive discussion about the term system for many years, yet a rather clear
understanding of what constitutes a system has evolved. While details remain to be worth
discussing, the common understanding of what a system is is reasonably precise and usable
for scientific work.
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the definition by Goldratt & Cox (2004) in that it does not limit the existence of
bottlenecks to question of physical capacity.4 In fact, the definition includes an
anticipation of one parameter of the classification of bottlenecks that is going to
be introduced in Section 2.3.3. The definition states that the threshold beyond
which the bottleneck becomes binding is determined either by physical capacity,
organizational rules, or operational practices. Put in manufacturing terms, this
is to express that the constraining factor in attaining higher production through-
put is not necessarily represented by a maching station’s (or a worker’s) phys-
ical limits; instead, the root cause of the system’s inability to generate higher
throughput might be found in the way the work at the bottleneck station is or-
ganized, in the way overall production is scheduled (e.g., work order releases
or batch configuration), in the way breaks are scheduled, etc. The important
implication for bottleneck management is that higher system throughput often
does not necessarily require higher physical production capacity (Goldratt &
Cox 2004).
Also, it is important to note that this definition of bottleneck does not equate
the existence of a bottleneck with the existence with any type of mismatch be-
tween demand and supply of material, just like the existence of a weakest link in
a chain does not imply the chain is going to crack. Yet, if it cracks, it will be the
weakest link that cracks first; by the same token, if a material flow system ex-
periences a mismatch between demand and supply, it will be the bottleneck that
limits throughput. Accordingly, a bottleneck can exist and remain unnoticed
until throughput reaches a threshold.
2.3.3. Classification of Bottlenecks
The review of literature with respect to definitions of “bottleneck” suggests that
a common and unambiguous understanding has not evolved. Partly, this might
4Goldratt & Cox (2004) have chosen their wording very carefully. The reason why they chose
to make the existence of bottlenecks a question of capacity lies in the fact that they distinguish
bottlenecks from capacity constrained resources, the latter of which are delaying or disrupt-
ing material flow not necessarily due to their internal capacity restrictions but to any other
possible reason. This distinction is not made in this document. A more elaborate discussion
of types of bottlenecks will follow in Section 2.3.3.
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be explained by the differences between the various domains where bottlenecks
can play an important role. Nevertheless, the lack of a unifying taxonomy poses
a problem for the researcher who attempts to make system level comparisons or
tries to adopt useful concepts from one system for application in another. Possi-
bly, a classification of bottlenecks might contribute to a common taxonomy and
remove ambiguity. Below the development of a classification of bottlenecks is
attempted. Such a classification will facilitate bottleneck management as it con-
tributes to a more precise understanding of the nature of bottlenecks emerging
as well as of possible remedies.
A first rough distinction between different types of bottlenecks can be found
in the tangibility of bottlenecks: Bottlenecks can be intangible or tangible.
Intangible bottlenecks are, for instance, processes that inhibit higher system
throughput. Processes can impede the system from achieving higher through-
put because they are badly designed or because the process is simply cumber-
some and takes a lot of time (e.g., EPA approval for new drugs in the US).
Tangible are those bottlenecks which impede higher system throughput due to
physical limitations. Furthermore, system elements that are tangible bottlenecks
can be either active or passive. Active tangible (physical) bottlenecks are those
elements which can influence system throughput by their own actions and be-
haviour (either deliberately or unintentionally). Examples are workers of a pro-
duction station (on a high level of detail) or an entire factory (on a lower level of
detail). Passive tangible (physical) bottlenecks, on the contrary, are not able to
change system throughput by themselves since they do not exhibit will or power
to do so. Examples are machines of a production station reaching their physical
limitations and streets that slow down transportation due to high traffic density.
Another way to categorize bottlenecks is by origin: organizational bottle-
necks, physical bottlenecks, and operational bottlenecks. Organizational bottle-
necks refer to situations where the root cause of constrained throughput can be
found in processes, organizational directives, or established procedures. Exam-
ples of organizational bottlenecks in a factory setting are maintenance processes
that require significant downtime of a machine, large buffers, order release rules
that increase WIP, and ineffective quality assurance processes leading to delays
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or low yield. Put differently, organizational bottlenecks refer to the question
“How things are planned”. Physical bottlenecks refer to the physical capa-
bilities or limitations of a system’s element. Physical bottlenecks refer to the
physical capability of a resource (e.g., a machine or a worker) or limitations
due to the general physical setup of production facilities. Put in different terms,
physical bottlenecks refer to the question “What can theoretically be done”. So
far, this categorization into organizational and physical bottlenecks at first sight
appears equivalent to the previous categorization into intangible and tangible
bottlenecks. The third category, operational bottlenecks, demonstrates the dif-
ference, though. Operational bottlenecks refer the actual handling of production
assets and parts. Examples are careless use of tools and machines that reduces
yield or requires frequent reworking, deviation from management directives, de-
struction of finished products due to careless transportation and badly scheduled
breaks (e.g., lunch breaks) at resources with high utilization. Put differently, op-
erational bottlenecks refer to the question “How things are being done”. Hence,
this classification addresses “how things are planned”, what physical limitations
are met, and how the work is being conducted. However, it is important to note
that the root cause of a bottleneck in the material flow system is not necessarily
so obvious that one could easiliy identify the bottleneck as, say, organizational
bottleneck. The bottlenecks would materialize in some element of the system
that passes on or processes material. The root cause of the problem, as in the
case of organizational bottlenecks, may still lie somewhere else in the firm or
even in another organization. Liu (2011, p. 39) proposes another classifica-
tion of bottleneck origins: bottleneck resources and logical bottlenecks. By
bottleneck resources, he refers to organizational and physical resources such
as processes and facilities; by logical bottlenecks, he refers to schedules and
functions.5 It seems that these categories are well covered by the more sophisti-
cated distinction between organizational, physical, and operational bottlenecks
as proposed above.
For the management of bottlenecks, it is important to know whether effec-
tive measures lie within or beyond one’s reach. Therefore, a distinction can
5Unfortunately, the examples given by Liu (2011) are rather vague.
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be made between bottlenecks that lie inside and those that lie outside manage-
ment’s reach. Borrowing from psychology, this parameter will be referred to
as Locus of Control (LoC, Rotter 1966) . If a bottleneck has an external LoC,
which may be the case if the bottleneck has its root cause outside the boundaries
of the organization, then management might be able to influence throughput at
the bottleneck through negotiation and “politics”, yet it is unable to directly
apply technical or organizatiomal measures that elevate system throughput. In
case of an internal LoC, the bottleneck lies within management’s reach and ef-
fective measures can be directly applied. As an example, in 2010 and 2011 many
car manufacturers suffered from a shortage of components from their suppliers
that included microchips (cf. Beer 2011). The bottleneck were the production
facilities of semiconductor producers. During the 2008/2009 crisis, semicon-
ductor producers cut back production capacity which they were then unable
to ramp up fast enough when some industries experienced resurgence in 2010.
Furthermore, the production capacity available was largely used to supply im-
portant customers from industries such as consumer electronics: both margins
and volumes there were considerably higher than in automotive. The reaction
of automobile manufacturers was both individual and joint efforts in persuading
semiconductor producers to dedicate more of their production capacity to chips
that were needed for automobile industry supply. Because neither individual
automobile OEMs nor the automotive sector altogether represent a major share
of customers, they were unable to exert power over semiconductor producers.
Instead, high-ranked managers of semiconductor producers were invited for ne-
gotiation and “event days” where automobile OEMs tried to influence capacity
dedication of semiconductor producers in their favour.
Another fundamental difference is whether a bottleneck emerges “somewhere”
or is planned by design. There are no material flow systems without bottleneck;
if there were, system throughput would be unlimited. Engineers planning a
material flow system can make deliberate decisions as to what element of the
system shall be the bottleneck. In a factory setting, for instance, firms may
choose the station as a bottleneck that involves the most expensive equipment
and machinery for reasons of depreciation. In a rather static environment where
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little changes in the factory layout occur, firms may also choose the last process
step as the bottleneck (Goldratt & Fox 1986). If a bottleneck is deliberately
chosen, this will allow taking effective measures to protect throughput at the
bottleneck. In contrast, if the bottleneck emerges in random, unforeseen places,
then throughput may suffer since the bottleneck may not be identified as such
(or only with some delay) and effective measures to protect throughput are thus
difficult or impossible to apply. “Randomly” appearing (i.e., floating) bottle-
necks are a typical phenomenon in multi-product manufacturing environments
and are difficult to detect with certainty as the location changes with the product
mix (Nakata et al. 1999, Hopp & Spearman 2008, p. 486). Firms may therefore
choose to eliminate the possibility of bottlenecks in some stations where adding
capacity is cheap, just to reduce the number of possible bottleneck locations
if identification proves challenging. From the perspective of a powerful OEM,
it might be beneficial for the OEM to design the supply network such that the
OEM’s production facilities represent the bottleneck and thus enjoy high uti-
lization whereas suppliers are required to provide some more excess capacity.
Quite apart from these considerations, a material flow system can be purposely
designed such that it will not be able to meet market demand because the produc-
tion output is intended to be scarce and valuable and not widely available. This
often concerns limited editions of luxury products, but more mundane products
can be subject to such considerations, too. Oil production, for example, had
been curbed in the past to establish higher price levels and similar measures
were discussed by OPEC member states after a sharp drop of oil prices in the
second half of 2014 (Lawler et al. 2014). While decisions to lower production
output were made deliberately despite higher production capacity available, the
same principle can be applied to factory design.
Another distinction can be made in terms of necessity – between avoidable
and unavoidable bottlenecks. Bottlenecks appear to be unavoidable if they result
from demand (that could not be reasonably anticipated) exceeding supply capac-
ity, so that physical limitations become binding. If, however, the emergence of
a bottleneck is due to sloppy preparation or other operational problems, or pos-
sibly even due to not well thought-through organizational policies, it seems to
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have been largely avoidable. Companies could make such a distinction in order
to identify levers for improvement.
Bottlenecks differ in the duration of their existence. The duration of their ex-
istence can be determined by changes in product mix, by demand fluctuation, by
changes in production capacity, by competitors entering or leaving the market,
and by a variety of other incidents that affect the firm’s ability to meet demand.
Lawrence & Buss (1995) assert that long-term bottlenecks cannot exist: “either
work will increase without bound or there will be sufficient loss of business
to reduce demand rate below capacity” (p. 342).6 Accordingly, they suggest
bottlenecks can only exist in the short-run and these can be managed through
the use of appropriate shop-floor control techniques. The authors ignore two
important aspects, though. First, every material flow system is constrained by
a bottleneck as otherwise throughput would be infinite. The bottleneck can be
internal or external to the system, but it does exist and does limit the system’s
throughput. If we accept this premise, then the second point is that bottlenecks
can exist by design and hence independently of short-term demand or supply
fluctuations. Markets can experience long-term upswings and a factory system
that is planned based upon (old) market might be unable to meet full demand.
This would be an example of an unintended (or unplanned) bottleneck by de-
sign. Löffler et al. (2002)7, for instance, discuss “static bottlenecks” that persist
over a full time period as demand continues to exceed supply capability. As
explained earlier, however, bottlenecks can also be purposely built-in by design.
Therefore, bottlenecks can be distinguished between short-term, medium-term,
and long-term bottlenecks provided these categories are useful in the context of
the problem and they are assigned more specific time horizons.
In a similar fashion, Nakata et al. (1999) argue in terms of lead time until ap-
pearance (“appearance cycles”) of bottlenecks and propose different manage-
ment approaches, particularly in terms of time horizon, for long-cycled, mid-
6Probably, Lawrence & Buss (1995) refer to self-regulating market mechanisms that will, in the
long-run, match demand and supply. In addition to the arguments that follow it shall be noted
that markets often are imperfect and not regulate themselves but also depend on external
control and steering mechanisms to maintain their functionality. Therefore, the authors are
disagreed with unless further clarification is provided as to the exact meaning of “long-term”.
7As cited in Schultheiss & Kreutzfeldt 2009
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cycled, and short-cycled bottlenecks. Long-cycled bottlenecks according to the
authors are those which emerge due to, for instance, planned changes in prod-
uct mix or changes in process design, i.e., changes that are known long8 before
the consequences (i.e., the emergence of the bottleneck) occur. Mid-cycled bot-
tlenecks emerge due to unplanned changes at short notice, such as changes in
customer orders that arrive after the production process has already been started
which leads to delays for the new order. Short-cycled bottlenecks are the third
case the authors describe. This case refers to machine breakdowns and similar
occurrences that will delay production.
Wandering or shifting bottlenecks are a problem widely discussed in the pro-
duction planning and control literature (e.g., Roser et al. 2002, 2003, Hopp &
Spearman 2008). Therefore, bottlenecks can be devided by their steadiness.
In dynamic production environments with changing product mix and varying
production processes, possibly not one particular station limits throughput but
a variety of different stations depending on the specific situation. Such dy-
namically shifting bottlenecks pose problems for bottleneck detection meth-
ods (Roser et al. 2002). Static bottlenecks, on the other hand, are more likely
to emerge in low-dynamic environments. Where production schedules don’t
change because of stable demand patterns, bottlenecks are less likely to shift in
normal operation mode. Having said that, other stations can emerge as tempo-
rary bottlenecks due to process variability such as rework, low yield, or machine
breakdowns. Static and shifting bottlenecks pose different challenges for bottle-
neck management. Generally, shifting bottlenecks are more difficult to identify,
to resolve, and to protect than static bottlenecks unless the root cause (mostly
variability) is resolved or mitigated.
Another rather practical distinction can be made based upon options that ex-
ist to resolve the bottleneck. Regarding the conception of bottlenecks as a mis-
match between demand and supply, it seems straightforward that a bottleneck
can be resolved by an increase in capacity. Goldratt & Cox (2004) suggest that
an increase in capacity often is neither necessary nor sufficient since the root
8“Long” is a rather subjective term and its meaning depends on context and perception. In this
context, “long” means about several days or a week in advance. The context of Nakata et al.
(1999) is semiconductor production.
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Parameters Characteristics 
Location Internal External 
Origin Organizational Physical Operational 
Locus of Control Internal External 
Intention Planned Unplanned 
Necessity Avoidable Unavoidable 
Duration Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
Appearance Short-cycled Mid-cycled Long-cycled 
Steadiness Static Dynamic („wandering“) 
Exploitation Options Only through capacity increase Through various options 
Financial Implications High Medium Low 
 
  
Figure 2.3.1. – Morphological Classification of Bottlenecks
cause of the problem tends not to be a lack of capacity of the bottleneck sta-
tion but rather how the capacity available is utilized. Nevertheless, it can be
that an increase in capacity of the respective station is the only effective mea-
sure to increase throughput, especially when other options have already been
explored. Therefore, it is suggest to classify bottlenecks further according to
the options available for effective throughput improvement into bottlenecks that
can be relaxed (i.e., throughput can be increased) by a combination of measures
and bottlenecks that can be relaxed only by adding additional capacity.
Bottlenecks can lead to severe financial consequences. On the other hand,
they could also be harmless. If, for instance, there is some slack between arrival
time of supply and begin of production, or if inventory can buffer delayed arrival
of supply, the bottleneck might not even invoke action on part of the focal firm.
If the bottleneck starves the focal firm’s production, however, leading to delayed
order fulfillment for customers, and upon arrival of supply the bottleneck shifts
to the focal firm which then has to catch up with production schedules, works
overtime, stretches maintenance cycles (possibly leading to compromised qual-
ity), and frustrated customers turn to competitors, then the financial implications
for the focal firm are intense. Many examples are conceivable where the exis-
tence of a supply bottleneck falls into either category.
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Generally, the following states of a bottleneck are conceivable. Generally, a bottleneck can either be 
working or not working (i.e., idle). If the bottleneck is working, a meaningful distinction can be made 
between “normal” operations with “normal” utilization (say, less than 80%) and the bottleneck being 
fully engaged with extremely high utilization. If the bottleneck is idle, it could idle due to a 
breakdown, it could be pausing (i.e., it has been consciously stopped by someone), it could be 
starving, and it could be blocked.  
With exception of “normal” operations, each of these states provides a starting point for a more 
detailed investigation as to why the state is so. Moreover, it can provide the fundament for a 
typology of reasons for the emergence of bottlenecks. It should be kept in mind that we are already 
dealing with a subset of bottlenecks, namely unplanned bottlenecks (as opposed to planned 
bottlenecks; cf. section “Classification of Bottlenecks”). That is, we are dealing with bottlenecks that 
emerge unintendedly and have not been planned into the system with full consciousness (and 
possibly good reasons). 
(Hier kann ich Beispielhaft die weiteren Möglichkeiten einer Klassifizierung erläutern, wie in der 
Mindmap dargestellt). 
The states of bottleneck as explained above represent theoretical cases. Furthermore, these cases 
are typical for material flow systems in factories. In the following, it will be examined which of these 
cases is of practical relevance in real supply networks – and to what extent. 
(…) 
(Kann ich das eigentlich als Petrinetz darstellen? Bottleneck-Darstellung als Petrinetz sinnvoll?) 
(Kann ich dies hier auch weiterverwenden für ein Paper „Classification of Bottlenecks“? Generell: 
Mail schicken an den Editor vom Journal, das Jan Frick vorgeschlagen hat, und nach Potenzial zur 
Veröffentlichung fragen. Jan Frick fragen, ob so eine Nachfrage Sinn macht). 
Figure 2.3.2. – Conceivable States of a Bottleneck
2.3.4. Bottleneck States
Bottlenecks can be in different states. Generally, the following states of a bottle-
neck are conceivable: A bottleneck can either be working or not working (i.e.,
idle). If the bottleneck is working, a meaningful distinction can be made be-
tween “normal” operations with “normal” utilization (say, less than 80%) an
the bottleneck being fully engaged with extremely high utilization. The reason
why such a distinction is important is that mathematically, throughput time in-
creases in a highly non-linear fashion as of a certain utilization rate of the system
whereas at low utlization rates throughput time behaves almost linear (Hopp &
Spearman 2008). If the bottleneck is idle, it could idle due to a breakdown, it
could be pausing (i.e., it has been consciously stopped by someone), it could be
tarving, and it could be blocked.
With the exception of “normal” operations, each of these states provides a
starting point for a more detailed investigation as to why the state is so. More-
over, it can provide the basis for a typology of causes for the emergence of
bottlen cks. It should be kept in mind that we are lready dealing wi h a subset
of bottlenecks, namely unplanned bottlenecks (as opposed to planned bottle-
necks; cf. Section 2.3.3). That is, we are dealing with bottlenecks that emerge
unintendedly and have not been planned into the system with full consciousness
(and possibly good reasons).
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2.4. Complexity
2.4.1. Introduction
Complexity has been part of several of the preceding sections. Increased com-
plexity is a mantra in much of the management and economics literature.9 In
this dissertation, too, increased complexity has been repeatedly mentioned, e.g.,
as a result of economic development, technological advances, interaction of ac-
tors in a network, and system border porosity of supply networks. In fact, it
seems like complexity is conceived of as one of the dominant challenges in the
management of modern organizations and networks.
In this section, a contribution shall be made to a clarification of the term com-
plexity in the context of supply networks and bottleneck management. It is not
attempted to provide a complete account of complexity; rather, the ambiguity of
the term complexity as commonly used shall be demonstrated, and its meaning
shall be narrowed down so that eventually sense can be made of the term from
a supply network management perspective.
2.4.2. Definition and Meaning
In everyday language, the noun complexity (or the adjective complex) is gener-
ally used to describe something that is not straighforward to grasp or to solve
(e.g., a problem). This understanding is reflected in dictionaries’ definition of
“complex”: “consisting of many different and connected parts” and “not easy to
analyse or understand; complicated or intricate” (Oxford Dictionaries 2014a).
This definition also shows that complex and complicated (or complexity and
complicatedness, respectively) are used synonymously. Accordingly, the dictio-
nary definition of “complicated” is very similar: “consisting of many intercon-
necting parts or elements; intricate” and “involving many different and confus-
ing aspects” (Oxford Dictionaries 2014b). Dissecting the differences between
9Internet search engines are useful to illustrate the ubiquitous use of the expression: Google
provides about 319.000 results for the expression "’increased complexity’ + economy”, about
543.000 results for "’increased complexity’ + management” and about 527.000 results for
“’increased complexity’ + product”.
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complicatedness and complexity is far from straightforward and a great many
controversies have evolved around this question. Furthermore, it is difficult to
discuss and define complexity without reference to complex systems or even
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). The term complexity shall be clarified first
before it will be continued with a discussion of Complex Adaptive Systems in
Section 2.5.4.
As to the difference between complex and complicated, Reitsma (2003) pro-
vides the following summary:
“A system is complicated if it can be given a complete and ac-
curate description in terms of its individual constituents, no matter
how many, such as a computer or the process of programming a
VCR (Cilliers 1998); ’a complication is a quantitative escalation of
that which is theoretically reducible’ (Chapman 1984, p. 370). A
system is said to be complex when the whole cannot be fully under-
stood by analyzing its components (Cilliers 1998)” (Reitsma 2003,
p. 14).
Reitsma (2003) also emphasizes that complexity has gained a meaning beyond
the dictionary definition. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, researchers from dif-
ferent disciplines have attempted to find common ground among their fields by
focusing on the characteristics and implications of complexity. Horgan (1995)
provides a critical account of this new field of “complexity science” – as made
popular by the Santa Fe Institute (Waldrop 1994) – and the hopes and claims
associated with it. He points out that there is disagreement even among the key
figures of this young branch of science with regard to the questions that can be
answered with the help of thinking in terms of complexity. Moreover, it seems
there is no unified understanding of what complexity is in the first place. The
view that this new field of science has been “over-hyped” is shared by Edmonds
(1999, p. 210). On the future of the discource on complexity he notes:
“[T]he dangers are short-term and common to many other new
trends and labels. Approaches associated with complexity will be
subject to too much hype for a while and their usefulness will be
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both under- and over-estimated, depending on the age of those who
judge them. While this stage lasts, there will continue to be much
confusion caused by the word ’complexity’, so much so that serious
researchers will start to seek to avoid using it. On the other hand
politicians will start to use it in speeches, demanding such as ’a
complexity-led solution’ to particular problems” (Edmonds 2010).
Some authors consider complexity as a subjective measure. Discussing problem
complexity, Waxman (1996) asserts that the complexity of a system is reflected
by a person’s difficulty to identify the unknowns of the system. As Edmonds
(1999) points out, this would mean that all complexity were only apparent and
thus equal to ignorance (p. 81).
Complexity can be considered a world-view or paradigm (Kuhn 1970) that
stands in contrast to a Newtonian (also referred to as Newtonian-Cartesian or
Cartesian-Newtonian or mechanistic or reductionist, to list only some names
commonly used) paradigm. According to the Newtonian perspective, we can
explain phenomena (such as the behaviour of a system) if we deconstruct the
system and look at its components. The rise of complexity as a science orig-
inates in the recognition that while this approach has been very fruitful in a
great many instances it cannot explain every kind of system and thus not ev-
ery phenomenon. The fact that certain problems – or more generally: systems
– cannot be dissected without ceasing to exhibit the phenomenon in question
gave rise to the attractiveness of complexity as a way to look at problems. That
complexity has been called a paradigm here shall not suggest that the complex
systems perspective and the reductionist perspective are mutually exclusive; in
fact, it seems that they are complementary approaches to solve problems and to
understand the world around us.
Weaver (1948) distinguishes disorganized and organized complexity. He in-
troduces problems of disorganized complexity by contrasting it with problems
of simplicity. Simple problems contain only a few variables which can be solved
for easily. Weaver uses the example of the motion of a single billiard ball whose
position at a certain point in time represents a problem of simplicity. The prob-
lem becomes manually unsolvable, however, when several billiard balls (like
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ten or 15) are involved and their motion is to be calculated as too many vari-
ables are involved. The calculation becomes manageable again when very large
numbers of balls are involved since statistical methods can be applied. So it
becomes easier to calculate the (average) motion of millions of billiard balls
at once than of only 15 billiard balls; and the more balls (variables) involved,
the more precise the statistical methods will work. Although individual balls
cannot be traced, the “system as a whole possesses certain orderly and analyz-
able average properties”. The “middle region” between simplicity with very few
variables and disorganized complexity with very large numbers of variables is
the region of organized complexity with “a sizable number of factors which are
interrelated into an organic whole” (Weaver 1948). These are the problems that
remain particularly difficult to solve.
Wood (1986) discusses three types of task complexity: component complex-
ity, coordinative complexity, and dynamic complexity. Component complexity
refers to the number of distinct acts required by a certain task. Coordinative
complexity comprises “timing, frequency, intensity, and location requirements
for performances of required acts” (p. 68), or put more simply: a measure of
what needs to be done in what way to achieve the desired output. The first two
types of complexity Wood (1986) refers to as static complexity in order to con-
trast it from dynamic complexity as the third type. Dynamic complexity exists
when during performance of a certain task parameters change so that require-
ments to successfully achieve the desired end-state change. Accordingly, tasks
that last longer are more prone to changes and thus more prone to exhibit dy-
namic complexity during performance than tasks that are performed within a
short period of time.
Also in the context of task complexity, Campbell (1988) distinguishes four
sources of complexity (“basic complexity attributes”):
1. presence of multiple paths to a desired end-state,
2. presence of multiple desired end-states,
3. presence of conflicting interdependence, and
4. presence of uncertainty or probabilistic linkages.
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Generally, as Campbell (1988) states, “any objective task characteristic that im-
plies an increase in information load, information diversity, or rate of infor-
mation change can be considered a contributor to complexity” (p. 42). This
statement reflects Naylor and Dickonson’s (1969) definition of complexity of
a task component which they define “in terms of its information-processing
and/or memory-storage demand requirements” (p. 167). The presence of mul-
tiple paths increase information load and, thus complexity if only one of the
multiple paths eventually is the correct one (although several may look correct)
and if efficiency is one success factor (otherwise all paths could be tried until
the correct one will be found). The presence of multiple desired end-states in-
creases complexity (if the desired outcomes are not positively related) as they
increase information load and information diversity. The presence of conflict-
ing interdependence refers to the presence of several outcomes where each of
which precludes the achievement of the others. The presence of uncertainty or
probabilistic linkages increases complexity of information as they increase in-
formation load and information diversity. While the sources of complexity just
mentioned result from the objective nature of the task, there are other, contex-
tual, factors, such as imperfect communication of task requirements. Through
different combinations, the four basic attributes can represent 16 different tasks
of differing complexity.
Senge (2006) distinguishes detail complexity from dynamic complexity. De-
tail complexity exists when many variables are involved, e.g., many parts that
need to be put together to build a house. Dynamic complexity exists where the
links between cause and effect are not obvious:
“When the same action has dramatically different effects in the
short run and the long, there is dynamic complexity. When an ac-
tion has one set of consequences locally and a very different set
of consequences in another part of the system, there is dynamic
complexity. When obvious interventions produce nonobvious con-
sequences, there is dynamic complexity” (Senge 2006, p. 71).
That is, Senge’s (2006) definition of dynamic complexity differs from Wood’s
(1986) definition of detail complexity. Senge suggests that dynamic complexity
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is a more urgent problem to tackle in many management situations. Senge’s
typology of complexity has been adopted by some other researchers, such as
Bozarth et al. (2009).
One of the main determinants of complexity according to Senge are time
delays. People have difficulties to see the connection between cause and effect
when there is a delay. The relationship between cause and effect becomes even
more difficult to see when feedback loops are involved. Senge proposes that
most people are unable to fully understand the implications of actions in systems
that contain several feedback loops and delays.
2.4.3. Complexity in the Context of Supply Networks
In this section, the term complexity shall be related to the context of supply
networks.10 It is in this branch of research where the term complexity enjoys
particularly high popularity and with some certainty can be found in the major-
ity of publications, often to underline the importance of the respective author’s
research. The tale usually is that complexity of the economy and of supply net-
works has increased or is ever-increasing. Globalization, shortened life-cycles
and changing customer preferences among the customers are often associated
with this development. As it has been pointed out in the previous section, mean-
ing and understanding of the term complexity vary depending on context and
author. When we narrow down the context to supply networks, we might ex-
pect to find greater alignment among different writers. Review of the literature
indicates, however, that the term complexity is still too vague and needs further
refinement. Writers in the research field of supply networks have responded to
this problem by introducing different types and categorizations of complexity.
They have discussed drivers that contribute to the different types of complexity.
The goal of this section is to introduce the most important concepts of com-
10The reader may want to become familiar with the concept of networks before proceeding with
this section. Networks, and supply networks as a more specific form of networks, are dis-
cussed in detail in Section 2.5. Because the concepts of networks, manufacturing systems,
complexity, and bottlenecks are interdependent in the way they are dealt with in this work,
any ordering of these topis in the structure of the thesis may require occasional interruptions
of the reading flow.
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plexity in the context of supply networks. It will not be attempted to discuss
all the drivers of complexity in supply networks; rather, the understanding of
complexity in supply networks shall be enhanced by pointing out different in-
terpretations of complexity, thereby increasing sensitivity towards the various
problems that may or may not emerge due to complexity.
Discussing complexity in supply chains and how it impacts on the pefor-
mance of manufacturing plants, Bozarth et al. (2009) distinguish between up-
stream complexity, downstream complexity, and internal manufacturing com-
plexity, thereby addressing different origins of complexity in a supply network
a manufacturing plant has to cope with. On each of the three levels, complexity
comprises detail complexity and dynamic complexity. In their study, they find
that dynamic complexity poses greater challenges for the organization of man-
ufacturing processes in a production plant than detail complexity. This finding
confirms Senge’s (2006) notion that dynamic complexity is more difficult to
manage than detail complexity.
Wilding (1998) discusses the supply chain complexity triangle. The triangle
consists of the three “interacting yet interdependent effects” (p. 599) amplifica-
tion, parallel interactions, and deterministic chaos. The author considers each
effect a source of uncertainty which in interaction “result in complex demand
patterns” (p. 607).
With amplificiation, Wilding refers to the swings in inventory in combination
with distorted ordering behaviour along a supply chain which is commonly re-
ferred to as Forrester Effect or Bullwhip Effect (Forrester 1958, Lee et al. 1997).
It describes how relatively small changes on a downstream stage in the sup-
ply chain will be amplified as orders travel up the supply chain. In extreme
cases this can lead to an alternation between significant over-supply and com-
plete depletion of inventory. Some of the underlying reasons for the amplifying
fluctuation upstream in the supply chain are uncertainty about actual demand,
the time gap between end customer purchase and production of the product, the
number of tiers (echelons) in the supply chain and the tendency of the actors
involved to apply some safety factor to order size or to increase safety stock .
The effect has been illustrated and made popular with the beer game in which
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Figure 2.4.1. – Bullwhip Effect: Amplification of Demand as Orders Travel up
the Supply Chain (ATKearney 2013)
a supply chain consisting of four tiers is simulated. Figure 2.4.1 illustrates the
concept of the game. It shows the increasing amplification of order quantities
as orders are passed through the supply chain.
The second effect of the triangle Wilding (1998) introduces is parallel interac-
tions. He describes them as “interactions that occur between different channels
of the same tier in a supply network”. As an example, Wilding describes the sit-
uation that a a firm will not receive the input it needs from one supplier so that
the customer has to reschedule its production which, in turn, affects the cus-
tomer’s other suppliers (p. 604). Another form of parallel interaction is often
referred to as indirect demand. Indirect demand becomes a problem when one
customer of a supplier occupies the supplier’s production capacity to an extent
that makes it diffult for the supplier to meet demand from another customer who
then might run into inventory stockouts. Besides the supplier’s production ca-
pacity it could also be other resources that are scarce, e.g., certain types of raw
material which then have to be allocated among the various customers. Power
of certain customers, for instance, might influence the allocation of resources
in their favor and to the the disadvantage of less powerful customers. Parallel
interactions are one of the reasons why the notion of supply networks in many
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instances is a better representation of reality than supply chains, as discussed
in more detail in Section 2.5.4 and in Beer et al. (2012). Wilding (1998) points
out that suppliers that normally show good performance can be adversely af-
fected by such indirect impact so that they will be unable to meet their delivery
targets. He points out that Just-in-Time suppliers in particular will suffer from
such irregularities.
The third effect and source of uncertainty in Wilding’s triangle is determin-
istic chaos. He characterizes determistic chaos as being governed by rules, as
highly sensitive to initial conditions, as exhibiting non-linear behaviour, and as
theoretically predictable – albeit practically unfeasible to predict (pp. 600 et
seq.). Since Wilding refers to the beer game for purposes of demonstration de-
terministic chaos, the exact differences between amplification and deterministic
chaos each of which he describes as a separate source of uncertainty remain un-
clear. Moreover, it remains unclear where Wilding draws the line between chaos
and complexity in his paper, as well as their relation to uncertainty as uncertainty
can be seen as another word for ignorance which, as indicated above, by some
authors is considered the sole source or even a synonym for complexity. That
Wilding (1998) uses these terms almost arbitrarily suggests that the paper’s con-
clusion regarding implications of complexity need to be treated carefully. Re-
garding the differences between chaos and complexity, Reitsma (2003) states
that “in Chaos Theory disorder arises from simple ordered states, in Complex-
ity Theory large scale order arises from complex apparent disorder at the local
scale”. Cilliers (1998) points out that while chaotic systems are highly sensi-
tive to initial conditions, complex systems are not, but are rather robust by their
adaptive nature. Furthermore, chaotic behaviour can result from a small num-
ber of equations whereas complex systems normally comprise a huge number
of components. Reitsma (2003) further adds that Chaos Theory is concerned
with closed systems whereas Complexity Theory is concerned with open sys-
tems. Supply Networks, show characteristics of open systems (cf. Section 3.7).
Hence, it will remain debatable as to what extent Wilding (1998) has carefully
chosen his terminology and as to what extent valuable conclusions can be drawn
from his use of the concepts of chaos and complexity. Besides that, regarding
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the properties of complex and chaotic systems, one might argue that the beer
game is an adequate representation of the latter rather than of the first: it de-
pends on a small set of differential equations, it is highly sensitive to changes,
and it develops from a stable state into chaotic behaviour. Nevertheless, the beer
game does include the elements that Senge (2006) considers essential for defin-
ing complex systems, such as delays and feedback loops. Hence, the beer game
illustrates once more the difficulties in clearly separating widely used terms such
as complexity and chaos.
Isik (2011) defines six “key dimensions” of complexity in supply networks:
• numerousness,
• diversity,
• interdependency,
• variability,
• variety, and
• uncertainty.
Each of the dimensions is positively correlated with supply network complex-
ity, i.e., when any dimensions increases, then complexity will increase, too.
Numerousness refers to what Senge (2006) calls detail complexity. The differ-
ence between diversity and variety is not apparent from Isik’s definitions of the
dimensions; one might assume that diversity refers to the existence of many
different parts and that variety refers to the quantitative relations between such
parts. Interdependency refers to the existence of systemic relationships between
the entities of the system (e.g., products and actors). Variability refers to the
amount of changes to system states inherent to the system or induced, e.g., by
customers’ volatile preferences. Uncertainty refers to ignorance about the sys-
tem’s future states. Isik (2011) furthermore distinguishes internal drivers of
supply network complexity from external drivers. Internal drivers refer to, for
instance, interruptions due to supply shortages and large product variety. Ex-
ternal drivers refer to factors such as competition or volatile customer demand
57
2. Theoretical Foundation
  Technology 
 Process / Product (Structure) Management Systems (Infrastructure) 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
C
o
m
p
lic
at
e
d
n
es
s 
 Skills and know-how required to 
operate processes or to manufacture 
the product 
 Number of tasks and sub-processes 
 Number of components (e.g., vertical 
integration) 
 Level of interactions between 
parts/components  
 Level of decomposability of processes 
 Product variety and customization 
 Extent of supply network 
 Extent of customer base 
 Geographical span of suppliers and 
customers 
 Number of echelons in the supply 
chain 
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
  Process capability of the focal firm 
(quality failures) 
 Process capability of suppliers  
 Throughput time variation and 
stochastic set-up time 
 Production scheduling changes 
 Late product delivery by supplier 
 Demand volatility 
 
Figure 2.4.2. – Conceptual Model of Supply Chain Complexity as Proposed by
Vachon & Klassen (2002)
(Isik 2011, p. 421). Similarly, Vachon & Klassen (2002) state that “[b]oth man-
agerial action and the external business environment can amplify or attenuate
any effects of supply chain complexity” (p. 218).
Vachon & Klassen (2002) suggest a conceptual model for supply chain com-
plexity based on the two dimensions technology and information processing.
They further divide technology into structural and infrastructural components.
Structure refers to characteristics of products and processes whereas infrastruc-
ture refers to characteristics of the broader supply network (e.g., number of
tiers involved or demand volatility). Information processing is further divided
into complicatedness and uncertainty. Together, the sub-dimensions represent a
two-by-two matrix. Figure 2.4.2 visualizes the model.
Based on a literature review, Serdar-Asan (2013) mentions two ways to cate-
gorize drivers of supply chain complexity and (implicitly) points to a third way.
The first categorization she refers to is based “upon the way [complexity] is
generated”:
• physical situation (e.g., number of products),
• operational characteristics (e.g., process uncertainties), and
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• dynamic behaviour (e.g., demand amplification).
The second classification she mentions is based on the origin of supply chain
complexity:
• internal (e.g., product variety and technology),
• supply/demand interface (e.g., supply policy and number of suppliers),
and
• external/environmental (e.g., regulatory framework and actions of com-
petitors).
Figure 2.4.3 illustrates the categorization of drivers as proposed by Serdar-Asan.
Serdar-Asan (2013) indicates the relationship between the origin of supply
chain complexity and the reach of organizational influence and control. While
the focal firm may be able to influence internal drivers of complexity to the
greatest extent, its reach decreases as one moves towards external/environmental
drivers. Hence, the firm’s level of influence and control can be seen as another
way to classify drivers of supply chain complexity. Figure 2.4.4 illustrates the
concept.
Hashemi et al. (2013), similar to Bozarth et al. (2009), distinguish between
upstream complexity and downstream complexity in supply chains. Upstream
complexity is mainly determined by design characterisics of the product whereas
downstream complexity is mainly determined by characteristics of product de-
mand. Characteristics that make product demand complex are, for instance, de-
mand uncertainty, demand variability, product variety, product lifecycle, prod-
uct range, demand volume, and delivery lead time. As characteristics of product
design that influence supply chain complexity the authors mention the level of
innovativeness, structure complexity, product modularity, structure compatibil-
ity, and lead time to produce. In their article, Hashemi et al. (2013) also propose
that product design complexity is influenced by product demand complexity,
suggesting that firms design more complex products as a response to the desires
of end-customers. This relationship, however, is likely to be bidirectional in-
stead of uni-directional as complex products often allow customers to choose
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to another, preferably on which they have more control. The companies make use of this property when 
managing the complexity in their SCs. 
 
 
Figure 1. Classification of SC complexity drivers according to their origin 
 
3. An overview of strategies for managing complexity in the supply chain 
Analyzing and understanding complexity drivers enable us to implement right strategies when dealing 
with complexity. Without an idea of the drivers, it will be very difficult to develop a clear strategy to deal 
with complexity. An effective way of developing strategies is making use of good practices. Here, a good 
practice is defined as “any proven working practice which is far enough ahead of the norm to provide 
significant performance gains if implemented” (Zairi and Whymark 2000). Good practices of complexity 
management in the SC have been identified and gathered from various sources, compiled through an 
Internet search, such as reports of companies, consulting firms, technology providers and other knowledge 
bases (e.g. articles, books, case studies, industry reports, conferences). After an initial screening the 24 
practices that are fulfilling the following criteria were further analyzed: (1) the complexity reported in the 
practice must be SC related; (2) the practice must have produced successful results; (3) the documents 
must be accessible and provide clear and detailed enough information to continue with the analysis The 
selected good practices were reviewed systematically and information on the following characteristics 
have been extracted: type of the company, type of SC, type of solution partner (if present), complexities 
involved in the SC, the goal or challenge the company is facing, necessary conditions to achieve the goal, 
problems related to the goal, complexity drivers of the problem, solution to overcome the 
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Figure 2.4.3. – Classification of Drivers of Supply Chain Complexity (Serdar-
Asan 2013, p. 794)
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Supply/Demand Interface
Internal
Decreasing Control over Complexity Drivers
Figure 2.4.4. – Level of Control of Drivers of Supply Chain Complexity
among different product configurations (as with, for example, cars that can be
ordered with or without certain extra options) which makes demand for certain
product configurations difficult to predict and to plan for.
For a high-level differentiation, it is suggested to distinguish between sys-
temic complexity and induced complexity. Systemic complexity is an inherent
characteristic of the system. It results from the number of nodes in the sys-
tem, the density of connections between nodes, the existence of feedback loops
and delays in causal relationsips, the properties and requirements of the entities
that flow through the system, the information requirements of and the infor-
mation provided to the nodes involved, policies for information and material
flow processing, as well as actual behavioural patterns of the nodes involved. In
practical terms, systemic complexity depends (inter alia) on the number on sup-
pliers involved for production and delivery of the components required as well
as the suppliers’ connection to customers and sub-suppliers outside the direct
supply chain of the focal firm (cf. Section 2.5.4), on the number of products,
on product properties, such as perishability, size, weight, and value, on deliv-
ery policies, transportation mode (air, sea, rail, road) and delivery mode (ware-
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house, consignment warehouse, Just-in-Time [JiT], Just-in-Sequence [JiS], Ven-
dor Managed Inventory [VMI]), spatial disperson of the supply network, (tech-
nical) production process requirements, information transparency for suppliers
(e.g., forecast horizon, actual order horizon, planned changes to products, new
production introduction...), opportunism of suppliers or customers, contract de-
sign, qualification and reliability of suppliers and employees, and many more.
When we understand the supply network as a system (see also Section 2.4.4 and
Section 3.7), then systemic complexity is made up of all the elements – and their
implications – that constitute the system.
Induced complexity, on the other hand, depends on events and behaviour that
are not inherent to the system. What is inherent to the system and what is not
does, of course, depend on how we delineate the system from its environment.
For a model system to be useful we generally try to draw the system border in
a way that lets us address the question of interest. The question of interest in a
supply network is: what do we have to do so that
• the right product is
• in the right time
• in the right place
• in the right amount
• in the right quality
• to the right cost?
Through conscious design of the supply network, logistics planners aim to make
all preparations necessary to ensure that the 6 Rights will be satisfied. The sys-
tem they plan contains many determinants for the success of this endeavour.
There will, however, always be factors that lie outside the scope of the logistics
planner and outside the system, and there is no point in integrating all possi-
ble determinants into the (model) system as the system would become too large
and cumbersome for effective analysis. The global economy, for instance, often
62
2.4. Complexity
turns out to have implications for the functioning of supply networks. Nev-
ertheless, it will not be useful to integrate the global economy into the model
system of our supply network unless we want to have a model of the world. The
same applies to natural desasters, political turmoil, unexpected rise of competi-
tors or substitute products, unexpectedly changing customer preferences, traffic
problems, strikes of labour or port workers, changing regulatory framework,
unexpected quality problems of components delivered by a supplier, and so on.
That is, there is a large amount of factors that induce complexity in our system
in addition to the inherent complexity of the system.
Whether complexity is induced or systemic does not perfectly determine to
what extent the factors causing complexity, as well as the complexity itself, can
be controlled, although nodes, edges, entities and events within our system are
more likely to be controllable than those that are external to it. A supplier of a
specific component is selected (and supplier managers try to make sure the se-
lection does not lead frequently to surprises such as frequent quality variation),
but it cannot necessarily be controlled what is going on inside the boundaries of
the supplier’s facility. The differentiating question therefore is: what are built-in
factors that lead to higher (systemic) complexity – and what share of the com-
plexity the system exhibits is caused unintentionally and unconsciously and is
caused by nodes, relationships, and events outside the supply network system.
When a firm considers its forecast information confidential and does not share
this information with suppliers, then order variations may come as a surprise
to the supplier and may cause perturbation among suppliers and sub-suppliers.
Such an information policy is inherent to the system. When a firm chooses to
source its parts globally to inexperienced suppliers in low cost countries while
insisting on short production and delivery lead time, the resulting complexity is
inherent to that decision and thus systemic. When the global economy is roar-
ing and consumer electronics producers such as Apple and Samsung celebrate
record production of electronic gadgets so that microchip producers’ production
capacity becomes short which makes further expansion of automobile produc-
tion difficult due to a lack of certain electric components that require microchips,
then this complexity is not an inherent part of the system design but is induced
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from outside.
From the discussion in this section, it can be concluded that the most useful
way to categorize and structure complexity depends on the question or problem
of interest. If a company experiences difficulties in managing integration of all
the different parts sourced to different suppliers, then it might be useful to think
in terms of detail or component complexity. When a company frequently suffers
from unexpected demand swings, availability of raw material on global markets,
interruption of traffic, and changing regulatory framework, then it might be use-
ful to think in terms of external/environmental or induced complexity. If quality
problems are prevalent, a look at upstream complexity, component complexity
or systemic complexity may be helpful to identify the source of the problem.
That is, no categorization of complexity is better than another as such; the qual-
ity of the categorization depends on its usefulness to address the problem of
interest. Figure 2.4.5 provides a summary of different types of (and ways to
categorize) complexity in supply networks.
It is important to acknowledge that complexity in supply networks is not neg-
ative per se. In fact, it might be inextricably linked to certain desired product
features that provide the company with a unique position in the market. Be-
ing able to manage the complexity resulting from a particular type of product,
service, or business model, may secure a sustainable competitive advantage.
Though the value lies not in the complexity as such, a certain amount of com-
plexity will come with the choice of particular products or processes, the size
of the organization, or specific behavioural characteristics of certain customer
groups, and therefore may be unavoidable. The complexity of serving a par-
ticular market or market niche may in fact act as a barrier to entry for possibly
emergent competitorst.11 This, of course, is only true for complexity that is
unavoidable or even desirable as in the case of products that provide unique
value due to their complex features. There is no value attached to complexity
that exists because of intransparent processes, outdated organizational policies,
scatterbrained management, or unreliable labour.
11Remarkably, complexity seems forgotten in the economic literature on barriers to entry. None
of the definitions McAfee et al. (2004), for instance, review mentions complexity. Most of
the barriers to entry are commonly discussed in terms of costs and margins.
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Types of Complexity 
 
Categories of Complexity  References 
Organized  Disorganized  Weaver (1948) 
Static  Dynamic  Casti (1979), as qtd. in Geurs et al. (2012, p. 17) 
Detail   Dynamic   Senge (2006), Bozart et al. (2009) 
Internal   External   Isik (2011) 
Component  Coordinative  Dynamic  Wood (1986) 
Upstream   Downstream   Internal Manufacturing   Bozart et al. (2009) 
Internal  Supply/Demand Interface 
External/ 
Environmental 
Serdar‐Asan (2009), Mason‐
Jones & Towill (1998; 
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Figure 2.4.5. – Types of Complexity in Supply Networks
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Generally, negative connotations dominate when it comes to complexity in
supply networks. There are several reasons for that. Complex systems are dif-
ficult to control and to manage as actions and their effect are separated in time
and often in space. Feedback loops are often invisible, subtle, and non-obvious.
Delay between cause and effect makes it hard to associate effect with cause,
and the decision to associate a particular effect with a particular cause can be
ambiguous or even arbitrary. Therefore, complex systems pose a major chal-
lenge to learning abilities of people and organizations (Senge 2006). The re-
quirements complex systems impose on management stand in conflict with the
fast-paced business environment of which many organizations are part. Com-
plex systems require a long-term perspective and time to learn in order to un-
derstand the relationships of cause and effect. Ironically, it seems that factors
associated with the often-cited “ever-increasing complexity” of business in gen-
eral and of supply networks in particular, such as shorter product life-cycles and
increasingly dense competition, at first sight demand faster and more ad-hoc
decision-making. That is, increasingly complex systems require a long-term
perspective and time to learn while at the same time increasing the pace of busi-
ness, encouraging short-term and short-sighted decision-making, thus leading
to even higher complexity. This hamster wheel, a reinforcing loop, increases
the pressure on everyone involved. From that perspective, it seems natural that
complexity tends to be considered a threat. Complexity inhibits the understand-
ing of causal relationships and thus the control and management of a system.
Since complexity makes it difficult to oversee the implications of one’s ac-
tions, people are likely to make mistakes without noticing it. Despite strict
quality control, for instance, manufacturers of aircraft such as Boeing and Air-
bus face severe difficulties trying to eliminate all safety-relevant problems in
new highly complex aircraft (Lavrinc 2014, The Telegraph 2013, Flightglobal
2009). It seems that the more complex a system becomes, the more difficult it
will be to get it free of errors, which raises concern not only about the qual-
ity of products one can expect as a consumer but also about the manageability
of supply networks that grow more complex to accommodate more complex
products.
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2.4.4. Supply Networks as Complex Adaptive Systems
Intuitively, many would agree if a network of organizations were suggested to
be described as a system. And yet, modeling an organizational network as a
system will come with a broad set of implications some of which are less intu-
itive. Indeed, a significant fraction of the research branch termed Supply Chain
Management does ignore such implications. Conceiving of organizational net-
works as systems can help understand problems organizations deal with, actions
organizations take, and consequences of such actions for the organization itself
as well as for its environment. The consequences of the actions of one organi-
zation could be negligible for the organizational network and its environment,
or they could pose significant changes. It is important to understand that one
may not be able to know in advance what will happen and whether the effect
that will be achieved will be desirable. Systems that produce unpredictable be-
havior due to the dynamic interaction of its constituents are the subject of the
science of complexity, a branch of research that has been developed and formal-
ized (predominantly) in the United States throughout the second half of the 20th
century. Its formalization is inextricably linked with the foundation and work of
the Santa Fe Institute (Waldrop 1994). Complexity science deals with a special
sort of systems that have been termed Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS).
In fact, Choi et al. (2001) assert that supply networks should not be regarded
as mere systems but as complex adaptive systems. Pathak et al. (2007) suggest
it is a “natural step to identify supply networks as a CAS” since organizations
adapt to complex environments (p. 550). Before this perspective can be adopted,
a definition of CAS shall be provided. Then, properties of CAS will be com-
pared to properties of supply networks. The understanding of systems is central
to the understanding of complex adaptive systems. Therefore, this section will
start by reviewing the concept of systems and their properties.
The conception of systems can be traced back more than two thousand years,
with the Aristotelian wisdom from his Metaphysics that “the whole is more
than the sum of its parts” certainly being one of the first concise statements
that system properties cannot entirely be explained by properties of its con-
stituents (Bertalanffy 1972). In spite of the general acceptance of thinking in
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terms of systems across a variety of disciplines it seems that an understanding
of what exactly systems are has not evolved for a long time (Marchal 1975).12
Von Bertalanffy has attempted to create an interdisciplinary theory of systems –
General Systems Theory – to develop an understanding of systems that is gen-
erally applicable to various branches of research . One of the most important
contributions of Systems Theory to science and research may be that due to
its very nature it has stimulated interdisciplinary discussion. If objects being re-
searched are understood as (open) systems which are connected to other systems
in their environment and experience transition of states due to the exchange of
inputs and outputs with those other systems, this emphasizes that concentration
on one system while ignoring the environment may inhibit a comprehensive
understanding of causes for and effects of transitions of states. Other systems
within the environment of the focal system may be subject of very different
branches of research and yet understanding of such systems may improve un-
derstanding of the focal system. In the context of this thesis, manufacturing
organizations can be understood as open systems. What is happening within the
boundaries of one manufacturing organization cannot be fully understood with-
out reference to other systems such as another organization, e.g., a supplier. The
relationship between the focal organization and its supplier is a system by itself.
This dyadic relationship, in turn, cannot be fully understood without seeing the
bigger picture of the supply chain involving not only the two organizations of
the supplier-OEM relationship but the supplier’s supplier(s) as well. As one
extends the view to include other systems and their implications for the focal
system, one may have to leave the boundaries of his academic discipline as
well. The researcher in the discipline of, for instance, Operations Management
may thus find answers in Exchange Theory, Transaction Cost Economics, Re-
source Based View, Resource-Dependence Theory, Supply Chain Management,
Social Network Theory and Supply Chain Risk Management as he widens his
perspective and attempts to better understand the behavior of an individual or-
ganization.
12Dubin (1969, p. 8), for instance, points out that System Theory uses the term system as a
synonym of model. Model, in turn, is often used interchangably with theory. Therefore, all of
the three terms are used interchangably by Dubin.
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Although General Systems Theory has gained popularity throughout the sec-
ond half of the 20th century and was able to provide reseachers in a variety
disciplines with a new perspective on their problems, it has had its critics. Some
of the criticism revolved around the applicability of a systems perspective, and
critics pointed out that even Systems Theory adherents were adopting mech-
anistic views of their problems (Phillips 1972). Also, as Marchal (1975) re-
ports, many researchers have raised concerns about and objections against such
a general use of ’systems’ as there is a danger of the term losing any rigorous
meaning and common (non-trivial) properties. From a broad set of examples
of definitions by various researchers, Marchal (1975) has distilled the minium
commonalities across the various definitions down to “S is a system only if S
is a set of related elements and relations between the elements” . Most defini-
tions that include more attributes, he argues, define some more specific kind of
system and thereby exclude others that should also be counted as system.
The system is distinct from its environment. Like the system, Hall & Fagen
(1956) define the environment as a set of objects. The environment interacts
with the system – if it is open (see below) – and can change attributes of the
system just like the system can change attributes of its environment (pp. 19,
23). Because objects within the system interact and thus influence each other’s
attributes and the system as a whole interacts with its environment, there is no
definite rule to identify which objects belong to the system and which do not but
are part of the environment. Essentially, the definition of the system boundary
depends on the question at issue; objects whose properties and interaction are
of interest shall be considered part of the system whereas those which are not
of interest and the interaction with whom does not have implications for the
question at issue shall be considered part of the environment. Also, this response
to arbitrary system boundary setting goes to the heart of some of the criticism
of a general definition of systems which Marchal (1975) reviews in his paper,
e.g., that anything can be related to anything and would thus constitute a system
and the concept would thus be “vacuous”. Even if it were possible to relate
arbitrary entities, however, it would still make sense to refer to systems with
significant (i.e., non-trivial) relationships to emphasize the interrelatedness of
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their components (as it is the case for supply networks).
There are open systems and closed systems. Open systems allow material or
energy to enter and to leave and thus allow change of their constituents (Hall
& Fagen 1956, Bertalanffy 1950). That is, open systems do not normally reach
equilibria whereas processes in closed systems which do not exchange energy
or material with the environment must eventually lead to equilibria, obeying the
second law of thermodynamics (Bertalanffy 1972, Waldrop 1994).
As with systems, the understanding of what exactly constitutes a complex
adaptive system varies among researchers (Gell-Mann 1999). There is some
confusion as to the defining properties of complex adaptive systems – as op-
posed to merely complex systems or just systems. The main difference between
complex systems and complex adaptive systems may be the existence of agency
as the necessary condition for adaptation, i.e., CAS contain active agents as op-
posed to merely passive entities (Choi et al. 2001). In a talk at the Santa Fe
Institute (and about the Santa Fe Institute), Gell-Mann (1990-01-09) raises the
same question by comparing the complex behaviour in turbulent flows of liq-
uids (a complex system) with complex adaptive systems. He suggests that it is
“the way information about the environment is recorded”. In CAS, the infor-
mation recorded makes up a model. CAS follow certain schemata (Anderson
1999, Gell-Mann 1999), also referred to as internal models (Holland, as quoted
in Gell-Mann 1999, Waldrop 1994). These schemata can be understood as a
cognitive structure or, more abstractly, as a set of rules (Anderson 1999) and
include the learning and adaption capability that Gell-Mann (1990-01-09) sug-
gests as defining characteristic for CAS. Choi et al. (2001) compare schemata
to Schein’s (1990, 2009) concept of organizational culture as a set of shared
beliefs, values, norms, and assumptions about reality and to Senge’s (2006)
concept of mental models.
As to complex systems, Simon (1962) suggests hierarchy and non-trivial sys-
tem behavior (“the whole is more than the sum of its parts”) emerging from
many interactions among a large number of parts as defining properties for com-
plex systems. At the same time, this type of emergent behavior that Simon
assigns to complex system reflects “the basic system problem”, i.e., is charac-
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teristic for systems in general (Bertalanffy 1972, p. 407). Anderson (1999, p.
219) argues that General Systems Theory, as put forth by Bertalanffy, addresses
deterministic systems whereas CAS show emergent behavior resulting from in-
teraction on the agents’ level. But again, the distinction is not quite sharp. In
her review of literature on complexity in supply networks, Serdar-Asan (2009, p.
18) provides an overview of systems characteristics but does not distinguish be-
tween the properties of complex systems and complex adaptive systems. Since
the discussion that follows will focus on complex adaptive systems which are
a subset of systems and complex systems and thus inherit their properties in
addition to the properties only possessed by complex adaptive systems, an ex-
act differentiation between these three concepts seems not to be of paramount
importance, however.
Because agents in CAS are connected they do not act independently of each
other. The level of connectedness of agents (i.e., the density of ties in terms of
graph theory) in systems can differ; sparsely connected networks of agents may
not develop complex behavior but tend to “freeze” whereas densely connected
networks are unstable and show chaotic behavior without any recognizable pat-
terns. Systems with an intermediate level of connectedness among agents can
show complex behavior that is unpredictable on the one hand but may show cer-
tain patterns on the other. Such a system at the edge of chaos (Waldrop 1994)
can be fairly stable and show patterns of regularity (Anderson 1999); the agents
involved do not reach an equilibrium, however, but are in constant motion and
change steadily in response to each other, i.e., they show self-organizing behav-
ior (Kauffman 1995). Self-organization occurs when agents, even simple ones,
interact according to their schemata in a nonlinear way. The nonlinearity of
interaction among agents is a result of their being connected through both posi-
tive and negative feedback loops which lead to amplification and attenuation of
behavioral patterns, respectively.
Early understanding of adaptation of systems referred to “some prearranged
end” to which an adaptive system will be led by its behavior (Hall & Fagen
1956, p. 23). This notion can be described as a top-down approach to adaptation
– one might even conceive of this notion as fatalistic or religious – and it stands
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in stark contrast to the understanding of adaptation as put forward by researchers
in complexity science where adaptation is exhibited through a set of local rules
which can, in fact, be quite simple and only a few in number (Waldrop 1994).
Whether a system is adaptive or not to some extent depends on the time hori-
zon during which the system’s behaviour is observed. Looking at the beer game
(cf. Section 2.4.3) one can see amplification of demand, leading to starvation
and oversupply at different points in time. There is a chance, however, that
those involved in the beer supply chain begin to talk to each other at some
point, thus mitigating one factor for the amplification (uncertainty and lack of
information) and possibly introducing other counter measures (e.g., information
transparency). Systems are sometimes adaptive in the long-term but experience
tough times in the short-term. Managers of supply networks may experience
teething trouble with their suppliers during production ramp-up but may resolve
many of the early problems in course of the contract life cycle. Shortening prod-
uct and thus supply contract life cycles then of course lead to frequent repetition
of the adaption phase.
The properties commonly associated with CAS can be summarized as follows
(Waldrop 1994, Kauffman 1995, Holland 1995, 2000, Gell-Mann 1999, 1990-
01-09, Anderson 1999):
• Consist of (many) Agents
• Internal Models/Schemata/Local Rules
• Adaptation
• Interaction
• Nonlinearity
• Emergence
• Evolution
• Self-Organization
• Hierarchy
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• “Edge of Chaos”
• Positive and Negative Feedback Loops
Based on the properties of CAS that have been identified, supply networks can
be analyzed with respect to the existence of such properties. Simply put, sup-
ply networks consist of organizations and relationships between organizations
which, in turn, consist of people and relationships between people. So in most
supply networks, a fairly large number of individuals is involved who make de-
cisions and act according to the decisions of others. Individuals and groups of
individuals (organizations) react to incentives, pressure, orders, or observations
according to different types of rules, such as legal and regulatory frameworks,
company policies, their own models of the world, and their own ethical com-
pass. Individuals in organizations get rewarded and punished, and they can –
albeit not always and not completely – observe the effects of their actions based
upon which they can adjust their behaviour and actions.
This short description already involves some of the properties that are asso-
ciated with Complex Adaptive Systems. It addresses the existence and numer-
ousness of agents that populate the system, their ability to adapt to changing
circumstances based on rules, their interaction with each other, feedback loops,
and the hiercharchy in which they are organized.
The notion of supply networks as CAS becomes more difficult to defend
when it comes to the properties of emergence and self-organization. Emergence
and self-organization result from adaptation and interconnectedness of agents.
These properties presume that the overall behaviour of the system (its global
pattern) is dependent on the behaviour and the decisions of individual agents in
combination, leading to some type of stability and order that would not have
been apparent nor explicable from the properties of the individual agents. As
mentioned before, this phenomenon can be summarized with the dictum ’the
whole is more than the sum of its parts’. Stacey et al. (2000) remark that the
claims attached to these properties – i.e., that system behaviour emerges from
the interaction of individual agents who act according to local rules (= schemata,
internal models, or mental models) – challenge the common understanding of
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the role of management. This role is commonly associated with policy-setting,
commanding, controlling, motivating, and goal-setting. The reason why it is
challenged is that management depends on the ability of individuals in author-
itative functions to select among different possible options – such as strategic
choices, candidates for a vacancy, suppliers for a sourcing decision – the one
option that promises the most desirable outcome which inherently requires the
ability to predict likely outcomes of the different options at hand. As Stacey
et al. (2000) put it: “Question predictability and you question all of these man-
agement beliefs” (p. 18). Controlling and leading – two of the management
functions Mintzberg (2011) defines – obviously are difficult to perform if the
notion of emergence and self-organizations is accepted. While Stacey et al.
(2000) relate to management of one organization, their point remains valid for
the management of supply networks and questions the notion inherent to Sup-
ply Chain Management that a focal company can manage its supply network.13
Choi et al. (2001) suggest that the focal firm merely triggers the creation of the
supply network. Most focal firms focus on tier-1 suppliers who in turn select
their suppliers, and so on. These authors maintain that often the focal firm does
not really know how the supply network looks like and what is going on. This
observation is in line with this researcher’s own findings that focal firms in au-
tomotive supply networks predominantly focus on tier-1 stage and only rarely
include higher tiers in their supply management efforts (Beer 2011).
On the other hand, one might argue that the focal firm does not merely trig-
ger the creation of the supply network but sets the standards it requires which
are then cascaded upstream as suppliers and sub-suppliers make their respec-
tive sourcing decisions. In this case, the focal company would define certain
boundaries and reduce the total population of possible choices its tier-n suppli-
ers can make. Provided, of course, that suppliers are commited to adhere to the
standards their customers require or suggest, which is a function of the power
relationships between the two organizations in the dyad (cf. Section 2.5.5.2).
Additionally, some focal firms do in fact begin to engage stronger in their
13See also Section 2.5.5.2 for a discussion of interdependency between organizations and the
ability to manage or merely cope.
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supply network beyond tier-1 stage than they used to do and stronger than their
competitors do (Beer 2011). There are several criteria based upon which the de-
cision is made as to whether the firm should engage in tier-n management. One
criterion used is the existence of a powerful tier-n (sub-)supplier who supplies
a less powerful tier-(n-1)14 supplier. In this case, the focal firm may engage in
price negotiations, may close the sourcing contract for delivery of the tier-(n-1)
directly with the the tier-n supplier, may support audits of the tier-n supplier,
and may chime in in case of conflicts between tier-n and tier-(n-1). That is, the
management of Supply Chain Management is emphasized to a greater extent,
which counters the assertation made by Choi et al. (2001) that “the actual struc-
ture of the SN is probabilistic rather than deterministic” (p. 359; emphasis in
original) and weakens the role of the “invisible hand”.
Accordingly, it is debatable if and to what extent supply networks exhibit
self-organization and emergence. Obviously, supply networks differ in their
characteristics; some networks might be closer to the “ideal” CAS than others
which exhibit rather deterministic and controlled patterns. The arguments put
forth by Choi et al. (2001) remain valuable as they indicate the need to assess
the network with respect to its ability to exhibit unexpected and possibly unde-
sirable behaviour.
2.4.5. Implications of Complexity for Bottleneck
Management
Different types of complexity can be traded-off against each other. For instance,
a company (such as a car manufacturer) may choose to use as many equal parts
as possible in all of its diverse models. Thereby, the company would reduce
the total number of different parts, leading to a significant reduction of detail
complexity. On the other hand, this measure increases the inderdependencies
between the components and different models into which the component is built.
Thus, the decrease in detail complexity comes at the price of higher dynamic
complexity. A change to the component in order to improve its fit in one model
14Read: tier-(n minus 1). This notation relates to a supplier downstream of a tier-n supplier, with
n being the stage of the supply chain.
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may trigger a series of changes to other models, which, in turn, may again lead
to the necessity to change other components, and so on. More importantly,
a higher share of equal parts in different products will influence demand and
capacity planning, the severity of supply shortages, and the effort and cost of
product recalls if it turns out that a common component is prone to defects or
even poses a threat to customer safety. In such a case, regular production would
continue while spare part production for the product recall would be increased
and thereby adds to capacity requirements. The recent case of Takata inflators
described in Section 1.1.2 is a case in point.
Complexity appears to be somewhat difficult to find access to in empirical re-
search. As indicated before, researchers have varying conceptions of what com-
plexity is. Measuring complexity does require its clear definition, though. At-
tempts to measure complexity are likely to break down this multifaceted concept
into simpler, more accessible parts which may allow measurement yet which
may not fully represent the theoretical construct of complexity, as discussed on
the preceding pages, any more. One instance is the (certainly worthwhile) ex-
ploratory attempt by Vachon & Klassen (2002) to link supply chain complexity
to delivery performance (Section 2.4.3; see also Figure 2.4.2 on page 58 for their
conceptual model of supply chain complexity). Due to a lack of sufficient data
support their study did not involve second and third tier suppliers or customers,
which, however, add to the complexity of the supply network for each addi-
tional node induces complexity through its interdependence with other nodes,
including with those outside the observer’s bounded vision. Arguably, the com-
plexity of supply networks is partly due to the interrelatedness of the various
echelons of suppliers as well as their connections to organizations outside the
direct supply network of the focal firm and their openness to influence from
organizations, markets, and environmental factors any single oberserver cannot
oversee. The approximation and simplification – and thus generally the decon-
struction and dissection – of complexity for the sake of accessibility to empirical
investigation arguably lets the complexity disappear, gives way to a reductionist
perspective, and lets the researcher focus his attention on aspects of a broader
phenomenon which he fails to describe.
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Therefore, identifying the impact of complexity on bottleneck management
is a problem. It can be presumed, however, that complexity does impact in the
ability to manage bottlenecks as it generally does impact on the ability to man-
age anything, as discussed in Section 2.4.4 on page 67. Complexity shall thus be
part of a theory of bottleneck management while it must be acknowledged that
its impact can neither be quantified nor otherwise be determined in any exact
way.
2.4.6. Systems Thinking and System Archetypes in Supply
Networks
Senge (2006) introduces a set of different system archetypes that describe com-
monly observable behaviour in a broad variety of everyday systems. As supply
networks have been characterized as systems – even as complex adaptive sys-
tems – it might be worthwhile analyzing supply networks with respect to the
existence of some of these archetypes. The relevance of this analysis lies in the
facilitated recognition of certain behavioural patterns and related fixes that are
intended to influence the behaviour of the system in a certain way – and often
are either ineffective or even reinforce undesired system behaviour.
People tend to interpret incidents in everyday life in linear ways. Problems
are perceived as events and can be resolved through the application of a fix.
Writer in systems thinking (e.g., Gharajedaghi 1999, Senge 2006, Morecroft
2007) point out that many fixes we can see being applied to solve problems
do not address the underlying causes of a particular incident but merely the
symptoms. The symptoms may then disappear for a while and the problem fix
may be considered a success. It may well be, however, that the symptoms will
appear again and require ever-increasing resources to apply the same fix over
and over; or the problem fix may lead to the appearance of entirely different
symptoms that are caused by the same underlying reasons which have remained
unaddressed. As Senge (2006) puts it: “Reality is made up of circles but we
see straight lines” (p. 73). Systems thinking emphasizes the need to understand
causes and events as connected through feedback loops: instead of seeing an
incident as an independent event, it shall be seen as the outcome of one or several
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other events that have occurred before. The phenomenon of interest may invoke
certain actions which, in turn, will influence the events that have led to the events
that have caused the phenomenon of interest. In short, incidents more often than
not are not isolated events but are part of cause-and-effect loops, often including
a delay.
The notion that immediate and seemingly obvious fixes can be misleading
and leave underlying problems unaddressed is of high relevance in industrial
production and supply chains. Without explicitly mentioning systems think-
ing and causal loops, Theory of Constraints (Goldratt & Cox 2004) emphasize
the importance of following up causal chains and addressing the true underly-
ing problems: Instead of increasing capacity and the level of automation in a
factory to resolve problems with long production lead times, the protagonist in
“The Goal” is advised to focus, for instance, on production scheduling and mis-
leading incentives for production workers. In the supply chain context, the beer
game that illustrates the bullwhip effect suggest that the actors generally suffer
from a lack of understanding of the broader implications of their actions. The
significant delay between their actions (ordering beer) and the effect they can
observe (beer is delivered) is one of the main hindrances to their understanding.
Senge (2006) identifies three essential building blocks of system archetypes:
reinforcing processes, balancing processes, and delays. All other system archetypes
than reinforcing processes and balancing processes (which are an archetype
in themselves) are comprised of a combination of these three building blocks.
Senge (2006, pp. 389 et seq.) lists 13 different archetypes.15 The purpose of dis-
cussing system archetypes is to facilitate and improve recognition of archetypes
in supply networks and ultimately to pave the way towards better (fundamental)
solutions instead of symptomatic “solutions” (Senge 2006).
Not all system archetypes are relevant in the context of this thesis and archetypes
shall not be discussed in detail. It was found important, however, to relate to this
concept as it enriches the discussion of management of supply networks.16
15As Senge (2006) points out, a lot of different people have contributed to the development of
the different archetypes and they have been discussed in a variety of publications.
16 Some that are relevant and can be related to situations observed in the practice of management
of supply networks are: Fixes that Backfire, Success to the Successful, Reinforcing Loops,
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2.5. Organizational Networks and Supply
Networks
2.5.1. Introduction
That the amount of literature on organizational networks is comprehensive is
certainly an understatement. In this section, some of the most crucial points
for the understanding of organizational networks shall be highlighted without
raising claims to completeness.
Many authors observe and describe an increased level of networking among
firms. The prescriptive stream of literature considers interorganizational rela-
tionships a solution for upcoming challenges such as increasing customer de-
mands, competitive pressure, or product complexity. Concepts from popular
management literature such as the focus on core competencies as proposed by
Prahalad & Hamel (1990) will necessarily lead to an increased number of in-
terorganizational relationships an organization has to deal with. Gulati & Kletter
(2005) consider an increased level of networking necessary to retain a competi-
tive edge. They suggest that firms focus on fewer activities and outsource larger
parts of their business. Hence, the authors propose essentially the same concept
that has been popularized by Prahalad & Hamel (1990) fifteen years earlier. If
firms follow this advice, it will lead to an increased number of vertical relation-
ships with firms that take over activities. The authors also argue for expanding
the value proposition that can be offered to customers through involvement of
firms that can offer complementary products or services, which would lead to
an increased number of horizontal relationships.
The broad stream of descriptive literature observes an increased trend to-
wards outsourcing and shifts in value-added. This trend has been discussed
in great detail in some industries in particular, such as automotive (Waldraff
2007, Semmler & Mahler 2007, Roehrich 2008, Rennemann 2007) and elec-
tronics (Sturgeon 2002). While the shift of value-added is seen by some as a
and Accidental Adversaries. Fixes that Backfire in particular can be related to several con-
temporary events, including the recent case of defective Takata inflators (see Section 1.1.2)
which some commentators trace back to cost saving attempts.
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potential measure to offload risk of volatile demand on suppliers, it comes with
different other risks, e.g., the risk that “that some control is relinquished to a
party who may not perceive the same concern with serving the end customer”
(Tsay 1999, p. 1340). Also, there might be performance trade-offs being in-
volved in outsourcing. As Weigelt & Sarkar (2012) report, firms may suffer
from lower adaptability to customer demands and requirements when outsourc-
ing the development and maintenance of technologically innovative solutions
for efficiency reasons.17 Cook (1977, p. 64) contends that networks (or more
general: exchange relations) form primarily due to two interrelated reasons: (1)
Organizations perform specialized functions and thus are part of a value-chain
and have to create ties to other organizations. (2) Resources are scarce and not
readily available to all organizations. This leads organizations to perform a lim-
ited set of functions which, again, makes organizations represent only part of
a value-chain and drives them into interorganizational exchange (cf. Levine &
White 1961). Even for a limited set of functions it may be necessary to obtain
additional resources from other organizations.
Thompson (1967) discusses the ability of individuals to maintain control
within an organization (pp. 132 et seq.). He contends that the notion of “om-
nipotent individuals” (as supposedly embodied by high-ranked managers) hav-
ing full control over all relevant actions within the organization is misleading
unless the degree of complexity is not higher than modest. Otherwise, individ-
uals have to seek cooperation. The arguments he makes for power and control
within an organization appear to be transferable to a network context to explain
network formation, i.e., relationships between organizations characterized by
coalition behavior. Thompson’s three arguments are (ibid, p. 133):
• “When complexity of the technology or technologies exceeds the com-
prehension of the individual”
• “When resources required exceed the capacity of the individual to ac-
quire”
17Furthermore, the authors propose that outsourcing for the sake of higher efficiency might have
diminishing returns with increasing levels of outsourcing, cf. Weigelt & Sarkar (2012, pp.
193-194).
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• “When the organization faces contingencies on more fronts than the indi-
vidual is able to keep under surveillance”
Arguments as to why organizations seek cooperation – just like individuals in
Thompson’s examples seek cooperation – can be made analogously.
The focus of this thesis is on supply networks. Networks often do share, how-
ever, certain characteristics regardless of the type of networks. The description
of networks in terms of nodes and ties, for instance, is universal whereas their
interpretation depends very much on the context, i.e., the exact type of network.
2.5.2. Conceptual Description of Organizational Networks
If organizations are looked at through systems thinking lenses, then it is im-
possible to say that there are not at least trivial relationship between any two
organizations as they can always be related, for instance, in terms of spatial
proximity (Hall & Fagen 1956, p. 18). Organizational networks, however, rep-
resent a set of organizations within the universe of organizations among which
relationships exist that are significant, “non-trivial”, and useful for the question
at issue. In most cases of organizational networks there will be implicit or ex-
plicit agreements defining the type of relationships that exist between any two
organizations. These can be helpful to delimit an organizational network from
its environment. Since organizations from within the network will normally
maintain relationships with organizations, institutional bodies, and other stake-
holders outside the network, i.e., from the network’s environment, the definition
of the organizational network’s boundary can be somewhat arbitrary. Thus, the
practical extent and the question who belongs can differ depending on the di-
mensions of interest.
Networks of organizations can be represented through a combination of nodes
and ties with nodes representing organizations and ties representing relation-
ships between organizations. Nodes are also referred to as “points” or “vertices”
and ties are referred to as “edges”. There are some fields of science making use
of this terminology, such as Graph Theory, Systems Theory, and Social Net-
work Analysis (SNA). In fact, these bodies of research provide a broad variety
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of concepts that can be applied to organizational networks and “Supply Chain
Management”, as increasingly many scholars have been doing in recent years
(e.g., Kim et al. 2011, Wagner & Neshat 2010, Borgatti & Li 2009, Choi & Kim
2008, Pathak et al. 2007).
For a conceptual description of organizational networks, a variety of proper-
ties is available for node-level description, for network-level description, and for
tie-level description.
2.5.2.1. Node-level Properties
Centrality One of the most obvious properties an organization (or more gen-
eral: an actor) has in a network is its level of centrality. The concept of centrality
plays a particularly important role in the analysis of social networks (Freeman
1979) but has increasingly gained from scholars from various branches of orga-
nizational and network science (e.g., Rowley 1997, Gulati et al. 2002, Kim et al.
2011). Centrality is a node-level property and positional descriptor character-
izing the relative position of an actor with respect to other actors. Depending
on type of centrality, branch of science, and question of interest, assumptions
can be made about the focal actor’s power, alternatives, and popularity or status
relative to other actors in the network (Brass & Burkhardt 1993, Rowley 1997,
Bonacich 1972). The crucial point here is that it is not the collective individual
attributes of the focal actor that provides him with a powerful position but the
structure of the network (Rowley 1997, p. 898) .
There are several distinct types of centrality, each of which can have differ-
ent implications for the relationship between the focal actor and other actors in
the network, among them degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, betweeness
centrality, and closeness centrality (Freeman 1979, Brass & Burkhardt 1993,
Borgatti & Li 2009).
Degree centrality is based upon the graph theoretical concept of degree of a
node. The degree of a node is the number of other nodes to which the node of
interest has direct ties (i.e., which are adjacent; Freeman 1979). That is, degree
centrality measures centrality by the number of direct ties an actor has to other
actors in the network (Jackson 2008); the more ties it has, the higher is its level
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of degree centrality. If directedness of ties is considered, a further distinction
can be made between in-degree centrality and out-degree centrality.
In-degree centrality is a measure of the number of ties going into the focal
node. A practical example are companies seeking cooperation with one partic-
ularly innovative organization (such as a research institution or high-tech com-
pany) whereby the innovative organization will show a high level of in-degree
centrality. That is, in-degree centrality can be used as a proxy for perceived
innovativeness or prestige – albeit with limitations as any attempt to interpret
network characteristics is context-sensitive.
Out-degree centrality, in turn, measures the number of out-bound ties from
the focal node. An illustrative example for high out-degree centrality would be
a supplier with many customers. If firm with high out-degree centrality turns
into a bottleneck, many customers may experience shortages at the same time.
Eigenvector centrality is conceptually related to degree centrality. It builds
on the notion that adjacency to a node that itself is very central tends to be more
important than adjacency to a peripheral node (Bonacich 1972, Wasserman &
Faust 2009). The concept of eigenvector centrality appears to be of particular
importance for questions of information flow. The concept of partner profiles is
related to eigenvector centrality. The idea is that characteristics of an adjacent
node affect performance of the focal node. Gulati et al. (2002, p. 292) associate
the potential benefit of status transfer with partner profiles.
Betweenness centrality is based on the graph theoretical measure of between-
ness which describes nodes lying on the shortest path (the geodesic) between
two non-adjacent nodes (Freeman 1979). High betweenness centrality thus in-
dicates that a node lies on many geodesics. Betweenness centrality can have a
wide variety of practical implications depending on the context. A node with
high betweeness centrality has increased potential to learn from, control, and
influence information flow between other nodes and thus can occupy the role
of a gatekeeper or broker (Kim et al. 2011). By the same token, such nodes
represent hubs and are thus structurally important in networks of material flow
(Borgatti & Li 2009). It would take increased effort to transfer material between
two nodes bypassing the intermediary on the geodesic – if this is possible at all;
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it might not if there is no other path between the two nodes representing origin
and destination of the material flow.
Closeness centrality can be understood as an indication of independence of
intermediaries when connecting to other nodes in the network; there are, how-
ever, different definitions of closeness centrality, some of which are of rather
general character (Freeman 1979). Closeness measures the sum of distances
to other nodes. Distance in this context means number of intermediary ties (or
“steps”) between two nodes (Borgatti & Li 2009, Kim et al. 2011). From a
practical point of view, closeness facilitates communication and spread of infor-
mation (Gulati et al. 2002).
2.5.2.2. Tie-level Properties
Types of Ties Borgatti et al. (2009) and Borgatti & Li (2009) discuss a ty-
pology of ties in a social network. They divide ties into four types: similarities,
social relations, interactions, and flows. These four types can be further divided
into continuous and discrete types of ties (cf. Figure 2.5.1). Continuous ties are
those that persist over the duration of the relationship, i.e., the tie is not repre-
sented by countable events, whereas this is the case for discrete ties which are
comprised of countable events.
It is not difficult to identify real-life situations in supply networks that could
be described in terms of continuous and discrete ties. Continuous ties exist
where long-term supply contracts exist. The duration of such contract periods
may cover several years, often as long as the product and maintenance life cycle
of a product. Instead of “social relations”, as termed by Borgatti & Li (2009),
such ties could be more specifically described as economic relations, however.
Discrete ties, on the other hand, can describe the economic relationships be-
tween buyers and sellers on spot markets.
Moreover, it seems that the concept of ties allows for different types of ties to
be nested: Within a continuous economic relationship, as formally established
by a sourcing contract, there will be deliveries of goods which are discrete
events. Depending on the manufacturing environment, the delivery of supply
could be almost continuous, as, for instance, in cases of frequent JiT deliveries
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Figure 2.5.1. – Typology of Ties in Social Networks (Borgatti & Li 2009, p. 7)
or in supplier parks of automotive OEMs where supplier and OEM factories are
located in close proximity and sometimes even are connected by conveyor belts
between their factories. In more discontinuous, project-based production envi-
ronments with lower frequency of deliveries which are formally specified and
covered by an enduring supply contract, the supply relationships could be best
described in terms of nested continuous and discrete ties.
Strong and Weak Ties The notion of strong and weak ties became popular
with the seminal article “The Strength of Weak Ties” by Granovetter (1973). The
strength of ties is a dyadic property (Gulati et al. 2002), i.e., they refer only to
the characteristics of the link between two nodes, regardless of other connec-
tions each of the two nodes may have with other nodes. The concept seems to
have been used mostly in the context of social networks. Granovetter (1973,
p. 1361) defines the strength of ties as a “combination of the amount of time,
the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal ser-
vices which characterize the tie”. Furthermore, Granovetter hypothesizes that
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the existence of strong ties correlates with the proportion of nodes “to whom
they will both be tied, that is, connected by a weak or strong tie” (ibid, p. 1362,
emphasis in original). Drawing on various researchers’ earlier studies, he infers
that strong ties are “breeding local cohesion” and thus “lead to overall fragmen-
tation” of communities (ibid, p. 1378). Weak ties, on the other hand, serve as
important means towards integration into social communities. In other words:
the central idea – which has become popular as „Strength of Weak Ties“ (SWT)
Theory – is that weak ties between individuals, as in the case of an individ-
ual („Ego“) and her acquaintance (as opposed to a close friend in the case of
strong ties), can function as a bridge between the group consisting of Ego and
her close friends and the group consisting of Ego’s acquaintance and his close
friends, thereby providing Ego with access to information from the other group
that it otherwise would not have been able to obtain. Accordingly, an individual
without weak ties will remain limited to the information available in its own
close group, separating it from the rest of society and leading to fragmentation.
Thus, the value of weak ties lies in their ability to provide connectivity between
an individual (and the group surrounding it) and another densely-knit group of
individuals, bearing the chance of new information: „The closely-knit groups to
which you belong, although they are filled with people eager to help, are also
filled with people who know roughly the same things that you do“ (Easley &
Kleinberg 2010, p. 47). Granovetter (1983) emphasizes that it is in their func-
tion of bridges between different social groups that weak ties are most valuable.
Structural Cohesion, Cohesive and Bridging Ties Structural cohesion
is a measure that is often used in Social Network Analysis (SNA) to identify
and describe subgroups. Different authors favour different formalizations of
cohesion, e.g., mutuality of ties, closeness of subgroup members, frequency of
ties among members, and relative frequency of ties among members compared
to outsiders (Wasserman & Faust 2009, pp. 251-252). Structural cohesion can
be seen as either a tie-level property (due to its being based on cohesive ties) or a
network-level property (due to subgroups’ being constituent parts of a network).
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Cohesive Ties: AB, AC, AD
Gulati, R., Dialdin, D. A., & 
Wang, L. (2002). 
Organizational Networks. 
In J. A. C. Baum (Ed.), 
Blackwell Companion to 
Organizations (pp. 281–
03). Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers.
Bridging Ties: AE, AF
Figure 2.5.2. – Cohesive and Bridging Ties (Gulati et al. 2002, p. 290)
Gulati et al. (2002) contrast cohesive ties and bridging ties. They define cohe-
sive ties as those that link the focal firm (“A”) with a second firm (“B”) which at
the same ti e has ties with (at least) a third firm (“C”) that maintains a connec-
tion with the focal firm (“A”). Cohesive ties are depicted in Figure 2.5.2 in the
relations AB, AC, and AD. A large number of cohesive ties within one section
of a network constitutes a subgroup. When all nodes are connected to all other
nodes in the subgroup, i.e., when there is complete mutuality, the subgroup is
called a clique (Wasserman & Faust 2009, pp. 253 et seq.).
A bridging tie connects one firm (“A”) with another firm (“E”) which has no
other connection with the first firm (“A”) in common. Bridging ties are depicted
in Figure 2.5.2 in the relations AE and AF.
2.5.2.3. Network-level Properties
Density, Structural Holes and Structural Equivalence The density
of a network is the ratio between all ties connecting nodes in the network and
the maximum number of ties possible in the network (Rowley 1997), excluding
loops and multiplexity. More formally and in terms of graph theory, “the density
of a graph is the proportion of possible lines that are actually present in the
graph” (Wasserman & Faust 2009, p. 101). Maximum density equals 1 and
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such a graph is called “complete”; if density equals 0, the graph is “empty”
(ibid, p. 102).
Again, the ties can be of different nature – as can be the network in the first
place. In a supply network, ties could be informal or formal communication
ties, supply ties (i.e., actual supply relationships), or even spatial distance.
In a way, the converse concept to density are structural holes. Burt (1995, p.
18) defines structural holes as follows:
”I use the term structural hole for the separation between nonredun-
dant contacts. Nonredundant contacts are connected by a structural
hole. A structural hole is a relationship of nonredundancy between
two contacts. The hole is a buffer, like an insulator in an electric
circuit. As a result of the hole between them, the two contacts pro-
vide network benefits that are in some degree additive rather than
overlapping.”
Dense networks have few structural holes whereas sparse networks have many.
Burt (1995) uses structural equivalence as one (imperfect) indicator for the
non-existence of structural holes and thereby points to another concept that po-
tentially has benefits for the analysis of supply networks. Structural equivalence
exists when two nodes relate to every other node in exactly the same way (Lor-
rain & White 1971).18 In the context of supply networks, two competing manu-
facturers are structurally equivalent if they are supplied by the same firms (and
supply the same customers, but it is the supply side that is of interest here).
2.5.3. Network Configuration, Performance, and Bottlenecks
One area of interest for bottleneck management is the effect of the supply net-
work structure on the likelihood and effect of the emergence of bottlenecks. As
indicated earlier and explained in detail in Section 2.4.4 on page 67, examin-
ing the effect of the network’s structure requires the researcher to abandon the
18“Objects a,b of a category C are structurally equivalent if, for any morphism M and any object
x of C, aMx if and only if bMx, and xMa if and only if xMb. In other words, a is structurally
equivalent to b if a relates to every object x of C in exactly the same ways as b does” (Lorrain
& White 1971, p. 63).
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notion of a supply chain and to accept the premise that supply processes are
organized in and dependent on networks of organizations that can, in fact, take
the form of complex webs.
Whereas concepts from (social) network theory have been used in research
branches such as sociology for a long time, researchers have begun to utilize
the concepts for analysis of bottleneck management related topics only in re-
cent years. Network research has recently experienced rising interest from the
research community in various fields as indicated by the number of publications
(Borgatti et al. 2009).
Different measures of networks and positional descriptors of actors in net-
works have been introduced in previous sections. In this section possible im-
plications of some of these measures on bottleneck management shall be dis-
cussed. This is not a well-developed research field and literature that directly
and explicitly discusses questions of network structure and its meaning for bot-
tleneck management is rare. Since network analysis has become so popular and
has been used in a great variety of research fields, there is plenty of literature
that does create causal relationships between network structure and outcomes
of some kind. In fact, as Borgatti et al. (2009) emphasize, it is „[p]erhaps the
most fundamental axiom in social network research (..) that a node’s position
in a network determines in part the opportunities and constraints it encounters,
and in this way plays an important role in a node’s outcomes. This is the net-
work thinking behind the popular concept of social capital (...)“ (Borgatti et al.
2009, p. 894). Some of this work, especially the share dealing with social
and economic networks, may be able to provide concepts and ideas that can be
transferred to supply networks and be analyzed with respect to their implications
for bottleneck emergence and management. Nevertheless, the interpretation of
network configurations and their effect on the outcome both of individual orga-
nizations and of networks remains challenging. Contributions to this field often
seem to be limited to theoretical reasoning rather than based on empirical evi-
dence (e.g., Oliver 1991, Rowley 1997). One of the challenges is that cause and
performance outcome are connected through rather indirect and often invisible
links. Construct validity problems may easily arise (Kenis & Oerlemans 2008).
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Provan & Sydow (2008) write:
“It is difficult to determine with any precision what specific out-
comes result from an IOR and what outcomes might have occurred
in the absence of an IOR. The problem is compounded by the preva-
lence of different theoretical perspectives for explaining IORs. For
instance, is the outcome financial as economists would claim, is
it enhanced power and resource acquisition capability as resource
dependence theorists would claim, or is it increased legitimacy as
argued by those adopting an institutional theory perspective? Fur-
thermore, the problem is complicated by questions about the ap-
propriate level of analysis. Who generates and appropriates IOR
outcomes? Is it the specific firm engaged in an IOR, the IOR dyad,
a more complex network of IORs, or even the hub firm organizing
a network of IORs?” (Provan & Sydow 2008, pp. 691-692)
Gulati et al. (2002) suggest that three characteristics of the networks and of
the firm’s position in the network are of importance for performance outcomes:
centrality, structural configuration of ties, and partner profiles, with whom he
associates various advantages for the focal firm.
Borgatti & Li (2009) point out that measures of social network theory can be
applied to both “hard” and “soft” links in supply networks. Hard links refer to
“technical” connections, such as material movement, whereas soft links refer to
personal relationships, information flow, etc. In fact, both the “hard” and the
“soft” dimension seem to be important for bottleneck management as organized
material flow is generally accompanied – and preceded – by information flow.
2.5.3.1. Node-level Properties and Performance Implications
Leavitt (1951) has examined communication patterns and group performance in
groups of individuals of different structure. His experiments show that while
groups with decentralized structure (as in a circle; cf. first illustration from the
left in Figure 2.5.3) provided higher satisfaction to its members such groups
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Figure 2.5.3. – Four Group Configurations (Leavitt 1951)
were outperformed in problem solving tasks by groups in which one actor ob-
tained a high centrality position (as in a wheel structure; cf. fourth illustration
from the left in Figure 2.5.3)19.
The given structure of the „wheel group“ more or less imposes a certain way
of organization with the central actor acting as a hub or leader – whereas in the
„circle group“ where all members are equal in terms of centrality no specific
form of organization is suggested. Leavitt (1951, p. 49) infers that „centrality
determines behavior by limiting independence of action, thus producing differ-
ences in activity, accuracy, satisfaction, leadership, recognition of pattern, and
other behavioral characteristics.“ While intuitive, however, this finding is in-
complete as later experiments showed that there are more variables that will in-
fluence the outcome (Borgatti et al. 2009, endnote 7). The idea that the structure
of a network and the centrality of its actors have implications for efficiency and
accuracy of information processing as well as for communication patterns may
be worthwhile discussing in the context of bottleneck management. Availabil-
ity of information and its accuracy are important determinants for the success
of supply network planning and maintenance. During the planning phase of
the supply network, suppliers need information about projected sales from their
customers so they can plan their production capacity. When the network has
become operational, suppliers need updated information about sales forecast on
a regular basis as well as accurate information about actual orders for their pro-
duction planning. The customer, in turn, needs information about the supplier’s
19Leavitt (1951) summarizes his observation of the group with the wheel structure in this sen-
tence: „the circle, one extreme, is active, leaderless, unorganized, erratic, and yet is enjoyed
by its members.“ (p. 46)
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ability to produce the quantities desired in the quality desired and to deliver it
within the time frame desired. These different sets of information require the
involvement of several organizational units. Involving the various information
sources requires time and effort and is likely to lead to inefficiencies and delays.
OEMs in some industries seem to have reacted by having created dedicated sup-
plier management departments which can combine streams of information and
information requirements from various sources and thereby enhance efficiency
of communication with suppliers. Such departments obviously hold a central
position both in terms of degree centrality and betweeness centrality and they
can take a leadership role in case combined effort is necessary to complete a
task or solve a problem. The interviews conducted in the course of the work on
this dissertation as well as from an earlier study in the automobile industry (cf.
Beer 2011) both suggest that the centralization of supplier management func-
tions has been influenced by the need for coordinated action and information
requirements.
Centrality is one of the characteristics which Gulati et al. (2002) attribute as
decisive for individual firms’ performance outcomes in networks, albeit supply
networks are not specifically discussed. They associate degree centrality with
higher cooperative experience and better capabilities to extract value from the
network (ibid, p. 288). The authors do admit, however, that “empirical evi-
dence on the linkage between degree centrality and firm performance is very
limited and mixed” and they infer that degree centrality cannot stand alone but
needs to be complemented by other centrality measures (Gulati et al. 2002, pp.
288-289). Closeness centrality is associated with information access as well
as with accessibility for other firms that may approach the focal firm to jointly
pursue opportunities. Betweeness is the third centrality measure discussed by
the authors. Betweeness centrality is associated with control of information and
resource flow, providing the firm with high betweeness centrality with a pow-
erful strategic position in the network. Due to their generality, the advantages
the authors attach to the three types of centrality do have implications for the
management of bottlenecks in supply networks, too. Information access is cru-
cial for the focal firm when appropriate measures are to be taken in the face of
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supply shortages. Control of network relations, e.g., the information exchange
between suppliers and possible competitors, is desirable, as is power so as to be
perceived by suppliers as important customer.
Mizgier et al. (2013) apply different measures from network theory in order to
assess their ability to identify those nodes which possibly pose an increased risk
of material flow interruption in a stylized supply network. Among the measures
they use are out-degree centrality, betweeness centrality, weighted betweeness
centrality, and radiality. Depending on the measure they apply, different nodes
in the network are indicated to be „important“. Each measure has one or several
advantages or disadvantages. Unfortunately, the analysis put forth by Mizgier
et al. (2013) lacks interpretation. That is, the authors do not explain the implica-
tions of, for instance, a supplier being highly interconnected with other suppliers
(in case of degree centrality). Network measures, however, have very different
implications depending on the context in which they are used. Thus, the topo-
logical properties of networks are almost only of relevance if they are seen in the
context of their practical meaning. A bank, for example, faces a very different
situation when its network connections represent relationships to banks which it
lent money and which own high-risk assets as compared to network connections
representing relationships to other banks from which it borrows money. In each
case, centrality may be high, yet the implications for the bank in the face of a
recession may be completely different. The same is true for supply networks.
Topological properties require further explanation if they are to be used as indi-
cation for the risk of unplanned bottlenecks. An OEM receiving material from a
broad range of suppliers will likewise show a high level of in-degree centrality.
In the latter case, however, in-degree centrality would not necessarily suggest
any desirable characteristic on side of the OEM. In the context of material flow,
it may have certain important implications, however, as the company has to inte-
grate a variety of incoming material flows. If the company with high in-degree
centrality is a supplier itself integrating incoming material flow from several
second-tier suppliers, there may be an increased risk of the company becoming
a bottleneck to its customer. One reason is that probabilities of failures multiply
if several components are to be integrated into one piece; i.e., the more incoming
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material flows there are that need to be integrated, the higher is the probability
that perturbations will arise. Therefore, “integrators” (Kim et al. 2011) deserve
some increased attention from their customers. That being said, the type of in-
bound ties makes a difference: High in-degree centrality can suggest a critical
point for material flow integration if most incoming ties are dedicated each to a
distinct material flow – as opposed to several ties providing the same material
as in case of dual- or multiple-sourcing strategies which obviously lower the
probability of a bottleneck arising.
Of particular importance for questions of material flow is betweeness central-
ity (cf. Section 2.5.2.1 on page 83). Nodes with high betweeness centrality tend
to be structurally important for the network. That is, if such a node fails, then in-
creased effort is necessary to bypass the failing node and maintain operations. If
the central node owns certain intangible assets that cannot easily be transferred
– or the transfer of which is not in the interest of the node – then interruption of
operations can be expected. This may be the case if the node in question holds
a monopoly for the goods it supplies. A focal firm’s dependency on sole supply
from a node with high betweeness centrality can thus be considered risky.
2.5.3.2. Tie-level Properties and Performance Implications
Cohesive ties constitute cohesive subgroups. Generally speaking, cohesive sub-
groups are found where companies are particularly well embedded in a subset
of nodes of a network. The implications for a focal firm depend on whether it is
part of that group or not. If the focal firm is embedded in such a group (or even
a clique), then it can possibly experience certain benefits for the management of
its supply. Such benefits are, for instance, higher level of mutual trust, higher
commitment of its suppliers, better information sharing, higher flexibility, and
better resiliency (Uzzi 1997). Configurations that correspond with the concept
of cohesive subgroups can be found in Japanese Keiretsus. Bhappu (2000) cites
research according to which the way industrial organizations in Japan function
must be explained by reference to the traditional Japanese family structure and
the way it used to govern its family business. Successful large-scale family
firms – called Zaibatsu – were broken up in the wake of Japan’s defeat in World
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War II. The parts into which the Zaibatsu were broken up were still linked by
strong social ties which continued to coordinate their action despite the lack
of common formal governance structure. Over time, this coordination has be-
come increasingly institutionalized to build what today is referred to as Keiretsu
(Bhappu 2000, pp. 410-413). In this context, Beer (2011) reports an example of
a supply shortage that has been resolved through a mutually beneficial deal. In
that case, a Japanese automotive firm was in short supply of glass panels. The
(Japanese) manufacturer of these glass panels also is a manufacturer of laptop
computers. The supply shortage could be resolved when the automotive firm
agreed to equip a significant number of employees with new laptop computers
from its glass panel supplier. Borgatti & Li (2009, p. 14) present an example
of Toyota’s supply network. The manufacturing facility of the sole supplier of
one component was destroyed by a fire so that Toyota’s production had to stop.
Due to good relationships between the individual firms in Toyota’s supply net-
work, several suppliers collaborated to enable the continuation of production
of the missing part within a short period of time. Borgatti & Li (2009) assert
that it is the density of the Toyota ego network that accounts for this successful
collaborative effort.
The situation is different if the focal firm is an outsider to the cohesive sub-
group. In this case, the focal firm may under certain conditions experience a
higher chance of supply irregularities. If a supplier faces capacity shortage and
has to allocate its insufficient remaining capacity, the focal firm may become
subject to lower prioritization as compared to members of the cohesive sub-
group.
2.5.3.3. Network-level Properties and Performance Implications
As to density and structural holes, there are several advantages and disadvan-
tages attached to having structural holes in one’s network, many of which are
related to the availability of non-redundant information. Individuals or organi-
zations filling structural holes may be able to enjoy a power advantage as they
serve as relay for information flow (Newman 2010). The advantages and dis-
advantages related to information flow are likely to be lower significance in the
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context of this study. Borgatti & Li (2009, pp. 13-14) theorize on the case that
a lack of structural holes in a supply network leads to high interdependence be-
tween various suppliers so that the supply stream to the buying firm can become
disrupted in spite of various simultaneous sources of supply.
Structural equivalence could represent a challenge for both supplying and
buying firms in the network. If two manufacturers are structurally equivalent,
the two buying firms may impose conflicting requirements on their suppliers,
which would lead to inefficiencies and increased communication requirements,
thereby increasing transaction costs. Also, the suppliers may have to set up
“firewalls” between accounts so as to prevent the transmission of confidential
information of one customer to the other. One customer may also be concerned
that the competing firm will benefit from his joint R&D effort with the supplier.
More importantly though, suppliers will have to make allocation decisions in
case they do not have enough production capacity or enough parts from their
suppliers to fulfill all orders from both customers on time, which can cause
supply interruptions for either firm or even for both firms.
Such a situation does not require equivalence; similarity or even one common
node in the supply network can already case perturbations. It is not uncommon
that suppliers not only have multiple competing customers within the same in-
dustry but also have customers from other industries. With automobiles increas-
ingly becoming mobile supercomputers, they share technology and parts with
products from completely different industries, such as consumer electronics.
2.5.4. Supply Networks as one Type of Organizational
Networks
Relationships can exist for a wide variety of purposes of which only a few are
interesting in the context of this dissertation. In supply networks, these are in-
formation flow, material flow, and financial flow. As Harland et al. (2001) put
it, the “primary purpose” of the organizations connected in supply networks is
“the procurement, use, and transformation of resources to provide goods and
services” (p. 22). Whereas information flow often occurs based upon merely
implicit agreements, legally binding contracts are almost always the basis for
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exchange of material and financial means. Such contracts do not necessarily
exist between the two parties directly involved in the exchange process but can
also exist between a focal company (such as the OEM) and a second-tier sup-
plier which has been selected by the OEM to supply its first-tier supplier (Kim
et al. 2011). This concept wherein an OEM controls the sources of material of
its direct suppliers is often referred to as “directed buying” or “directed sourc-
ing”.
Supply Chain Management (SCM) has become one of the dominant streams
of research in logistics. This term as such, however, appears to be misleading
as it has connotations of linear chains of organizations with sequential division
of work and only sequential interdependencies, managed by an entity mighty
enough to enforce rules and behavior comprehensive enough to be considered
management. Some authors assign quite noble goals to supply chain manage-
ment, such as the overall maximization of value (or ’supply chain surplus’) gen-
erated (cf. Tan 2001, Chopra & Meindl 2010), and thereby generate a mental
model of altruistic individual actors which are willing to sacrifice their own re-
turn for the sake of fair distribution of benefits among all supply chain partners
(Beer et al. 2012). In reality, many interorganizational relationships are likely to
be less romantic and more complex with a multitude of interdependencies not
only within supply chains but also between several supply chains that share cer-
tain organizations (Dubois et al. 2004). Section 2.4.4 (pp. 67 et seq.) discusses
supply networks from a Complex Adaptive Systems perspective; together with
the discussion of dependencies and interdependencies among firms in networks
(114 et seq.) it can be be conceived of supply networks as complex webs of
firms that neither exist nor do business in isolation but instead are character-
ized by a multitude of different ties among them. Supply chains thus appear to
be heavily simplified models which can’t explain certain behavioral patterns of
organizations. Extending the view to include lateral relationships to other sup-
pliers and competitors then provides answers which cannot be found within the
narrow perspective of the individual organization, the dyadic relationship, or the
supply chain.
In addition to the simplified conception of supply structures as chains, there
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is reason to question the attitude assigned to organizations towards candid co-
operation. Lonsdale (2001) remarks that the adoption of the expectations that
organizations would happily cooperate and share information indicates “a lack
of awareness of context” (p. 22) on side of lean management proponents who
transferred a Japanese attitude towards business cooperation to the West and
thus to a different behavioral context. Furthermore, it ignores opportunism ( the
existence of which is one of the fundamental assumptions of Transaction Cost
Economics, cf. Williamson 1975, 1979, 1985). This is not to say that close co-
operation does not exist; rather, it is suggested that a useful conception of supply
networks should be consistent without reliance on altruistic behavior. A tension
between overall optimization and local optimization exists in supply networks,
as it does exist even within many factories (Skinner 1974).
Peck (2005) points out another aspect of the popular supply chain notion that
does not correspond with reality. Optimization of information and material flow
for close collaboration requires stability which is hardly a typical characteristic
of many modern supply networks. In response to the“seamless supply chain
model” (Geary et al. 2002), she notes that
“It reinforces the notion of simplicity by promoting the vision of
a stable, controllable, linear, self-transporting flow, hermetically
sealed from disruptive environmental forces” (Peck 2005, p. 219).
In fact, an uncountable number of SCM publications begin with a vivid descrip-
tion of the ever-changing, complex market environment in a globalized and in-
terconnected world. Hence, many authors negate the conditions for stable sup-
ply chains before they continue to discuss the advantages of closer cooperation,
process integration, and other tenets of SCM. This tendency is fortified by the
prescriptive character that is prevalent in much of the literature on SCM. Steb-
bings & Braganza (2009) suggest that theories “that assume alignment, equilib-
rium or harmony” between organizations may be “inadequate for the future” (p.
28). The authors emphasize the importance of adaptive network configurations
as a means to deal with continuous change.
Johnsen et al. (2008) note about the origin of the term SCM:
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“The expression supply chains –– and, consequently, supply chain
management (SCM) –– appears to have been invented in the early
1980s, principally as a simplistic method of describing the much
more complex concept of a business network. It further appears to
have been started as a means of selling management consultancy
and early commentators do not offer much of a theoretical base.
(...) Despite its weak provenance, ’supply chain’ has been wel-
comed into business parlance worldwide. (...) SCM does appear
to have met success as an aid to selling management consultancy
services and recently attracted theoretical discussion, albeit lacking
consensus in its etymology.“ (pp. 71-72)
The “lack of consensus in etymology” of SCM becomes obvious when compar-
ing the broad variety of definitions of SCM that have emerged over time (see,
for instance, Tan 2001). This lack of precision makes the term arbitrarily us-
able in any situation where supply of goods, integration of processes, sourcing
decisions, change of delivery mode, supplier base reduction, etc. are involved.
One might argue that if one piece of material is the object of interest, then it
normally flows along a consecutive series of value-adding stages which could
indeed be described as a “supply chain”. In fact, New (1997) contends that
“supply chain” can be understood in three ways (of which the second one cor-
responds to the previous example):
1. “the supply chain from the perspective of an individual firm (as in ’ZipCo’s
supply chain’);
2. a supply chain related to a particular product or item (such as the supply
chain for beef, or cocaine, or oil); and
3. ’supply chain’ used as a handy synonym for purchasing, distribution and
materials management” (p. 16).
It will be argue that the third meaning of supply chain as proposed by New
(1997) is dominant, the first meaning is misleading, and the usefulness of the
second meaning depends on the context.
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2.5.4.1. The Notion of the Supply Chain from the Perspective of an
Individual Firm
As to the first meaning of supply chain as proposed by New (1997), it is evident
that firms do not normally deal with isolated and independent supply chains
(Beer 2011, Beer et al. 2012), nor do many firms have only one single supply
chain. Likewise, suppliers normally have more than one customer and sup-
ply performance can be affected by supply relationships with other customers.
Indeed, buying firms sometimes compete for supplier capacity and use their ne-
gotiating power to push suppliers to allocate a greater share of scarce capacity
in their favor. The automobile industry provides plenty of examples of powerful
OEMs competing for parts in short supply, e.g., microchips and glass panels for
GPS units.
Not only will most suppliers have several customers who can affect each other
in their decisions towards the supplier, but customers can also be part of very
different industries. The fact that firms compete across several industries can
lead to surprising effects both, for suppliers and buying firms –– but especially
for the latter. Strong demand for Apple’s iPhones and other popular consumer
electronics gadgets, for instance, can lead to part shortages and increased lead
times in the automotive sector as Apple (or Foxxconn, for that matter), Sony,
and other major consumer electronics producers may be more attractive and
lucrative customers for microchip producers than any automotive supplier (Beer
2011).
Apparently, it is not only the direct suppliers, or the suppliers of the direct
suppliers, that can cause perturbation in material and information flow; unex-
pected situations of material shortage in the supply network can be caused by
a variety of reasons, and many can be found outside the direct contractual rela-
tionships of a supply chain. Choi & Kim (2008) thus contend that more consid-
eration should be given to the network the supplier which the focal firm wants
to connect to is embedded in. It is not sufficient to examine the supplier in iso-
lation if realistic conclusions are to be drawn prior to sourcing decisions about
the supplier’s performance and its potential as the supplier’s own supply net-
work can indirectly, through the supplier, affect the buying company. Thus, the
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supply network the supplier depends on for its incoming material flow deserves
attention from the buying company.
The interest of the buying firm is to maintain an uninterrupted flow of all
material and information necessary to be able to conduct its operations while
maintaining or increasing operational efficiency. Many reasons for interrup-
tions in supply, however, can be found outside the operational boundaries of the
direct supplier which does emphasize the importance of a wider perspective on
the management of supply beyond a notion of linear chains. Supply Chain Man-
agement arguably provides the methodological tool kit for a wider perspective
that takes into account several value-adding stages since an inherent part of the
SCM concept is to look beyond the first tier of supply and “integrate”20 higher
tiers into the supply management perspective. In fact, several definitions of
SCM mention the entire chain of material and information flow from raw mate-
rial supply through end customer as object of management’s interest. Empirical
evidence that such a perspective is adopted in reality is scarce, though; in par-
ticular, automotive (Beer 2011), apparel, and electronics industry seem to focus
largely on their direct contractual partners with the latter two even being unable
or unwilling to prevent frequent incidents of child labor and life-endangering
working environments, as media reports reveal every other month.
Therefore, the notion of supply chains from the perspective of an individual
firm is not an adequate description of reality.
2.5.4.2. The Notion of the Supply Chain of a Particular Product or
Service
New (1997) suggests that “supply chain” can be understood as the physical flow
of a particular product or service. This notion seems to be straightforward as
the flow of one piece of material through several sequential value-adding stages
can be adequately described as a supply chain. It remains to be seen whether
this notion is useful, too.
Many non-trivial products in the manufacturing context consist of several
components which are assembled in a series of value-adding stages and even-
20“Integration” appears to be one of the tenets of SCM
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tually make up the final product. Many of the different components originate
from different sources (i.e., suppliers). A tier-3 supplier may receive a variety
of components which are then put together and delivered to the tier-2 supplier.
The tier-2 supplier, in turn, will combine the components delivered by several
tier-3 suppliers to a semi-finished good which will be delivered to a tier-1 sup-
plier. The tier-1 supplier, again, integrates a variety of components received
from various tier-2 suppliers before supplying the OEM for final assembly. The
material flow of each individual component can be described as a supply chain;
each individual supply chain will merge with another on the various tiers. For
such a supply configuration, the supply chain model seems to be no particularly
good representation of reality.
In contrast to the sequence of supply and assembly that has been described in
the previous paragraph, there are products which are not combined with other
products on the various value-adding stages. Some products are processed and
thus are transformed while the “chunk” remains the same. Other products are
delivered through a chain of carriers not for reasons of product transformation
but for logistical purposes as in some complex international trade with a variety
of different traders and distributors who take care of transportation, tariffs, and
country specific legal obligations. Examples are some agricultural products and
(illegal) drugs. The supply chain notion can be useful to describe the physical
flow of such products the core or chunk of which remains the same through
several value-adding stages.
In the manufacturing context where on many value-adding stages components
are processed and integrated with other components before they are delivered to
the next supplier, the supply chain notion captures only a peripheral part of the
whole picture which would be more adequately described as a network. There
is reason, however, to switch to a supply chain perspective if one particular
components becomes the object of interest. Such a situation would emerge,
for instance, in cases of part shortages where the bottleneck for the supply of
one particular component is to be resolved. Part shortages often exist for one
particular component and channeling an increased amount of attention to the
part in short supply is prudent. For the sake of practicality one may want to talk
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about the supply chain for, e.g., glass panels, leather, or microchips to clarify
where a part shortage has emerged.
Whereas the notion of supply chains for particular products or services seems
to be well established in business parlance, it seems to be of no great use when
identifying and eliminating bottlenecks. The reasons for the emergence of bot-
tlenecks in supply can often be found outside the direct supply chain of the part
in short supply. In fact, it may be difficult to understand the origin of the part
shortage unless one adopts a network perspective as the following points shall
demonstrate.21
Conflicting Requirements on Suppliers Suppliers normally have more
than one customer. Each customer may expect a supplier to adopt specific pro-
cesses, use certain software tools, employ and commit to standards. Also, cus-
tomers may expect supplier to commit to certain capacity reserves and perfor-
mance targets. In order to meet all requirements imposed by customers, suppli-
ers sometimes have to dedicate significant resources. The resources dedicated
to fulfill requirements from one customer may be missing when attempting to
fulfill requirements from another customer. Also, certain rules imposed by one
customer may conflict with rules imposed by another customer.
Competition for Supplier Capacity Depending on their product line, sup-
pliers may have several customers from the same or similar market segments.
That is, several customers may follow similar demand patterns as their market
segment is growing or declining. Suppliers producing for BMW’s 5-series may
also supply Audi for the A6 and Mercedes-Benz for the E-Class. Accordingly,
suppliers may face increasing capacity utilization when market demand for lux-
ury sedans is growing and several customers simultaneously increase their or-
ders. This tendency is fortified when several customers are supplied from the
same tools or the same assembly line. Additionally, one or several customers
may have market power that allows them to command guaranteed delivery ––
21The following arguments have been published in Beer et al. (2012). The original paper draws
on evidence from the automobile industry; the general implications, however, are likely to be
valid in a variety of manufacturing industries.
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on the expense of other customers. While suppliers would certainly hesitate to
admit that this happens, some customers are certain about their being disadvan-
taged with delivery of parts in short supply due to other (competing) customers
negotiation power (Beer 2011).
Cultural Influence and Loyalty Supply for many products is organized
on a global basis. The reasons are diverse; cost pressure may play a role for
global sourcing decisions, but sometimes specific production capabilities are
only available in certain regions. Such regions may have a certain cultural code
that differs from the cultural code of the customers. Much of the electronics in-
dustry, for instance, produces in Asian countries, predominantly China, Japan,
and South Korea. Leading Western electronics firms focus on the invention, de-
sign, and marketing of products while outsourcing the entire production process
(Sturgeon 2002). The relationships between firms in Asian countries like Korea
and Japan are influenced by different cultural patterns than they are in Europe or
the United States (Hofstede 1984, 1993, Bhappu 2000) and their organizational
culture differs accordingly (Schein 1990, 2009). Interorganizational constructs
like the Japanese Keiretsu have attracted much attention from researchers as
the implications for business can be significant (Teece 1996). Trust, possibly
fortified by institutional and societal sanctions, is one of the outstanding char-
acteristics of relationships within these networks (Hagen & Choe 1998). There
is reason to expect that firms embedded in such networks are not independent in
their decisions but that they are constrained due to their interorganizational rela-
tionships (Granovetter 1985) which – measured by the standards of the Western
observer – are often maintained for long periods of time. While this reduces
uncertainty for partners within such networks, it does increase uncertainty for
firms maintaining business relations with firms from within a Keiretsu while not
being part of it themselves.22 In cases of short supply, it can be expected that
22Uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of most transactions and is (essentially) due to incom-
plete information. It can be further divided into environmental uncertainty and behavioural
uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty is caused by difficulties of predictability in general
and by bounded rationality in particular (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997). Bounded rationality is
one of the key concepts of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and refers to the assumption
that actors do not have complete information and thus are limited in their rationality. The
104
2.5. Organizational Networks and Supply Networks
firms embedded within an interorganizational network like a Keiretsu – or even
just within the same cultural sphere – are more likely to find a solution for their
supply problems if the producer of the scarce parts in demand is also part of the
network.
Planning Horizon for Production Capacity In industries that produce
on a large scale – such as automotive – sales forecasts provide valuable informa-
tion for suppliers to plan production and adjust production capacity. Different
customers, however, tend to provide forecasts for differing time horizons, and
these differences can be significant. While some OEMs may provide forecasts
for, e.g., nine months, others provide forecasts for, e.g., only three months. In
addition to variances in time horizon, interviews with automotive suppliers have
shown that there are also variances in forecast quality between different cus-
tomers (Beer 2011).23 The consequence is that suppliers can have difficulties
planning their production capacity; accordingly, they may turn into bottlenecks
and some customers may face part shortages in spite of their providing their
suppliers with the necessary information on sales. The interviews showed that
suppliers seem to generally try not to let any particular customer down even
when their short planning horizon or unreliable data have led to perturbations,
TCE concept of bounded rationality thus contradicts the notion of rational decision-makers
as proposed in neoclassical economic theory. Because actors are limited in their rational-
ity they are unable to create and conclude contracts that provide for all contingencies, that
is, there will always be a certain amount of uncertainty remaining which can lead to higher
transaction costs. Looking at it the other way around, actors will have problems to create and
conclude complete contracts because the environment is uncertain and may change which
may make adaption of contractual agreements necessary and thus leads to increased trans-
action costs; Williamson (1979) asserts that “long-term contracts are necessarily incomplete
(by reason of bounded rationality)” (p. 241). Behavioural uncertainty refers to the difficulty
of predicting and assessing behaviour of other actors (Rindfleisch & Heide 1997 call this a
“performance evaluation problem”). Part of the problem is opportunistic behaviour which
TCE assumes to be a characteristic of human individuals and groups of individuals (organi-
zation). Williamson (1979) defines opportunism as “seeking advantage” or “self-interest in
guile”, which obviously implies incomplete information on the part of the contract partner if
successful.
23Also, there are differences in forecast quality for the same customer for different components,
which can create additional planning problems. In an earlier paper – Beer & Liyanage (2011)
– adjustment of production capacity flexibility rates for supplied parts with certain character-
istics was proposed.
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so capacity problems may impact all customers, even the most reliable ones, if
they arise (Beer 2011).
Indirect Demand from Competitors and Other Industries Many prod-
ucts share certain components although they may be from completely different
industries as high-tech components become part of everyday life in a variety of
ways. Cars, for instance, could be circumscribed as “computers on wheels” as
no modern car would be functioning without real-time data processing for en-
gine control and advanced driver assistance systems. Likewise, household ap-
pliances, air conditioning, security systems, and other devices and systems have
computerized components that, in their core, often build on the same technology
as cell phones or laptop computers. Accordingly, suppliers of microchips, glass
panels, human interface devices, etc., have acquired customers that traditionally
have not been part of their customer base; vice versa, OEMs have to manage
suppliers that traditionally have not been part of their supplier base.
For suppliers, a broad variety of customers from different industries can make
capacity planning even more challenging. For customers, unexpected part short-
ages may emerge when suppliers face capacity constraints and decide to fo-
cus their efforts on those customers that, for instance, pay the highest margins.
While some industries demand cutting-edge technology with product life cycles
shrunk to only some months, other industries demand relatively low-tech com-
ponents for their products as product life cycle extends over several years. The
first category of customers often pays high margins and constantly demands im-
provements in product performance whereas the second category of customers
will be supplied with the same product for several years. An example for the
first is consumer electronics, an example for the latter automotive. Accordingly,
supplying automotive firms is less attractive for some electronics production
firms than supplying consumer electronics firms such as Apple or Sony. Indi-
rect demand from consumer electronics, for instance, could therefore lead to
part shortages for automotive firms, especially when global production capacity
is limited, as it has been the case for semiconductor production in the wake of
the economic recovery after the 2007-2009 crisis.
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Supplier Ownership In their search for capital, some firms open up to in-
ternational capital markets. Additionally, large companies are looking to invest
their their capital internationally. Increasingly many lucrative German SMEs,
for instance, have been acquired by Chinese companies in recent years (Eis-
ert 2013-04-13). In some industries such as automotive, strong consolidation
among suppliers has taken place (Semmler & Mahler 2007). The ownership
structure of suppliers may not always be obvious at first glance and OEMs may
unwittingly source to suppliers owned by competing firms. Even if ownership
structure is known suppliers may be contracted for good reasons such as cost
competitiveness or unique quality promises. Conflicts of interest may arise if
suppliers have to allocate resources while several customers – the company
owner among them – are in short supply. The German automotive supplier
Angell-Demmel, for instance, had faced capacity shortages due to internal pro-
duction bottlenecks and was unable to meet the demand from several of its cus-
tomers, among them some German OEMs such as Mercedes-Benz and Audi.
Angel-Demell is owned by Faurecia, a large French automotive supplier, whose
largest share is held by the Peugeot Société Anonyme (PSA), the producer of
Peugeot and Citroën cars. With regards to complicated cross-ownership struc-
tures in some Japanese Keiretsus or multi-faceted industrial conglomerates in
other Asian countries such as China or South Korea, disadvantages in capacity
allocation are a possible threat to supply reliability, which may be fortified by
cultural influence and loyalty as described above.
2.5.4.3. The Notion of Supply Chain as a Synonym for Purchasing,
Distribution, and Materials Management
The third dominant interpretation of supply chain according to New (1997) is its
understanding as a synonym for purchasing, distribution, and materials manage-
ment. In fact, this seems to be the meaning that has been most widely adopted.
Supply Chain Management has become so dominant a term that among profes-
sionals and researchers alike many seem to consider SCM the more encompass-
ing term while logistics, for instance, represents only a subset of SCM tools and
concepts. Other consider the two terms equivalent and use them interchange-
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ably. Apparently, management parlance and associated media have, through
the ubiquitous use of the term, helped it dominate the much older and classical
term logistics in the perception of many. At least part of its success can be ex-
plained by the SCM field’s lack of conceptual clarity: its vague character makes
it easy to apply it to everything from transportation to integration of business
processes. Researchers have acknowledged the lack of conceptual clarity long
ago (cf. Cooper et al. 1997, New 1996, 1997), yet after about 30 years up to the
present day there is still no consensus as to a precise definition of Supply Chain
Management and “much writing in this area is based around a loose agreement
on a general theme” (New 1996, p. 19). New (1997) suggests that Supply Chain
Management is also characterized by a “’normative tension’ between the is and
the ought” (p. 16), i.e., the claims of what Supply Chain Management ought to
be according to its various (and often somewhat pompous) definitions and what
it actually is in practice indicate a gap that cannot be filled by academic explana-
tions of inadequate implementations in real life industry environments. Given
the handiness of a concept that is intuitively appealing for laymen and at the
same time vague enough to make a smart impression in a broad variety of busi-
ness situations, the success of the SCM concept is not surprising, its conceptual
gaps and broken promises notwithstanding.
2.5.4.4. Proposition About the Adequacy of the Supply Chain
Model
As it has become obvious from the preceding discussion, supply chain can be
a valid and useful model under certain circumstances. Its use in great parts of
the literature, however, does not distinguish between conditions where the sup-
ply chain model is a useful representation of reality and where supply network
would be the more adequate representation.
Borrowing terminology from critical realism, it can be stated about supply
networks that they contain both necessary and contingent relations between or-
ganizations. The relation between a buyer and a supplier is a necessary one.
If the buyer did not buy from the supplier, it would not be a buyer; the exis-
tence of a buyer necessarily requires the existence of a supplier (seller), and
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vice versa. There may be additional relations in a network, however. A supplier
may maintain additional relations and the existence of such relations may have
implications for the focal buyer-supplier relation. On a physical level, the sup-
plier might have obligations towards other buying firms, too. Other customers
might be competing for the supplier’s attention and capacity, and how success-
fully they compete can influence the focal buyer-supplier relationship. On a
social level, the supplier – and more specifically, the entities nested within the
supplier: the supplier’s employees – may have relations to and be influenced by
the culture of their home country to which they might adhere to varying degrees.
It is mostly the physical level of contingent relations that indicates the useful-
ness of a network model as opposed to a chain model of interorganizational
buyer-supplier relationships.
In the preceding paragraphs, three meanings of supply chain were explored
that New (1997) considers dominant in the literature. It was argued that the
notion of supply chains from the perspective of an individual firm is not useful
as firms in most cases will not deal with isolated chains but networks of sup-
plying firms. As to the second notion of supply chains of particular products
or services, it was argued that this perspective can be useful in cases where the
object of interest is a clearly distinct component whose main characteristics re-
main unchanged throughout the supply processes yet in many other situations
will not be a useful model for actual supply processes. As to the third mean-
ing, it was argued that the notion of supply chain as a synonym for purchasing,
distribution, and materials management is wide-spread but imprecise and not
scientific. Hence, not much seems to be won by adopting the popular notion of
supply chains and Supply Chain Management and only very deliberately will
these terms be used in this dissertation. The mental model conveyed by the
terms supply chain and Supply Chain Management appears to be misleading.
As indicated earlier in this thesis (Section 1.3), the ontology adopted for this
project is critical realism. A multiple-case study was selected as the method to
gather and work with empirical information. As Easton (2010, p. 123) points
out, “critical realist case approach is particularly well suited to relatively clearly
bounded, but complex, phenomena such as organizations, interorganisational
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relationships or nets of connected organisations”. He also notes that bound-
aries that were initially defined might need to be modified in the course of the
research. After all that was said about the (in-)adequacy of the supply chain
model, it seems apt to explicitly widen the boundaries of the research phenom-
ena of interest to include not only linear or even merely dyadic interaction and
effects but also the possibility of lateral effects so as to be able to explain and
interpret phenomena (such as the unexpected emergence of bottlenecks that can-
not be explained alone with incidents within a linear chain model) and actions in
bottleneck management. Limiting the boundaries to the supply chain, important
information – including relevant entities – would likely not be included in the
investigation as they are pushed outside the researcher’s too narrow window of
attention.
This section addressed aspects of research question 7. Strong and to some
extent certainly provocative statements were made in this section. The reasoning
was based on a review of literature as well as on evidence from an earlier study
in the automobile industry. The collection and analysis of empirical data in a
later part of this project may provide further evidence that will put the claims
made in this section to a test.
2.5.5. Aspects of Interorganizational Networks
2.5.5.1. Relationships between Organizations in
Interorganizational Networks
Interorganizational networks can appear in a broad variety of forms, some of
which can be close to what is often termed a supply chain while others can
be very different. To some extent, it is a matter of the perspective that makes
something appear to be a chain or a network (cf. previous chapter). If taking
a material flow perspective, one discrete piece of material or one part always
flows between the source organization and the destination and thus the product
flow can be adequately represented through the notion of a supply chain. For
products consisting of more than merely one piece of raw material that is pro-
cessed on different stages of a supply chain, several different chains will supply
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one common destination (e.g., the OEM); however, the same principle holds
true for different value-adding stages in the process, i.e., for tier-1 suppliers,
tier-2 suppliers, etc.). The organization “managing” its supply thus deals with
a variety of chains. Such chains are not always independent of each other but
often have several links in common. Therefore, it may be more adequate to talk
about networks instead of chains if the management of supply – as opposed to
the material flow between two or more organizations in a linear setup – is the
object of interest.
In manufacturing networks within industries operating close to the techno-
logical edge, i.e., industries dependent on R&D and aiming at innovative or
high-tech products, it is more than the technical setup of material flow that is
important to make an interorganizational relationship successful. Organizations
engage in coordinated relationships for different reasons with different objec-
tives. In the best case, objectives of all organizations within an interorgani-
zational engagement are complementary or identical (or at least congruent to
the greatest extent). In such a case, cooperative behavior can be expected so
that transaction costs are low and the relationship is most beneficial. Identical
objectives are also an underlying assumption of SCM as authors attribute an
altruistic mindset to members of a supply chain. (cf. Chopra & Meindl 2010,
p. 22 for an example). While it seems straightforward that all members of a
supply chain are interested in making profits, it is debatable whether they are
mainly or exclusively interested in their own financial results or in the financial
results of the entire supply chain – or whether it is a matter of distribution of
bargaining power (Crook & Combs 2007). Even within the relatively simple
setup of supply-demand relationships, objectives can, however, be conflicting
in spite of organizations agreeing on the broad setup of the relationship and
having entered into the relationship by their own choice. Firms trying out dif-
ferent business models, for instance, may face resistance from their sometimes
larger suppliers as the latter may have to cope with greater bureaucratic hurdles,
lower flexibility, different governance structures, different intrinsic motivation,
different organizational culture, different leadership mindset, etc. The case of
Riversimple, a UK-based start-up, provides an example for possibly diverging
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objectives in supply-demand relationships.24
Riversimple wants to sell mobility – a concept based on a different business
model than selling cars. In its pursuit of sustainable business, the company ex-
tends its responsibility beyond production and sale of cars; in fact, Riversimple
does not sell cars to consumers but leases them out. While service and repairs
are important business for most common car manufacturers, it is a financial bur-
den for Riversimple. Instead of having the customer pay for service and repairs
when they occur, Riversimple charges a monthly fee that covers all costs the
customer would normally have to bear except for fuel (the cars run entirely on
hydrogen). Hence, Riversimple is best of when all cars are working normally
and no need for repairs arises. This creates strong incentives for Riversimple’s
engineers to develop high quality reliable products – as opposed to other car
manufacturers that benefit from product failures after warranty is over and thus
do not have similar incentives. Riversimple does face a challenge, though: If
it maintains ownership of all cars and just leases them out, this would be going
to inflate the company’s assets. To avoid huge amounts of assets in its balance
sheet, Riversimple tries to convince its suppliers to maintain ownership of cer-
tain components and lease them out to Riversimple. Apparently, not all suppli-
ers embrace this concept as it threatens their traditional business model: selling
stuff. As a small company, Riversimple does not represent a large share of sales
for most suppliers and its bargaining power is limited. Therefore, Riversimple
and some of its suppliers are likely to continue to face diverging objectives as
important differences are rooted in conflicting business models.
Companies may enter interorganizational relationships for different reasons
and engage in different activities. Supply-demand (or more general: logistics)
is but one area where firms can engage, but even here there is a variety of dif-
ferent parameters that determine the quality of a relationship. Manufacturers
purchasing off-the-shelve products from a perfectly competitive supplier mar-
ket can maintain a more distant relationship to their suppliers than manufac-
24The information about the Riversimple case were gathered during the research project Sustain-
Value over a period of three years. Data were provided verbally by two founders and one
leading engineer on several occasions, both formal and informal. The case was not part of the
multiple-case study conducted for this thesis and serves only as an illustrative example.
112
2.5. Organizational Networks and Supply Networks
turers purchasing fully customized built-to-order products from a monopolistic
technology pioneer. Even if organizations engage in a relationship in order to
secure supply of raw material for its own production or assembly, the interor-
ganizational relationship will never be limited to just one single aspect. The
supply relationship represents but one tie among several. The existence of a
variety of ties which exist in parallel between two organizations is called multi-
plexity (Borgatti & Li 2009). Even for a supposedly clearly delineated network
category like supply network there are additional specifications to be made in
order to be precise. Organizations can receive a variety of sorts of supply from
water supply to office supplies to actual production input, each of which may
have different requirements for management and are of different interest for the
present examination. When being more precise and using the term supply net-
work exclusively in the context of delivery of production input (raw materials),
further distinction can be made between contractual relations and actual mate-
rial flow as organizations may receive materials from other organizations with
which they do not have any contractual relationship on their own but which are
appointed through directed sourcing agreements (Kim et al. 2011). In such a
case, a tier-1 supplier can receive material from one or several tier-2 suppliers
which have been appointed by the OEM and which are contractually bound to
the OEM. This type of tier-n management has generally been avoided in some
industries (such as automotive) as it contributes to higher complexity and higher
transaction cost (the OEM may be regularly involved when problems between
tier-1 supplier and tier-2 supplier need to be resolved) but has gained more at-
tention in the past couple of years (Beer 2011). Since the focus of this thesis
lies on problems of material flow tier-n aspects such as directed sourcing are not
discussed in detail.
Definition 2. In the context of this thesis, a supply relationship as the basic
dyadic module of a supply network is defined as a relationship established
through contractual agreement and aiming at the directional transfer of mate-
rial intended as production input from a supplying company to a demanding
company in exchange for money or other means of payment, other potential ties
leading to multiplexity notwithstanding.
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2.5.5.2. Dependencies, Interdependencies, Power, and
Governance Mechanisms
When organizations work together and maintain relationships that go beyond
market-based ad hoc relationships, i.e., relationships that are sustained for the
medium or long term, they may develop embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) and
interdependencies on one another (Provan 1993). Such interdependencies de-
velop directly among organizations that have some type of regular exchange of
information or goods, i.e., within what is often referred to as supply chains,
and they can indirectly affect organizations that do not have a direct contrac-
tual or transactional relationship with each other but are related through com-
mon partner organizations or, more generally, common interest or fate. That is,
interdependencies exist not only within but among different chains of relation-
ships (Dubois et al. 2004, Provan 1993). Where interdependencies exist, some
type of coordination – or more specifically: governance of this interdependence
(Grandori & Soda 1995, p. 187) – is required so effort of either organization
can be directed towards the right goals.
In his well-cited book, Thompson (1967, pp. 54-55) distinguishes between
three types of interdependence25: pooled interdependence, sequential interde-
pendence, and reciprocal interdependence.
Pooled interdependence refers to a situation in which “each part renders a
discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole” (ibid,
p. 54) and thus is indirect by nature, which can apply to the case, for instance,
25While Thompson (1967) is mainly concerned with interdependence of parts within an orga-
nization, his concept of interdependence can be applied well to interdependence of different
organizations or groups of organizations. On the one hand, his three types of interdepen-
dence describe logical connections that can be understood independent of the context of
organizational theory; on the other hand, the generation of value-added in many industries
is distributed vertically and horizontally to a greater extent, i.e., the value-adding functions
that used to be represented by one organizations are represented by a group (or network) of
organizations, hence making the application of Thompon’s concept of interdependence ap-
propriate for application. Lazzarini et al. (2001) propose that sequential interdependencies
have been subject to what is often referred to as Supply Chain Management, i.e., the analysis
and management of sequential vertical relationships, whereas pooled and reciprocal interde-
pendence are dealt with in network analysis, by which the authors understand the analysis of
firms among which there are mainly horizontal relationships.
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of a supplier network where parts of low quality supplied to the OEM by one
supplier lead to poor reputation of the product, and, eventually, lower sales and
thereby adversely affect business of other suppliers that may not even know the
supplier responsible for this effect.
Sequential interdependence is asymmetrical and refers to a situation where
one part is directly dependent on another part, normally coupled with a temporal
delay, as it is the case when the work output of one organization serves as the
work input of another organization.
Reciprocal interdependence refers to a more circular situation in which “the
outputs of each become inputs for the others” (ibid, p. 55). These three types of
interdependence are not mutually exclusive, as Thompson emphasizes, but can
be represented on a Guttman scale (Guttman 1944):
“[A]ll organizations have pooled interdependence; more compli-
cated organizations have sequential as well as pooled; and the most
complex have reciprocal, sequential, and pooled. Knowing that
an organization contains reciprocal interdependence automatically
tells us that it also contains sequential and pooled interdependence.
Knowing that an organization contains sequential interdependence
tells us that is also contains the pooled type. Knowing that an or-
ganization contains pooled interdependence, however, does not tell
us whether it has the others” (Thompson 1967, p. 55).
Where interdependence exists, action needs to be coordinated when unintended
(and potentially adverse) effects are to be avoided. Coordination can be difficult
within an organization consisting of several interdependent parts; but as opposed
to networks of organizations where there normally is no governing organization
that can freely impose rules on other organizations in the network and can expect
obedience, the governance of individual organizations with internal hierarchy
can make coordination relative easier compared to networks of legally indepen-
dent organizations. Indeed, Williamson (1992) emphasizes fiat as an important
characteristic of hierarchies (i.e., governance forms of individual organizations).
The term Supply Chain Management suggests that focal firms can, to a certain
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extent, “manage” their sources of supply. As indicated earlier, however, supply
chains do rarely exist but are, in fact, networks, which again leads to even more
difficult management due to the various interdependencies that can exist – even
between organizations that do not sustain or have ever had a direct relationship.
The question arises how networks can be managed at all and what exactly can
be understood by “managing a network”. Ritter et al. (2004) suggest that sin-
gle organizations do not normally control networks and that networks rather are
self-organizing systems. Organizations do, however, “confront different types
of relationship and network management situations, including those when they
are in a powerful and controlling position, those when they are subject of oth-
ers [sic] control, and those in which multiple parties have strong influence over
each other” (Ritter et al. 2004, p. 177). This argument is broadly in line with
Harland & Knight (2001) who point out that the dichotomy between the two
extreme positions on network management often referred to in the literature –
organizations either merely “cope” with the network according to one stream
of literature, or they control the network according to the other stream – is not
necessarily reflected in practice and that organizations can employ “different
types and varying degrees of intervention that [represent] more or less proactive
forms of network management (...)” (p. 486). Harland et al. (2001) suggest that
it depends on the value the focal firm adds to the network through volume and/or
innovativeness whether the firm will merely cope with or actively influence its
network.
As for coordination of interdependent parts, Thompson (1967) suggests three
different types of coordination which refer to the three types of interdependence
he introduces (cf. p. 114): coordination by standardization, coordination by
plan, and coordination by mutual adjustment.26 The different types of interde-
pendence and the related types of coordination are displayed in Table 2.5.1 on
the facing page.
Thompson also suggests that the cost of coordination differs among the dif-
ferent coordination approaches and is increasing from coordination by standard-
26Thompson credits March et al. (1958) for the three types of coordination of which he modified
the names.
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ization (lowest cost due to lower amount of communication necessary and less
frequent decisions) to coordination by plan (more frequent communication and
decisions necessary than for coordination by standardization yet less frequent
than for coordination by mutual adjustment) to coordination by mutual adjust-
ment. Mutual adjustment is the most dynamic and difficult to manage form of
coordination and requires a high degree of managerial involvement and hence
cost. Such coordination cost can be seen as part of transaction cost. The reason
is that coordination attempts are not ends in themselves but are embedded in
a broader context, or simply put: something will be coordinated for some pur-
pose. That is, coordination is necessary if, for instance, products and services
are exchanged or produced, when resources are shared or distributed, or when
common strategic plans are devised (Williamson 1979, pp. 239 et seq.,1981,
p. 563). Williamson (1979, 1981) assigns three attributes to transactions: fre-
quency, uncertainty, and asset specificity. As indicated by Thompson (1967)
(cf. Table 2.5.1), reciprocal interdependence requires the highest frequency in
decision-making and communication and thus involves higher cost. Further-
more, uncertainty is higher in situations of complex interdependencies which
makes successful coordination less likely and can lead to higher transaction
cost. With respect to the determinants of adequate coordination mechanism
for interdependence among different organizations, Alexander (1995) considers
what Thompson (1967) proposes for interdependence among work units within
one organization too simplified. Alexander (1995) contends that in interorgani-
zational relationships it is not only the type of interdependence that determines
the appropriate form of coordination, but rather a combination of the specific
characteristics of the transactions between the two organizations and the type
of interdependence in combination (p. 33). Thus, Alexander’s argumenta-
tion is in line with the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) view proposed by
Williamson: Williamson (1992) suggests, for instance, that vertical integration
without high degree of interdependency between two organizations should be
avoided (p. 344). That is, transaction cost does not suffice all information re-
quirements when the most economical form of governance is to be selected and
it is necessary instead to consider interdependencies.
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Where transaction cost is high, different forms of governance may be efficient
than when transaction cost is low (Williamson 1991). Organizations affected by
high transaction cost due to complex interdependent relationships may there-
fore consider resolving some of their dependencies through vertical integration
– or a different form of governance in the network. A wide-spread assertion
from proponents of Transaction Cost Economics is that any form of network
governance can be seen as an intermediate (or hybrid) form between the two
poles market and hierarchy (Williamson 1991). While hierarchy refers to a
fully integrated organization that is not dependent on transactions with other or-
ganizations to produce its desired output, market refers to a form of governance
where firms interact on ad hoc basis and receive all information necessary for
their (non-repetitive) transactions from market prices. The dichotomy between
markets and hierarchies can be traced back to Coase (1937).27 Some researchers
disagree with the assertion that markets and hierarchies are the poles between
which there is a continuum on which all other forms of governance lie. In par-
ticular, Williamson’s “rule” – “try markets, try hybrids, and revert to vertical
integration only for compelling cause” (1985, 1992) – is questioned. Powell
(1990) calls this notion a “distortion of historical and anthropological evidence”
(p. 298). Grandori & Soda (1995), too, disagree with Williamson and main-
tain that neither coordination processes nor structures of networks have to lie
between the two poles.28
Provan & Kenis (2007) have analyzed different modes of network governance
with respect to their effectiveness in different settings. The settings vary in (i.e.,
the independent variables are) (1) the level of trust distribution among network
participants29, (2) the number of participants, and (3) goal consensus among
27Coase (1937) has approached the question as to why firms (i.e., coordination as “the work of
the entrepreneur”) have emerged in some cases whereas markets (i.e., coordination as “the
work of the price mechanism”) have remained the dominant governance form in other cases
by reference to the cost of exchange transactions.
28Grandori & Soda (1995) appear to disagree not only with Williamson’s notion of networks as
hybrid forms but also with Powell’s conception of networks as a third form: “Both approaches
stress, in an unnecessary way, some interesting properties of networks at the expenses of
others” (p. 184).
29Level of trust distribution refers to the question whether trust is rather widely and equally
distributed among network participants or rather to be found in subsets of the network such
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network participants. Combination of these variables can serve as a proxy for
certain levels of complexity in decision-making and requirements on commu-
nication, and hence for coordination cost.30 Conclusions to be drawn for the
appropriate form of network governance can thus be assumed to be comparable.
Provan & Kenis use one additional output variable besides the proposed form
of network governance: the need for network-level competencies for network
participants which itself can be understood as a proxy for coordination require-
ments. The three forms of governance Provan & Kenis (2007) propose are
1. “shared governance”,
2. “lead organization”, and
3. “network administrative organization”
which, in this order, are considered to match increasing levels of network com-
plexity. Shared governance refers to a governance form where no participant
in the network carries higher responsibility for the effectiveness of the network
than other participants. Lead organization refers to the situation that one orga-
nization in the network accepts (or actively claims) higher responsibility for the
network outcome. The automobile industry can serve as an example since in
many cases the auto manufacturer “manages” its suppliers and takes extended
responsibility for the entire network’s success. The third form, governance with
a network administrative organization, refers to a situation where one exter-
nal organization is dedicated to network organization and coordination. Such a
form of governance can be found in public-private partnerships and is related
to the idea of fourth-party logistics providers. There are certainly other mixed
forms that might be in place in practice, such as governance with a division of
as dyads. The other input variables are self-explanatory.
30The parameters cannot necessarily serve as a proxy for high interdependence, however, since
this would require information about the nature of the ties between the different organizations
in the network (Provan 1993). Until this point, it has been assumed there is interdependency
among organizations in the network but it has not been discussed what the reasons for this
interdependency might be. Provan & Kenis (2007) do, however, mention different levels of
interdependence that require different levels of network-level competencies (pp. 12 et seq.).
Hence, it seems that complexity and interdependence are assumed to be positively correlated
which underlines the conclusions drawn here.
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responsibility between an internal and an external lead organization. For their
analysis, the authors focus on selected extreme cases, however. They assert that
each governance model has its distinct strength and weaknesses and should find
application in different situations. Table 2.5.2 displays the forms of network
governance they propose for different configurations of input variables.
Gereffi et al. (2005) introduce a different typology of governance forms for
networks. They use the combination of three independent (input) variables –
1. complexity of information and knowledge transfer,
2. codifiability of information and knowledge to be transmitted, and
3. capabilities of actual and potential suppliers
– to identify five distinct forms of governance for “global value chains”. These
forms are
1. markets,
2. modular value chains,
3. relational value chains,
4. captive value chains, and
5. hierarchy,
i.e., three forms of governance are conceptually located between markets as one
pole and hierarchy as the other. Besides the form of governance that is likely to
emerge, they define two additional dependent (output) variables:
1. level of explicit coordination and
2. power asymmetry.
While markets and hierarchy have been described above, the three remaining
forms of governance require explanation.
In a modular value chain, a supplier in tier-1 position is responsible for the
production and delivery of modules consisting of several parts which in earlier
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times might have been supplied to the OEM separately by several individual
suppliers. This form of governance can be found in automotive production net-
works where tier-1 suppliers can be responsible to deliver an entire dashboard
or fully assembled seats. With reference to Sturgeon (2002) who describes the
same pattern for the electronics industry, the authors label such modular suppli-
ers turn-key suppliers. Relational value chains is a description for networks of
suppliers and customers with high levels of interdependence, asset-specificity,
and switching costs. The last form of network governance is called captive value
chain and describes a network relationship where the supplier experiences high
degree of dependence on his customer as well as high switching costs. The cus-
tomer plays the leading role in this type of relationship and imposes clear rules
and requirements on its supplier. The forms of network governance as proposed
by Gereffi et al. (2005) are summarized in Table 2.5.3.
Another aspect of interdependence that has been brought into discussion by
Casciaro & Piskorski (2005) is the distinction between power imbalance and
interdependence, where power imbalance refers to a predominantly one-way
dependence relationships. According to the authors, significant power imbal-
ance in a dyadic relationships suggests that no structural (governance) changes
in the relationships between the two actors are likely to happen since the pow-
erful actors will deny attempts of the dependent actor to reduce his uncertainty
and dependence. Conversely, if the relationships is characterized by mutual de-
pendence, i.e., interdependence, governance changes are likely to happen since
both actors strive to reduce uncertainty.
Gulati & Sytch (2007) build on the dichotomy introduced by Emerson (1962)
and further elaborated within the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) context
by Casciaro & Piskorski (2005).31 They bring together the concept of interde-
31In its formal version, Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) originates in Pfeffer and Salan-
cik’s 1978 book “The External Control of Organizations” (reprinted as Pfeffer & Salancik
2003). Similar to the Resource-Based View (RBV), RDT deals with resources and the depen-
dency on the organization’s environment due to unequal distribution of resources; and similar
to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), RDT suggests that organizations attempt to reduce
uncertainty through changes in organizational structure and coordination mechanism.
The focus of RDT is set on the organization’s environment and the behaviour of organiza-
tions in the RDT framework is explained by reference to power and dependency over or on
the environment, respectively:
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pendence and embeddedness and argue that interdependence between two orga-
nizations will improve their performance through the logic of specific elements
of embeddedness – joint action, trust, and improved information exchange.
Hence, interdependent organizations achieve a stable and mutually beneficial
relationship.
This perspective is broadly in line with Cook (1977) who argues that “ac-
tors prefer exchange with equally powerful actors because there are fewer costs
attached to the exchange process” (p. 67). By power Cook (1977) refers to
bargaining power as the converse of resource dependence. Equally powerful
organizations thus would be mutually dependent.32 This notion, however, is
countered by Casciaro & Piskorski (2005) with their proposition that interde-
pendence will let the organizations of the dyad face conflict and increased trans-
action costs in response to which they will intensify cooperation to improve their
situation.
Grandori & Soda (1995) describe ten coordination mechanisms that networks
of organizations can employ:
• communication, decision, and negotiation mechanisms,
• social coordination and control (“(...) in the sense of deep and stable
“A good deal of organizational behavior, the actions taken by organizations, can be
understood only by knowing something about the organization’s environment and
the problems it creates for obtaining resources. What happens in an organization is
not only a function of the organization, its structure, its leadership, its procedures,
or its goals. What happens is also a consequence of the environment and the
particular contingencies and constraints deriving from that environment” (Pfeffer
& Salancik 2003, p. 3).
Pfeffer & Salancik (2003, p. 3) further emphasize that dependence on the environment is not
problematic as such:
“Problems arise not merely because organizations are dependent on their environ-
ment, but because this environment is not dependable”.
In this respect, RDT is very similar to TCE as dependency and uncertainty are important con-
cepts in both theories (Nienhüser 2008, p. 12). RDT can also be considered a complement
to RBV as Medcof (2001) suggests (p. 1002). The important characteristics of resources that
create sustainable competitive advantage and constitute the core of the RBV tenet make an
organization powerful with respect to other organizations which depend on such resources.
32In fact, they could also be completely independent to become equally powerful in terms of
resource dependence.
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relationships based on group norms, reputation and peer control (Ouchi
1979, 1980)” (Grandori & Soda 1995, p. 194)),
• integration and linking-pin roles and units (e.g., consortia for complex
projects, interlocking directorates),
• common staff (e.g., “resident engineers” of automotive suppliers in OEM
facilities),
• hierarchy and authority relations (organizations in networks may to some
extent exert authority over one another, e.g., in franchise relationships and
also in some supplier-buyer relationships),
• planning and control systems (e.g., audits),
• incentive systems (e.g., profit sharing schemes, property rights agree-
ments),
• selection systems (e.g., sourcing criteria33),
• information systems (e.g., EDI and shared forecasting data), and
• public support and infrastructure (e.g., to control the use of shared re-
sources; the authors refer to the “tragedy of the commons” problem, cf.
Hardin 1968).
Grandori & Soda (1995) suggest that in different networks (and in different
types of networks) these coordination mechanisms vary in their combinations,
their degree, and the degree to which they are formalized, e.g., in contracts.
They analyze different types of networks with respect to these two dimensions,
distribution of coordination and degree of formalization. As to coordination,
the authors distinguish central, asymmetric forms of coordination and parity-
based, or symmetric, forms of coordination. In their analysis, central forms of
33“Even on the basis of casual observation of networking behaviour among firms, we can formu-
late the testable hypothesis that the broader the scope of cooperation, the stricter the rules of
access will be” (Grandori & Soda 1995, p. 196).
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coordination seem to be deliberately chosen by powerful actors who thereby are
better able to exert and extend their influence and will.
A notion widely adopted in literature on dependence and interdependence
between organization is that power represents the converse of dependence and
that dependence of one organization on another thus equals power disadvantage
of the first relative to the latter. Some researchers propose that having power
advantage (over a dependent organization) therefore provides means of better
performance. Starting from this hypotheses, Gulati & Sytch (2007) found in
their study of relationships among suppliers and car manufacturers with differ-
ent dependency profiles that this does not need to be so. For car manufacturers
being dependent on suppliers, the authors could not find empirical evidence for
improved performance of suppliers whereas for car manufacturers having power
advantage over suppliers the performance effect was even negative. Yet again,
there is some disagreement in the literature about the connection of possession
of power and its use; some authors propose that possession of power will lead
to use of power (Cook 1977, p. 67). These findings underline the need for a
more elaborate discussion of power in interorganizational relationships. Kumar
(2005) points out that talking about power as a generic construct is meaning-
less because there are different forms of power with different implications for
interorganizational relationships. He distinguishes between dependence-based
power and power based on punitive capability. Dependence-based power can re-
sult from the possession of important resources the other organization needs for
value creation. Resource Dependence Theory, Exchange Theory, and Resource-
Based View provide frameworks for analysis of this type of power. Power
based on punitive capability can – but does not necessarily need – result from
dependence-based power advantages. It describes one organization’s “ability
to inflict negative consequences on the partner” (ibid, p. 864). Cook (1977)
discusses the converse relationships between power (by which she means bar-
gaining power) and (resource) dependence in the context of Exchange Theory
(Emerson 1962). In absence of other sources of necessary resources, an organi-
zation is dependent on the organization in possession of the resource. If alterna-
tive sources are available, the dependent organization can reduce its dependence
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and increase its bargaining power.34
However, dependence does not need to be absolute in order create power.
Even in a monopoly or monopsony market situation a customer or supplier, re-
spectively, may the have the ability to escape by changing technology, approach-
ing new markets, changing his business model, or to obtain legal correction of
the market situation. Hence, in many cases dependence can be represented by
a certain amount of switching costs. This has implications for the use of power
on part of the supposedly powerful party. Excessive exploitation of power ad-
vantage can lead the disadvantaged organization to opt for escape and accept
switching costs. Therefore, the organization exercising power may experience a
trade-off between value appropriation and value creation (Gulati & Sytch 2007,
p. 59), i.e., the attempt to obtain a larger share of value will conflict with de-
creasing overall value generated. Organizations aware of this potential conflict
may exercise power carefully in spite of the possession of potentially signifi-
cant structural power advantages. Another hindrance to exploitation of power
advantages due to one-sided dependence results from uncertainty with respect
to future developments. Power advantages due to resource dependence, for in-
stance, can be rendered useless if the hitherto important resource loses value due
to innovation, can be substituted, obtained from additional sources, or otherwise
becomes obsolete. Therefore, it is wrong to equate the possession of power with
economical advantage.
2.5.5.3. Flow of Agents and Entities and Degree of Freedom
The design and setup of networks – or more generally: systems – not only
depends on the objective that is to be achieved and on the means available, but
also on restrictions or limitations that can be imposed on the planner or on the
planning process from outside. Such restrictions can relate to the regulatory
framework with which an organization has to comply and it can relate to actions
from competing organizations. Generally, planning of a system – be it a supply
network, a hospital, or a ski resort – can be described with a set of parameters
34Unless indicated otherwise, the use of the term power in the discussion of network relationships
refers to dependence-based power.
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Parameters Planning Operations 
Agents Variable Constant Variable Constant 
Resources Variable Constant Variable Constant 
Entities Variable Constant Variable Constant 
 
Figure 2.5.4. – Parameters in Planning and Operational Stage
that may or may not be variable. Parameters that are not variable represent
restrictions to the planning process.
A particular set of parameters that are part of the systems planning and execu-
tion process include the agents of the system, the entities of the system, and the
resources of the system. The agents represent the subjects that perform opera-
tions with the entities – the objects – under utilization of the resources at their
disposal. The resources required are determined by the activities that are to be
performed. Activities also represent a parameter for planning and operations.
They are no physical objects, however, and thus not of relevance at this point in
time.
Systems differ with respect to the variability of these three parameters. Fur-
thermore, such parameters may be variable during the planning process but may
become constant once the planning phase is over and the system becomes oper-
ational. In the planning process of a factory, for instance, the location may be
variable; once the factory building has been constructed, the location becomes
a constant. Figure 2.5.4 illustrates the concept. In this figure, agents, resources,
and entities can be understood as arrays, i.e., collections of elements that could
be indexed. Accordingly, some agents, for instance, could be variable during
operations while others are constant.
Up to this point, the description has been rather general. In the given context
we can narrow the scope by focusing on the physical flow of agents, resources,
and entities. The difference becomes obvious when different types of systems
are compared, for instance a supply network and a hospital. In a supply net-
work, the relevant physical flow is limited to entities, i.e., to the material that is
processed and turned into a final product. In a hospital, on the other hand, phys-
ical flow consists of entities (patients), agents (doctors and nurses), as well as
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Parameters Planning Operations 
Agents Variable Constant Variable Constant 
Resources Variable Constant Variable Constant 
Entities Variable Constant Variable Constant 
 
 
Parameters Supply Network Hospital 
Agents Constant Variable 
Resources Constant Variable 
Entities Variable Variable 
 
Figure 2.5.5. – Parameters of Physical Flow in Operational Stage in a Supply Net-
work and in a Hospital
resources (beds and technical equipment), and sometimes resources and entities
are “grouped” and moved together, as in the case when patients are moved to a
different room or part of the hospital while staying in their bed. The comparison
is illustrated in Figure 2.5.5. That is, the degree of freedom for system config-
uration is much higher, which makes an optimal configuration a much more
difficult objective to achieve as the number of different possible combinations
increases.
2.5.6. Classification & Match of Supply Networks
2.5.6.1. Introduction
Supply networks can have a large variety of different characteristics that make
them suitable for different market requirements. Obviously, the supply network
behind a large automobile producer looks different than the supply network be-
hind a retail store. In this section, common characteristics of supply networks
are going to be explained. Moreover, a link will be established between the
characteristics of a manufacturing system (as discussed in Section 2.2.2) and
characteristics of supply networks that serve manufacturing systems. Finally,
implications for bottleneck management will be outlined.
2.5.6.2. Types of Supply Networks and Strategies
It is debatable whether the majority of firms actually consciously elects and
adopts a supply network strategy. Possibly, many networks have simply emerged
as suppliers happened to be able to deliver a component which a manufacturing
firm needed. When both firms were happy with such a relationship, it might
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have persisted over an extended period of time. On a low level, a conscious
decision might well concern the priority a manufacturing firm assigns to certain
characteristics of its supply operations. For instance, firms may put emphasis
on reliable supply, on quick supply, on responsive supply, or on cheap sup-
ply, or on a combination of several of such priorities – with obvious trade-offs.
When rather modern supply strategies like Lean are compared to the “classic”
approach, the dichotomy stressed is often that between mostly cost-based ap-
proaches, with intense competition between several multiple sources, and the
more efficient and better performing new approach, such as Lean. Such a di-
chotomy is often illustrated by case examples, with General Motors represent-
ing the retarded, cost-based strategy of the old world and Toyota representing
the new approach, outperforming GM by far. Most likely, these popular case ex-
amples are no perfect representation of this dichotomy any longer, as industry
analysts suggest (Cable 2009). Nevertheless, the point was made clear: differ-
ent companies employ different sourcing and supply concepts, and some are
more successful than others. Because product, demand, and production char-
acteristics can differ significantly, firms are well-advised to choose their supply
strategy accordingly.
Grandori & Soda (1995) characterize different forms of networks based upon
their mix of coordination mechanisms. The dimensions they use are (1) the
degree of formalization of the network exchange and (2) the symmetry of coor-
dination. Network exchange can be rather formalized, as in case of bureaucratic
networks such as trade associations, or rather informal, as in case of social net-
works such as personal social relationships. Moreover, networks can be asym-
metric, as in the case when a central, often powerful, agent acts as an coordina-
tor, or they can be more symmetric, when power and coordination is distributed
more evenly (albeit not necessarily completely evenly). The symmetry of coor-
dination, often correlated with power, is likely to influence the shape and content
of supply relationships.
Fisher (1997) distinguishes between functional and innovative products on
the one hand and between responsive and efficient supply networks on the other
hand. He suggests that there must be a match between the demand character-
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Figure 2.5.6. – Match Between Demand and Supply Characteristics (Fisher 1997)
istics for a product and the characteristics of its supply chain in order for the
company to be successful. The demand characteristics of the product, he main-
tains, are influenced by many factors, but are primarily determined by the degree
of its innovativeness (p. 106). Because demand for innovative products implies
higher uncertainty than for functional products whose demand can be forecast
with fair accuracy, supply networks need to be responsive when they serve man-
ufacturers of innovative products and can be optimized towards efficiency when
they serve producers of functional products. The principle is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.5.6.
Lamming et al. (2000) extend Fisher’s (1997) concept by adding requirements
for unique products. They are building on the Resource-based View (RBV) no-
tion of uniqueness and define unique products as those which are valuable, rare,
non-imitable, and non-substitutable.35 Moreover, the authors suggest that in-
35The Resource-based View puts emphasis on the importance of resources – as opposed to the
market environment which has been emphasized by concepts such as Porter’s (1980) Five
Forces – for gaining competitive advantage or even sustained competitive advantage if the
firm “is implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by
any current or potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the
benefits of this strategy” (Barney 1991, p. 102).
The basic assumptions that sets RBV apart from much of the earlier research in strategic
management (Priem & Butler 2001) are the existence of heterogeneous resource distribution
and imperfect mobility of resources (Barney 1991, pp. 104-105). Several arguments concern-
ing the quality attributes of resources and its implications for firms’ (sustained) competitive
advantage are based on these assumptions (Barney calls the different quality attributes re-
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novative products and unique products are not generally the same; however, “it
may be difficult in practice to differentiate between the two” (p. 681). Ac-
cordingly, they propose a distinction between supply networks for functional
products and supply networks between innovative-unique products, closely re-
sembling Fisher’s (1997) dichotomy. In addition to the characteristic “compet-
itive priority” which refers to the foci on flexibility or efficiency, respectively,
Lamming et al. (2000) also mention “sharing of resources” as a characteristic
in which the two types of supply networks differ. Whereas sharing of resources
(such as staff, product information, cost information) tends to be unproblematic
for supply networks of functional products, it may be problematic for supply
networks of innovative-unique products. The reason lies in the uniqueness of the
products whose characteristics firms may fear could be replicated by other actors
in the network, the focal firm thereby losing its sustained competitive advantage.
In addition to the distinction between supply networks for innovative-unique
products and for functional products, the authors introduce product complex-
ity as a second dimension with two characteristics (high and low complexity),
thereby creating a 2x2 matrix in which they describe implications for compet-
itive priority and options for resource and information sharing. The difference
between networks for products of high and low complexity mainly lies in the
need for more or less sophisticated information technology, respectively . Fur-
thermore, their survey indicates that information sharing is inhibited when firms
are marketing unique products (ibid, p. 688). Their resulting classification is
sources need to have for sustained competitive advantage “indicators of how heterogeneous
and immobile a firm’s resources are” (1991, p. 106)). To generate sustained competitive ad-
vantage, resources must be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and not substitutable (Barney
1991, pp. 105-106). Priem & Butler (2001, p. 31) point out that the former two attributes
generate the competitive advantage whereas the latter two attributes make the competitive
advantage sustainable.
Wernerfelt (1984) defines resources generally as “anything which could be thought of as
a strength or weakness of a given firm” (p. 172). Among his examples are in-house knowl-
edge of technology as well as skilled staff and trade contacts. The latter also indicates that
interorganizational relationships may well count as a resource that can provide competitive
advantage. Whether such a competitive advantage can be sustained depends on the specific
relationship. Among the attributes of the relationship that are important for this question may
be, for instance, contractual details (e.g., exclusive rights) as well as information about the
market environment (e.g., relationships with a supplier holding a monopolistic position or
being a monopsonistic buyer).
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displayed in Table 2.5.4.36
Harland et al. (2001) assert that existing classifications of networks “offer
limited operational assistance for focal companies trying to manage their net-
works effectively” (p. 22). Furthermore, the authors contend, existing clas-
sifications tend to be conceptual rather than empirically grounded. Based on
empirical studies, Harland et al. (2001) offer a prescriptive framework based on
two decision variables: degree of supply network dynamics and degree of focal
firm influence. Network dynamics are based on internal factors such as opera-
tions characteristics as well as on external factors leading to uncertain demand
conditions. Low degree of focal firm influence may be caused, for instance, by
low purchasing and production volumes, or the focal firm being low on innova-
tion, so that the firm adds little value to the network. Based thereon they define
four archetypes of supply networks. In this framework, firms with low degree
influence on the network appear to be coping with the network rather than being
able to manage it whereas firms with high degree of influence tend to be able
to make deliberate decisions rather than merely accept given conditions. At the
same time, the optimization goals for dynamic and routinized supply networks
differ. The focus in routinized networks lies on process innovation, operational
improvement and reduction of inventory. In dynamic networks, the focus lies on
product and technological innovation and the management of unstable and un-
certain demand conditions, requiring inventory buffer. Accordingly, the means
by which the focal firms in each type of network can operate vary. Network
activities Harland and co-authors describe for firms with low degree of influ-
ence on their network are “motivating” and “risk and benefit sharing”, whereas
firms with high degree of influence in the network can select partners and make
other deliberate decisions. Moreover, dynamic networks for either degree of in-
fluence on network call for “human resource integration” and “knowledge cap-
ture” whereas routinized networks are more apt for “equipment integration” and
improvements in “information processing”. The characteristics are displayed in
Figure 2.5.7.
36The original table provided by Lamming et al. (2000) includes comments on the criticality of
IT for information exchange which were omitted here for the perception of IT requirements
is likely to have changed in the course of the years after the publication of the paper.
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Table 2.5.4. – Classification of Supply Networks According to Lamming et al.
(2000)
Characteristics Supply Networks of
Competitive-Unique
Products
Supply Networks of
Functional Products
High
Complexity
Competitive Priority:
speed and flexibility,
innovation, quality
supremacy
Sharing of Resources and
Information:
large amounts of
non-strategic information;
problematic when involving
sensitive information and
knowledge
Examples from Survey:
not included in survey
Competitive Priority: cost
reduction,
quality sustainability,
service
Sharing of Resources and
Information:
large amounts of
non-strategic information –
generally unproblematic:
may include cost
breakdowns and strategic
knowledge
Examples from Survey:
off-road car
Low
Complexity
Competitive Priority:
speed and flexibility,
innovation, quality
supremacy
Sharing of Resources and
Information:
problematic exchange of
sensitive information and
knowledge
Examples from Survey:
drugs, LED semi-conductor,
communications technology
Competitive Priority:
cost (by high volume
production), service
Sharing of Resources and
Information:
generally unproblematic –
may include cost and
strategic knowledge
Examples from Survey:
canned soft drinks, beer
cans, wheel cylinders,
windows wipers
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Figure 2.5.7. – Classification of Supply Networks by Harland et al. (2001)
Lee (2002) extends Fisher’s (1997) framework by adding supply uncertainty
as a second dimension to demand uncertainty (as implied in innovative vs. func-
tional products in Fisher’s framework). The resulting matrix displays four com-
binations, each of which is suitable for a type of products (e.g., fashion apparel
vs. basic apparel) and a different supply network strategy (see Figure 2.5.8).
Trent & Monczka (2002) differentiate international purchasing from "true"
global sourcing. They provide a five-stage framework that illustrates the path
from solely domestic purchasing activities (level 1) via international purchasing
(levels 2 and 3) to "integrated global sourcing" (levels 4 and 5), the latter of
which, they claim, is rarely understood and adopted by industrial firms. Figure
2.5.9 shows their framework. The primary benefit the authors associate with
global sourcing are cost savings which, the authors say, are higher the more
integrated and global the purchasing process is.
Hull (2005) distinguishes between make-to-order (MTO) supply chains, make-
to-stock (MTS) supply chains, and supply driven chains. The distinguishing
characteristic is the event that triggers material flow. In MTO supply chains,
actual customer orders trigger production while the information flow goes up-
stream to ensure that supply will follow. Similarly, in MTS supply chains, de-
mand forecasts trigger material flow with the same implications for information
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Figure 2.5.8. – Supply Network Strategies for Demand and Supply Uncertainty
(Lee 2002)
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
International
Purchasing
Global
Sourcing
Engage in Domestic 
Purchasing Only
Engage in International 
Purchasing As-Needed
International Purchasing as 
Part of Sourcing Strategy
Integration and Coordination 
of Global Sourcing Strategies 
Across Worldwide Buying 
Locations
Trent, R. J., & Monczka, R. M. (2002). Pursuing 
Competitive Advantage Through Integrated 
Global Sourcing. Academy of Management 
Executive, 16(2), 66–0.
Integration and Coordination 
of Global Sourcing Strategies 
with Other Functional Groups
Figure 2.5.9. – Five-Stage Framework Illustrating the Development From Domes-
tic Sourcing to Integrated Global Sourcing (Trent & Monczka
2002)
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flow. In contrast, in supply driven chains, products are pushed downstream the
supply network, and so is information.
Meyr & Stadtler (2005) identify functional attributes and structural attributes
of supply networks. The functional attributes comprise the categories
• procurement type,
• production type,
• distribution type, and
• sales type.
The structural attributes comprise the categories
• topography of a supply network and
• integration and coordination.
The categories and attributes proposed by Meyr & Stadtler (2005) represent a
comprehensive typology of supply networks. Tables 2.5.5 and 2.5.6 provide an
overview.
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Table 2.5.5. – Functional Attributes as Proposed by Meyr & Stadtler (2005)
Category Attribute
procurement type
number and type of products procured
sourcing type
flexibility of suppliers
supplier lead time and reliability
materials’ life cycle
production type
organization of production process
repetition of operations (mass, batch,
one-of-a-kind)
changeover characteristics
working time flexibility (overtime, additional
shifts)
distribution type
distribution structure (stages)
pattern of delivery (cyclic, dynamic
[order-based])
deployment of transportation means (standard
routes vs. custom routes)
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loading restrictions (e.g., FTL)
sales type
relation to customers (B2B/B2C,
transaction-based or agreement)
availability of future demands (contract,
forecast)
demand curve (shape; e.g., seasonal, static,
random)
(stage in) product life cycle
number of product types
degree of customization (standard product off
the shelf vs. highly customized)
BOM structure (convergent, divergent, serial)
portion of service operations
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Table 2.5.6. – Structural Attributes as Proposed by Meyr & Stadtler (2005)
Category Attribute
topography of supply network
network structure (convergent, divergent,
serial)
degree of globalization
location(s) of decoupling point(s)
major constraints (e.g., limited capacity of
one supplier
integration and coordination
legal position (inter-organizational vs.
intra-organizational supply chains)
balance of power
direction of coordination
type of information exchanged (e.g., only
capacity, also cost. . . )
In their discussion of product complexity and supply chain integration, Novak
& Eppinger (2001) point out that there are more aspects to a sourcing relation-
ship than the binary choice between make and buy. They refer to what Meyr &
Stadtler (2005) have called integration and coordination, specifically the legal
position. They mention
• Keiretsu relationships in which the OEM often partially owns the supplier,
• joint ownership agreements in which both supplier and OEM own (and
possibly operate) the assets used to produce the part in question,
• equipment loans (in fact, in some industries such as automotive and agri-
cultural machinery it is rather common that OEMs own the tools which
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suppliers use to produce for the OEM),
• and arm-length subsidiaries37.
Chopra & Meindl (2010) discuss the strategic fit between a supply network and
a company’s competitive strategy. They define two dimensions that have to be
matched in order to achieve strategic fit: responsiveness of the supply network
and implied uncertainty (cf. Figure 2.5.10). Responsiveness refers to the supply
network’s ability to react to variance in demand or supply. Implied uncertainty
comprises implied demand uncertainty and uncertainty regarding reliability of
the supply network (Chopra & Meindl 2010). In this respect, the framework
presented by Chopra & Meindl (2010) is based upon the same dimensions as
the framework presented by Lee (2002). Implied demand uncertainty, however,
is different from “just” demand uncertainty in that it does not capture the en-
tire market demand but only the specific portion that is served by the supply
network of interest. Chopra & Meindl (2010, p. 41) illustrate the difference
by contrasting the requirements imposed on a supply network that fulfills emer-
gency orders with those imposed on a supply networks that fulfills orders for
a construction site with long lead time and well-planned demands. The por-
tion of market demand that is represented by emergency orders implies much
higher demand uncertainty on the supply network in terms of quantities needed,
response time tolerated, product variety demanded, and service level required.
Similarly, Christopher (2011) uses the two criteria lead time (supply charac-
teristics) and predictability of demand (demand characteristics) to match generic
supply chain strategies. Because lead time can be seen as just another way
to express the responsiveness of the supply network, and predictability of de-
mand can be seen as a function of product innovativeness, the parameters are
essentially the same as in the models from Fisher (1997) and Chopra & Meindl
(2010). The difference lies in the way Christopher (2011) frames the matching.
He attempts to answer the question where a Lean configuration would yield the
greatest benefits, where Agile configuration is preferable and where a hybrid
37Unfortunately, it is not clear what exactly the authors mean by arm-length subsidiaries. Possi-
bly, they refer to fully owned suppliers that operate independently and have to compete with
other (“external”) suppliers for sourcing contracts.
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Figure 2.5.10. – Strategic Fit of the Supply Network (Chopra & Meindl 2010)
strategy should be adopted (cf. Figure 2.5.11, description of Lean in Section 3.3
on page 157 and of Agile in Section 3.5 on page 168).
Due to its inherent lack of flexibility (Hopp & Spearman 2008), a Lean strat-
egy would suit networks which have to cope with rather predictable and sta-
ble demand whereas Agile is suited for networks which pose higher flexibility
requirements. A parallel hybrid strategy can be adopted when each concept is
suitable for different products with different demand and supply patterns (Pareto
curve approach, Christopher & Towill 2001) or for base and surge demand
(Gattorna & Walters 1996). A parallel hybrid strategy depending on product
characteristics, similar to the Pareto curve approach, resembles Fisher’s (1997)
matrix (cf. Figure 2.5.6 on page 132). A consecutive hybrid strategy would
use the order decoupling point where Lean would be adopted upstream whereas
Agile would be adopted downstream (Christopher & Towill 2001).
Pagh & Cooper (1998) discuss postponement and speculation strategies. The
idea of postponement is to be able to maintain a generic product as long as pos-
sible in the supply chain and only customize it to a specific customer or market
when there is an actual order for the product, thereby reducing the number of
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Figure 2.5.11. – Generic Supply Network Strategies (Christopher 2011)
variants that have to be kept on stock along the chain. Besides reducing capital
expenditures, lower total inventory enables quicker reaction to possible market
changes. Speculation represents the “converse concept” of postponement and
thus suggests that the final destination and thus the final form of the product
should be fixated as early as possible. The advantages Pagh & Cooper (1998)
attach to this concept are scale economies and fewer stock out issues. Based on
a 2x2 matrix with both concepts applied to each logistics and manufacturing, the
authors define four generic postponement and speculation strategies for supply
chains (cf. Figure 2.5.12).
Furthermore, the authors examine decision parameters based upon which the
right strategy is to be chosen. They discuss “product life cycle, monetary den-
sity38, value profile39, product design characteristics, delivery time, frequency
of delivery, demand uncertainty, economies of scale, and special knowledge”
(ibid, p. 21).
38By monetary density, the authors mean the ratio between weight and value of the product (cf.
Pagh & Cooper 1998, p. 22).
39By value profile, the authors refer to the allocation of value at each echelon of the supply
network (cf. Pagh & Cooper 1998, p. 22).
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Figure 2.5.12. – Generic Postponement and Speculation Strategies (Pagh &
Cooper 1998)
2.5.6.3. Summary & Implications for Bottleneck Management
As this section has demonstrated, supply networks can be very heterogenous.
How they look like and how they behave to a large extent depends on a vast
amount of factors. The attributes worked out by Meyr & Stadtler (2005) (Ta-
bles 2.5.5 and 2.5.6) provide good insight into the various variables. It has been
pointed out that strategic fit is necessary in order to make the supply network
both effective and efficient. Most authors reviewed above rely on two dimenions
for their analysis of strategic fit. The various versions of two-dimensional anal-
yses, as well as the more elaborate discussion by Meyr & Stadtler (2005) cited
before, suggest that more than two factors need to be accounted for at the same
time to create strategic fit.
It seems likely that different types of supply networks would require different
reactions to the emergence of bottlenecks. Part of the reason is that the sever-
ity of bottlenecks is different. Supply networks which are particularly lean and
where inventory buffers are mostly absent run a greater likelihood of interrup-
tions. Where irregularities cannot be buffered by inventory, more emphasis on
prevention of irregularities might seem appropriate. In competitive markets with
little differentiaton between products or for products with switching cost, the ex-
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istence of a bottleneck in supply may force customers to switch to competing
products, switching cost notwithstanding. If satisfied with the new product they
had to try out, customers might consider not switching back, which translates
into loss of future business. Accordingly, the consequences of a bottleneck in
supply may be negligible if the firm holds a monopoly position. High severity
may be implied, however, when supply is insufficient for the production of in-
novative products with short life-cycles that have to reach the market fast or will
become obsolete.
The implications just mentioned are merely examples. A more elaborate anal-
ysis is beyond the scope of this work but may yield very interesting insights.
The take-away lesson from the discussion of different types of supply networks
and supply strategies is that such differences and their implications should be
taken into account when developing a strategy for the management of supply in
general and for bottleneck management in particular.
2.6. Summary
The second chapter contains the first part of the literature review and introduced
the reader to a variety of topics representing the theoretical foundation of this
thesis.
A review of literature on manufacturing systems included a discussion of dif-
ferent types of manufacturing systems and how they have been classified by
different authors. An introduction to bottlenecks followed, including the defini-
tion of the term, a classification of types of bottlenecks, and a short discussion
of different states a bottleneck can have.
The third section of this chapter introduced the concept of complexity and
involved a discussion of system in general.
Lastly, literature on organizational networks was reviewed. The discussion
touched upon conceptual description of networks and on how different network
setups relate to organizational performance.
Supply networks as one specific type of organizational networks were intro-
duced, involving a discussion of the wide-spread notion of supply chains and the
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term Supply Chain Management. Different aspects of organizational networks
were referred to in the following section. A short general discussion of objec-
tives and relationships between organizations was followed by a more thorough
investigation into power, dependence, and governance. The last aspect touched
upon involved a short discourse on degrees of freedom in system configuration.
The chapter ends with an inquiry into different types of supply networks and
how they can be categorized.
The topics reviewed the core of bottleneck management in supply networks
but also adjacent fields that might provide useful concepts and ideas to build
upon. Several concepts and ideas discussed in this chapter will surface again
later on when the data collected in the multiple-case study are analyzed.
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3. Analysis of Related Research
Fields
3.1. Introduction
This is the second of two sections containing a review of related literature. This
section covers more specific topics from industrial application which have their
conceptual roots in more fundamental theory (as reviewed in the previous chap-
ter) yet have evolved into largely independent subjects with high applicability
and relevance in the industrial context. The topics selected for the review in
this section tackle problems that are related to questions of stable and reliable
supply.
The first topic covered is purchasing portfolio analysis (PPA; Section 3.2). It
represents an early attempt to integrate the analysis of both purchased material
and market characteristics so as to devise strategy for the management of supply.
If dissected, the criteria suggested for the analysis can be traced back to insights
from various research fields, such as manufacturing, power and dependence in
networks, and systems theory. Hence, PPA is also a great example as to how
the topics reviewed in this section relate to the topics reviewed in the previous
section: the topics covered here combine insights from the more general, basic
theory of the previous section and represent handy devices with catchy names
for their industrial application.
Lean/Just-in-Time (Section 3.3) and Agile (Section 3.5) represent antagonis-
tic yet complementary approaches to the configuration of both manufacturing
systems and supply networks. When applied complementarily, the setup goes
by the name of Leagile. Lean in particular seems to have received much at-
tention since the 1980. The essential ideas of these concepts are identified and
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shortly discussed; their review is closed with a short discussion as to how they
relate to supply-related problems.
Theory of Constraints (ToC), too, had received much attention since the 1980.
It introduces a way of thinking about material flow problems in factories in terms
of bottlenecks and thus is essential to consider for the conception of bottleneck
management in supply networks. It will be reviewed in Section 3.4.
Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) is introduced in Section 3.6. The
review is also used to introduce and define the term risk – which one would
presume to be of relevance in the context of supply-related problems. Indeed,
the emergence of bottlenecks can be seen as a risk in the management of supply
networks, and it is this risk Supply Chain Risk Management is mostly concerned
about. Hence the short review.
Apparently, there are concepts such as ToC that deal with problems similar as
the one selected for this project in the context of manufacturing; some, like Lean
and Agile, even span over and influence both settings, manufacturing systems
and supply networks. This suggests there are conceptual similarities between
these settings. After all, both are material flow systems. Therefore, the review
closes with a systematic comparison between manufacturing systems and supply
network systems in Section 3.7. The objective was to better understand the
similarities, the differences, and the relation of the two systems.
As with the previous review of more fundamental topics, the selection of
topics covered in this section comes rather naturally. It does not require an
intellectual stretch to see the relevance of the topics reviewed for the topic of
this thesis. Each of the topics were repeatedly encountered during the early
widespread “cross-border” review of literature at the outset of the study and
were saved for a more in-depth investigation at a later point in time. Each of the
topics grapples with problems or aspect of problems encountered when thinking
about and reframing supply-related problem in terms of bottlenecks.
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3.2. Purchasing Portfolio Analysis
3.2.1. Short Description
The classical purchasing portfolio analysis (PPA) is an attempt to add some
“strategic spin” to the corporate purchasing function. Kraljic (1983) defines
a four-stage approach to identify suitable strategic action in purchasing. In the
first stage, the purchased material is classified according to supply risk and profit
impact, each of which is assessed according a set of criteria. Criteria the author
suggests for profit impact are purchasing volume, percentage of total purchase
cost, impact on product quality, and impact on business growth. Criteria for sup-
ply risk are, for instance, availability, number of suppliers, competitive demand,
make-or-buy opportunities, storage risks, and substitution possibilities (Kraljic
1983, p. 112). The four resulting categories and their labels are depicted in Fig-
ure 3.2.1.1 The strategic implications for each of these categories may be very
different, as the author points out. It is the material identified as “strategic” in
this first stage of analysis that deserves most attention.
Figure 3.2.1. – Categorization of Purchased Material as Suggested by Kraljic
(1983)
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The analysis of purchased material is followed by a market analysis in the
1Note that how Kraljic uses the label “bottleneck” does not correspond to the use of the same
term in this thesis.
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second stage of Kraljic’s approach. In the market analysis, specific criteria that
mark strengths or weaknesses of the buying firm are compared to the corre-
sponding items of the suppliers. The purpose of this analysis is to get an im-
pression of the company’s bargaining position as compared to its suppliers’. In
a third step, the result of this analysis for each supplier of strategic material is
plotted in the “purchasing portfolio matrix” (cf. Figure 3.2.2).
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Figure 3.2.2. – Purchasing Portfolio Matrix (Kraljic 1983)
Wildemann (2001) uses the same concept but presents it in a slightly dif-
ferent manner. Just like Kraljic (1983), he combines the individual analyses
of purchased materials (leading to the same categories with similar labels as in
Kraljic’s article) and supplier markets (leading to the four categories of suppliers
or supplier archetypes with labels corresponding to the categories of materials:
strategic suppliers, bottleneck suppliers, standard suppliers, and core suppliers)
to deduce suitable purchasing strategies. The two matrices are then combined
to one 16-field purchasing portfolio matrix that plots the four classes of material
against the four classes of suppliers previously identified.
The purchasing portfolio matrix in Wildemann (2001) points at four archety-
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pal purchasing strategies. These are: Purchase efficiently (standard material,
standard suppliers), secure access (bottleneck material, bottleneck suppliers),
use market potential, then cooperation (core material, core suppliers or strate-
gic suppliers), and value-adding partnership (strategic material, core suppliers
or strategic suppliers). The four strategies are described in greater detail along
(and with implications for) items such as contractual terms, quality assurance,
research and development, organization, and electronic supply markets.
The notable difference between Kraljic (1983) and Wildemann (2001) seems
to be that Kraljic focuses exclusively on strategic material and plots supplier
strength against buyer strength in the purchasing portfolio matrix to deduce
three different strategic imperatives (exploit, balance, diversify) whereas Wilde-
mann includes all four categories of material in the analysis and plots them
against supplier archetypes which he identifies by combining supply risk and
supplier development potential.
Power and dependence were discussed in Section 2.5.5.2. It thus appears to
be worthwhile looking at how the analysis of power configurations in the supply
network is approached in the purchasing portfolio analysis. Kraljic (1983, pp.
113 et seq.) suggests ten (exemplary) sets of criteria for the comparative analysis
of supplier and buyer strength which are listed in Table 3.2.1. The criteria shall
be shortly explained.
The first criteria compare the production capacity of an individual supplier
with the overall supply market capacity for the specific material under consid-
eration as well as the allocation of the purchasing volume of the buying firm to
the supplier and its overall purchasing volume. The comparison of market size
and supplier capacity gives an indication of the market share of the supplier for
the specific material or component. At the same time, the purchasing volume
of the buying firm gives an indication of the buying firm’s importance for the
supplier’s business. Hence, the first set of criteria compares the buying firm’s
dependence on the supplier with the supplier’s dependence on the buying firm
in terms of purchasing volume.
The second set of criteria does essentially the same but looks at how this
relation changes over time. It compares supply market growth with capacity
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Table 3.2.1. – Criteria for the Comparative Analysis of Supplier and Buyer Power
(Kraljic 1983, p. 114)
Supplier Strength Company Strength
1 Market size vs. supplier capacity Purchasing volume vs. capacity of
main units
2 Market growth vs. capacity growth Demand growth vs. capacity
growth
3 Capacity utilization or bottleneck
risk
Capacity utilization (variation) of
main units
4 Competitive structure Market share vis-à-vis main
competition
5 ROI and/or ROC Profitability of main end products
6 Cost and price structure Cost and price structure
7 Break-even stability Cost of nondelivery
8 Uniqueness of product and
technological stability
Own production capability or
integration depth
9 Entry barrier (capital and
know-how requirements)
Entry cost for new sources vs. cost
for own production
10 Logistics situation Logistic
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growth of the supplier and buyers’ market growth with the capacity growth of
the buying firm and thus indicates how the dependence relations may change in
the future.
While the first two sets of criteria focused on the market structure, the third
set of criteria is more operational. Throughput time in a factory can behave
highly non-linear so that congestion can be expected at very high utilization
rates. Mathematically, throughput time becomes infinite at 100% utilization
(Hopp & Spearman 2008). The supplier’s capacity utilization thus plays an
important role for the reliability of supply. At the same time, high utilization of
suppliers’ production capacity may hint at efficient use of assets and economies
of scale. The implications for the power relationship between buyer and supplier
– and thus why the Kraljic (1983) includes this item into the analysis – are not
quite clear, however. For the assessment of capacity utilization at the demand
(buying firm) side, the case is clearer. High variation in demand requires that
suppliers maintain a capacity surplus so as to be able to meet peak demand.
Maintaining extra capacity is expensive for the supplier and the buying firm
may have to seek compromise with the supplier or pay a premium.
Next, Kraljic (1983) look at the competitive situation both of supplier and
buying firm. This point is related to the first point (market size vs. supplier ca-
pacity), to the eighth point (uniqueness of product), and to the ninth point (entry
barriers). Strong competition for sourcing contract lowers the supplier’s bar-
gaining power. By the same token, the buying firm’s market share can provide
a bargaining advantage if it is high and a disadvantage if it is low.
The next point, ROI/ROC, again is related to other items which are break-even
stability and cost and price structure. In fact, the differences do not become ap-
parent in Kraljic (1983). If the ROI/ROC can be achieved easily and early, the
supplier is not urged to accept deals “at any cost” but can choose to seek a more
favorable agreement with another customer, even at a later point in time. Like-
wise, break-even stability at low capacity utilization levels provide the supplier
with more freedom to deny unfavorable conditions and thus increases its bar-
gaining power. Similarly, the profitability of the buying firm’s end products can
provide a bargaining advantage or disadvantage to the buying firm. If profitabil-
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ity of end products is high, the buying firm does not have to seek compromise
with suppliers in order to get the best price but can reject unfavorable conditions
and look for other suppliers, even for those that would charge higher prices. On
the other hand, low profitability of the end products may force the buying firm
to accept unfavorable conditions (such as mediocre supply reliability) in order
to achieve low purchasing cost per part.
The cost of nondelivery at the buying firm – although it remains unclear why
this criterion is paired by Kraljic with break-even stability at the supplier – has
important implications for the effort the buying firm should make in order to pre-
vent supply shortages. If no or little cost is attached to nondelivery, expensive
prevention and contingency measures are inadequate; also it provides a bargain-
ing advantage for the buying firm. If, on the other hand, the cost of nondelivery
is high, the buying firm would put more emphasis on reliable supply and thus is
more dependent on the supplier’s performance.
The uniqueness of the product or material delivered by the supplier was men-
tioned before in the context of the supplier’s competitive situation. In the eighth
set, the author pairs it with the buying firm’s ability to produce in-house (or
ability to integrate vertically so as to create options for in-house production).
Obviously, if the supplier holds a monopoly position, this contributes to bar-
gaining power. On the other hand, if the buying firm can produce the same
component in-house, the buying firm improves its bargaining position by reduc-
ing its dependency on the supplier.
Entry barriers in the supply market are compared to entry (or switching) cost
for new sources on the demand side. Entry barriers in the supply market can
influence the supplier’s competitive situation; if entry barriers are considerably
high, new competition is less likely to emerge and suppliers can maintain their
competitive position. By the same token, if the buying firm can easily switch to
other existing sources or create new sources at little or no cost, it gains bargain-
ing power as compared to its suppliers.2
2What exactly Kraljic (1983) means by logistics situation and logistic in the tenth set of criteria
could not be determined from his article and thus remains unclear.
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3.2.2. Ramifications for Bottleneck Management
The PPA goes to the heart of bottleneck management. It uses both product
and market characteristics to assess the status quo of the purchasing portfo-
lio in terms of bottleneck risk so that suitable strategies can be deduced that
will help prevent supply shortages. It thereby provides a pragmatic approach
to bottleneck management in supply networks. The focus on PPA is clearly
on prevention which is merely one aspect of bottleneck management, however.
The greatest value PPA provides lies in its being a framework to combine both
market and product aspects in a consistent way, both of which include a broad
variety of more detailed aspects and criteria.
By putting emphasis on power in the supply market analysis, PPA includes
factors that tend to be neglected by the canon of SCM teachings (whereas em-
phasis is put on cooperation in the latter). Among the criteria PPA analyzes
are lateral relationships in the supply network which seem to be mostly ignored
in SCM yet can have important implications for the reliability of supply (Beer
et al. 2012).
3.3. Lean Production and Just-in-Time
3.3.1. Short Description
Lean and Just-in-Time (JiT) have been extensively covered by researchers and
practitioners alike throughout the past thirty years and it is not this researcher’s
intention to provide a complete account here. Instead, a concise overview of
the central tenets that have ramifications for the management of bottlenecks is
sought to be provided.
Lean and Just-in-Time (JiT) are mostly synonymous terms that surfaced at
different points in time, however (Hopp & Spearman 2008). An early account
of the production methodology and management paradigm that later have been
associated with the term Lean has been provided by Hayes (1981) who did not
use this term, however, in his vivid description of the Japanese manufacturing
environment. As Holweg (2007) discusses, there has been extensive coverage
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of JiT methodology in the research literature throughout the 1980s before the
term Lean has been established through the publication and tremendous success
of the book The Machine that Changed the World (Womack et al. 1990). Lean
and JiT will be used interchangeably when referring to the production and man-
agement paradigm. When JiT is used to refer to the actual delivery process, it
will be obvious from the context.
Hayes (1981) describes his observations and impressions from visiting sev-
eral Japanese factories. His article captures many of the features and particu-
larities of the Japanese production system (most often referred to as the Toyota
Production System, TPS) that later have been formalized as a comprehensive
science of production and management – which we refer to as Lean or JiT. The
increasing success of Japanese firms in the US at that time by many had been
attributed to particular Japanese habits, Japanese governmental support, cheap
labor, and other idiosyncratic factors unavailable to US firms (Holweg 2007).
Others expected high automation, superior equipment, or some type of special
techniques the Japanese were using to be responsible for the growing produc-
tivity and cost gap between Japanese and Western manufacturers. What Hayes
(1981) saw and described, however, was largely the same equipment as used in
the US (or even simpler), no hidden secrets or special techniques, but simply
prudent and diligent Operations Management combined with the strive for per-
fection and the absence of compartmental thinking. Hayes’ paper thus provides
an early documentation of the ideological attachment of JiT – as opposed to a
set of tools or techniques. A quote from his article brings this to the point:
“The modern Japanese factory is not, as many Americans be-
lieve, a prototype of the factory of the future. If it were, it might
be, curiously, far less of a threat. We in the United States, with our
technical ability and resources, ought then to be able to duplicate
it. Instead, it is something much more difficult for us to copy; it
is the factory of today running as it should” (Hayes 1981, p. 57,
emphasis in original).
The quote suggests that the key to productivity and quality as sought by “the
Japanese” is predominantly a matter of mindset and organization. Nevertheless,
158
3.3. Lean Production and Just-in-Time
JiT includes a variety of tenets that are derived from the broader philosophy and
put into practice through standard operating procedures.
Reduction is one of the most important activities in JiT. Reduction of waste
(muda) lies at the core of the concept (Bicheno & Holweg 2009). This includes
reduction of inventory. In fact, Hayes (1981) quotes a Japanese senior manager
on the problems attached to inventory:
“We feel that inventory is the root of all evil. You would be
surprised how much you simplify problems and reduce costs when
there are no inventories. For example, you don’t need any inven-
tory managers or inventory control systems. Nor do you need ex-
pediters, because you can’t expedite. And, finally, when something
goes wrong, the system stops. Immediately the whole organization
becomes aware of the problem an works quickly to resolve it. If
you have buffer inventories, these potential problems stay hidden
and may never get corrected” (Japanese senior manager, as quoted
in Hayes 1981, p. 59).
Figuratively, inventory is sometimes compared with the water level in a river.
As the water level – representing inventory – is decreased, rocks – representing
problems – will surface that previously remained covered. As the rocks are
removed and the water level is further decreased, new rocks will keep surfacing,
and so on (Hopp & Spearman 2008, p. 165).
Reduction of complexity is a central tenet of JiT (Klaus & Krieger 2008, p.
308). Since the reduction of inventory will reveal problems (which is expected
and intended), they are less likely to surface unexpectedly and can be resolved
as they are found. This reduces the time gap that is to be bridged by the feed-
back loop, which is an important factor for complexity reduction (Senge 2006).
Lower variety of products and processes reduces the chance of unexpected inci-
dents and thereby further lowers the level of complexity. Process irregularities
have a designated term in the JiT terminology – mura – and are continuously
tried to reduce. Standardize (Seiketsu) is one of the 5S – five methods for work-
place organization (Bicheno & Holweg 2009).
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Reduction of batch size is intended to reduce the average throughput time
of parts. To make this possible, changeover time of tools likewise has to be
reduced and thus is one of the core core operational objectives in JiT. Moreover,
continuous reduction of changeover time is part of a broader set of activities
to continuously improve. In fact, continuous improvement (kaizen) is another
key activity which is reflected in a steady effort to improve product and process
quality.
3.3.2. Ramifications for Bottleneck Management
JiT operationalizes the flow principle. That is, it employs a holistic view on the
entire system and attempts to reduce measures that inhibit the unhindered flow
of products (Klaus & Krieger 2008). Part of the waste that JiT aims to reduce is
non-value-adding time of parts spent in the system. Non-value-adding time is,
for example, waiting time in queues (Christopher 2011). Waiting time in queues
is reduced via the reduction of work-in-progress (WiP) inventory. A means to
this end is the reduction of process and transfer batches. The idealized goal is
zero inventory and a batch size of one, that is one-piece flow. In this case, parts
would flow through the system and no time would be wasted waiting in queues
for processing (process batches) or for completion of transfer batches.
Although continuous flow of parts is desired in a Lean/JiT setting, workers are
empowered to stop the production process if they encounter quality problems (or
problems of other kind, respectively) so the problem can be resolved. That is,
production interruptions will be frequent until a certain quality level is reached.
Accordingly, JiT does not only foster stable processes but also requires a stable
environment (Christopher 2011). Put differently, “JiT is inherently inflexible”
(Hopp & Spearman 2008, p. 173). Flexibility, however, is needed to cope with
variability. Generally, there are three types of buffers in systems: inventory,
capacity, and time (Hopp & Spearman 2008) Each buffer comes at a cost and
it depends on the specific situation in which combination and to what extent
they should be used. As previously discussed, inventory is tried to be reduced
to the greatest extent in JiT systems as it is considered waste or even “the root
of all evil” (cf. p. 159). Accordingly, inventory is not the predominant way
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in which JiT systems buffer against variability. Time is the buffer to which
systems fall back when they fail to deal with variability and find better solutions;
in most cases, it may be the most undesirable type of buffer. Using time as
a buffer simply means that throughput time extends so that customers would
need to wait longer for delivery. Although there may be situations when this is
acceptable, activities within supply management generally seek to avoid having
customers wait for the product. Capacity is the third type of buffer against
variability, and it is one type frequently utilized. Both ToC (see below) and JiT
accept low utilization of process steps (e.g., machines or workers), in which
case excess capacity is available to cope with demand peaks. In sourcing audits
in the automobile industry, suppliers have to indicate the number of work shifts
per week they will need to achieve the requested production output so that the
customer (e.g., the OEM) knows that additional work shifts will be available in
case demand will be higher than forecasted (Beer 2011). Capacity seems to be
the buffer most favored in JiT systems. Foremost priority remains, however, the
reduction of variability in the first place.
As inventory buffers are removed, there is the danger that interruptions occur
more often. Bretzke (2010, p. 3) remarks:
“We have to realize that the combination of rigid process inter-
facing and strong time compression has made our supply chains
unnecessarily vulnerable and thus has lead to unnecessarily high
shares of special express deliveries. It is no indicator of great logis-
tical intelligence to configure hyper-lean process chains, creating an
unanticipated amount of disruptions, to later use our whole mental
concentration to create ’Supply Chain Event Management’ in order
to mitigate these disruptions subsequently.”3
3Translated by the author. Original in German: “Auch werden wir zur Kenntnis nehmen
müssen, dass die Kombination von rigiden Prozesskopplungen und starker Zeitkompression
unsere Lieferketten unnötig verletzlich gemacht und damit unnötig hohe Expressfrachtanteile
produziert hat. Es ist kein Zeichen von großer logistischer Intelligenz, erst hyperschlanke
Prozessketten zu konfigurieren, die in einem ungeplanten Ausmaß Störungen produzieren,
um dann mit unserer vollen geistigen Konzentration ein ’Supply Chain Event Management’
zu kreieren, dass diese Störungen nachträglich entschärfen soll.”
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In an interview, the Director of Supply Chain Management at a major car maker
indicated that supply interruptions had to be dealt with more often after suppli-
ers adopted JiT delivery (Beer 2011). In factory environments, where the origin
of JiT lies, interruptions were embraced as they served to reveal problems that
ought to be solved (Hopp & Spearman 2008). Used in relatively stable environ-
ments, the cost of (relatively rare) interruption may be acceptable as they come
with quality improvements. Supply networks, however, are relatively open sys-
tems, prone to induced variability from a variety of external sources. While the
reduction of waste in general remains a valuable goal in either way, it must be
evaluated with care for each particular case whether lean supply processes will
generate benefits that exceed cost due to interruption.
3.4. Theory of Constraints
3.4.1. Short Description
The Theory of Constraints (ToC) started out as a scheduling logic for production
systems and developed into what ToC followers say is a full-fledged manage-
ment philosophy that favors continuous improvement and focus on a system’s
constraints (Raman 1998). ToC became popular after Goldratt released his busi-
ness novel The Goal in 1984 (Goldratt & Cox 1984). While ToC has its root in
manufacturing and continues to be most influential in this field, its concepts and
ideas have been adapted to fit other management topics as diverse as project
management (Goldratt 1997) or marketing (Goldratt 1994).
ToC is centered around few concepts which are repeated and applied through-
out the various business novels and other publications, such as
• the distinction between constraints and non-constraints,
• a clear statement of a company’s goal: “make more money now and in
the future”,
• criticism of common cost accounting logic and the introduction of a per-
formance measurement system based on throughput, inventory, and oper-
ating expense,
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• a five step thinking process to improve a system’s performance ((1) iden-
tify constraint, (2) decide how to exploit it and exploit it, (3) subordinate
everything else, (4) elevate constraint, (5) repeat)
• the Current Reality Tree to help illustrate likely causes and effects leading
to the current state of the system,
• the Evaporating Clouds Diagram to help visualize conflicting demands
on a system, and
• the Drum-Buffer-Rope logic for production scheduling.
ToC is not founded on entirely new concepts, although it’s best-known publica-
tion, Goldratt’s The Goal, does not give credit or refer to any previous concept.
Goldratt met this criticism in Goldratt (2009) and explained the root of some of
the core ideas of ToC.
It should be noted that while ToC certainly has gained a foothold in academia
it seems not as much discussed both in wideness and in depth as related con-
cepts such as Lean or Total Quality Management. The reasons are not entirely
clear. One possible factor might be that ToC literature and organizations create
the impression of a cult focused on their prominent founding father Goldratt.
Also, while many authors have attempted comparisons between ToC and re-
lated or competing philosophies (Raman 1998 provides a – not quite up-to-date
– overview), publications by authors from ToC’s inner circle exhibit the ten-
dency to create the impression of a ToC-centered universe, which might possi-
bly conflict with the more objective stance academia is supposed to take.
Surprisingly little has been written about the application of the Theory of
Constraints (ToC) on SCM despite some authors indicating the contrary (e.g.,
Childerhouse 2002).
Lockamy III & Draman (1998) discuss the application of the Drum-Buffer-
Rope (DBR) concept, buffer management (BM), and the 5 Focusing Steps of
ToC on supply chains. The authors, however, do not do much more than putting
forth high-level claims, such as that “members of a supply chain must recognize
and embrace the global perspective” (p. 350), i.e., that they are part of a larger
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system that should be optimized, and that the tools of ToC “must” be adopted.
That is, the authors do not discuss how members of a supply chain should in-
troduce such measures or what could be the reasons that they have not done so
already.
Simatupang et al. (2004) apply the Evaporating Cloud Diagram of ToC to
investigate (1) impediments to collaboration in supply chains and (2) the appli-
cation of ToC problems and solutions on supply chains. With the Evaporating
Cloud Diagram, the authors illustrate the conflict between the altruistic idea of
maximization of the entire supply chain’s profit and companies striving after
optimization for themselves, and they support the existence of this conflict by
reference to literature. The authors then suggest the introduction of the ToC
accounting system based on Throughput (T), Investment (I), and Operating Ex-
pense (OE) (Goldratt & Cox 2004) on a supply chain system level as a solution
to the apparent dilemma. The weak point of this proposal is that the premises
are weak. The underlying assumption of Simatupang et al. (2004) is that “[t]he
supply chain can be viewed as a system established for the purpose of accom-
plishing a system’s goal” (p. 61). The validity of this assumption, however, is
debatable. One important difference between a firm and a supply chain (net-
work) is that in a firm all members of the system belong to one legal entity and
are legally obliged to obey orders from their superiors, i.e., all the entities by
definition follow one overall goal which in a profit-oriented firm tends to be to
make money (cf. Section 3.7 on page 175 for a more detailed discussion on the
similarities and differences). The supply chain, on the other hand, consists of
individual firms which in most cases do not belong to the same legal organi-
zation. That is, although the supply chain represents a system, this system has
not been established for the purpose of accomplishing an identical or at least
fully congruent goal. Cases of strongly idealistic organizations notwithstand-
ing, members of a supply chain have not chosen to become part of a supply
chain in order to join other members in their pursuit of the higher ideal of ac-
complishing a common “system’s goal” but out of mere necessity because they
need raw material to produce what they want to sell their customers in order to
earn money which is their goal. That is, there is no common goal of a supply
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chain system but many individual goals companies pursue. Moreover, systems
in general tend not to have a common – central – goal. Rather, Systems Theory
emphasizes that systems are comprised of individual entities, each of which fol-
lows its own individual goals. Assuming that the purpose of a supply chain is to
accomplish a common goal of the member firms thus misses the point and puts
a strain on the inferences. The normative nature of the paper becomes apparent
in statements such as the following:
“The chain members need to rank the increase of throughput on
the priority list before reducing investment and operating expenses.
In addition to this scale of importance, all other local or departmen-
tal metrics are less important than the global, or supply chain-wide
metrics” (Simatupang et al. 2004, p. 62, emphasis added).
Although the (normative) claim that organizations should sacrifice individual
benefits for the sake of overall supply chain performance is frequently repeated
in the SCM literature, there is, in fact, little empirical evidence that this is ever
consciously done by organizations. In order to break the dilemma between
global efficiencies and the economic logic of firms that pushes them to focus
on local efficiencies, the authors suggest an entirely different distribution sys-
tem for supply chain profits. Rather than through sales from echelon to echelon,
the authors propose that benefits are only allocated once the product has been
sold to end customers (ibid, p. 63).
dos Santos et al. (2010) follow the same line of thinking as Simatupang et al.
(2004) and argue on a normative basis that members of a supply network should
abolish local efficiencies and aim to involve the entire network to use the same
metrics and adopt a central and commonly agreed upon mechanism for bene-
fit sharing that replaces the market mechanism of individual contracts and ex-
change of goods and money between a buyer and a seller:
“At last, a new paradigm to be followed by SC’s partners could be
established in order to assure an efficient implementation of this de-
scribed TOC’s approach: the benefits ($) of the SC’s members will
be guaranteed only if the products were sold to the end-customers.
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This paradigm contrasts with the traditional rule usually adopted
where each SC’s member produces benefits ($) by selling to others
partners. In this way, all SC’s members should align its goals to a
global profitability SC, and the waste in the SC will be lower. Fur-
thermore, it should be elaborated in a common agreement with all
SC’s members a hierarchical local and global indicators structure
(...) to assure complete visibility of SC’s performance for all stake-
holders, so that partners can individually assess as well, as seeing
their real contribution to the global SC’s performance” (dos Santos
et al. 2010, p. 87).
Besides the emphasis of an entirely different allocation of benefits throughout
the supply network the authors focus on buffer management.
Wu et al. (2013), too, discuss buffer management and inventories in supply
networks and propose a “brand new (sic) inventory replenishment mechanism,
namely the TOC supply chain replenishment system (TOC-SCRS)”. This re-
plenishment concept consists of two guiding principles: (1) minimize inventory,
i.e., keep only enough inventory for one replenishment period, and (2) replenish
only the material you have sold (ibid, p. 80). These two principles, however, are
not novel and, although certainly part of it, do not originate from ToC but have
been at the core of Lean for a long time.
Mathu (2014) has identified major constraints in the South African coal pro-
duction and supply. The actual – or possible prospective – application of ToC
remains unclear, however, as the suggestions for improvement are limited to
high-level recommendations.
It appears that many publications in the field of ToC lack some academic
rigidity, which clearly sets them apart from Lean/JiT where serious research has
been conducted for thirty years and publications of high quality are abound.
Nonetheless, ToC does provide useful ways of thinking about material flow and
therefore does represent a valuable knowledge base upon which this work can
build.
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3.4.2. Ramifications for Bottleneck Management
Although the literature reviewed that aims to transfer concepts from ToC to
SCM turns out not to be particularly fruitful, ToC does provide a variety of
concepts which are worthwhile taking up and which are indeed made use of in
this dissertation.
First of all, ToC introduces a bottleneck perspective. Goldratt (in his various
publications on ToC) puts bottlenecks at the center of his concepts for produc-
tion control and improvement and develops a theory around the idea that bottle-
necks – due to their inherent importance for material flow – are the central levers
and deserve most attention. Because supply networks are material flow systems,
too, it has been attempted in this thesis to develop a bottleneck perspective on
supply networks so as to find out if such a perspective can support management
of supply.
Furthermore, ToC proposes a systematic approach to the management of bot-
tlenecks. There is a tremendous amount of literature on SCM that discuss a
variety of tools, concepts, and strategies. It seems, though, that methodological-
wise there have been only few developments, such as categorizations of supply
networks (Harland et al. 2001) and the dichotomy between responsive and effi-
cient network strategies (Christopher et al. 2006). Because a bottleneck perspec-
tive on supply networks has hardly been discussed in the literature, there is little
methodology that supports such a perspective. The systematic character of ToC
arguably is what made ToC popular and applicable. It has thus been one aim of
this thesis to contribute to a better methodological base for the management of
supply networks so as to make the field more accessible and applicable.
As part of its five-step methodology, ToC introduces the concepts of bottle-
neck identification (step one), bottleneck exploitation (step two) and bottleneck
elimination (step four, “elevate”). These steps provide the foundation and sup-
port the development of the bottleneck management methodology for supply
networks in this thesis.
One frequent pattern in “The Goal” is that physical capacity often is not the
cause of reduced or interrupted material flow. Policies are emphasized in ToC as
a root cause of less than optimal throughput. The identification of weak policies
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and operational deficiencies has also been emphasized in this study, and both
policies and operations provide an important lever for bottleneck management
measures, as demonstrated in the data analysis of sections 6.2 and 6.3.
This short overview demonstrates that ToC provides a rich foundation of con-
cepts and ideas that can enrich the methodology for the management of supply
networks. The system-level comparison of supply networks with production
systems (cf. Section 3.7) illustrates that the fundamental mechanisms of ma-
terial flow in both systems are similar. Hence the transfer of concepts seems
promising.
3.5. Agile and Leagile Supply Chains
3.5.1. Short Description
Agile supply chains, Agility or just “Agile”4 started off as a production paradigm
that has risen in popularity as of the second half of the 1990s, often considered
an alternative to Lean (Mason-Jones et al. 2000). Several British researchers,
perhaps most notably among them Martin Christopher from Cranfield Univer-
sity, have brought the concept to wide attention.
Agility is meant to support responsiveness of supply chains to ensure cus-
tomer demand can be met. In this respect, Agility prioritizes effectiveness
higher than efficiency, i.e., rather than the reduction of cost the availability of the
product to the customer is subject to the optimization effort (Christopher 2011).
Agility, as defined by Christopher & Towill (2001), is a “business-wide capabil-
ity that embraces organisational structures, information systems, logistics pro-
cesses and in particular, mindsets. A key characteristic of an agile organisation
is flexibility” (p. 236).
Christopher and his co-authors explain the concept by contrasting it from the
Lean paradigm which, through the elimination of waste, aims to increase effi-
ciency. Thus, Lean and Agile represent the two poles of the efficiency-flexibility
trade-off in Supply Chain Management. Furthermore, Christopher & Towill
4As to the spelling, Agile will be spelled with uppercase “A” when referred to the concept while
lowercase “a” will be used when referred to as an adjective. The same applies to Lean/lean.
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(2001) characterize Agile as an “organizational orientation” (p. 236) and thus
position it as a way of thinking or a paradigm in parallel to Lean/JiT which is
referred to as both a way to organize a production system and a management
philosophy (e.g., Hayes 1981).
While the two extreme poles, Agile on the one hand and Lean on the other
hand, are mutually exclusive concepts when it comes to implementation in one
particular segment of a supply network or an organization, the two concepts
can be combined to form hybrid, Leagile chains in consecutive order. More
specifically, the upstream part of a supply chain would be designed to be lean
whereas the downstream part of the supply chain would be designed to be agile.
The two segments would be connected by the decoupling point (also called
order penetration point, OPP) at which some inventory is held (Mason-Jones
et al. 2000, Christopher & Towill 2001). The chain would carry “generic” goods
which would then be customized according to actual customer demands from
the OPP on downstream5.
Alternatively, the two concepts can be used in parallel for different products
– or supplied components of a product – when these are subject to different
demand patterns, e.g., Lean for predictable demand and Agile for volatile de-
mand. Christopher & Towill (2001) suggest the application of the Pareto rule.
They refer to Gattorna & Walters (1996) for another option which would be the
distinction between base and surge production capacity with base capacity be-
ing suitable for Lean principles and surge capacity being suitable for an agile
approach.
The principal guideline of Agile to put effectiveness – i.e., availability of the
product or service to the customer – first, corresponds well with the bottleneck
focus of this work.
3.5.2. Ramifications for Bottleneck Management
The prioritization of effectiveness over efficiency in order to keep the material
flow uninterrupted with some certainty can be said to be aligning well with pri-
5The customization of generic goods as far downstream in the supply chain as possible is com-
monly referred to as postponement (Klaus & Krieger 2008, p. 457).
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orities of large segments of manufacturing industry. Some companies spend
enormous resources in order to ensure the timely arrival of supply so as to not
“starve” their production processes. In the automobile industry, it is not un-
common to use quick yet expensive means of transportation such as helicopters
to reduce transportation time if incoming goods inventory stock-out could not
be avoided otherwise (Beer & Liyanage 2011). In such situations, the cost of
transportation easily exceeds the cost of parts; the much higher cost of idling the
factory can be avoided, though.
Means such as helicopter transportation capacity are not normally “active”;
helicopters tend not to be part of production company’s assets. Instead, such ser-
vices are received through contracted providers. In agile systems, the means to
increase flexibility and responsiveness tend to be internal. Examples are more
flexible machines and robots or higher skilled workers. Such assets are often
more expensive, yet due to their better responsiveness to market needs they
help the organization be more profitable. Nonetheless, the principle remains the
same: avoiding interruptions of material flow by maintaining flexible produc-
tion or transportation means at one’s disposal, whether internal or contracted.
Thinking in terms of Agility, including its coupling with Lean – Leagile – does
inform and support the conception of bottleneck management activities.
Conceptually, it is not quite clear how Agility relates to concepts such as pro-
duction capacity flexibility (PCF), both internal and at suppliers. PCF translates
into “excess capacity”. While excess capacity could easily be declared “waste”
in a Lean mindset, it is also one of the primary tools of Lean, often embodied in
overtime or additional work shifts, to make up for variation. That is, PCF seems
to be right at the interface between the two seemingly opposed concepts Lean
and Agile, which suggests that definition and demarcation of either concept are
not quite sharp.
3.6. Supply Chain Risk Management
A thesis about bottlenecks in supply networks would be incomplete without
reference to the wide body of literature in the field of Supply Chain Risk Man-
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agement (SCRM). In fact, many might consider the emergence of bottlenecks in
a supply network and subsequent supply shortages a typical supply chain risk.
However, the relation of bottlenecks and Supply Chain Risk Management
is not as straightforward and has more facets than the above example suggest.
Before details will be elaborated, it seems sensible to define risk.
While ambiguity and lack of precision in the use of key terms is a widespread
problem (e.g., “performance”, “system”, “strategy”, “supply chain”, etc.), “risk”
is certainly one of the terms where the lack of common understanding is most
prevalent. Aven (2010) has dedicated an entire book to different (mis-) con-
ceptions of risk. Fortunately, many writers in the field of risk management do
provide “a” working definition of risk. Two common elements in many defini-
tions of risk are the probability of an event and its consequences or significance
(e.g., (Mitchell 1995, Harland et al. 2003, Hallikas et al. 2004)). Aven (2011a,
2011b) refers to this risk definition as
Risk (A,C,P) (3.6.1)
where A describes the event, C describes the consequences, and P describes
the associated probability. Probability (regardless whether in a frequentist or
Bayesian/subjective/knowledge-based setting) is used to express uncertainty.
There is, however, uncertainty beyond what can normally be expressed as proba-
bility, i.e., probability is an imperfect representation of uncertainty (Aven 2012).
Harland et al. (2003), for instance, differentiate between the “likelihood of a
trigger that will realise the risk” and the extent of exposure to the risk (p. 54).
Furthermore, a risk definition that includes a frequentist perspective on proba-
bility would be inadequate to describe risk in a context where an event cannot
be expected to be repeated. Subjective probabilities, on the other hand, may be
based on strong assumptions and “the origin and amount of information support-
ing the [probability] assignments are not reflected by the numbers produced”
(Aven 2012, p. 43). A more “modest” way of expressing risk which emphasizes
uncertainty would then be
Risk (A,C,U) (3.6.2)
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In this equation, uncertainty U replaced probability P. Accordingly, the defi-
nition of risk would be as follows:
Definition 3. “Risk associated with an activity is to be understood as uncertainty
about and severity of the consequences of an activity, where severity refers to
intensity, size, extension, scope, and other potential measures of magnitude, and
is with respect to something humans value (lives, the environment, money, etc.)”
(Aven 2010, p. 227).
The last sentence of the definition is important as one would not care about
consequences for an object or entity the existence of which is unknown or of no
relevance to us. Accordingly, everyone may perceive risk differently in a very
subjective manner depending on his levels of responsibility and liability, his
relevant performance objectives, and his personal goals (Peck 2006). The con-
sequences of an event can be both tangible and intangible, the resulting damage
can range from major to minor, and may be clearly visible (also in its extent)
to the person (or organization) affected and to others, only visible to the person
affected, or mostly invisible both to the person affected and her environment.
Harland et al. (2003) provide a list of different types of risk according to their
impact. They mention strategic risk, operational risk, supply risk, customer
risk, asset impairment risk, competitive risk, reputation risk, financial risk, fis-
cal risk, regulatory risk, and legal risk. Each of these types if risk bears different
implications for the parties affected.
Among the many definitions of risk that exist in the literature, the one pro-
vided above was chosen because it seems that uncertainty plays an important
role in supply network management in general and in bottleneck management
in particular. As outlined in sections 2.5.4 and 3.7, uncertainty is involved in
“drawing” the imaginative system boundary, it is involved in the actions of other
autonomous (and possibly opportunistic) actors in the network, it is involved in
new product development and introduction to markets, medium-term economic
swings as well as long-term market and technological developments, it is in-
volved in global politics and in the natural environment; essentially, uncertainty
is – directly or indirectly – involved in all possible events that may lead to un-
planned bottlenecks.
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Although risk does not by definition mean something negative (Stone & Grøn-
haug 1993, Aven 2010), it often is negatively connoted as something inher-
ently unpleasant, not least in management of supply risk (Peck 2006). Mitchell
(1995), for instance, explains that negative connotation of risk in the managerial
context is one of the important differences to the conception of risk in decision
theory:
"There is, therefore, a persistent tension between ’risk’ as a measure
(e.g., the variance) of the distribution of possible outcomes from a
choice and ’risk’ as a danger or hazard. From the former perspec-
tive, a risky choice is one with a wide range of possible outcomes.
From the latter perspective, a risky choice is one that contains a
threat of a very poor outcome" (Mitchell 1995, p. 117).
A similar conceptual tension exists with bottlenecks. The existence of bottle-
necks, is a necessity, and there is nothing inherently unpleasant about bottle-
necks, just as there is nothing inherently negative about variation in possible
outcomes.6 One might even choose to internalize bottlenecks in order to control
system throughput and thus to avoid dependence on external factors. Bottle-
necks cannot be entirely removed for this would mean that throughput became
infinite. If the bottleneck of a system is removed, another bottleneck will appear,
and even when all bottlenecks within the system can be removed, the system
will still be constrained by an external bottleneck. In the context of a factory,
the external bottleneck could be customers’ demand or suppliers’ production ca-
pacity; in the context of manufacturing networks this could be market demand
or regulatory policies (e.g., antitrust law). The ultimate purpose of bottleneck
management therefore is to make sure the bottleneck can be utilized without
unplanned interruption at any point in time (i.e., fully exploited). In this case,
the system will achieve its maximum theoretical throughput (Goldratt & Cox
2004).
The distinction between unplanned and planned bottlenecks (cf. Section
6Another difference between the concepts of risk and bottlenecks is that risk can be subjective
or socially constructed (Slovic 1999, Aven 2011b) whereas the existence of bottlenecks is an
objective, positive (in the sense that its existence can be logically inferred) fact.
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2.3.3) brings some clarity into the relationships between risk and bottlenecks.
While bottlenecks cannot be entirely removed and a system will thus always be
constrained by some limiting element, it is useful to distinguish between bot-
tlenecks that emerge unplanned and those that are deliberately planned into the
system. The latter result from a conscious design decision, i.e., uncertainty as
one of the constituents of risk is low. The former, however, can pose a risk as it
is unclear where the bottleneck emerges and what the consequences are.
Unplanned bottlenecks can therefore be understood as risk factor for the sup-
ply network. How big this factor is depends on the likelihood of the bottleneck’s
occurrence, its impact, its duration, and the options for its exploitation or elimi-
nation. Moreover, the options for exploitation or removal of the bottleneck may
depend on whether the bottleneck has emerged internally (i.e., within organiza-
tional reach) or externally (e.g., at a supplier).
It seems reasonable to assume that bottlenecks in external locations (i.e., in
the supply network) pose a higher risk to the organization than a bottleneck
within physical reach. Likewise, a bottleneck that is outside its organizational
control increases uncertainty for the focal firm; the system-level comparison in
Section 3.7 provides more detailed explanations of this point. The effects of
unplanned bottlenecks that exist over an extended period of time are less likely
to be buffered by inventory (inventory buffer will be used up at some point)
and are more likely to “buffered by time” (in terms of Hopp & Spearman 2008)
than effects of bottlenecks that exist only for a short period of time. Static
bottlenecks can be more easily identified than wandering bottlenecks, which
allows measures to protect the bottleneck. Accordingly, wandering bottlenecks
arguably pose a higher risk to the firm. If the only way to increase throughput
is to increase capacity of the bottleneck and no other way is conceivable, then
cost incurred for the capacity increase can be significant in some cases, but
at least much higher than for many alternative measures that can help exploit
bottleneck capacity already available. Whether the severity of the bottleneck
effects is higher for bottlenecks due to organizational, physical, or operational
causes and whether short-cycled, mid-cycled, or long-cycled bottlenecks pose a
higher risk, very much depends on the circumstances.
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There is little empirical research on the actual effects of supply interruptions
on firm performance. One important reason certainly is that network effects
on individual firm performance are difficult to single out. A more fundamental
problem may be that performance is a poorly defined and ambiguous concept
and that measurements may yield different results depending on the dependent
variable that one chooses to measure. “Performance is never objective” (Lebas
1995, p. 27) and the reason is that goals differ depending on the stakeholder
concerned and on the purpose of the measurement (Sink 1993, p. 8-3.12; Lebas
1995, p. 24; Simons 2000, p. 10). The survival rate of network relationships
has been used as an approximation to measure success (Gulati et al. 2002, p.
293). Supply relationships are often not intended to persist forever but will end
with the phase-out of a product, however. In this case, a termination of the
relationships does not yield information about the success of the relationship
(Kenis & Oerlemans 2008). In contrast, continuation of a supply relationship
does not mean it is successful; instead, switching or exit cost may simply be high
(Kim et al. 2006). Stock market effects were used as an indicator for the effect
of supply chain interruptions in Hendricks & Singhal (2003) and Hendricks &
Singhal (2005a,b). These authors found that both stock prices and operating
performance respond significantly to “glitches” in supply. As outlined above,
however, such findings should not be generalized as the consequences of delays
or interruptions of supply will differ for firms.
3.7. A Synoptic Systems Perspective on
Manufacturing Networks and Production
Systems
3.7.1. Introduction: Purpose of a System Level Comparison
The following section will present a short systematic comparison of the two
archetypal material flow systems factory and supply network.7 Because ma-
7An earlier version of this section was presented as a paper at the World Congress of Engineer-
ing Asset Management 2013 in Hong Kong and was published as Beer (2015).
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terial flow systems are similar in some respects but will show differences in
others, such a comparison can support the understanding of both potential for
improvement as well as possible limitations in the management of material flow
in either system.
The comparison draws on different streams of literature, such as Systems
Theory, Operations Management, and Supply Chain Management, and is partly
informed by findings from earlier research conducted in supplier management
in the automobile industry (Beer 2011).
The objective of this thought-experiment is to capitalize on the large amount
of research that has been done on material flow and bottleneck management in
factory settings and to derive lessons for the improvement of material flow in
supply networks.
3.7.2. A Systems Perspective on Factories and Supply
Networks
The two systems can be compared across a variety of systemic properties. The
outcome of such a comparison to some extent would depend on the specific type
of factory and the specific supply network selected; either system differs widely
in its respective characteristics in practice. There are some archetypal properties
which, while not always present, tend to be characteristical for the two systems.
Nonetheless, the comparison will remain a thought experiment.
One premise of this comparison is that both factories and supply networks
can be understood as material flow systems. As such, they share certain charac-
teristics. For instance, both systems are comprised of entities that stand in some
relationship to each other. In this case, the relationships are primarily defined
by the flow of material between those entities. The entities convert incoming
material or products into another type of outgoing material or products. Some
entities may only have a relay function, such as cross-docking stations of logis-
tics service providers or warehouses.
Furthermore, both factories and supply networks show characteristics of open
systems, albeit to a differing degree. In both systems, the constituting elements
may be changed by external influx of energy or material. In fact, both systems
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depend on the influx of energy and material which, after transformation during
the production process, will leave the system again.
Though a more extensive comparison might yield interesting results, this
short review shall be limited to the following:
• degree of system openness,
• degree of system complexity,
• focus on flow, and
• autonomy of nodes.
3.7.3. Systemic Differences Between Factories and Supply
Networks
3.7.3.1. Degree of System Openness
While both factory and supply networks are open systems, their system borders
differ in permeability. In each case, the system border allows influx and outflow
of material and energy required for the value-adding production process. There
are significant differences, however, in the extent to which each system is sub-
ject to undesired and possibly interruptive impact from the system environment.
The main reason lies in the spatial distribution of the systems’ nodes. Not
every supply network is globally dispersed (nor are factories necessarily well
shielded from undesirable external impact), yet for a general, albeit stylized
dichotomy, it is certainly valid to claim that nodes in a supply networks tend
to be wider dispersed than nodes in a factory system. Indeed, there are two
extrema in the layout of supply networks: on the one hand, supply networks can
be globally dispersed; on the other hand, supply networks can be concentrated
in a small geographical area, as in the case of supplier parks. However, even
in the case of supplier parks, (additional) raw material and parts have to be
delivered either directly to the OEM or to the suppliers which predominantly
represent only the first tier of the supply network. That is, a large part of the
supply network remains outside the geographically concentrated area and thus
remains vulnerable.
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Large geographic dispersion involves long distance transportation with a va-
riety of transportation modes. Furthermore, the nodes in the supply network are
exposed to different environmental (i.e., political, social, natural, and cultural)
conditions that can impact on the production and transportation of goods. The
high exposure to various, possibly adverse, factors increases the uncertainty in-
volved in the business. Furthermore, the variety of factors possibly impacting
on the supply network and the resulting uncertainty limits management in its ef-
fectiveness when attempting to safeguard the functioning of the system. Given
the various sources of uncertainty – and especially the number of unknown un-
knowns – in a widely dispersed network, the risk of interruptions is difficult to
grasp.
Of course, large geographical concentration of suppliers is not without risk,
either. Obviously, the occurrence of significant events in the environment (e.g.,
natural disasters, political riots, wars, etc.) would impact a larger number of
suppliers at once. In such an event, significant interruption must be expected as
it is unlikely that production and supply can be kept upright. The use of alterna-
tive sources for supply within a contingency plan is unlikely to be able to avert
interruptions when a large number of suppliers is involved. Accordingly, Craig-
head et al. (2007) found that geographical concentration of suppliers (“supply
chain density”) is likely to create more severe disruptions. Simplified, the risk
of supply interruptions with respect to geographical dispersion (or geographical
concentration) of suppliers may be visualized by a U-shaped graph: While the
risk of interruptions may be high due to the higher number of vulnerable links
in a globally dispersed network – that is, probability (or uncertainty) of adverse
occurrences is high –, the risk of interruption in geographically concentrated
suppliers is high due to the severity of the possible occurrence. Uncertainty and
severity both are part of the risk definition introduced earlier (cf. p. 172). An
example for high risk due to high exposure of the supply networks to a broad va-
riety of possible impacts can be found in the frequent interruptions automobile
manufacturers had to cope with in 2010 and 2011 due to a combination of nat-
ural disasters, political turmoil, and economic conditions (e.g., interruption of
the volcano Eyjafjallajökull in southern Island, political uprise in North Africa,
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severe floods in Europe and Asia, suppliers struggling financially due to the ef-
fects of the recent financial crisis, etc.). An example for interruptions due an
incident that affected several suppliers at once can be found in the earthquake
that hit Japan’s eastern coast in 2011 which had put a halt to the production
of many industrial firms, (Leckcivilize 2012), among them several automotive
suppliers. 8 Also in 2011, the automobile industry suffered from shortages of
semiconductors and glass panels which were not induced by natural or political
disasters. Here, the reasons for supply delay and disruption were not insuffi-
cient production capacity from suppliers per se but rather decisions to allocate
production capacity differently. Suppliers of semiconductors and glass panels
did in fact have production capacity that would have met demand from the au-
tomotive sector alone; however, in the face of insufficient production capacity
for a total of all their customers they had to make decisions concerning capac-
ity allocation and preferred to supply customers from other industries such as
consumer electronics as margins there were much higher. That is, lateral effects
in the supply network from nodes that belong to system’s environment rather
than to the system itself led to distortion (cf. Section 2.5.4 on page 96 and Beer
et al. 2012). This case suggests another apparently important difference: While
the system boundary of a factory system is relatively easy to draw, this is much
more difficult to do and more ambiguous in a supply network. When there is
ambiguity about system boundaries, then planning and preparing for contingen-
cies is much more difficult. The likelihood that the focal firm in the supply
network experiences some adverse impact it was unable to prepare for seems to
8Compared to supply networks, factory systems obviously are an extreme form of geographi-
cally concentrated value creation. In contrast to supply networks, however, nodes of a factory
system cannot be spread over any significant geographical area without invoking severe ineffi-
ciencies. Following the arguments that have been made about risk of geographically dispersed
or geographically concentrated suppliers, respectively, one could conclude that factories are
subject to high risk because when they are hit by external adverse impact this entire material
flow system would come to halt. Whether alternative solutions are worth seeking, such as
redundant production capacities in other locations or parallel production in several plants, de-
pends on various factors, among them the product margin and the product maturity in terms
of its life cycle. Interruption of production of high-margin products on an early stage of their
life cycle can hurt the firm badly as market share may be irretrievably lost to competition. Ap-
parently, the trade-off here is between efficiency and responsiveness, which is the questions
that needs to be answered for the design of supply networks, too (cf. Fisher 1997).
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be high.9
3.7.3.2. Degree of System Complexity
It is difficult to characterize differences in complexity of two generic systems in
theory. It is possible, though, to identify drivers of complexity that may or may
not be present in either system. It will be argued that such factors are likely to
cause a higher level of complexity in supply networks than in a factory.
The higher openness of the system resulting from higher permeability of the
system boundaries is likely to have an impact on the nodes within the system.
Nodes in a supply network can be described as agents which are acting accord-
ing to a set of rules (cf. Section 2.4.4). That is, the nodes in a supply network
are active in nature; they act and they react based upon the conditions they find,
part of which are an inherent part of the system whereas another part of the con-
ditions may consist of external stimulus from the system’s environment. Such
external stimulus can be environmental incidents (market conditions, political
conditions, natural disasters, etc.) and lateral effects, such as indirect demand
from other industries. Due to their status as (typically) autonomous firms that
are legally independent of their customers and thus not subject to fiat within a
single firm hierarchy – as it is the case with process stations in a factory – nodes
in a supply network (i.e., suppliers) can choose from a much more comprehen-
sive set of possible courses of action. Nodes in a factory system thus are rather
passive than active and exhibit a lower level of autonomy. Mathematically spo-
ken, nodes in a factory system have fewer “degrees of freedom”.
Availability of information generally helps decreasing and controlling com-
plexity. The emergence of the bullwhip effect, for instance, can partly be ex-
plained by a lack of information about actual customer demand which requires
companies upstream in a supply network to interpret ambiguous data which,
in turn, often leads to over- or underestimation of actual demand, resulting
in strongly oscillating inventories (Forrester 1958, Lee et al. 1997). That is,
9This case can also serve as a powerful reminder of the inadequacy of the supply chain model
that invokes a linear single-threaded chain where lateral effects cannot occur (cf. Section
2.5.4).
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each agent acts rationally according to his local rules and the information lo-
cally available, thereby unintendedly creating turbulence for the entire network.
There are several reasons why availability of relevant information to all nodes
involved is less likely to be achieved in a supply network than in a factory sys-
tem:
• The spatial dispersion of nodes requires some type of information system
to bridge geographic distance since information does not just “happen to
arrive” at the right place in the right time as it might occur between locally
concentrated nodes.
• For an information system to work effectively, it must be defined what
kind of information shall be made available to other nodes. Besides that
humans sometimes make wrong decisions, it is not always known in ad-
vance what information is of importance to other nodes. Hence, it is
possible that important information is not transmitted.
• A delay is often involved in the transmission of information between
nodes in a network. In some industries, e.g., automotive, it is common
to have nightly EDI call-offs sent from the OEM to its tier-1 suppliers.
The tier-1 suppliers, in turn, may have nightly EDI call-offs for their sup-
ply from tier-2 suppliers. If disadvantageously scheduled, it can take two
days before the call-off information reaches the tier-2 suppliers. In case of
long supply chains – some chains have six tiers and more – a significant
delay can occur before information is processed.
• Not all information will be disclosed to other nodes and sometimes the
level of information available is purposely kept low in order to protect
confidential information from competition. In a factory system, on the
other hand, each process station normally belongs to the same legal or-
ganization and information tends to be more freely shared than between
legally independent firms.
• Transmission of feedback from other nodes in the network to the focal
firm suffers from similar problems, i.e., possibly incomplete or delayed
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information, which fortifies the problem.
Due to the reasons outlined here, it is less likely that availability of information
can help decrease or manage complexity in a supply network to the same extent
as in a factory network.
3.7.3.3. Focus on Flow
Significant improvements in factory throughput have shown to be possible as
a consequence of paradigm shift from centrally controlled push systems with
focus on efficiency to improvement of material flow.10 Many of the changes
can be traced back to the development of variety of production philosophies,
some of which could also be referred to as management philosophies due to
the generalizability of their underlying principles. Examples are Just-in-Time
(or: Lean), Total Quality Management, Theory of Constraints, and Six Sigma.
These philosophies employ different thematic and methodological foci and dif-
ferent lexica, but are similar in some ways. One aspect that is shared across all
these philosophies is the improvement of material flow, either as central theme
(e.g., in Theory of Constraints) or as consequence (e.g., of reduction of variabil-
ity, as in Six Sigma). The changes that have (arguably) been brought about in
many manufacturing environments are due to the significantly different mindset
that has guided production planning since the wide adoption of Material Re-
quirements Planning (MRP) throughout the 1970s as compared to the “new”
philosophies. MRP (as well as Manufacturing Resources Planning, MRP II) is
a central planning approach to control production along two dimensions: quan-
tities and timing (Hopp & Spearman 2008). Lean (or JiT), on the other hand,
though providing a set of general rules, is an inherently decentralized approach
that allows individuals to act based upon local conditions (while obeying the
general rules). Instead of dealing with quantities or timing from an aerial per-
spective and pushing material through the system, production is directly trig-
gered (pulled) by demand. The ideal is to produce the exact amount needed
10See Hopp & Spearman (2008) for a more comprehensive account of the content and implica-
tions of different management philosophies.
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so that it is finished right when it is needed. Large amounts of WIP that accu-
mulate due to large production batches and variability – and, in turn, increase
variability even more – can be avoided and cycle time thus be reduced. Ideally,
the material flows through the factory with fewer delays.
Various direct and indirect advantages are associated with improved mate-
rial flow and many have been widely recognized – at least in the literature.11
They include (but are not limited to) improved throughput, reduced cycle time,
reduced inventory (both on stock and in process, i.e., WIP), improved quality,
higher reliability, and eventually higher customer satisfaction.
The advantages of the flow principle have been discussed in the literature and
have been embraced by in the industry. Successful implementation and oper-
ationalization of the flow principle have predominantly been achieved within
the boundaries of factory systems, whereas in the larger manufacturing supply
network groundbreaking changes have not occurred. There are attempts to im-
plement the flow principle in supply networks; the umbrella category Supply
Chain Management does, in fact, contain tools and concepts such as Just-in-
Time (JiT), Just-in-Sequence (JiS), Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), Col-
laborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR), and some other.
JiT and JiS in particular seem to be the logical extension of a factory-internal
implementation of the flow principle. At second sight, however, the actual im-
plementation of JiT and JiS in practice demonstrates difficulties inherent to the
management of supply networks and thereby reveals some differences between
supply networks and factories. A look at the automotive industry suggests that
the implementation of JiT and JiS in many cases is limited to the delivery mode
between a supplier and his customer (e.g., the OEM), and does not link the in-
ternal pull systems across several tiers. A study of the supplier relations in the
automotive sector (Beer 2011) suggests that some OEMs’ intention for the im-
plementation of “JiT” is to reduce inventory in incoming goods warehouses –
and instead move it to supplier site and responsibility. The amount of inventory
remains essentially unchanged, but location and ownership change. Accord-
11In the course of the research done for the case studies in this thesis, some differences between
the state-of-the-art knowledge in production planning in the literature and the situation in
several firms have become quite apparent.
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ingly, the benefits of this “fake JiT” implementation turn out to be unevenly dis-
tributed. In their study, Göpfert & Braun (2010) show that OEMs indeed greatly
benefit from such implementations, whereas the positive effects for supplier are
small, if at all, and sometimes even negative.
There are some possible explanations as to why this kind of fake implemen-
tation is being pursued. Arguably, the automotive industry has characteristics
other industries do not have, so that the emergence of this phenomenon cannot
be expected to exist elsewhere. Additional studies in other industries are neces-
sary to find whether the findings with regard to JiT and JiS implementation can
be generalized.
One typical characteristic of the automotive sector is that the cost of OEM
plants being idle are extraordinarily high. Therefore, OEMs have strong interest
in reliable supply and require suppliers to maintain a safety buffer of parts from
which they can supply the OEM. One indicator that this might be one factor can
be seen in the popularity of another delivery mode that is employed for many
parts: delivery to consignment warehouses. In consignment warehouses, the
inventory is owned by the supplier while the warehouse is located on or close
to the OEM site. Ownership of parts changes only when the OEM takes the
part out of the warehouse. Together, JiT/JiS and consignment warehouses have
replaced traditional delivery-to-warehouse mode in which the OEM owns the
inventory for many parts (Beer 2011). So arguably, the main objective of OEMs
is to reduce ownership of inventory – and not to reduce inventory as such.
An extension of the previous proposition is that one actor in the supply net-
work does not care about the amount of inventory that other actors in the supply
network hold. This might be the case because they do not feel the negative con-
sequences of other actors holding high inventory, or because the advantages of
other actors holding high levels of inventory, e.g., (arguably) higher supply reli-
ability, overcompensate potential disadvantages. With regard to potential disad-
vantages, one could argue that higher inventory levels and thereby higher hold-
ing cost incurred may also lead to higher cost for the customer. The response
to this argument is two-fold: first, the cost of suppliers holding inventory (and
the customer, i.e., the OEM or the lower-tier supplier paying for this inventory
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through higher prices demanded by the supplier to compensate his additional
cost) might still be lower than the cost of supply interruptions; second, a quick
glance on the history of relationships between OEMs and suppliers in the au-
tomotive industry suggests that OEMs might not be fully aware of the negative
consequences for them when they maintain adverse supplier relationships, or
they are at least ignorant about concerns of suppliers (cf. the role and work of
José Ignacio López de Arriortúa at General Motors, Opel and Volkswagen and
the “López Effect”; Mitchener 1997-03-14, Willutzki 2001).
In addition to the lack of concern of OEMs and downstream suppliers about
inventory levels of upstream suppliers, there is a lack of interest of some up-
stream suppliers to align with possible “low-inventory, smooth-flow” ideals with
customers. This lack of interest is embodied in minimum order quantities. In
one case encountered during an earlier study of supply management in the au-
tomobile industry (Beer 2011), a logistics audit conducted by an OEM on a
tier-1 supplier production site revealed that the supplier’s warehouse for incom-
ing goods was filled to the top with 300.000 units of one specific plastic part.
The warehouse manager at the supplier, asked by the auditors why his company
holds this high amount of inventory of this one part on stock, respondet that
their supplier, i.e., the OEM’s tier-2 supplier, required them to buy the mini-
mum order quantity of 300.000 units in spite of his actual need of only some
hundred units. The tier-2 supplier which holds a powerful position in the net-
work did not have to fear any consequences or negative effects on his business
from the relatively unimportant customer. While this case is certainly extreme in
its magnitude, it is conceivable that serious JiT or JiS implementations in other
buyer-supplier relationships and in other industries can fail for similar reasons.
Beamon (1998) provides a literature review of performance measures used
in SCM. None of the authors she reviewed uses throughput explicitly as per-
formance measures whereas cost reduction is a dominant parameter. Reduction
of inventory and reduction of variability (“Minimize product demand variance
and demand amplification”) is mentioned as performance indicator by some au-
thors, cycle time is hidden in “customer responsiveness”, however. For the man-
agement of a factory system, Goldratt & Cox (2004) suggest using throughput
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as primary indicator, inventory as secondary indicator, and operating expenses
(i.e., cost) as tertiary indicator. The priorities in the literature reviewed by Bea-
mon (1998) seem to be different. Also, while inventory levels are mentioned as a
decision variable in supply chain modeling, no attention is paid to delivery (reg-
ular warehouse, JiT, JiS, consignment warehouse, VMI...) and transportation
(road, air, water, rail) mode. The different modes do, however, have implica-
tions for the steadiness of the flow as well as the size of the inventory (both
planned and actual) as they determine the equivalent of what is referred to as
the production batch size in a factory.
The arguments above illustrate why tools, methods and principles for the im-
provement of material flow in supply networks can experience problems in im-
plementation. The arguments referred to diverging interests among suppliers
and customers, imbalance of power relationships (and the exploitation thereof),
trade-off between objectives of a firm, and lack of foresight.
3.7.3.4. Autonomy of Nodes
One important difference between the management of material flow in a factory
and management of material flow in a supply network lies in the amount of
control and influence management can exert over the various nodes and edges
of the system (or in different terms: over the assets and processes). In a factory,
management is working on behalf of the owners of the assets and employees
are contractually bound to obey management’s directives. This is not to say
that management has full control over assets and processes; in fact, there is
much research on phenomena such as opportunism (e.g., in Transaction Cost
Economics, cf. Williamson 1975) and organizational culture (cf. Schein 2009)
which suggests that while management can use the power of fiat it may still be
unable to achieve all of its objectives within an organization. Nevertheless, it
seems to be a valid claim that management and owners do have considerable
control over assets and processes in their organizations.
In contrast, there rarely is a legal foundation in a supply network for a focal
company’s interference in internal organization of its suppliers. Although the
term “Supply Chain Management” and its definition suggest an active role of
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the focal firm in the organization of and interplay between nodes in the network
(cf. Section 2.5.4), researchers are in disagreement as to what extent a supply
network can be managed and to what extent the focal firm merely has to cope
with the network (cf. Section 2.5.5.2). On the other hand, field research in some
industries shows that focal firms do have some control over their suppliers in
some cases. It is very common, for instance, that automobile OEMs conduct au-
dits on supplier sites and actively point out issues that have to be resolved before
the supplier can enter into a supply relationship with the OEM, or to maintain
this relationship, respectively. Bicheno & Holweg (2009) claim there are only
two mechanisms to “align incentives” in supply networks: power and shared
rewards. Whether and to what extent it is possible to exert power in a supply
network depends on the power configuration resulting from interdependencies
as well as the type of network governance (cf. Section 2.5.5.2). Furthermore, it
may not always be wise to exploit advantageous power positions in a network.
As pointed out earlier (cf. Section 2.5.5.2), the exploitation of a powerful po-
sition in the network can, in fact, deteriorate performance as the disadvantaged
party might rather accept switching costs (which can be conceived of as a rep-
resentation of dependence) and leave the network. It may thus be necessary to
focus on incentive alignment instead (Narayanan & Raman 2004).
3.7.3.5. Implications for Bottleneck Management
The differences discussed in the preceding paragraphs have implications for the
maagement of bottlenecks.
There is a variety of methods for the detection of bottlenecks in manufactur-
ing systems. Common methods for bottleneck detection in factory systems are
utilization-based methods, queue length-based methods, wait time-based meth-
ods, and experiments (Roser et al. 2002, 2003). The reasons for the existence of
multiple methods include:
1. The understanding as to what constitutes a bottleneck varies,
2. different systems are subject to different limitations, which can render
some methods for bottleneck detection inapplicable, and
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3. depending on the method and the definition of a bottleneck, different ele-
ments of the systems could be identified as a bottleneck. Different meth-
ods may thus be necessary to validate the findings of the detection pro-
cess.
The literature review in Section 2.3.2 indicates that many authors are imprecise
in their definition of bottlenecks and in stating the characteristics they exhibit.
Some confuse, for instance, the definition of bottlenecks with the methods to
detect bottlenecks. There are several indicators that can suggest the existence of
a bottleneck, such as high utilization of a certain system element, long queues
in front of a system element, elements that are blocked from releasing mate-
rial or are starving from a lack of material. Depending on what indicator is
employed for the detection of bottleneck results may vary. The second point
refers to the fact that design decisions in the material flow system can render
some indicators or methods for bottleneck detection useless. A physical limita-
tion of queue length in front of a machining station, for instance, will not allow
to employ a queue length-based method for bottleneck detection. A maximum
waiting time in the queue before prioritization is changed or (occasionally or
even frequently) changing prioritization by urgency will render methods useless
which rely on wait time. Low availability of a machine due to frequent break
downs or maintenance measures may lead to high utilization and may wrongly
suggest the existence of a bottleneck where there is none. Hence, as indicated
in the third point, detection results may be unreliable and validation necessary.
Apparently, bottleneck detection suffers from ambiguity even when conducted
within the boundaries of a factory. In a supply network, the level of transparency
with respect to indicators is lower, the autonomy of nodes is higher, the level of
complexity is higher, and so is (arguably) the level of opportunism. In fact, sup-
pliers may be black boxes to customers if the latter do not possess a particularly
powerful position that allows them to enforce a certain level of transparency
through audits and agreements. Suppliers may even have strategic interest in
not revealing information that would allow other firms to use indicators for bot-
tleneck detection. Furthermore, in spite of the buzz around “managing the whole
supply chain from raw material to customer”, focal firms are not normally in-
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volved in the business with sub-suppliers, so they often do not receive any in-
formation from them. Essentially, the most common case may be that the focal
firm is dependent and has to rely on information provided by its suppliers by
their own choice.
The same obstacles that make identification of bottlenecks in a supply net-
work difficult make their elimination a challenge. More than anything else,
autonomy of suppliers may represent the major constraint for effective supply
network bottleneck management on part of the focal firm. Autonomy of suppli-
ers causes a lack of control for the customer. Measures to protect or resolve the
bottleneck are therefore difficult to enact. Protecting the bottleneck means that
it should never starve and that it should never be blocked from releasing parts
that have been processed. Furthermore, it must be avoided that the bottleneck
wastes capacity (Goldratt & Fox 1986, Goldratt & Cox 2004).
Focal firms would need to go into tier-n management, i.e., they would need
to “manage” not only direct (tier-1) suppliers, but need to expand their activities
over several tiers. A look at the automotive industry, where there are powerful
OEMs with high efficiency requirements and thus high vulnerability towards
bottlenecks, suggests that even the most powerful firms are not doing it. Only
very recently, some (very few) OEMs have started to expand their tier-n activ-
ities (Beer 2011). However, even when companies intend to do tier-n manage-
ment, the problem remains that suppliers remain autonomous and, if their power
position in the network allows, are unlikely to let customers interfere with their
internal processes in any significant way. Conflicts of interest with other cus-
tomers could be expected.
In an interview conducted as part of an earlier case study (Beer 2011), a
supplier manager at a large automotive OEM stated that most supply shortages
result from quality problems. This statement indicates that suppliers run out
of production capacity when scrap rate is high and rework necessary. Bottle-
necks emerge due to quality problems because there is too little extra capacity
available to make up for the waste of capacity due to work on defective parts
or work on parts that then do not meet quality criteria, respectively. Because
OEMs generally demand low prices – and expect yearly reductions in the prices
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they pay to their suppliers throughout the product life cycle – suppliers have to
maintain high utilization of their production assets to ensure cost efficient pro-
duction. Put differently, suppliers are pushed towards the “efficiency pole” of
the efficiency-flexibility trade-off.
Another important implication concerns the purposeful location of a planned
bottleneck. Every system has a bottleneck. One way, however, to facilitate
control of the bottleneck is to plan it consciously into the system. This allows the
firm to protect the bottleneck and thereby ensure high throughput. In practice,
firms may want to select those resources as bottlenecks where high utilization is
desirable. Commonly, for accounting reasons these will be resources with high
fixed cost, such as paint shops or other processing stations with particularly
expensive machines. What does this imply for the management of a supply
network?
To better understand the implications, we can draw on the concept of Supply
Chain Orientation (SCO) as introduced by Mentzer et al. (2001). They define
SCO as “the recognition by an organization of the systemic, strategic implica-
tions of the tactical activities involved in managing the various flows in a supply
chain” (p. 11). That is, SCO describes a specific organizational mindset, an
aspect of the organizational culture. In order to achieve anything that comes
close to the claim of strategic coordination for the well-being of the entire sup-
ply chain (instead of local optimization), as included in various Supply Chain
Management definitions (e.g., Council of Supply Chain Management Profes-
sionals (CSCMP) 2010, Mentzer et al. 2001; cf. Section 2.5.4), such Supply
Chain Orientation needs to exist not only in one firm, but is required “across
several companies directly connected in the supply chain” (Mentzer et al. 2001,
p. 11). The multiple-case study conducted as part of this dissertation as well as
earlier case study research in the automobile industry suggest that the existence
of SCO across several companies cannot be taken for granted. It seems more
likely that each firm in the supply network enjoys the economic benefits of high
asset utilization to the extent the supply contract allows. For that very reason,
supply contracts often stipulate terms regarding the maximum amount of work-
ing shifts per week a supplier may use for production of the forecast amounts
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so that production capacity flexibility can be maintained and production can be
scaled up in case demand increases at short notice. Apparently, the same eco-
nomic logic that may lead management as the central power in a firm to choose
high-value assets as bottlenecks to ensure high utilization comes into play in the
supply network. The important difference is, however, that in a decentralized
supply network no powerful central entity can make such a decision on behalf
– and for the sake – of the whole network. Accordingly, firms will tend to pri-
oritize their individual outcome over the network outcome as a whole. To what
extent individual firms will make sacrifices for the good of the entire network
is still subject to ongoing research. Questions of firm ownership (sharehold-
ers) and governance may play an important role, and so do interdependence and
power relations in the network (cf. Section 2.5.5.2).
3.7.3.6. Conclusion
By comparing supply networks with factories, some systemic differences be-
tween these two types of material flow systems could be highlighted. The dif-
ferences provide explanation for the difficulties a focal firm may encounter when
trying to establish measures to improve material flow in a network.
On the one hand, the level of variability in the network is increased due to
higher system openness and complexity. On the other hand, the focal firm’s
means to reduce variability are rather limited since nodes in the supply network
enjoy higher autonomy than nodes in a factory system. Higher autonomy of
nodes tends to reduce the transparency of material flow and possible impedi-
ments to material flow and thereby limits the focal firm’s ability to control and
steer. The lack of transparency further increases complexity. Hence, the focal
firm cannot expect to be able to manage its supply networks’ material flow on a
level that is roughly comparable to the options it has in its own factory.
The increased difficulties reflect the need to make careful design decisions
right from the beginning. Because directly approaching an existing bottleneck
seems to be a problem in supply networks, design decisions should involve care-
ful preparation for the prevention of unplanned bottlenecks. Possibly, bottleneck
placement could be an option worthwile investigating. Conscious bottleneck
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placement is a familiar topic for production planners (cf. Goldratt & Fox 1986)
but seems to be non-existent in the literature on supply networks (or “Supply
Chain Management”). Additionally, the focal firm’s manufacturing character-
istics in terms of flexibility and efficiency should be reflected by the character-
istics of the supply network since a mismatch is likely to lead to inefficiencies
and loss of throughput.
3.8. Summary
This chapter represents the second part of the review of relevant literature.
While the first part was focused on more fundamental topics, this one touched
upon concepts that emerged from those fundamental topics and gained impor-
tance through application in practice. The topics covered in this chapter include
Purchasing Portfolio Analysis, Lean/Just-in-Time, Agile and Leagile, Theory
of Constraints, and Supply Chain Risk Management. The chapter closes with
a systematic comparison between material flow in a factory and material flow
in a supply networks. This purpose of this comparison was to identify system
properties of supply networks that have implications for the management of
bottlenecks in supply.
192
4. Conceptual Model for
Bottleneck Management in
Supply Networks
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, insights and findings from the previous review of literature will
be used to extract useful ideas, concepts, and categories in order to create a
tentative conceptual model of bottleneck management in supply networks. The
model shall serve to guide both the collection and the analysis of empirical data
that will follow after this chapter. Also, research questions will be defined at
the end of this chapter. These build on the general research aim as articulated
in Section 1.2 and take into account the information – and more specifically the
gaps in information – from the theoretical review.
According to Shehabuddeen et al. (1999, p. 13), “a model supports the un-
derstanding of the dynamic interaction between the elements of a system”. The
causes of bottleneck emergence and the activities organization perform to man-
age bottlenecks in supply are inherently dynamic; they are subject to frequently
changing conditions and to dynamic interations between suppliers, the focal
company, as well as organizations outside the dyadic relationship and possibly
even outside the system that is referred to as supply network. Shehabuddeen
et al. (1999) elaborate further that understanding of the model involves abil-
ity to make predictions (ibid, p. 12). Hence, the conceptual model drafted in
this chapter serves as a precursor to the theory which this study aims to create
eventually.
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4.2. Categories of Bottleneck Management
The review of literature in the preceding sections brought up a variety of impor-
tant aspects for the stabilization of material flow and thus for the management
of bottlenecks in supply networks.
There is currently no standard body of literature that defines the key tasks –
or categories – of bottleneck management. Moreover, bottleneck management
is hardly recognized as a discipline but seems to be predominantly considered a
sub-topic of production scheduling in the context of factory material flow plan-
ning or as sub-topic of Supply Chain Risk Management in the wider context of
supply networks.
When dealing with unintended or undesirable incidents, prevention is an im-
portant, almost universal principle. A good share of the literature on risk man-
agement deals with strategies to minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of
adverse effects. In the context of supply networks, the field Supply Chain Risk
Management (SCRM) (cf. Section 3.6) has gained popularity. Many researchers
discuss and investigate ways to make supply networks more resilient against
disruptions. The most obvious activity production firms can pursue in order to
stabilize their material flow therefore is to prevent bottlenecks in their supply
network in the first place. Also, prevention is the focus of purchasing portfo-
lio analysis (PPA; cf. Section 3.2). In PPA, market and product analysis are
combined so as to be able to devise norm strategies and develop action plans in
order to prevent supply shortages from happening. Prevention is also a the im-
plicit focus of the Agile approach to SCM (cf. Section 3.5). Agile emphasizes
flexibility which is to help avoid mismatches between supply and demand.
Hence, many measures known from literature and industrial practice can be
summarized under the category of bottleneck prevention. Bottleneck prevention
is the first category of bottleneck management activities to be included in the
tentative conceptual model. Bottleneck prevention is comprised of activities and
methods whose purpose it is to prevent the occurrence of unplanned events that
will lead to lower throughput in the system. In system theory terms, it is con-
cerned with planning out throughput-related characteristics of the nodes and of
194
4.2. Categories of Bottleneck Management
the paths. Such characteristics are the production capacity of the nodes and their
flexibility (production capacity flexibility, PCF), buffers, production schedule,
transportation routes, transportation means, and quality control. Quality con-
trol does not only refer to quality check of processed parts but refers to process
quality, too. Thus, it includes supplier audits, e.g., for sourcing decisions.
A typical measures for bottleneck prevention is to include a required rate for
production capacity flexibility in the supply contract. In the automobile indus-
try, for instance, it is common to inflict 10% required flexibility on suppliers and
to determine the maximum amount of work shifts per week (e.g., 15) suppliers
are allowed to use to produce the amount of parts the customer demands. This
enables suppliers to scale up production at short notice. Also, in case of deliv-
ery to consignment warehouses, OEMs and suppliers negotiate the amount of
inventory days on hand.
Not always will prevention measures suffice, however. Supply shortages can
occur nonetheless. Force majeure is a prominent topic for international trade
and supply. Volcano outbreaks that interrupt flight traffic, tsunamis, war, strikes,
and riots are only some of the many events that are difficult to plan for and im-
possible to prevent. Accordingly, the elimination of an existing bottleneck is
the second category of bottleneck management activities that can be derived.
Bottleneck elimination is an important topic in the literature on ToC and gener-
ally appears to follow logically from the higher-level aim of stabilizing material
flow. Bottleneck elimination is concerned with the removal of an unplanned
bottleneck. Because a system would have unlimited throughput if there were no
bottlenecks (and because this case does not exist in practice), a new bottleneck
will emerge once the old bottleneck has been eliminated, or a planned bottleneck
will become the binding constraint. Technically, it would thus be more accurate
to refer to shifting the bottleneck rather than to eliminating it. What measures
will effectively eliminate an existing bottleneck depends on the causes for that
bottleneck. Elimination measures either have to aim at the root cause of the
problem that causes the bottleneck or they have to open up alternative streams
of material flow.
There is more companies can do, however, than preventing the bottleneck
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Figure 4.2.1. – Physical Capacity and Effective Capacity of a Bottleneck
from emerging or making it disappear (or shift). Accordingly, besides reducing
the likelihood of adverse incidents, the second big focus of SCRM is on the
mitigation of consequences of such incidents. As indicated in Section 2.3.3,
a bottleneck does not necessarily exist due to limits to its physical capacity but
may exist because the theoretical (physical) capacity available is not sufficiently
used. Capacity can, for instance, be limited due to organizational rules that
represent an impediment to higher bottleneck utilization. Also, operations on
the bottleneck might be inefficient and thus waste capacity. A look at Figure
4.2.1 can make this clearer. The converging lines at the upper and lower end
of the figure represent the total capacity of the system at the bottleneck – the
physical throughput capacity. The shaded area represents capacity losses. The
definition of the bottleneck provided earlier in this document already hinted at
“organizational rules and operational practices”. These can reduce the physical
throughput capacity of the bottleneck. What remains can be called the effective
bottleneck capacity.
Bottleneck elimination – the second category of bottleneck management ac-
tivities previously identified – means that the entire bottleneck is removed (or
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shifted elsewhere, that is). This can take time, though. It can, for instance, re-
quire the buying firm to approve a new source of supply. In the meanwhile, the
buying firm would be well-advised to fully use the physical throughput capac-
ity at the bottleneck by reducing the shaded area in the illustration. This can
be called bottleneck exploitation and it represents an additional category of bot-
tleneck management activities. Bottleneck exploitation aims at maximizing the
effectively available throughput capacity at the bottleneck until the bottleneck
can be eliminated for good. Stabilizing the throughput at the bottleneck also
corresponds to the flow principle that is emphasized in the Lean/JiT paradigm
(cf. Section 3.3). At the same time, it seems that the converse concept, Agility,
could contribute to the conception this activity. Agility values effectiveness
higher than efficiency (cf. Section 3.5). That is, it puts emphasis on making
something happen in due time, as demanded by the market, rather than make it
as cost-efficient and with as little waste as possible. Rather than running the risk
of drying out the inbound material stream, expenses are committed to maintain
as high a level of uninterrupted inbound material flow as possible and necessary
so as to not starve internal production processes. Therefore, agility seems to be
a good theoretical anchor for the concept of bottleneck exploitation.
The importance of maximizing bottleneck throughput is obvious: “An hour
lost at a bottleneck is an hour lost for the total system” (Goldratt & Fox 1986,
Goldratt & Cox 2004). The reason is that the bottleneck does not have excess
capacity that could be used to catch up with any loss of throughput. Therefore
the bottleneck must be protected from interruptions to its operations and from
waste of its capacity. Specifically, that means (Goldratt & Fox 1986, Goldratt &
Cox 2004)
• the bottleneck should never starve, i.e., it should never run out of input
material to work on,
• the bottleneck should never be blocked, i.e., it should always be able to
release material it has processed,
• the bottleneck should never work on parts that could be processed else-
where, e.g., at another station or from a contract manufacturer,
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• the bottleneck should never work on parts that are not needed to finish
actual customer orders,
• the bottleneck should never work on defective parts,
• parts that have been processed by the bottleneck should be treated with
care as each part that breaks after it has been processed by the bottleneck
inevitably equals a loss of throughput for the entire system that cannot be
compensated for.
In addition to measures that support throughput at the bottleneck, bottleneck
exploitation is concerned with the mitigation of consequences for material flow
resulting from the shortage of supply due to a bottleneck. For a factory pro-
ducing discrete parts, this means that if production in a factory is running out of
one specific part that is required to finalize the product, then there are essentially
three possible options for production:
1. halt the entire production process in the factory (e.g., stop the assembly
line),
2. sort out the product(s) for whose production process the missing part is
needed – and thread in the product and continue later when the missing
parts arrive,
3. keep producing and finish production without the missing part which will
be added to the product later once it arrives.
Which of the three options is viable depends on a variety of parameters. These
parameters include (but are not limited to):
• the share of products in the production process affected by the supply
shortage,
• the technical feasibility to continue the production process and add the
missing part later (and the cost thereof),
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• the total cost of halting production (which should include the loss of sales
and the potential loss of customers to competition although quantification
of these values will be difficult),
• the estimated arrival time of the missing parts,
• the space available to sort out products from the production process.
Not all parameters and options discussed above can be transferred from the
factory setting to the supply network setting. They do provide a better and
more detailed impression of bottleneck exploitation and related activities and
measures.
Before any action can be taken to exploit or eliminate an existing bottleneck,
the company has to know about its existence – which sounds like common sense
but can be a challenge nevertheless. There can be a substantial time gap be-
tween the emergence of a bottleneck in the supply network and its effect on the
inbound material flow of the buying firm. It is not unusual that firms are hit
by supply shortages without prior warning or indication from the supplier. In
such a case, the period of time between the emergence and the actual adverse
impact on the buying firm is wasted whereas it could be used productively, for
instance, to activate alternative sources of supply or warn customers. Thus, bot-
tleneck identification is another important category of bottleneck management
activities.
Bottleneck identification is concerned with the identification of material flow
bottlenecks. Intuitively, one might assume that identification of existing bottle-
necks is straightforward. This, however, is not generally the case. In fact, there
is a comprehensive body of literature about methods to identify bottlenecks in
production environments. One of the main impediments to the identification
of a bottleneck is that bottlenecks tend to wander (i.e., they change their loca-
tion) as production schedule changes. In supply networks, bottlenecks possibly
do not change with as fast a pace as in a factory environment and it is rather
obvious which of the various tier-1 suppliers is unable to deliver as promised
when a specific component is missing. The root cause of the problem, however,
may remain unclear nevertheless. The buying firm might not have any insight
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in the supply network beyond its first echelon of suppliers and suppliers might
be reluctant to provide information about the actual root cause of the problem
(or they may not even know about it, either). Essentially, bottleneck identifica-
tion can be translated into information gathering. Information about possible or
actual supply-related problems in a supply network are imperative to informed
decision making. Literature on the bullwhip effect (Forrester 1958, Lee et al.
1997) demonstrates how lack of information and unexpected shortages can am-
plify supply problems along the network. Therefore, bottleneck identification
appears to be more than a pro forma category; it is, in fact, important.
These four tasks identified hitherto are mainly concerned with unplanned bot-
tlenecks, i.e., bottlenecks that have not been purposely and consciously planned
into the system, albeit bottleneck exploitation refers to both planned and un-
planned bottleneck. Bottleneck placement then could be considered a fifth key
task that is concerned with finding the right location for a planned bottleneck.
In every material flow system, throughput is limited by some bottleneck. If this
were not the case, throughput would become infinite. The idea behind bottle-
neck placement is this: if there has to be a bottleneck anyway in our system, we
can consciously place it somewhere so we have full control of it, i.e., we can
protect it and exploit it.
In a factory environment, we may have certain stations which perform en-
ergy, time, or – more generally – cost intensive processes or which require high
investment upfront. For economic reasons, it might be desirable to dimension
those stations in such a way that they do not provide significant excess capac-
ity. On the one hand, it might be short-sighted to dimension capacity too tightly
so that new machines and tools will be required if demand develops positively.
On the other hand, (accounting) production cost per unit become very high if
production capacity is over-dimensioned. In some cases, it might be necessary
to load and operate the machine batch-wise. Examples are furnaces for ther-
mal hardening and tanks for chemical hardening of glass. Such stations require
both time and energy, each of which in economic terms translates into “cost”.
So there is a trade-off between the generally undesirable interruption of material
flow along with an increase of variability induced by the creation and processing
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of batches on the one hand, and the economics of efficiency of this particular pro-
cess step on the other hand. Certainly, there is no point in heating up a furnace
for one single glass panel; and yet, delaying the process until, say, 500 glass
panels that make up one complete batch could also turn out to be uneconomical.
The planning problem that comes with this trade-off is particularly obvious
for stations that are very expensive and whose capacity cannot easily be ex-
panded without another major investment, so that the decision “locks in” the
firm in the short or even medium term. In cases where certain process steps are
particularly costly but where capacity can be increased with reasonable effort
and investment, such a station that demands high utilization (for reasons of effi-
ciency) could be designed to represent the bottleneck of the production system
and “beat the drum” (Goldratt & Fox 1986). The production system could be
then be designed in a way that protects the station in question from starving and
blocking. In practical terms and to improve flexibility, it would be more advis-
able to have the station comprise several smaller machines (e.g., smaller fur-
naces) of which some are idle in normal times and activated in busy times than
having one large machine that requires large batches and is over-dimensioned
for normal demand.
To summarize, five key tasks can be synthesized from the literature as consti-
tuting bottleneck management:
1. bottleneck prevention,
2. bottleneck identification,
3. bottleneck exploitation,
4. bottleneck elimination, and
5. bottleneck placement.
The streams of literature leading to the categories of bottleneck management
activities that were identified and explained above are illustrated in logical and
chronological order in Figure 4.2.2. Placement is separated by a dotted line
because it is not part of the logical and chronological sequence. It remains
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Figure 4.2.2. – Streams of Literature that Inform Bottleneck Management Activi-
ties
to be seen whether (and if so: to what extent) these categories of bottleneck
management activities can be found in practice.
The categories of bottleneck management constitute a core element of the
tentative conceptual model of bottleneck management in supply networks.
4.3. Measures of Bottleneck Management
In the previous section, categories of bottleneck management activities were de-
fined. These categories were derived from various streams of literature, such as
Supply Chain Risk Management, Supply Chain Management, Production Plan-
ning and Control. Lean Production, and Theory of Constraints. The content of
these categories are the actual measures organizations can take in order to man-
age bottlenecks in their supply network. These measures represent the second
element of the model.
Some measures are well-known and can easily be related to the management
of bottlenecks. Multiple sourcing is an example of a measure that is commonly
associated with increased supply reliability, that is, with the prevention of bot-
tlenecks. In other cases, the effect of a particular measure on bottleneck man-
agement is less obvious. Different than in the previous section on categories,
a list of actual measures shall not be provided here. The identification of such
measures in industrial organizations is one of the objectives of the multiple-case
study conducted as part of this project.
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4.4. Causes of Bottleneck Emergence
The definition of bottlenecks proposed in Section 2.3.2 refers to “physical through-
put capacity, organizational rules, and operational practices”, either of which
can determine the throughput threshold beyond which a bottleneck becomes ac-
tive or binding. In other words, causes of bottleneck emergence could be clas-
sified into physical, organizational, and operational causes. Physical causes
represent limitations in absolute terms; an increase of throughput at a physical
bottleneck necessarily requires a physical expansion of the bottleneck – or that
another channel opens up for material flow and the bottleneck thereby becomes
eliminated. Organizational and operational causes, on the other hand, allow the
exploitation of the bottleneck without application of physical changes.
Accordingly, the type of reason for bottleneck emergence can have impor-
tant implications for the cost involved in managing (exploiting, eliminating) the
bottleneck. Such a categorization is therefore likely to provide value to the bot-
tleneck management effort for early orientation as to the selection of appropriate
measures.
Figure 4.4.1 illustrates the categorization of causes of bottleneck emergence
together with the five categories of bottleneck management activities. The black
triangle pointing to the bottom indicates the position in the logical and chrono-
logical order of bottleneck management activities where the bottleneck sets in.
If bottleneck prevention is unsuccessful, the bottleneck will become effective
and the next bottleneck management activity the firm can pursue is bottleneck
identification. As in Figure 4.2.2, placement is separated from the other four
activities by a dotted line for it is not part of the sequence. The scheme outlined
in Figure 4.4.1 will also serve to present a summary of each individual case in
Section 6.
203
4. Conceptual Model for Bottleneck Management in Supply Networks
Prevention Identification Exploitation Elimination Placement
Causes
...
Causes
...
Causes
...
Physical Organizational Operational
Bo
tt
le
ne
ck
 E
m
er
ge
nc
e
Bo
tt
le
ne
ck
 M
an
ag
em
en
t
Figure 4.4.1. – Categorization of Causes of Bottleneck Emergence and Bottleneck
Management Activities
4.5. Influencing Factors for the Selection of
Measures
Not all organizations choose to employ the same measures for they are facing
different circumstances. Companies are operating in different industries and are
located on different positions within their network; they are of different size
and have suppliers of different size, which often translates into questions of
power (and dependency). Companies serve different markets with different re-
quirements; in some cases, reliability of supply may be first priority whereas
in others not much happens if supply is delayed. Different classifications and
requirements of supply networks were discussed in Section 2.5.6. That is, what
measures are chosen depends on a variety of parameters. These parameters
can be broadly divided into requirements and needs and limitations. A distinc-
tion between these two categories is not necessary yet can make things clearer:
whereas limitation can be seen as invariable parameters that may need to be ac-
cepted and coped with, at least in the short term, requirements and needs are
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more flexible or variables and may possibly be altered.
4.5.1. Requirements and Needs
Because organizations are subject to different environments and different ex-
pectations by stakeholders, they have to fulfill different requirements in their
management of supply bottlenecks. The purchasing portfolio analysis, for in-
stance, analyzes supply market and product characteristics to devise suitable
purchasing strategies (cf. Section 3.2). Also, the downstream effect of supply
shortages needs to be taken into account. Competition can be an important fac-
tor, too. That is, all three echelons the firm directly relates to are of importance:
upstream, downstream, and competition on the same value-adding stage. At
the same time, organizations may follow certain management or manufactur-
ing paradigms or strategies. If the company wants itself and its network to be
lean, then extensive inventories of supply may not be an option. The discussion
of differnet types of supply networks and supply strategies in Section 2.5.6 as
well as the discussion of different types of manufacturing systems in Section 2.2
provide an overview of various factors that should be taken into account when
making decisions about the selection of the right measures.
4.5.2. Limitations to the Management of Bottlenecks
Limitations or limiting factors represent impediments to the firm and as such
prevent or impede the firm from doing something it seeks to do. Extremely high
prices for raw material, for instance, can challenge the firm’s ability to keep
the material on stock as a buffer to maintain flexibility and responsiveness to
customer orders. Also, in a very competitive market environment, a firm might
not be able to gain much in negotiations with suppliers as these would easily be
able to reject unfavorable terms and conditions.
Some concepts that may represent limiting factors to the management of bot-
tlenecks were discussed in preceding sections. Complexity was mentioned as
one factor whose exact impact is difficult to determine. It was said to be poten-
tially limiting a firm’s ability to predict, which limits its ability to manage.
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Power and dependency were discussed in the context of organizational net-
works and modes of their governance. Situations where lack of power of an
organization inhibits its ability to perform certain actions in order to stabilize its
income material stream are easily conceivable. Power can be a function of, or at
least be influenced by, the structure of the network an the focal firm’s position
in it.
Limitations may not only arise from the external environment, however, but
can be internal, too. Organizational procedures, limited knowledge or qualifi-
cation of staff, and organizational culture are examples of factors that can limit
the firm’s ability to respond appropriately and quickly to bottlenecks.
4.6. Summary: Conceptual Model
Four broad themes emerge from the review of various streams of literature that
are likely to have implications for the management of bottlenecks in supply
networks.
The supply market was explicitly mentioned in PPA (cf. Section 3.2) and
frequently is subject in publications on SCRM (cf. Section 3.6). It might be the
most obvious and – possibly – most important determinant for suitable action.
Characteristics of the buyers’ market are of relevance because they partly de-
termine the severity of the consequences of a supply shortage. A supply short-
age might cause little or no problems to the focal firm’s customers or the conse-
quences might be grave. Measures to protect customers from supply shortages
should be selected accordingly.
Competition at the echelon of the focal firm can weaken or limit the focal
firm’s ability to pursue certain measures. Suppliers might not be willing to
accept certain terms and conditions in supply contracts that imply increased
cost for them and might choose to do business with other customers than the
focal firm.
The three determinants mentioned hitherto are external to the firm. Internal
characteristics of the organization can play an important role for the selection of
appropriate bottleneck management measures, too. Characteristics of the prod-
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ucts, the production technology, the firm’s (technological) capacity or ability
and the strategy it has chosen to follow all influence the choice of measures for
bottleneck management.
From each of the four determinants arise limitations to the actions of the
firm as well as specific requirements and needs. Concepts such as power and
dependency are inherent to each of the four broad determinants; complexity
relates to all of them in combination.
The conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 4.6.1. The figure shows similar-
ity to Porter’s Five Forces model (Porter 1979, 2008). This is no coincidence:
Porter’s model attempts to describe competition of the firm and is a proxy for
the financial attractiveness of the particular market niche the firm has chosen or
considers choosing. Competitive forces – not only with respect to peers but also
in the supply and the demand market – play an important role in this model, too.
Each activity, factor, limitation, or determinant mentioned above that influ-
ences the design of the conceptual model represents a proposition that this pa-
rameter exists in reality. It remains to be seen if the data analysis will provide
support for these parameters of bottleneck management.
4.7. Research Questions
The aims and objectives for this dissertation have been articulated in Section
1.1. More specifically, the work on this dissertation is guided by the follow-
ing research questions which represent more specific objectices and will help
accomplish the more general aims:
1. What are some of the reasons why supply shortages occur in supply net-
works?
2. Can the causes of bottleneck emergence be structured in a useful way?
3. What do organizations do about bottlenecks in their supply networks?
4. Can the bottleneck management measures of organizations be structured
in a useful way?
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5. What can organizations do about bottlenecks in their supply networks?
6. Are there parameters that influence or determine what organizations can
do in order to stabilize inbound material flow? How do organizations
choose their measures? And what seem to be the parameters?
7. Concerning the adequacy of the terms supply chain and Supply Chain
Management:
a) Is the notion of supply chains (as opposed to supply networks) use-
ful and does it represent interorganizational structures which the
case companies are part of?
b) Is Supply Chain Management a pointed description of the activi-
ties organizations perform or seek to perform in order to ensure the
stability of their inbound material streams?
c) How does the understanding of supply relationships change if the
notion of supply networks (as opposed to supply chains) is adopted?
In Section 1.4.1, it was referred to Whetten (1989) who suggests that a com-
plete theory consists of the constituents What, How, Why and of the boundary
definitions Who, When, an Where. As can be seen, the questions are put in such
a way all of these constituents are addressed.
The results of this research project – the answers to the research questions
stated here – are intended to constitute a basic theory of effective bottleneck
management in supply networks. The theory shall provide guidance for firms
which seek to improve the management of their incoming material flow in strate-
gic (e.g., what design decisions in supply network planning can help improve
supply reliability?), tactical (e.g., what is the risk resulting from an existing net-
work configuration?), and operational (e.g., what actions can be taken to get the
most out of a supply bottleneck?) matters.
209
4. Conceptual Model for Bottleneck Management in Supply Networks
4.8. Summary
From the various topics covered hitherto, this chapter sampled out important
concepts and ideas as elements for a tentative conceptual model. The concep-
tual model includes causes of bottleneck emergence, categories of bottleneck
management, and parameters for the selection of specific measures (require-
ments and limitations). The model is to guide the collection of empirical data in
the multiple-case study as well as their analysis.
Moreover, the chapter presented the research questions that could be distilled
from the theoretic review. The research questions address the gaps identified in
the first chapter as well as the general research aims and objectives of this thesis
and could be formulated now that a review of the state of the art in the relevant
disciplines has been completed.
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5.1. Introduction
This chapter elaborates on research design and research approach as introduced
in Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. It provides information about how the data collec-
tion was prepared and conducted. The sources of information (company repre-
sentatives and experts) are discussed and how they were selected is explained.
Structure of and reasoning behind the interview questionnaire are elaborated
on. The chapter aims to enhance transparency about the research process so that
data analysis and conclusions drawn are better comprehensible.
5.2. Case Study Design
Yin (2009, p. 18) defines a case study as follows:
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contem-
porary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, espe-
cially when then boundaries between phenomenon and context are
not clearly evident.”
Woodside & Wilson (2003, p. 493) include some more specific objectives in
their definition of case study research:
“CSR is inquiry focusing on describing, understanding, predict-
ing, and/or controlling the individual (i.e., process, animal, person,
household, organization, group, industry, culture, or nationality).”
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The authors emphasize “deep understanding” as the principal objective among
the several objectives of case study research (ibid, p. 497).
For this dissertation, a multiple-case study has been conducted consisting of
ten individual cases. The multiple-case study is comprised of semi-structured
interviews, site visits, and – when possible – analysis of archival data and doc-
uments. The formal request for case study participation that was sent to all
companies by email can be found in Appendix B. All companies which par-
ticipated in this research project were promised anonymity. Instead of real
names pseudonyms are used whenever a specific company is referred to. The
pseudonyms are of the format “case company [i]”, where “i” refers to the num-
ber of the case company in chronological order of the case data collection.
The multiple-case study conducted in this research project is guided by the
research questions stated in Section 4.7. It is exploratory in that it aims to iden-
tify relevant practices for bottleneck management in a supply network. There
are examples for such measures that can be found in textbooks and there are
earlier research projects that studied such activities (e.g., Beer 2011). However,
the ability to access a broader base of organizations provides a promising oppor-
tunity to create a database of activities. Such a database serves two purposes:
1. it provides value by enabling interested organizations to learn what activ-
ities other organizations perform, and
2. it allows subsequent analysis of the activities with respect to contextual
information, such as certain enabling or limiting parameters.
In this sense, the exploratory part of this project provides the foundation for
the explanatory part. The project is explanatory in that it attempts to explain
the significance of problems with bottlenecks in different settings (e.g., differ-
ent characteristics of production and supply and different demand patterns), i.e.,
why manufacturing firms encounter more problems with supply shortages in one
setting than in another. Moreover, how do methods employed for bottleneck
management function and why do firms use a particular set of methods whilst
ignoring others (e.g., are there limitations in the use of those other methods in
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the particular setting?). The main unit of analysis thus is bottleneck manage-
ment practices.
It should be noted that the use of the term exploratory in this thesis might
differ from the use in other publications and context. Yin (2012), for instance,
suggests that exploratory case studies should be conducted as a separate task
and be completed before the actual, “real” case study is begun. In that context,
the exploratory case study serves as an instrument to create some preliminary
framework or theory that serves as input to the final – often explanatory – case
study. While legit, this understanding of exploratory research should be seen
in the light of rejection of brute naïve realism that led to the development of
research concepts such as Grounded Theory (Suddaby 2006). In this project,
however, a conceptual model was developed prior to the case study that guides
data collection and analysis. The term exploratory is used in its more common,
literal meaning: One aim of the collection of empirical data was to identify
(i.e., to explore) relevant organizational measures that aim to stabilize inbound
material flow. These measures were then analyzed (explained) and related to
contextual information and literature (cf. Phase III of the data analysis).
The case study began with semi-structured interviews conducted on-site with
personnel in relevant positions (procurement, supplier management/supply chain
management, plant manager, CEO). An interview guideline was developed that
was intended to stimulate discussion and find out about
• the frequency and severity of supply interruptions,
• the state of knowledge about supply interruptions and their root causes,
• measures to deal with and to avoid supply interruptions, and
• the structure and the properties of the supply network.
Companies were asked to be available for follow-up interviews and discussions
later in the project in case new questions would arise. The complete interview
guideline can be found in Appendix C; a more detailed account of the interview-
ing process can be found in Section 5.5.
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The multiple-case study is not intended to be used for quantitative cross-case
analysis. The number of cases involved is too low to draw meaningful statistical
conclusions with any confidence. Accordingly, no statistical generalizations are
intended to be made based upon case study results.
5.3. Expert Interviews
In addition and in parallel to the case study interviews, three expert interviews
were conducted. Two interviews (experts 1 and 2) were semi-structured and
guided by an interview questionnaire while one interview was an open conver-
sation (expert 3). The expert interviews took place in an early stage of the data
collection at the case companies and before the data analysis. Because the ex-
pert interviews did not have much direct impact on the study, they shall be only
shortly described.
Expert 1 is a researcher and lecturer in Supply Chain Management, Logistics,
and Operations Research at the Chair of Operations Research at a German uni-
versity. The interview took place in the expert’s office at the university and was
audio-taped.
Expert 2 is a former SCM practitioner and current PhD candidate in the UK.
The interview was conducted on the phone and notes were taken manually.
Expert 3 is raw material expert at DERA, the German Raw Material Agency,
a part of the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR).
The conversation was had on the phone and notes were taken manually, based
on which a summary of the conversation was written up.
The objective was different for each individual interview, but the overarching
motivation behind the expert interviews was the hope that the experts would
raise points of view which this researcher had been unaware of hitherto (i.e.,
they were exploratory). Also, some ideas and concepts intended to be used
in this dissertation were described in the interviews so that the experts could
criticize them or raise objections (i.e., they were used to improve validity).
The interviews with experts 1 and 2 did not reveal new information that would
have altered the objectives or the content of this thesis. They did confirm some
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perceptions and ideas this researcher had, which is worthwhile noting.
The interview with expert 3 was, in fact, exploratory and the interviewee did
raise some interesting points about the raw material market. This interview
supported the discussion of limitations to bottleneck management in Section
6.3.8.
5.4. Selection of Companies for Case Study
The companies asked for participation had been selected based upon the follow-
ing criteria:
• Some companies should represent different industries to account for the
effect of industry-specific phenomena,
• some companies should be of different size,
• some companies should exhibit different production characteristics, and
• some companies should have supplier networks with different character-
istics.
The reason as to why it was chosen to do a cross-sectoral analysis is that industry-
specific parameters can influence the type and number of options available to
the focal firm. Limiting the analysis to only one industry may possibly leave
ideas untapped that would be worthwhile investigating and transferring to other
industrial contexts. The same logic is followed by companies when doing cross-
industry benchmarks.
At the same time, a cross-industry case study may reveal in what setting – i.e.,
in what combination of industrial and organizational parameters – bottlenecks
are more likely to occur and to have adverse impact than in others. In fact, if
we accept the notion that supply networks can be described as open systems, as
proposed in Section 2.4.4, then environmental parameters are key to the under-
standing of the supply system. As Gharajedaghi (1999, p. 32) puts it: “Open
systems can be understood only in the context of their environments.”
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Table 5.4.1. – Overview of Participating Case Companies
Company Key Size Industry
Case Company 1 SME Manufacturing of glass-based products
Case Company 2 Large Manufacturing of agricultural machinery
Case Company 3 SME Manufacturing of heating systems and
solar panels
Case Company 4 Large Raw material trading
Case Company 5 Large Production of copper and copper-based
products
Case Company 6 SME Raw material trading
Case Company 7 SME Manufacturing of soldering powder
Case Company 8 SME Manufacturing of radiation shielding and
anodes for metal extraction
Case Company 9 SME Raw material trading
Case Company 10 Large Raw material trading
When selecting the companies, care had been taken to identify both compa-
nies and networks that show similar properties and companies and networks that
show different properties. Thereby, control groups have been created that could
help avoid premature conclusions about certain properties and their effects. This
is an important part of replication logic as Yin (2009) suggests should be used
in multiple-case study design.
The companies participating in this research project are summarized in Table
5.4.1.
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In each company, example products were selected so that questions and re-
sponses in the interviews could be related to practical cases.
5.5. Method for Data Collection: Cross-Industry
Interviews
5.5.1. Structure and Reasoning of Interview Questionnaire
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as primary format for data collection. It
was initially unclear whether the structure of bottleneck management activities
proposed in this thesis, and for which it was intended to obtain empirical data,
would make make sense to respondents. In fact, this is one point that was to be
clarified. Accordingly, it was allowed for interaction between interviewer and
interviewee in order to explain the concept and key terms to interviewees. Also,
interviewees may not be fully aware of the details that the researcher hoped to
hear from them without him probing; the fields of supply network management
and bottleneck management are simply too broad as to expect that profession-
als would answer in the way the researcher would hope for. Thus, unstructured
interviews seemed inadequate. Neither was it known what information could
be got from respondents, which made structured interviews too rigid an instru-
ment that would bear the danger of preventing interviewees from providing un-
expected and possibly valuable information. Therefore the midway had been
chosen in order to preserve the chance of receiving unexpected information and
serve the partly exploratory nature of the research endeavor while being able to
provide guidance, probes, and explanations to help respondents focus in case
they would wander off the topic or otherwise spend too much time.
Gillham (2005) suggests that in preparation of the interview the questions
comprising the questionnaire should be grouped into topics and that a narrative
sequence should be identified. The questions used in the interview questionnaire
are grouped into eight parts:
• Part I: Industry Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, and Product Char-
acteristics. In this part, it is aimed to improve the understanding of the
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specific circumstances the organization has to cope with. This is im-
portant because organizations face different constraints in what they do
depending on market environment and firm parameters (e.g., size). For
different circumstances different configurations of the supply network are
suited best to accommodate the requirements of customers, focal firm,
and suppliers (Fisher 1997, Chopra & Meindl 2010).
• Part II: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: General. In this part, it is aimed
to get an impression of the perceived severity of bottlenecks by the in-
terviewee and his firm. The interviewee’s responses to this section set
the direction for the remainder of the interview: if the interviewee indi-
cates that bottlenecks in the firm’s supply network is a minor problem, it
will be tried to determine the parameters as to why this firm apparently
is less affected (or at least: feels less affected) by material shortages oc-
curring in its supply network. If the interviewee’s responses indicate that
bottlenecks are a severe problem, it would be tried to elaborate on the
constraints the supply manager faces in that company. While the inter-
view questionnaire will guide the conversation in either case, one might
assume that the supply manager who perceives bottlenecks as a major
problem and deals with them on a daily basis has invested more time and
thought in practices of bottleneck management than the supply manager
who largely feels unaffected. In the latter case, the meaning of interview
questions that follow might not be as obvious to the interviewee and thus
might need further explanation.
• Part III: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Prevention. In this section,
it will be asked about measures the firm takes in order to prevent un-
planned bottlenecks in the first place. That is, the first of the five core
activities of bottleneck management as devised in this thesis is addressed.
The questions are designed such that the interviewee can respond freely
and extensively first before supplementary questions follow as a means to
prompt a more focused response. The section includes a question about
the interviewee’s personal opinion about the adequacy and suitability of
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the measures the firm employs to prevent bottlenecks.
• Part IV: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Detection. In the fourth part
of the questionnaire the aim is to hear from the interviewee how his com-
pany finds out about bottlenecks in the supply network. The questions
predominantly address the information flow between the focal firm and
its suppliers.
• Part V: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Exploitation. This part of the
interview addresses the measures the company takes once an unplanned
bottleneck has emerged and the output is to be maximized under this
constraint. Similar to part III, the interviewee’s personal opinion as to
whether the current activities are sufficient or should be amended is aimed
for.
• Part VI: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Elimination. This part ad-
dresses measures to eliminate (i.e., remove or shift) the bottleneck from
the network. This section contains one open question which encourages
the interviewee to speak freely about the measures the company takes to
eliminate bottlenecks, and one question that, as in parts III and V, ad-
dresses the interviewee’s ideas for additional measures.
• Part VII: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Placement. In this part, the
concept of bottleneck placement is explored and it shall be found out to
what extent it can be practically applied in supply networks. The opening
question is complemented by two follow-up questions that address pos-
sible parameters of bottleneck placement (production capacity flexibility)
to find out more about the concept even when interviewees would not
fully comprehend the idea.
• Part VIII: Supply Network Characteristics. The interview concludes with
inquiries about characteristics of the supply network, such as delivery
modes, power relationships, and number of direct suppliers. This infor-
mation is important to make sense of the interviewee’s previous responses
about the severity of bottleneck problems and bottleneck management
219
5. Collection of Empirical Data: Multiple-Case Study
measures. Hence, part VIII complement part I in creating a context for
better understanding and analysis.
The grouping and ordering of the questions along the core tasks of bottleneck
management that were derived in the conceptual model – prevention, detection,
exploitation, elimination, and placement – provide the narrative sequence of the
interview in logical and chronological order. That is, the theoretical concep-
tual model provides the general structure for the empirical part of the research
project.
5.5.2. Interview Preparation, Initiation, Process, and
Follow-up
Gillham (2005) defines five stages for the conduct of the interview:
1. preparation,
2. initial contact,
3. orientation,
4. substantive phase,
5. and close phase.
A sixth stage is added – follow-up – and the activities and how they relate to
each stage shall be shortly described and explained below.
Preparation Phase Contact to interviewees was established by email or
telephone. Upon contact initiation, a short1 description of the formal project
background, of the research topic, of the interview format, and an affirmation of
confidentiality were sent to the interviewee by email. Preparation of the inter-
views included familiarization with the organizations’ most important products,
size of the organization, as well as recent developments if this information was
publicly available. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in the facilities
1One A4 page
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of the interviewees’ organizations if possible; in one case (case company 10),
the interview had to be conducted via telephone.
The “hand luggage” for the interviews included a hard copy of the project
description that had been sent by email earlier and which was offered the in-
terviewee for his files, a short description of the organization and its products
as an overview for the researcher, a taxonomy of key terms likely to be used
during the interview so that handy definitions were available, a table with exam-
ples of causes of bottleneck emergence that could be used as prompts to support
more focused responses of the interviewee, business cards, a dictating machine,
paper, and pen.
Initial Contact and Orientation Phase All interviews were initiated with
a short introduction of the researcher and of the research project. Interviews
were recorded as audio files if the interviewee agreed and indicated that he
would not feel uncomfortable being recorded. When interviewees did not want
the interview to be recorded, handwritten notes were taken (no complete tran-
scription but all important information for a lack of better options). Key terms
and structure of the interview questionnaire were introduced by shortly explain-
ing the five core activities of bottleneck management as defined in this thesis.
Substantive Phase As Gillham (2005) writes, the substantive phase rep-
resents the “central core of the interview”. For each part of the interview (cf.
Section 5.5.1) the kind of information looked for and how this is different from
the other parts were defined. Generally interviewees could answer each ques-
tion for as long time and as extensive as they wanted to and probes were used to
re-align the focus as was felt necessary to obtain the information desired.
Closure Phase After all questions from the questionnaire had been dis-
cussed, interviewees received information about how much longer it would take
before the study would be finished, so that they would get a better idea of when
the researcher would get back in touch with them to present his findings (a pre-
sentation of the study results upon completion of this dissertation was offered
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if interviewees indicated interest). Also, options were evaluated for possible
follow-up emails or phone calls in case the need would arise to clarify any un-
clear point that would come up during the interview analysis.
Follow-Up Phase Both audio records and handwritten notes were trans-
ferred to the computer. Eight interviews were audio-taped, seven of which were
fully transcribed while one was selectively transcribed. For the telephone in-
terview with case company 10 notes were taken manually and checked and
approved by the interviewee right after the interview. The case descriptions
presented in Phase I of the data analysis were sent to the interviews for correc-
tion and approval. Approval and confirmation of correctness of the information
could be obtained in all but one case where an official statement from another
than the interviewed person’s apartment was still pending by the time the thesis
was submitted.
The researcher’s personal impression of confidence in interviewees’ responses
was added to his personal notes if the impression was significant. Emails or calls
would follow if unclear statements were stumbled upon.
5.6. Summary
This chapter described in detail the design of the multiple-case study. This in-
cludes a discussion of the criteria for the selection of the case companies as
well as a detailed description of the interview questionnaire and of the inter-
view process. Also, the expert interviews conducted as complementary element
were explained. The information provided in this chapter complement the in-
formation on the research method for this project as introduced in the Chapter
1.
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6.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the findings of the multiple-case study will be presented. The
data analysis is divided into three parts.
The first part of the data analysis consists of individual case analyses. The
information is structured along the categories of the interview questionnaire
which, in turn, is based upon the categories of bottleneck management iden-
tified in the review of relevant literature as presented in Chapter 4. The first
part of the data analysis represents the exploratory nature of the study and pro-
vides rich case descriptions. The information received was categorized yet not
interpreted and remained unmodified and in its essence in this first part.
For the second part of the data analysis, the information retrieved at the in-
dividual case companies is drawn together and summarized. Hence, the second
part, too, does not contain interpretation of the findings but a synopsis of all
causes of bottleneck emergence, all bottleneck management measures, and all
limitations to bottleneck management which could be identified at the case com-
panies.
The first two parts of the data analysis will provide the answers to research
questions 1 through 4. These What and How questions require descriptive an-
swers, which is reflected in by the style of these two parts.
The third part of the data analysis relates the case study information to the
literature and the conceptual model defined in Chapter 4. It aims to explain
why some organizations are subject to certain causes of bottleneck emergence
which do not affect other organizations. Moreover, it is tried to explain the
selection of specific measures of bottleneck management by the case companies.
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To that end, some concepts identified in the literature review are related to the
choice of bottleneck management measures. In so doing, roles of bottleneck
management measures are identified. The explanations in this part of the data
analysis provide the answers to research questions 5 and 6. Lastly, the third
part of the data analysis investigates the terms supply chain and Supply Chain
Management and tries to provide an answer to research question 7.
6.2. Analysis of Interview Data Phase I: Individual
Case Analysis
6.2.1. Introduction
One task of data analysis is deriving categories from data (Gillham 2005). Since
the interview questionnaire used to collect data is structured along categories
(representing the core activities of bottleneck management as derived in Section
4), there is already a useful descriptive categorization of the data obtained so
that the categorizing and coding was facilitated. Because the case data is partly
structured along the categories that were derived in the conceptual model, the
categorization of data also served as a test of the meaningfulness of the cate-
gories.
This first phase of data analysis is both exploratory and descriptive. Rich case
descriptions were created in this section based upon the data that could be ob-
tained from the case companies. The case descriptions include both information
about the activities companies pursue in order to manage their supply bottle-
necks as well as contextual information that help put the bottleneck management
activities each company pursues into perspective. The descriptions were created
based upon interview transcripts (if audio record was available, else based on
handwritten notes) which were coded with key words. The key words were de-
rived from the conceptual model. Archival records and information received in
informal talk served as supplementary material.
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6.2.2. Case Study 1
6.2.2.1. Short Description
The case company is a medium-sized manufacturer of glass-based products with
production locations in six countries. The company receives raw glass from
glass producers and intermediate dealers and applies various technologies such
as chemical and thermic hardening, printing, coating, cutting, as well as some
assembly operations. The products are then supplied to a broad range of busi-
ness customers who use them in their final products, such as TV screens, scales
or control panels.
6.2.2.2. About the Data Collection
The interview took place in one of the company’s production sites in Central
Europe. Interview access to procurement staff was granted upon direct request
by the researcher who knew the company from an earlier internship. Manual
notes were taken during the interview. Present during the interview was the
primary interviewee whose position is Project Manager Purchasing, a second
long-term employee, also from Purchasing, who was listening during most of
the interview and who occasionally provided additional information, and one
intern. The interview took 1:20 hours. The project description was sent to the
interviewee one week in advance.
6.2.2.3. Market Situation
The interviewee describes the case company’s industry as largely stable with
few firms entering or leaving the industry. Technological advancement within
the industry is incremental with little groundbreaking innovation.
The case company’s products are described as complex by the interviewee
due to the various product characteristics that customers demand.
Three to five other companies in the industry compete with the case company
with similar products.
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6.2.2.4. Supply Situation – General Information
The company receives raw glass partly directly from manufacturers, partly from
specialized dealers, as well as additional components for assembly operations
directly from manufacturers. Suppliers are located globally. Most parts are
single-sourced, which the company is about to change, aiming for two to three
sources for a greater share of parts. Parts are delivered to conventional ware-
house.
Bottlenecks in supply are perceived by the interviewee as a severe problem
and he states that management shares this view.
6.2.2.5. Production Process
Production steps involve cutting (with different technologies available), clean-
ing (between all operations), hardening (chemical and thermic), coating, print-
ing, assembly, and quality control. For most products, several of these opera-
tions have to be combined so that eight to twelve production steps are involved
to give the product the properties customers demand.
6.2.2.6. Bottleneck Emergence
There is no tendency as to where bottlenecks emerge in the company’s supply
network.
The interviewee names three reasons that have repeatedly led to problems:
1. amounts of products requested by customers are increased on short notice,
2. customers request very short lead time, and
3. dealers/producers of glass run out of stock while running a different pro-
duction batch.
The implications of and difficulties attached to the first two reasons are obvious;
the third reason requires explanation, however. The interviewee explains that
suppliers’ tooling time required between production of different types of raw
glass is more than one week. Therefore each type of raw glass is produced in
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large production batches which are referred to as “campaigns” in the industry’s
language. At the same time, glass has limited shelf-life. Quality of glass de-
teriorates, often as early as one year off production – especially when coating
(e.g., Anti-Reflex coating) is involved. That is, glass producers have to produce
batches large enough to meet expected industry demand yet not so large that
significant amounts remain on stock for too long a period so that quality would
deteriorate. According to the interviewee, producers occasionally err on either
side with implications for availability of raw glass for customers like the case
company.
A then existing bottleneck was used by the interviewee as an example for
another reason for bottleneck emergence. One customer (“A”) of the case com-
pany (“B”) set a sub-supplier (“C”), i.e., a direct supplier for the case company
which was to supply plastic parts to the case company for assembly of a prod-
uct the case company produced for that customer (“A”). The sub-supplier (“C”)
that was set by the customer maintains a contract with the customer (“A”). All
common supply procedures, however, such as call-off of the plastic parts, were
managed by the case company (“B”). The sub-supplier (“C”) turned out be un-
able to supply the case company (“B”) with all the parts needed for assembly of
the product the customer (“A”) demanded because the sub-supplier’s capacity
was used up by other jobs for the same customer (“A”). In this constellation
of contracts, solving the problem and coordinating the use of the sub-supplier’s
production capacity proved difficult so that the bottleneck remained active for a
relatively long period of time.
The interviewee remarks that there is a tendency that supply shortages occur
with those suppliers compared to which the case company is relatively power-
less.
6.2.2.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
The case company maintains a framework agreement with all suppliers. The
agreement requires suppliers to be able to supply the demand forecasted by the
case company plus 10% production capacity flexibility. There are quality agree-
ments with suppliers, requirements for certain certificates, and audits conducted
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by the case company.
The interviewee states that the case company plans to qualify more suppli-
ers for increased supply reliability. The aim is to find both regular permanent
suppliers as second or third source and suppliers that would step in in case sup-
ply bottlenecks emerge. Maintaining at least two sources is a requirement the
case company has to meet for some customers. Also, a broader supply base
is a reaction to the dependency on certain suppliers and the notion expressed
by the interviewee that bottlenecks tend to emerge in supply relationships with
more powerful suppliers. The broader supply base is expected to lessen the
dependency on and thus the power of certain suppliers. Moreover, by sourc-
ing globally the case company reduces the risk of locally confined impact on
suppliers in certain regions.
Another option the company aims for in the future according to the intervie-
wee are contractual penalties that would be included in sourcing contracts for
cases of violation of the agreements.
6.2.2.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
Three situations can be distinguished.
1. When the case company sends an order the supplier is expected to con-
firm the delivery date. The supplier is called when no confirmation of the
delivery date is received within three to four days. In case the supplier re-
jects the delivery date requested by the case company it is already obvious
that promised delivery dates with customers will need to be renegotiated.
2. The supplier notifies the case company right away that the expected de-
livery date cannot be met.
3. The expected delivery date passes without delivery and without notifica-
tion by the supplier.
All three situations occur. As a response to this uncertainty induced, the case
company plans to get in contact with suppliers shortly before the delivery date
to reconfirm if the date can be maintained.
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6.2.2.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
No measures of bottleneck exploitation could be identified in this case study.
6.2.2.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
Generally, when a supplier is unable to deliver the case company seeks out an
alternative source. This can be done quickly when an alternative supplier has
already been qualified and it will take more time when a new supplier has to be
qualified after the bottleneck kicks in.
6.2.2.11. Bottleneck Management: Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement did not apply to this case study.
6.2.2.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
A major limitation arises out of the production logic of raw glass. The signifi-
cant changeover time requires producers to run batches based on forecasts rather
than on actual demand. When producers and dealers run out of stock of a spe-
cific type of glass there is nothing customers, i.e., glass manufacturers, can do
besides looking for yet other suppliers or dealers. For some products and appli-
cations it might be conceivable that certain types of glass could be substituted
for others; the interviewee did not mention this option, however.
The interviewee suggests that more powerful suppliers are more likely to
cause supply shortages than suppliers of equal or less power. This does not pose
a permanent limitation to the case company, however, as the company decided
to react by qualifying additional sources of supply to counter power imbalance
with suppliers.
6.2.2.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.1 presents a graphical summary of the reasons for bottleneck emer-
gence and the case company’s bottleneck management activities.
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Figure 6.2.1. – Bottleneck Emergence and Bottleneck Management Activities at
Case Company 1
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6.2.3. Case Study 2
6.2.3.1. Short Description
The case company is an international producer of agricultural machinery, head-
quartered in Central Europe with production and sales locations under different
brands in many countries around the world.
6.2.3.2. About the Data Collection
The interview took about 30 minutes and was conducted in the company’s head-
quarters in Central Europe. The interviewee was part of the Supplier Manage-
ment department at the time of the interview and is now Head of Logistics. The
interview was audio-taped and some additional notes were taken manually. The
project description was sent to the interviewee some days in advance and ex-
planation of the concept of bottleneck management preceded the interview (not
included in interview time).
6.2.3.3. Market Situation
As a globally operating actor, the case company’s economic situation is affected
by the various economic developments as well as climate conditions around the
world. Times with good harvesting returns for agricultural business are often
followed by increased investment activity in agricultural machinery.
The industry for agricultural machinery is described by the interviewee as one
that is incrementally and continuously innovating, e.g., for steady efficiency im-
provements in the harvesting process. At the same time, more radical innovation
such as the introduction of automated harvesting processes, supported by GPS
technology and real time data analysis, is increasingly gaining pace. Overall,
says the interviewee, the agricultural machinery industry might be more inno-
vative than, for instance, the automobile industry.
With its products, the company competes with about five, partly larger, direct
competitors. Strong competition notwithstanding, the case company’s business
has developed positively over the last couple of years.
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6.2.3.4. Supply Situation – General Information
Products are complex – a harvesting machine consists of about 65.000 parts.
About 70% of value is added by suppliers. Accordingly, stable supply processes
are given great weight in the company. Shortages of supplied parts occur fre-
quently; interruptions of the internal production process due to part shortages,
however, could be averted for more than five years.
Supplied parts are received in “all” different delivery modes, i.e., JiS/JiT, con-
ventional warehouse, and consignment warehouse. Large parts and expensive
parts, such as engines and cabins for tractors, are received JiS.
The case company has developed an elaborate set of measures and processes
for supplier management, often paralleling measures and processes employed
in the automobile industry.
6.2.3.5. Production Process
Due to the complexity of the products, the production process comprises a broad
variety of activities and technologies, involving complex metal works, engine
and cabin assembly, installation of electrical equipment, and many more. As
pointed out before, on average suppliers add about 70% of the products’ value
before they reach the case company.
6.2.3.6. Bottleneck Emergence
Shortages typically occur on tier-1 stage; according to the interviewee, bottle-
necks have emerged on tier-2 level only two times in the past five years. Bottle-
necks are a frequently upcoming topic yet are managed well, so that the com-
pany can usually prevent delay in internal production processes.
As two examples for parts that have repeatedly been in short supply the inter-
viewee cites engines and tires. In both cases, suppliers are large and powerful
companies with a broad variety of customers. Tires are known to require long
delivery time because of tooling time (two to three days), which, says the in-
terviewee, makes planning of availability more difficult. Missing tires are no
reason to interrupt the production process, however, as provisional wheels can
232
6.2. Analysis of Interview Data Phase I: Individual Case Analysis
be used to “roll” the vehicle along the production line and can later be replaced
once the correct tires arrive. Such an aid would not be available for engines,
however, as the effort to mount and replace a temporary engine is too big.
Typical reasons for bottleneck emergence are short-term changes in demand
and short-term technical changes. Other reasons that have occurred, albeit less
frequently, are, for instance, supplier bankruptcies and a ship with supply from
India sinking.
Furthermore, the interviewee suggests that cultural difference with suppliers
seem to make a difference for supply reliability. As examples he cited suppliers
from India and from France that require more attention than suppliers from less
culturally remote regions.
Suppliers which underperform become “focus suppliers”. Such focus suppli-
ers will receive special attention from supplier managers and closer contact and
more intense communication is maintained. Focus suppliers represent about 1%
of all suppliers, which adds up to about 20 to 25 suppliers per year.
Specifically asked for problems related to indirect demand from competing
customers of the same suppliers or related to schedules breaks or holidays, the
interviewee states that he is not aware of problems that have been caused by
such reasons.
According to the interviewee, problems tend to arise with parts that are de-
livered JiT or JiS. C-Parts delivered to conventional warehouse do not normally
cause problems.
The interviewee suggests that by tendency supply-related problems emerge
more often with large and powerful suppliers than with smaller ones.
6.2.3.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
The Interviewee states that his company generally is well-prepared for bottle-
neck emergence and can deal with such problems very efficiently. The facts that
the company has a dedicated supplier management department and that sup-
ply interruptions have not caused delay in internal production for a long time
support this statement.
The case company maintains long-term contracts with suppliers, which con-
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tributes to trustful relationships and facilitates planning and investment in pro-
duction capacity.
Suppliers are provided with a forecast of 12 months. When actual orders are
sent, the supplier has seven days to enter an objection. When no objection is
entered the order counts as confirmed by the supplier. Suppliers are required to
maintain safety stock of parts from which they can supply the case company in
case their production is not able to keep up with demand.
Contracts with LSPs are signed with the case company, not with the individ-
ual suppliers. Thereby, the case company can use its influence and combined
purchasing power to receive better offers – and possibly to benefit from extra
effort LSPs are willing to make for a large customer. Also, there is quick com-
munication with LSPs in case problems arise in transportation.
The case company uses an ABC classification scheme for suppliers (referring
to purchasing volume and part criticality). Quality and logistics audits are con-
ducted with new A-suppliers immediately upon contract closure. B-suppliers
and in some cases also C-suppliers are audited later in the process. To further
improve the process the interviewee suggests that audits should be conducted
with all suppliers (i.e., including C-suppliers) for which, however, manpower
is missing. Audits are followed-up by workshops on supplier sites in order to
resolve the problems identified during the audits.
One element of the audits the company conducts with its suppliers is their
suppliers’ supplier management. By evaluating the processes suppliers have in
place to manage their suppliers, the case company removes the need for tier-
n management. Thus, tier-n management is not the rule and only been done in
rare exceptions. Employees in relevant departments receive training for supplier
audits.
Suppliers are located globally. While this might not be a conscious network
design decision for the sake of better bottleneck prevention, it does contribute
to prevention by spreading risk and reducing the impact of locally confined de-
velopments or occurrences leading to irregularities.
The company uses guidelines to decide for which part single-sourcing is suf-
ficient and for which parts multiple sources shall be used. Parts sourced to
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low-cost countries, for instance, are often sourced to more than one supplier.
Likewise, tires – cited above as an example for a component that frequently
causes problems – are received from three to four different sources of supply.
When bottlenecks are encountered, measures to prevent the same or similar
problems in the future are mutually agreed upon with the supplier.
6.2.3.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
According to the sourcing contract suppliers have to inform the case company if
they are unable to supply according to schedule. The length of the notification
period differs depending on the part and the reason for delay; in case of engines
and tires, notification of shortage may be two to three months before delivery.
Only infrequently do suppliers notify the case company about delays in supply
on short call, e.g., one day in advance.
Suppliers can enter an objection to orders received by the case company
within seven day, which would indicate immediately that supply problems can
be expected.
6.2.3.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
Upon notification of delay the case company inquires into the reasons for the
bottleneck. Support is then offered by the case company. For instance, the
case company may organize express delivery (quicker road freight or air freight
instead of sea freight). The expenses incurred are usually carried by the supplier.
One measure of bottleneck exploitation the company uses is to access the
stock of parts intended for use as replacement parts in order to avert interrup-
tion of the production process. The stock of replacement parts will then be
replenished to normal levels once the supply shortage could be eliminated. An-
other short-term measure is to take parts out of finished products that have been
produced to stock (and are currently not covered by actual customer order) and
build them into products that have been ordered by a customer so that actual
customer orders can be finished without delay.
The interviewee attributes this pragmatic hands-on attitude to the case com-
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pany’s culture and flat hierarchies: employees maintain a high level of com-
munication and generally try to support each other and solve problems if they
occur. There are few, if any, compartmental silos. In case of bottlenecks, often
five to ten people from different functional areas (e.g., purchasing, production,
sales, supplier management) work together to solve the problem. Accordingly,
the interviewee states that the company already does everything he can think of
in order to exploit bottlenecks.
6.2.3.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
Besides immediate short-term measures as described in the previous section,
the case company investigates into the root cause of the bottlenecks in order to
find ways to eliminate it. The interviewee emphasizes that lack of production
capacity is not normally the root cause of bottlenecks. Rather than by capacity
constraints problems are caused by organizational, operational or technical rea-
sons. Accordingly, capacity increase tends not to be the problem solution to the
bottlenecks the case company encounters.
Since many smaller companies are part of the supply base and may be less
experienced and professional, the case company offers suppliers support with
analysis and solution of the problem. Both parties agree on measures to avoid
the problem in the future.
6.2.3.11. Bottleneck Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement could not be applied to this case study.
6.2.3.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
Generally, the case company seems to face only few constraints when it comes
to efficient supplier and bottleneck management.
One limitation the company does face, however, is due to the fact that some
competitors are larger and demand larger volumes from some shared suppliers,
suggesting higher priority for competitors in case of capacity allocation deci-
sions.
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The interviewee expresses that (human) resources represent a constraint as
more capacity would be needed to conduct comprehensive audits with all sup-
pliers. Currently, quality and logistics audits are focused on A- and B-suppliers.
6.2.3.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.2 presents a graphical summary of the reasons for bottleneck emer-
gence and the case company’s bottleneck management activities.
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Figure 6.2.2. – Bottleneck Emergence and Bottleneck Management Activities at
Case Company 2
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6.2.4. Case Study 3
6.2.4.1. Short Description
The company is a medium-sized manufacturer of high efficiency heating sys-
tems based on solar energy and other renewable energy sources such as wood
pellets. The company is less than 30 years old and maintains a network of
representatives and distributors in 15 countries (in addition to its headquarters’
location). Customers are both private homes and businesses.
6.2.4.2. About the Data Collection
Contact to the company was established by email and followed up by telephone.
The interview was conducted on the company’s production and office site. The
meeting began with a tour through the company’s production facilities (about
1 hour) before background information to the project were provided and the
interview began. The interview was audio-taped (47 minutes), transcribed and
coded. The position of the interviewee is Team Leader in Procurement and
Logistics. The meeting took about three hours in total.
6.2.4.3. Market Situation
There is strong competition with about ten competitors of the same size and four
larger competitors. Overall, the market for solar energy related products has ex-
perienced a downturn recently which also affects the case company’s business.
Production of solar thermal collectors, for instance, at the time of the interview
was limited to one shift per day. Several companies within this industry have
filed for bankruptcy in the last few years. Nevertheless, the industry can be de-
scribed as largely stable; all important competitors are known and technology
of the products is subject to incremental improvement.
6.2.4.4. Supply Situation – General Information
The company maintains a supply base of about 350 suppliers of which about
80 – 120 supply main components of the company’s products. The normal
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delivery cycle for many components is 14 days while some other components
(e.g., smaller parts from China) are purchased only three times a year.
There is little insight into the supply network beyond tier-1 stage. In some
cases, collaboration with tier-2 suppliers is fostered for reasons of product de-
velopment.
Delays in supply are perceived as a problem both by management and by the
interviewee. Because products are customer-specific delays in supply may well
lead to delays in delivery of the finished product.
Supply is delivered to conventional warehouse. Parts of the supply base are
globally dispersed with suppliers located in countries like China and Italy.
6.2.4.5. Production Process
The company produces to order and often customized to customer requirements,
albeit similar components are used for each product within the same product
group.
The production process involves the manufacturing and assembly of discrete
parts. Some process steps are fully automated while others are done manually.
Manual labor sometimes involves scrap rates that occasionally led to reordering
of certain components in the past.
In-house production of some components normally produced by suppliers is
possible. At the same time, contract manufacturers add additional production
capacity for components normally manufactured in-house.
6.2.4.6. Bottleneck Emergence
Bottlenecks tend to surface on tier-1 level. Most common reasons are machine
breakdowns at the suppliers’ production sites and high scrap rates in suppliers’
production. Especially during the introduction phase of new products delays
have occurred.
The interviewee reports that supply was delayed because suppliers served
other – “more important” – customers first. The interviewee mentioned the
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relative small size and thus lower purchasing volumes as reasons for this priori-
tization in favor of other companies.
Sales partners of the company are not able to provide reliable long-term fore-
casts, so that customer orders may come unexpectedly. At the same time, lead
time for reordering certain components can be significant with up to 60 days for
certain components from Italy and even longer for deliveries from China. The
combination of long supply lead time and unexpectedly high level of orders has
led to difficulties in the past.
The interviewee reports that supply shortages have emerged because of hu-
man error in the case company’s call-off of supply as well as in the processing
of orders at suppliers.
Another reason as to why supply has been delayed was that in spite of delays
in production suppliers were trying to produce enough components to complete
the agreed upon transport batch size – instead of delivering the components that
had already been produced in smaller batches to allow the case company to
continue production.
Bankruptcy of suppliers is another reason for delays that have occurred.
6.2.4.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
The case company provides its suppliers with forecast data. At the same time,
however, the case company’s sales partners often are not able to provide reliable
forecast data to the company. In order to deal with the combination of long
supply lead times and lack of reliable forecast data from sales partners high
inventory levels have been held on stock to buffer demand peaks.
The company has traditionally fostered long-term partnerships with sole sup-
pliers rather than using multiple sources of supply for increased reliability. Ac-
cording to the interviewee, this may change for certain components both to in-
crease negotiation power for part prices and to improve reliability of supply.
Nevertheless, the interviewee emphasizes the importance of partnerships with
suppliers. One of the factors for the mostly well-working supplier relationships
is the “emotional factor” as suppliers realize they work with a company that has
pioneered products for sustainable life style.
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One important sourcing criterion for qualification of new suppliers is lead
time: suppliers with short lead time are preferred, which helps cope with short-
cycled demand peaks.
In order to be able to better deal with variability in demand, suppliers are con-
tractually obliged to provide 20% of production capacity flexibility per month.
According to the interviewee it often is possible to get even higher increase (up
to 50%) in output from suppliers in one month when no significant increase of
production output is expected in the following month.
Supplier delivery to consignment warehouse is desirable but currently not an
option. The primary reasoning in favor of consignment warehouses is reduced
capital cost rather than improved supply reliability, although the interviewee
suggest that for reasons of supply reliability suppliers might maintain higher
inventory levels in a consignment warehouse than the case company would in
its own conventional warehouse.
Although penalty clauses are part of some supply contract, the case company
does not normally make use of them. According to the interviewee, in 90% of
all cases the case company does not retreat to contractual penalties.
6.2.4.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
The interviewee distinguishes between predictable and unpredictable delays.
Delays in supply are predictable when a supplier does not confirm the deliv-
ery date in his order confirmation or when he suggests a later date.
In other cases, when delivery dates were confirmed but problems surface that
make delivery on schedule unlikely, suppliers generally notify the case com-
pany. Suppliers usually provide notification of delays three to five days prior
to the promised delivery date. In case of machine breakdowns notification may
be given only one day in advance. Only infrequently do deliveries not arrive
without prior notification.
It does happen that inventory levels at the case company are not as planned
because consumed material had not been properly booked in the IT system. In
such cases the supply shortage is not related to irregularities in supply.
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6.2.4.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
There are several measures in place to maximize throughput when supply bot-
tlenecks emerge.
When delays occur at suppliers, the case company expects suppliers to use
faster means of transportation. According to the interviewee suppliers some-
times simply do not think of this option. Furthermore, transportation lot sizes
that had been agreed upon with suppliers for economic reasons can be reduced
so that production can be continued.
The interviewee also reports that refurbishing of material that is locked due to
quality problems is increased so that more parts become usable for production.
6.2.4.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
When it comes to the company’s attention that a supplier will be unable to meet
promised delivery dates and the dispatcher is unable to find a viable solution
with the supplier, the dispatcher will contact his purchasing manager who will
inform the company’s management. Management then will get in touch with
the supplier to check if a solution can be found through negotiation on a higher
hierarchical level.
In cases where a second source of supply is available the case company
switches to this source when delays are expected from the primary source. One
of the improvement measures the interviewee suggests is that alternative sup-
pliers shall be qualified for most parts so that time can be saved and the case
company does not have to begin the search process for new suppliers in case
bottlenecks emerge.
For certain components that are normally sourced to suppliers internal pro-
duction capacity is available so that the component in short supply can be man-
ufactured in-house.
In case the bottleneck shifts to the case company’s internal production ca-
pacity, contract manufacturers have been qualified to support internal manufac-
turing of components of some of the case company’s products. In so doing
production capacity available for these components can be doubled.
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The interviewee suggests that supply shortages sometimes should simply be
accepted before high cost is incurred to resolve the situation. Instead of elim-
inating the bottleneck at any cost there should be an evaluation of the damage
that will be caused by the bottleneck. Possibly internal production is scheduled
such that the material would not be immediately needed upon arrival on the
promised delivery date. Also, before additional actions are triggered, the case
company should assess whether its own delivery date promised to the customer
is in fact critical, which according to the interviewee might not even be the case.
In some cases, substitute material that can provide the same function as the
material in short supply is temporarily approved for production after careful
evaluation by quality assurance.
6.2.4.11. Bottleneck Management: Placement
The interviewee states that the case company has purposely chosen to work with
only one supplier for an electronic component so that they are better able to
coordinate and cooperate in the development and production of the component.
Hence, they have consciously limited their possible sources of supply, albeit not
for reasons of efficiencies. Hence, the situation does not reflect the reasoning
behind bottleneck placement.
6.2.4.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
There are not many obvious constraints the case company has to deal with when
managing supply bottlenecks.
The overall market situation in the case company’s industry is currently char-
acterized by relatively low demand, which has driven several manufacturers of
related products, e.g., producers of solar panels, into bankruptcy. Low volumes
have been mentioned as one reason as to why the qualification and introduction
of alternative or second source suppliers for certain components is currently
not viable. Introducing additional suppliers in a market of already decreasing
volume would lead to unfavorable conditions for the relationship with each sup-
plier.
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The interviewee reports that one supplier openly communicated that produc-
tion jobs for other, larger customers (of the supplier) were prioritized over those
for the case company. This indicates clearly that the purchasing volume of some
components is such that some suppliers do not regard the case company as
highly important customer. This implies that the case company has less ne-
gotiation power when it comes to prevention, exploitation, and elimination of
bottlenecks, but also in price negotiations.
Because sales partners are often small and medium-sized local handicraft
businesses reliable forecasts are not received and difficult to create. This limi-
tation is inherent to the way the organization is set up and linked to the market
and thus cannot easily be resolved.
The interviewee mentions that because of the market downturn for solar en-
ergy related products in recent years banks have become suspicious of firms
in that industry, so that the case company prefers to describe itself as a manu-
facturer of heating systems with focus on solar energy technology rather than
as a solar energy company or as a producer of solar panels and solar thermal
collectors. This indicates that conditions for loans from banks to expand the
business or to deal with difficult business situations – as might be caused by
supply-related problems – may be unfavorable or loans might not be available
at all. That is, the company is currently subject to financial constraints, as are
other companies in the same industry.
The case company has traditionally focused on long-term relationships with
one or very few suppliers per component. Part of the reason why this is so is the
company’s ethical stance, suggesting that putting trust on one supplier is a better
thing to do than spreading orders across many suppliers. The interviewee indi-
cates that this mindset has sometimes led to single-sourcing agreements where
there should have been multiple sources instead. That is, the case company’s or-
ganizational culture has been a limiting factor for the prevention of bottlenecks.
6.2.4.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.3 presents a graphical summary of the reasons for bottleneck emer-
gence and the case company’s bottleneck management activities.
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6.2.5. Case Study 4
6.2.5.1. Short Description
The case company is a large international trading firm for different types of
metal with headquarters in Europe. Customers come from diverse industries
and are of different size, reaching from small firms to large corporations.
6.2.5.2. About the Data Collection
The interview was conducted in the company’s headquarters in Central Europe.
Two interviewees were available for the interview. Both interviewees are spe-
cialized on tin trading and the interview thus focused mostly on supply networks
for tin.
The interview was audio-taped and the recorded interview time was about 46
minutes. Before the interview began, an introduction to the research project as
well as explanations about terminology and bottleneck concept were provided.
Contact to this case company had previously been established by the purchas-
ing and logistics manager of another case company.
6.2.5.3. Market Situation
Global demand for tin currently exceeds supply. Accordingly, prices are stable
on a high level. One interviewee suggests that despite the slight imbalance of
(global) demand and supply “enough” tin will be available to the market in the
next couple of years as there is still some slack in the effective use of production
capacity in the producing countries such as Indonesia.
There are only “a handful” of companies active in tin trading in Europe which
are competing with the case company. The case company has a strong market
position.
6.2.5.4. Supply Situation – General Information
The supply situation for the case company is largely stable. The largest amounts
of tin are shipped from Indonesia and South America and are received in con-
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ventional warehouses in three locations, one of which is the incoming material
stock of a facility for tin production whereas the other two are dedicated ware-
houses without production capacity attached. Customer orders are fulfilled with
material from stock, which normally allows processing and delivery of customer
orders within 48 hours. According to the interviewees irregularities in supply
do occur but can generally be buffered or otherwise managed.
6.2.5.5. Production Process
The case company is active in metal trading, that is, they receive material to
conventional warehouses and sell it from there. There is no further modification
of the material.
6.2.5.6. Bottleneck Emergence
According to the interviewees, political instabilities in the producing countries
affect the availability of tin in the global markets. In most cases, however, this is
merely reflected by rising prices for tin; a real supply shortage has not emerged.
Also, political events in other countries influence the price level, such as the
ongoing political crisis in Crimea. One of the interviewees considers the polit-
ically induced turbulence in the Indonesian tin market as “a game they play in
order to keep prices high”.
One important aspect is the existence of a multitude of different brands of
tin with differences in purity and amounts and types of by-products. According
to one interviewee, not all brands can be held on stock in large amounts so
that mismatch might occur between which brand a customer wants and which
brands are available. Some customers are flexible as to the brand, others have
very specific needs.
Since all material is shipped from overseas, delays of cargo ships do some-
times occur.
One interviewee reports that one reason why supply shortage of other metals
than tin sometimes occur – more specifically, he refers to magnesium and some
other metals mostly supplied from China – is that suppliers hold back deliveries
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when they expect rising prices and then sell material to other customers who are
willing to pay higher prices. The interviewee refers to this pattern as a Chinese
business peculiarity.
6.2.5.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
According to the interviewees, two measures are dominant to prevent the emer-
gence of bottlenecks in supply: the use of multiple (about two to four) sources
and good relationships with suppliers. Although three warehouses are main-
tained, the inventory kept in these warehouses is not intended to cover long
periods (e.g., several months) of supply as the price for tin is too high and hence
impact on cash flow significant. Instead of relying on large inventories as buffer,
the use of multiple reliable sources is emphasized. At the same time, the inter-
viewees stress the importance of good relationships to LSPs in order to make
sure no delays will occur in the outbound stream. The interviewees state that
overall the company reaches a service level of 99% and with most customers
even 100%.
The interviewees suggest that because the case company belongs to the big
players in the tin market suppliers generally put much effort into ensuring that
the supply process goes smoothly and uninterrupted. That is, the company’s
reputation as a large and important customer does play a role.
The case company has information about the total production capacity of its
suppliers as well as about their production output. This information helps the
company estimate whether problems may arise out of short production capacity.
6.2.5.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
The interviewees state they are informed by the warehouses when inventory
reaches a critically low level. In such cases, information about estimated arrival
time will be retrieved from the cargo ships that are on their way to find out if the
inventory levels will suffice until arrival of new material.
As described in the previous section, the case company is aware about slack in
suppliers’ production capacity and thus can estimate in advance if a bottleneck
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may emerge.
6.2.5.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
Two of the three warehouses are dedicated to holding inventory for trading
whereas one warehouse is attached to a production facility for tin-based prod-
ucts. Normally, all orders for unprocessed tin are served from the two dedicated
warehouses. The interviewees explain, however, that it is possible to access ma-
terial from the production warehouse in case inventory levels in the other two
warehouses are too low to fulfill customer orders.
6.2.5.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
The most obvious measure for the case company to eliminate a bottleneck in
one supply relation is to switch to another supplier. The company maintains
parallel supply relationships with two to four tin producers. According to one
interviewee, one relationship normally is the preferred one; however, the other
suppliers do receive their share of orders. In case suppliers would be unable to
supply the right material in the right amount on time, the case company would
also buy material from competing trading firms. The overarching goal is to
fulfill the customer’s order even when order fulfillment would cost the company
money.
One interviewee states that in case a bottleneck exists the company approaches
the customer to validate the promised delivery date. The reason is that customers
sometimes set arbitrary delivery dates – sometimes weeks before they actually
need the material. In such cases promised delivery dates can be postponed by
some time in order to reduce the stress on the supply relation.
When a customer orders a particular brand of tin which at that time is not
readily available, the case company may approach the customer to offer another
brand with similar characteristics. Depending on the specific demands of the
customer, such a substitution may resolve the bottleneck situation.
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6.2.5.11. Bottleneck Management: Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement could not be applied to this case study.
6.2.5.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
There are few – if any – obvious limitations to the company’s ability to manage
bottlenecks.
One physical constraint certainly is that material has to be shipped from over-
seas and thus requires transportation by cargo ships, which is usually slow and
prone to interruptions and delay due to weather conditions. Alternative trans-
portation modes are not available, however, due to weight and amount of the
material.
6.2.5.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.4 presents a graphical summary of the case company’s bottleneck
management activities.
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6.2.6. Case Study 5
6.2.6.1. Short Description
The case company runs several large production plants in Europe where it pro-
duces copper and some by-products such as gold. The company sells copper
cathodes as well as copper-based products, the latter of which are manufactured
in a separate division of the company. Among the case studies conducted for
this thesis, this company might be the one which is located furthest upstream in
the supply network.
6.2.6.2. About the Data Collection
The interview was conducted in the company’s headquarters in Central Europe.
The interviewee’s position is Head of External Logistics. The interview took
about 45 minutes, was conducted in English, and was audio-taped. The re-
searcher’s contact to the company was established by another case company’s
procurement and logistics manager. Although the project description was sent
to the company some days in advance it was not forwarded to and received by
the interviewee prior to the meeting. The interview was preceded by an intro-
duction to the project and an explanation of some concepts used in the thesis.
Although the interviewee emphasized that he might not be able to answer all
questions as some touched upon other departments’ responsibility and function
most questions were answered during the interview.
6.2.6.3. Market Situation
To this day, the company has maintained a relatively high level of integration
as compared to some competitors so that competition exists for products and
intermediate products at several points in the company’s value chain. Although
several competitors are smaller than the case company they have good market
positions in their respective local geographic markets. Likewise, the most im-
portant market for the case company is the domestic European market. Current
market demand for copper cathodes is strong and the interviewee describes the
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market as a sellers’ market.
6.2.6.4. Supply Situation – General Information
The case company receives copper concentrate from copper mines and pur-
chases recycling copper globally. The interview was focused on the inbound
stream of copper concentrate.
Most of the raw material is received to a conventional warehouse which is
operated by an external service provider. Since the proportions of ingredients
(copper and by-products) in copper concentrate change depending on the loca-
tion of the mine and also over time, upon arrival from overseas freight different
copper concentrates are blended by the service provider before the concentrate
is processed in the plant. A smaller share of raw material is delivered directly
to the production plant where there is a smaller storage area where the material
can be prepared for use in the production process.
The purchasing department of the company is given great weight. Production
of copper cathodes is a continuous chemical process and interruption of supply
would incur significant cost. The interviewee does not recall a situation of sup-
ply shortage that has occurred in the last couple of years. The stable supply, in
turn, allows the company to achieve a high service level with its customers.
6.2.6.5. Production Process
The basic metallurgical processes have remained similar over long periods of
time. Changing quantities of, for instance, toxic material in the copper con-
centrate, however, that requires special attention in the process, such as arsenic,
induce the need for technological innovation.
The production of cathodes in the electrolytic process takes roughly three
weeks.
6.2.6.6. Bottleneck Emergence
The interviewee states that he is not aware of any externally induced interruption
of the production process of copper cathodes due to a shortage of supply in the
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past years. This suggests that the order and supply processes are stable.
Since demand for both copper-based products and copper cathodes is cur-
rently strong, copper cathodes represent a supply bottleneck as more copper-
based products could be produced and sold if more copper cathodes were avail-
able in the market. The reason for this shortage of copper cathodes are pro-
duction capacity constraints. Since cathode production is a continuous process,
there is little flexibility to scale up production, for instance by adding additional
work shifts. That is, production of copper cathodes generally remains stable
over long periods of time whereas demand changes and thus determines avail-
ability of copper cathodes in the market.
One bottleneck for cathode production was created internally due to main-
tenance work in the production of anodes which are required pre-material for
cathode production. Planning for the maintenance work began three years in
advance and anode stocks were increased for several months in order to have
sufficient inventory and minimize impact on cathode production. The result of
the deliberate planning process was that losses of cathode production could be
minimized – albeit not avoided completely – although maintenance of the anode
production area persisted for several weeks.
Both constraints described in this section do not represent bottlenecks in sup-
ply but internal bottlenecks.
6.2.6.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
The primary measure to avoid shortage in raw material – should it occur – ac-
cording to the interviewee is the diversification of supply sources. The concen-
trate purchased from the various sources is buffered in an external warehouse
where different concentrates are then blended to reduce variety of chemical pro-
portions in the material for the production process. The blending process as
such can be seen as a prevention measure in itself.
The blending reduces the dependency on specific qualities of copper concen-
trate and thus on specific sources of supply. Irregularities in supply from one
source can thereby be compensated for by other sources without compromising
on the chemical properties of the copper concentrate.
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The raw material inventory kept in the external warehouse is able to feed
supply to the production process for several weeks so that a possible gap in the
inbound material flow can be bridged.
Diligent planning and multiple sources notwithstanding the mere importance
of the case company as a customer for its suppliers may be another reason why
irregularities in supply of raw material could be averted for several years.
Furthermore, the company engages in scenario planning. The interviewee
explains that potential global problem areas are investigated and possible op-
tions for counter measures assessed. One result of such planning activities is
an increased awareness and thus possibly shorter reaction time. Examples for
possible problems that are assessed in these planning activities are, for instance,
union activities in mines and strikes at important sea ports.
6.2.6.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
The interviewee states that the case company is an active participant in trade or-
ganizations and other networking opportunities within the same and related in-
dustries in order to exchange and capture information about the supply situation
worldwide. This way, problems that are possibly coming up can be identified in
an early state so that counter measures can be put into action.
6.2.6.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
The blending of copper concentrate from different sources has been described
above as an activity to prevent bottlenecks. With some justification, however,
it can be considered a measure of bottleneck exploitation, too. The blending
process allows to better utilize the resources available as copper concentrate –
which may include an unfavorable proportion of ingredients – to make it suitable
for straight use in production process can be made usable by blending it with
copper concentrate from other sources.
Other measures of bottleneck exploitation could not be identified in this case
study.
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6.2.6.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
The most important measure for bottleneck elimination is switching the sources
for supply. However, problems with supply bottlenecks were not reported.
6.2.6.11. Bottleneck Management: Placement
For supply of raw material from external suppliers the concept of bottleneck
placement did not apply to this case study.
Internally a bottleneck had been created through massive maintenance work
in anode production, as described under “Bottleneck Emergence”. The intent to
create this bottleneck was not to capitalize on efficiencies or to control produc-
tion flow, though; rather, the maintenance work the anode production underwent
was a necessity. Thus, the concept of bottleneck placement as defined in this
thesis does not apply.
6.2.6.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
Since production of copper cathodes requires large amounts of raw material
which is supplied from overseas, an obvious limitation is that there are no short-
cuts available to speed up transportation in case production would encounter a
shortage of raw material. For transport of large amounts of raw material from
continents such as South America there is no alternative to conventional sea
freight.
The nature of the production process – a continuous chemical process – cre-
ates limitations as it excludes flexibility to scale production up or down ac-
cording to demand and availability of raw material. That is, inherent technical
characteristics of the process impose limitations on the actions the company can
take to alleviate problems attached to irregularities in supply.
To this day, the limitations described here are hypothetical as the case com-
pany appears to be in full control of supply and has not faced supply shortages
for an extended period of time.
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6.2.6.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.5 presents a graphical summary of the case company’s bottleneck
management activities.
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6.2.7. Case Study 6
6.2.7.1. Short Description
The case company is a medium-sized trader of raw material with focus on non-
ferrous metal.
6.2.7.2. About the Data Collection
One interview was conducted at the headquarters in Europe on April 3rd, 2014.
The contact to this case company had been established by the logistics and pro-
curement manager of another case company. The interview was audio-taped,
transcribed and coded. The interviewee is the CEO of the firm. The interview
took about 50 minutes.
6.2.7.3. Market Situation
As a relatively small player in a market of mostly large companies the company
fills a niche. According to the interviewee, some of the competitors are so large
that they simply do not bother the case company due to its relatively small size.
6.2.7.4. Supply Situation – General Information
The supply situation was described as largely stable. That is, the company does
not have to deal with supply shortages on a regular basis.
Ten different types of raw material are kept permanently on stock and sev-
eral others are offered on demand. That is, most orders are served from stock,
which allows the company to offer short delivery time to customers. In total,
the company’s supplier portfolio consists of more than 100 different suppliers.
Suppliers are both smelters and other raw material traders. When regular sup-
pliers are unable to deliver, raw material can also be ordered from competing
trading firms.
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6.2.7.5. Production Process
The case company trades raw material, i.e., the only modification of the ma-
terial is in terms time and place. The company receives most of its material
to conventional warehouse; only a small share of goods is kept in a consign-
ment warehouse. Some (“basic”) materials are permanent part of the product
portfolio whereas other parts of the product portfolio change on a yearly basis.
6.2.7.6. Bottleneck Emergence
The reasons as to why suppliers fail to deliver as promised are diverse and in-
clude technical, political, natural, cultural, and operational reasons.
According to the interviewee, problems often occur related to overseas deliv-
ery. As an example she mentions delivery of lead from Thailand. Occasionally,
“one container is left behind” during transfer so that delivery time doubles from
four weeks to eight weeks so that delivery time exceeds inventory buffer time.
Problems are reported related to delivery from Eastern Europe, particularly
from Poland and Russia. The interviewee suggests that some suppliers prefer to
supply domestic customers first, which repeatedly led to delays. Also, commu-
nication with some suppliers has turned out to be difficult as clear statements
as to the state of order processing could not be obtained. In some cases, ma-
terial was held back by suppliers when market price was low. The same has
been reported about a supplier from South America who decided not to ship or-
dered material overseas. The interviewee referred to this behavior as “artificial
scarcity of supply”.
Several smelters in Southern Europe regularly stop operations for several
weeks in summer and empty their stocks. When operations are continued af-
ter the summer break and demand is high, scarcity for certain materials can
occur.
In Europe, scrap metal has become the dominant raw material for production
of several metals and many once “primary” smelters have become “secondary”
smelters, i.e., they process scrap metal instead of ore. Apparently availabil-
ity of scrap metal sometimes is limited so that delay can be caused. The case
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company receives scrap metal from several sources and provides smelters with
scrap metal who, in return, deliver pure metal of some kind. When availability
of scrap metal is insufficient this cycle is interrupted and the pure metal becomes
more expensive or – in the worst case – unavailable.
Machine breakdowns in smelter’s production processes also occur and cause
delays. The interviewee reports that one supplier had created an order back-
log of about 10.000 tons of material when several machines in his production
process broke down at once.
The interviewee mentions that in case suppliers were unable to keep up with
demand the case company did experience that larger customers where preferred
over the case company. That is, the relatively small size of the firm occasionally
has been a disadvantage when short material had to be allocated.
The interviewee cites the REACH1 regulation that has led to the situation that
for some raw materials such as cadmium the number of registered importing
companies is so low that demand repeatedly exceeds supply. According to the
interviewee, firms are discouraged by the cost related to REACH registration
and approval of material.
One of the most prevalent problems the company has to cope with is that
many customers tend to order late. Although the case company’s business model
is based on delivery on short notice it does require some days to organize trans-
portation. That is, the source of the demand-supply mismatch here is not the
supply base but constraints such as immediate availability of transportation ca-
pacity, which can make meeting such orders difficult.
Political and societal events such as strikes in mines or government influence
such as in Indonesia occasionally lead to delays and price fluctuation.
6.2.7.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
One effective measure the company employs is to maintain a broad set of sup-
pliers (i.e., multiple sourcing). Tin, for example, can be received in its various
qualities from eight different suppliers, some of which are smelters whereas
1Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)
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others are trading firms. This provides the company with a variety of options in
case of contingency.
The company’s core business logic is to sell material from stock to buyers
who need material at short notice and who thus are willing to pay a premium.
That is, the company maintains a certain inventory level for its core products.
This inventory level buffers irregularities in supply and demand, so that mis-
match between demand and supply can be avoided if delays in supply do not
exceed a certain time range.
For the purchase of some materials yearly framework agreements exist so that
the supplier can allocate capacities accordingly. Such framework agreements
are likely to lessen the chance of unexpected supply shortages due to strong
industry demand.
Although most material is kept in conventional warehouses, the case com-
pany maintains one consignment warehouse with a supplier. Consignment ware-
houses are not only a means to mitigate the burden of capital cost but also allow
effective inventory control by the supplier. Thus, the consignment warehouse
can be seen as a measure to prevent supply shortages for the respective material.
6.2.7.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
The interviewee has emphasized the role of networking in the metal trading and
processing industry. Maintaining good relationships to other industry players
can be seen as an effective “early warning system”. One anecdote mentioned
during the interview is that a fire broke out at one large smelter and that it took
less than half an hour before “everybody in the industry” knew about the inci-
dent and contacted the supplier to learn about possible implications for supply.
Generally, suppliers notify the case companies when they become aware of
problems.
6.2.7.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
No measures for exploitation of bottlenecks in the company’s supply network
could be identified in this case study. However, one measure has been reported
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that can support and accelerate the transfer of material in demand to customers.
The interviewee mentioned that late customer orders regularly cause problems
as transportation capacities might not be immediately available although the
material would be readily accessible on stock. In such cases, material pick up
can be organized by customers to allow immediate access to the material.
6.2.7.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
The use of multiple sourcing allows the company to switch to another source
of supply in case the original source is unable to deliver as planned. The inter-
viewee emphasized that buying from alternative sources – even from competing
traders – (even for higher prices while selling at loss) is an option that the com-
pany can retreat to.
In case one particular material is not available from suppliers and customer
orders are pending, the company does approach customers and offers them a
substitute product. For instance, lead with higher purity can be offered when
lead with lower purity is currently in short supply.
6.2.7.11. Bottleneck Management Limitations
The relatively small size of the company poses limitation to its options in the
face of the often external causes of bottleneck emergence in the supply network.
For instance, it has been mentioned above in the description of bottleneck emer-
gence that the case company faced situations where it was disadvantaged as
compared to larger competitors in the allocation of scarce material.
As it becomes clear from the description of bottleneck emergence, the options
for the company to prevent the emergence of bottlenecks in the supply network
are limited as the reasons tend to lie outside its direct influence.
It seems there are financial constraints which prevent the company from fol-
lowing certain activities. The interviewee stated, for instance, that the company
could organize the overseas transportation of certain materials on its own so as
to skip one echelon of the supply chain; the constraint, however, is that this
would require upfront investment which would put the firm’s financials at risk.
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The current terms and conditions are such that smelters, i.e., suppliers, insist
on instantaneous payment or even cash before delivery whereas customers of
the case company enjoy 30 to 60 days period of payment. The gap has to be
bridged by the case company, which consumes capital that could be used for
other activities.
One limitation for the case company’s bottleneck management activities arises
from the natural scarcity of certain raw material. That is, some products might
only be available on the market in small amounts, at high prices, or, in extreme
cases, not at all.
Also, natural distribution of material on the planet makes sourcing to remote
places a necessity rather than a choice. At the same, weight and amounts of ma-
terial are such that air freight must be excluded as an option and the only viable
transportation mode remains sea freight, which is slow and prone to delays due
to weather conditions.
6.2.7.12. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.6 presents a graphical summary of the case company’s bottleneck
management activities.
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6.2.8. Case Study 7
6.2.8.1. Short Description
The company is a producer of soldering powder and other related products for
the manufacturing of electrical components. The product portfolio consists of a
wide range of different products and product variations. Customers are mostly
automotive suppliers and suppliers of computer components, i.e., the company
is located upstream in the supply network for electronic components. The com-
pany is part of a larger industrial group based in the same country and has one
production plant in central Europe and one in China. Each plant has a produc-
tion output of several hundred tons of powder per year. Further expansion of the
business is planned.
6.2.8.2. About the Case Study
The primary mode of data collection for this case was one semi-structured in-
terview. The interview took place in the headquarters of the company. The
interviewee’s position is Sales and Administrative Manager. The interview was
audio-taped; additional notes were taken manually on a hard copy of the in-
terview questionnaire. Limited access to archival records was granted. The
researcher’s contact to the company had been established by another case com-
pany’s procurement and logistics manager. The meeting, including the inter-
view, introduction of the project and introduction of the company, took about
two hours.
6.2.8.3. Market Situation
There is strong competition from another producer of similar products in Europe
and five to ten competitors in Asia, five of which are described as large.
One particularity is that some companies downstream the supply network
perform tier-n management and approve and audit suppliers up to four echelons
upstream.
According to the interviewee, many customers employ dual sourcing as a
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means to avoid bottlenecks in supply. That is, the case company often is not the
only source of supply for its customers.
6.2.8.4. Supply Situation – General Information
Primary raw materials are tin, lead, silver, copper, antimony, and bismuth, with
tin and lead representing the largest amounts. Overall, there are more than ten
different types of metal required to produce the diverse range of soldering pow-
ders. The minimum order batch size for several of the raw materials is 5 tons.
The supply situation has been described as largely stable with delays occur-
ring only on rare occasions. The forecast horizon from customers in Europe
normally is only 1 month; customers in China tend to provide even shorter fore-
cast horizon of only one to two weeks. For certain products that are part of
microchip supply chains, however, the forecast horizon provided by customers
is up to one year.
The company uses two sources for several materials and purchases other ma-
terials from traders that employ several sources.
Raw material is delivered by truck from continental Europe to a conventional
warehouse. The normal delivery frequency is one delivery per week. The com-
pany keeps a buffer of raw material in its warehouse from which it covers regu-
lar and smaller orders. The amount purchased per months is adjusted based on
sales in the previous month. Large orders are treated separately: raw material
for large orders is purchased in the exact quantities needed to complete the job.
6.2.8.5. Production Process
Raw material is processed in a continuous process that runs 24 hours for five
or six days per week. The production process is normally interrupted only for
cleaning and maintenance work. Depending on the change of the products that
are to be produced on the production lines, extensive cleaning work might be
required to remove all particles of certain raw materials that must not be con-
tained by the product to which the process is to be changed. Such cleaning for
product changeover can take half a day.
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6.2.8.6. Bottleneck Emergence
The interviewee reports that problems have been caused due to insufficient qual-
ity of raw material and delayed delivery by one supplier with whom the com-
pany subsequently stopped working after “many years”.
The interviewee’s interpretation of the events was that this (larger) supplier
acquired some new customers which the supplier prioritized higher and to which
he allocated more capacity and diligence. These new customers were not direct
competitors of the interviewee’s company but purchased the same raw mate-
rial. The supplier delayed deliveries to the case company several times so that
the production process had to be interrupted. After such delays occurred sev-
eral times, quality of raw material additionally started to vary, so that delivered
batches sometimes were flawless and at other times were unusable, which for
technical reasons only could be detected in the end product, i.e., after the pro-
duction process for the respective product had been run. In such cases, the
entire production batch had to be discarded, could only be used for customers
with lower quality requirements, or had to be used otherwise. The interviewee’s
explanation for the variance in raw material was that the supplier had begun to
buy material from another source.
Internally, delays sometimes occur due to problems in the production pro-
cess. On the distribution side, problems occur due to delays in transportation
to customers in Asia when cargo ships are behind schedule. The interviewee
mentions that once a ship with more than ten tons of production output sank on
its way to a customer in Asia.
In cases as the ones just described the bottleneck shifts from the supplier
or the distribution, respectively, to the case company. When an entire produc-
tion batch is wasted due to insufficient raw material quality or when supply is
delayed, the internal production of the case company becomes the new bottle-
neck. Likewise, when a cargo ship with finished products sinks on its way to
customers, the production output of several days or even weeks is lost so that
internal production capacity becomes the limiting factors.
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6.2.8.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
Generally, the company employs annual framework contracts with suppliers that
include amounts to be purchased to allow better capacity planning. The same is
done with some (yet not all) customers.
Tin and lead are purchased from a raw material trading firm that itself main-
tains several sources for its material, all of which previously approved by the
interviewed company. Material that is acquired directly from raw material pro-
ducers is always sourced to two suppliers in parallel. Dual sourcing is a re-
quirement from several customers. The use of the trader is due to bureaucratic
obstacles for the direct import of tin and lead but (unmentioned by the inter-
viewee) also has a risk pooling effect. When the Indonesian government put
forth new rules for the export of tin with effect from 1 January 2014, the dealer
expressed confidence that he will be able to provide all the amounts required by
the interviewed company.
The purchasing of raw material is combined with another company in the
same conglomerate (also, the purchasing manager is the same). This allows to
leverage higher purchasing power.
Several of the company’s customers and indirect customers (further down-
stream in the supply network) have policies in place that affect bottleneck pre-
vention. For better inventory and capacity planning, the company operates sev-
eral consignment warehouses at sites of large customers. The consignment
warehouses are described by the interviewee as expensive but useful. Also,
all suppliers from which the case company sources raw material for products
delivered to that customer have to be qualified by a blue chip corporation three
echelons downstream; i.e., this firm performs tier-n management up to four ech-
elons upstream in this supply chain. Also, audits are performed regularly, both
by some customers and by the case company itself.
Some material is sourced to domestic suppliers so that the chance of delays
and interruption due to transportation issues can be minimized.
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6.2.8.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
No specific measures are in place to identify bottlenecks in an early stage.
The company maintains good relationships to a broad variety of firms in its
industry as well as with suppliers and customers. For that purpose the company
maintains a sales office in Singapore. That is, larger developments on the raw
material market will be detected early.
6.2.8.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
Measures of bottleneck exploitation touch mostly upon internal processes and
actions. Several measures have been mentioned for the case that the bottleneck
shifts to the internal production of the case company.
Weekend work has been mentioned as a primary measure to catch up with
production schedules. Additional work on Saturdays and Sundays allows for an
internal production capacity flexibility of 20% to 40%. Since normally mainte-
nance jobs are performed on the weekend, production on the weekend comes at
the cost of scheduled maintenance.
To resolve the resulting capacity shortages in the case of the ship that sank
with ten tons of finished goods during distribution (as mentioned above) four
measures were put into action:
1. Weekend work (see above)
2. Use of faster transportation modes. In this case, air freight was used to
transport the finished goods to Asia.
3. Smaller transportation lot sizes. Material was shipped as soon as possible
in smaller batches to allow the customer to continue with production.
4. Other customers were contacted to evaluate the urgency of their orders.
Thereby, the production schedule could be adjusted and the production of
the scarce material could be optimized.
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6.2.8.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
The primary measure to deal with problems in supply is to use the second source
of supply.
Also, because of its being part of a larger industry conglomerate, the com-
pany is able to access material on stock at the other company of the same group
(which is the same organization with whom the procurement process is com-
bined, as mentioned above).
Options to eliminate a bottleneck are limited once it shifts to the internal pro-
duction of the case company. Although the sister production plant in China has
the same technical equipment and similar capacity, employing its production
capacity in order to elevate overall capacity is not normally an option due to
bureaucratic barriers. Once an exception was made, but it required that the ma-
terial would pass through several external organizations and had to be shipped
by air, so the process was lengthy and expensive. Complementary use of pro-
duction capacity in the Chinese plant thus is not an option at short call.
6.2.8.11. Bottleneck Management: Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement could not be applied to the business con-
text of the case company.
6.2.8.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
There are several limitations that do affect the way the company can manage
bottlenecks.
One limitation has become apparent in the description of the reasons for bot-
tleneck emergence. It seems there is a power imbalance between the company
and some of its suppliers. Relatively low purchasing volumes in spite of com-
bined purchasing with a sister company in the same conglomerate make the
company replaceable from the position of a larger supplier. This is a condition
for which there is no obvious solution. At the same time, customers sometimes
are significantly larger. That is, the company of medium size finds itself as a
smaller party in a position between large suppliers and large customers.
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Another notable limitation is the short forecast horizon that is provided by
customers for several of the company’s products. A forecast horizon of one
month or only one to two week in Europe and China, respectively, does not al-
low much time to adjust purchasing and production plans. The limitation arises
out of customers’ claim not to have the data available, as the interviewee states.
At the same time, increased order size on short call for certain materials such
as tin is likely to remain unmet by suppliers. Some materials, such as antimony
and bismuth, generally have a higher supply lead time. That is, a combination of
short forecast horizon meets a certain lack of flexibility of supply. Increasing the
level of inventory in the warehouse poses a financial risk as the cost for several
of the materials are very high, i.e., capital cost for inventory might become
unacceptable. Generally, some of the raw material can be subject to significant
price fluctuation. That is, building up a larger inventory buffer for certain raw
materials may not be an option to cope with the combination of short forecast
horizon and the danger of insufficient availability of supply.
Switching between certain products in the production process requires exten-
sive cleaning which lowers the overall production capacity. A combination of
weekend work to catch up with production schedule when the bottleneck shifts
to internal production and the need for a change-over between two products
that require careful cleaning in between would turn out to create a difficult sit-
uation. Because high purity of the products is required, polluting one product
with residues of a previous production batch would possibly render an entire
production batch unusable.
It has been mentioned that for technical reasons insufficient quality of raw
material might only become apparent after the production process has ended.
Obviously, this is a major limitation to the prevention of bottlenecks. Running
the production process with one flawed input material will waste the capacity
needed for the production of the batch (i.e., machine capacity and manpower),
the other raw material that has gone into the process (solder powder generally
is a combination of different metals) and other cost such as electricity and man-
power.
Import/export policies in China prevent that orders processed at one plant can
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be supported by additional production capacity from the other plant (in either
direction). Circumventing such restrictions involves an expensive and lengthy
process and thus is not an option for bottleneck elimination at short notice.
6.2.8.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.7 presents a graphical summary of the case company’s bottleneck
management activities.
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6.2.9. Case Study 8
6.2.9.1. Short Description
The case company is a medium-sized producer of products for radiation shield-
ing, anodes for metal extraction, and several special alloys of non-ferrous met-
als. A subsidiary of the case company produces soldering products. Because of
the various applications of its products the range of different customers is very
broad.
6.2.9.2. About the Data Collection
Two interviews were conducted at the main production site of the company in
central Europe. They were part of a larger case study over a period of two weeks
during which the researcher stayed on site, participated in meetings, talked to
managers and staff to learn more about the firm and the industry, and conducted
an analysis of bottleneck risk at this production site. The interviews were audio-
taped and are complemented by manual notes and archival records received dur-
ing the two weeks. The researcher’s primary contact and interview partner is the
company’s procurement and logistics manager (hereafter referred to as intervie-
wee); the second interview partner is the head of the business division for anode
production and he provided mostly technical information about production pro-
cesses. This case analysis is mostly based on the interview with the primary
contact.
6.2.9.3. Market Situation
The company has competitors for most of its products, yet no other company
offers the same product range at once. For some products the barriers to enter
competition are high due to the need for approval by officials and by classifica-
tion bodies. Also, capital and expert knowledge required to compete in some
areas can be considered an entry barrier. Some other products, on the other
hand, might easily be manufactured by other companies with competencies in
lead processing. Overall, there is strong competition for some products while
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competition is much less significant for some others.
6.2.9.4. Supply Situation – General Information
About 15 to 20 suppliers represent the major sources of goods purchased.
Although the situation can be described as largely stable delays and irreg-
ularities in supply of non-ferrous metals do occur and are considered routine
work, i.e., procurement staff is familiar with such situations. For certain mate-
rials, other sources can be easily tapped while some metals with very particular
specifications can only be acquired from one source. While some metals are
purchased directly from producers (e.g., most of the lead), others are purchased
from dealers as the amounts required tend to be smaller than minimum order
batch sizes of raw material suppliers.
Also, irregularities have occurred in the supply of other components than pure
metal in which certain manufacturing capabilities are involved so that the source
could not easily be replaced or complemented.
Overall, irregularities and delay in the supply situation do require intervention
of procurement staff on a regular basis but do not regularly pose a significant
threat to the company’s processes.
6.2.9.5. Production Process
The production process differs for the individual products the company offers.
There is both manufacturing and assembly of discrete components as well as
continuously running chemical processes. Products are generally produced and
delivered to order and many of the company’s products are customized to spe-
cific customer needs.
6.2.9.6. Bottleneck Emergence
The reasons for the emergence of bottlenecks are diverse.
The interviewee reports that most frequently given explanations for delays
in supply are machine breakdowns and the lack of raw material on the tier-1
stage, i.e., bottlenecks on higher echelons such as tier-2. There is currently no
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transparency as to the reasons why suppliers of higher tiers cause raw material
shortages for tier-1 suppliers.
Other reasons are related to uncertainties when introducing new suppliers.
For instance, after a sourcing agreement had been closed with a new supplier
in China, the supplier found himself unable to produce a certain component so
that a new supplier had to be found for that part at short notice.
For certain products, e.g., products related to radiation shielding, approval
of classification societies is required for reasons of safety and official approval.
This sometimes takes longer than originally expected when mismatch occurs
between finalization of the product and free capacity of the classification body.
Also, missing documents for customs have led to delays when a Chinese sup-
pliers had been newly introduced into the sourcing portfolio.
One particular supplier which was the sole source for an important component
had caused problems (delays, quality problems and mismatch between price
expectations) several times before it failed quality audits and was subsequently
removed from the portfolio. The reasons as to why this particular supplier failed
to comply with requirements and expectations several times are not entirely
clear, yet it became apparent that the supplier did not adequately fill the role of
the single source supplier for a critical component. Additionally, it turned out
the supplier’s business conduct diverged too much from acceptable levels. That
is, the decision to use this suppliers as the sole source might not have been fully
justified in the first place.
Other reasons for the emergence of bottlenecks involve internal processes.
The interviewee reports that there is a lack of transparency about free internal
production capacity, which complicates the process of order scheduling with
customers. That is, there is a danger that promised delivery dates are ‘opti-
mistic’. Also, there seems to be insufficient communication between production
staff and procurement staff so that procurement occasionally remains unaware
of incomplete or delayed delivery of raw material and cannot follow it up.
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6.2.9.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
The company uses standardized quality criteria for the selection of suppliers to
ensure compliance. Generally, yearly framework agreements are used and if
possible supply is sourced to at least two suppliers, often with 70%/30% alloca-
tion. Some contracts include penalty clauses for non-compliance.
Most material supply is delivered to conventional warehouse; for expensive
raw material such as tin and silver the company and its suppliers have agreed
upon delivery to consignment warehouse. Besides the advantage of not carrying
capital cost for the material in the consignment warehouse the supplier has better
transparency as to the amount of material on stock and the amount of material
that need to be replenished.
With some suppliers workshops are conducted to improve collaboration on
critical projects so that the chance of irregularities is diminished.
Some metals are purchased from raw material traders. Although bottleneck
prevention was not mentioned as intention behind this decision – rather, it is
a necessity as the amounts purchased are not large enough to be sourced to
producers of such materials – it contributes to bottleneck prevention as trading
firms generally employ multiple sourcing strategies (cf. analysis of interviews
with raw material traders in this chapter).
In some critical cases, suppliers are closely monitored by the quality assur-
ance team to ensure smooth completion.
The purchasing function of the case company is also responsible for the pur-
chasing needs of a fully owned subsidiary of the company so as to leverage
economies of scale in purchasing.
6.2.9.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
The SAP system notifies procurement staff about expected delivery of raw ma-
terial on promised delivery dates so that order fulfillment can be followed up.
Order fulfillment is not followed up, however, for all parts, but predominantly
for A and B parts.
Generally, suppliers are expected to notify the company as early as possi-
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ble when delivery due dates cannot be met. The interviewee reports that this
does not happen in every case, however. Occasionally delays in the delivery
of raw material only surface in the procurement department when production
staff calls, which in some instances has been done only three weeks after the
promised delivery due date of an order.
In rare critical cases (about 5% of all orders) quality assurance closely moni-
tors progress on supplier sites to ensure timely delivery of flawless components,
which at the same time is a prevention measure.
6.2.9.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
No specific measures of bottleneck exploitation could be identified.
6.2.9.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
The use of multiple (mostly two) sources allows switching to another supplier
in case delays have to be expected. Also, some materials are bought from raw
material traders who generally employ multiple sources and who are connected
to other traders with several sources. While some raw material traders require
significant lead time for orders, others are able to supply material from stock at
short notice (albeit sometimes with a premium). In case a trader or a producer
would be unable to fulfill an order, the company sometimes is able to switch to
a dealer with material on stock.
Non-ferrous metals in many cases are available in different grades of purity or
with different properties, e.g., with higher radiation or lower radiation. In case
there is a shortage of material of lower purity while material of higher purity is
available, substitution is possible.
Furthermore, the company maintains production capacity of certain alloys
that normally are delivered by suppliers (i.e., “make” instead of “buy”). Al-
though in-house production may require significant (both, time and financial)
resources as compared to delivery by suppliers, it does provide an opportunity
to eliminate a bottleneck and remain productive.
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6.2.9.11. Bottleneck Management: Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement could not be applied to this case study.
6.2.9.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
The case company is medium-sized and throughput of certain raw materials
does not reach amounts that are considered significant by some larger suppliers.
That is, buying power for certain materials is relatively low. In fact, there are
concerns that in the future one specific larger supplier may not be willing to
supply the small amounts needed or that he may charge a premium for small
amounts that would render this source uneconomical for the case company.
The relatively small size as compared to other companies that purchase the
same raw material from the same suppliers also puts a constraint on negoti-
ation power of the case company when it comes to delivery to consignment
warehouse. While it was possible to agree upon this delivery mode with some
suppliers it proves impossible to convince others since the company often does
not require amounts that are considered significant by the – often much larger –
supplier.
Because the amounts ordered of some materials are smaller than minimum
order lot sizes of suppliers, the case company has to receive such materials from
raw material traders. While some traders are large multinationals or at least pos-
sess significant market share on a national level, other traders are much smaller
and do not possess significant negotiation power relative to their suppliers either.
At the same time, some of the customers of the case company are also much
larger. This implies lower negotiation power and limits influence, e.g., on or-
dering behavior.
Delays that are caused by lengthy approval processes of officials, customs,
and classification bodies provide little opportunity for intervention by the case
company. This emphasizes the importance of elaborate preparation and com-
munication with these parties prior to the approval process.
There is a natural scarcity of certain raw materials, e.g., of lead with high
purity or with low radiation. This creates a natural monopoly for those suppli-
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ers who possess access to these resources and hence a natural limit to the case
company’s selection of possible suppliers, its sourcing strategy, and its negoti-
ation power. Because of specific technical requirements materials often cannot
be substituted. Also, relative scarcity drives prices, e.g., at the London Metal
Exchange (LME), which increases the price risk and the capital cost for storing
extensive safety stocks in conventional warehouses.
Because of their natural geographic distribution it is necessary to source cer-
tain raw materials from remote places. Longer transportation distances and
larger transportation batch sizes involve more possibilities for irregularities and
delays, e.g., due to weather conditions and political conditions. Additionally,
communication with suppliers, audits and on-site visits become more difficult,
more time consuming and more expensive.
For economic reasons management of the case company is reluctant to ap-
prove higher travel budgets that would be required to qualify more second or
third source suppliers and to conduct supplier audits. This has obvious implica-
tions for the amount and the quality of information the case company has about
its suppliers, for improved bottleneck prevention and for improved bottleneck
elimination.
6.2.9.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.8 presents a graphical summary of the case company’s bottleneck
management activities.
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6.2.10. Case Study 9
6.2.10.1. Short Description of the Firm
The case company is an international medium-sized trader of non-ferrous met-
als. Important products of the company are zinc, copper, tin, lead, aluminium,
nickel, and several “minor metals” for special applications. Customers come
from diverse industries and are of different size, reaching from small firms to
large corporations.
6.2.10.2. About the Data Collection
The interview was conducted in the company’s headquarters. Thee members
of the company participated in the interview, representing different functional
areas. Due to the professional background of the interviewees special attention
was given to tin and zinc throughout the interview.
The contact to this company had been established by the purchasing and lo-
gistics manager of another case company.
6.2.10.3. Market Situation
There are competitors which trade the same raw materials as the case company.
The market for zinc is characterized by a small number of producers and very
large traders among several smaller ones. The market for tin is more diversified
with about seven competing traders. By and large, the metal trading industry is
described as stable and mature and competing firms are generally known.
The customer structure for zinc is diversified in size with amounts requested
between 500kg and up to several truck loads. Customers of tin tend to be SMEs
which accordingly request small amounts.
One interviewee reports that the market for tin has long been dominated by
buyers, which has changed in recent years. There is no tendency that powerful
raw material producers exploit the market situation and dominate the case com-
pany, which has been attributed by one interviewee to the long-term partnerships
the company maintains with its suppliers.
282
6.2. Analysis of Interview Data Phase I: Individual Case Analysis
6.2.10.4. Supply Situation – General Information
The company receives its metals directly from producers in different parts of
the world. No exact number of sources was mentioned, but the interviewees
made clear that the availability of several suppliers with whom the company
generally maintains long-term relationships is one of the cornerstones of the
supply strategy. The number of possible supply sources is limited due to natural
distribution of the various raw materials.
6.2.10.5. Production Process
The company does not perform any processing of the material. Raw material
is received from producers and directly delivered to customers or stored in the
company’s own (conventional) warehouse until delivered to customers. Primary
transportation mode to customers in continental Europe is delivery by truck.
Raw material from overseas is delivered as sea freight.
6.2.10.6. Bottleneck Emergence
Early in the interview it was emphasized that material shortages due to bottle-
necks in supply – while naturally and generally representing an immanent risk
of the trading business – are no major impediment to the company’s business.
The interviewees made clear that the company always delivers as promised and
that bottlenecks in supply have not delayed order fulfillment in the past.
Nevertheless, bottlenecks do emerge and they do require action on part of
the case company. Reasons tend to be more “global” and less specific to par-
ticular relationships with suppliers. One interviewee states that supply short-
ages were “induced by the market, so that everybody was affected and not just
us.”2 One example is the decision of the Indonesian government to pull out In-
donesian tin export of the London Metal Exchange and to exclusively use their
domestic exchange, which created large uncertainties in the market. That is,
problems were politically induced (policies) and not due to physical problems
2Quote translated by the author.
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in material flow. Also, strikes in South America were mentioned as another
political/societal event that possibly impacts on stability of supply processes.
Climate conditions and weather in the suppliers’ regions were also mentioned
as factors. Delays sometimes occur during the monsoon season when ore min-
ing activities are interrupted.
Recently delays occurred due to unavailability of cargo containers. Accord-
ing to one interviewee, large demand from China has led to a shortage of empty
containers in Europe. The situation also exists the other way around so that oc-
casionally too few containers are available in Asia which delays shipments from
there to Europe.
6.2.10.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
Generally, because the reasons for bottlenecks are largely political, societal,
or due to climate and weather, the case company has little influence on the
emergence of such situations.
The actions the case company takes, however, aim to reduce the impact the
emergence of bottlenecks has on the company’s business. Prevention seems to
be the dominant strategy the company chooses to deal with market irregulari-
ties as options for exploitation and elimination of bottlenecks are limited (see
below).
As a trader, the case company uses multiple sources from different geographic
regions for its raw material. Thereby the risk for delays in or interruption of
supply is reduced as political and climate conditions vary across the different
sourcing regions. Such geographic spread cannot hedge the risk of complete
failure of supply from certain regions, however. For tin, for example, the depen-
dence on one sourcing country – Indonesia – is too big so that all other sources
would not be able to compensate lack of supply from that country.
Long-term relationships are fostered by the case company and one intervie-
wee repeatedly emphasized the importance of long-term partnership: “It is our
philosophy to work with the same people for a very long period of time.”3 Ac-
cording to this interviewee the company remains in touch with business partners
3Quote translated by the author.
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even in times when there are currently no ongoing transactions. Maintaining a
good network is seen as a measure against adverse impact of bottlenecks. In
case primary suppliers fail to deliver as scheduled, the case company is thus
able to tap other sources of supply.
Holding of inventory is another primary measure to deal with irregularities
and delays in supply. According to one interviewee, the levels of inventory the
company keeps have always been sufficient to bridge gaps on the supply side.
Generally, materials need to be certified in order to be tradable on the Lon-
don Metal Exchange. That is, a certain level of quality and reliability can be
expected from suppliers.
New suppliers are carefully selected. For the approval of new suppliers, small
amounts of material are ordered and analyzed with respect to the material’s qual-
ity and chemical properties. The supply and dispatch processes are monitored
and early deliveries of raw material are only shipped to customers which can
perform chemical tests to find out if the material suits their requirements. Since
this process for supplier qualification takes time and is followed before poten-
tial bottlenecks emerge, it must be seen as a preventive measure rather than a
measure for bottleneck elimination when a bottleneck has actually emerged.
6.2.10.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
Continuous communication with suppliers – also in times when there are no ap-
parent problems – was mentioned as the primary measure to learn about possible
changes in the supply situation. The network is fostered on conferences, trade
fairs, and via personal relationships. The goal is to learn about possible changes
before they are reported in public media such as Bloomberg or Reuters.4
Because the reasons for possible shortages vary and generally can be ac-
counted to factors external to the company’s supply network, such as new poli-
cies by supply countries’ leadership, strikes, or natural disasters, the notification
period also varies. There were, for instance, indications that Indonesia would
4This implies that threats to stable supply with raw material are of ‘global’ nature (political,
societal, natural causes) and are not specific to the case company’s supply network. This
presumption underlies most of the interviewees’ statements.
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change its trade policies for tin, so that possible options to circumvent supply
shortages could be explored early on, as one interviewee reports. Other events
such as Tsunamis or other extreme weather conditions do occur without signif-
icant lead time that would allow preparation, however.
6.2.10.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
The specific characteristics of the supply network (global networks with large
amounts of raw material received from overseas), of the business model (trade
of raw material without further modification or transformation of the material
except in terms of location and time), and of the reasons for supply shortages
(global reasons such as supply countries’ changed trade policies or extreme
weather conditions) do not provide many options for the exploitation of bot-
tlenecks. Faster transportation mode, for instance, is not an option due to the
weight and the amount of material received, and there is no “waste” of material
that could be reduced (as exists, for instance, in production environments with
significant scrap rate and possibility to refurbish material).
6.2.10.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
Since multiple sources are used to receive raw material, switching to another
source of supply certainly is the primary measure to eliminate a bottleneck in
one source of supply. There is no intervention at suppliers’ sites. As with bottle-
neck exploitation, the company’s specific situation seems to make options other
(production) firms pursue largely unfeasible.
6.2.10.11. Bottleneck Management: Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement could not be applied to the business con-
text of the case company.
6.2.10.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
Limitations arise from the nature of the causes of bottlenecks in the case com-
pany’s supply network. The reasons why bottlenecks emerge seem mostly un-
286
6.2. Analysis of Interview Data Phase I: Individual Case Analysis
related to operational causes within supplier companies. Instead, bottlenecks
occur mostly due to extreme weather conditions (e.g., hurricanes or seasonal
phenomena such as monsoon), strikes, and policy changes in supplier compa-
nies’ home countries; i.e., most reasons can be classified as Force Majeure.
While it is possible to plan so that the impact of such events is reduced, the
underlying causes remain unchanged as they tend to lie beyond an individual
firm’s reach. The case company has adapted its strategy and focuses on the
avoidance of supply shortages and the minimization of their impact.
Three measures stand out:
1. Keeping levels of inventory that allow to keep up the service level in spite
of supply irregularities
2. Multiple sourcing
3. Continuous exchange of supply related information between the case com-
panies and its suppliers as well as with other industry representatives
(such as DERA5).
Each of the measures is subject to limitations. High levels of inventory tie up
capital and it generally remains unclear how much inventory must be held on
stock as the causes for irregularities in raw material supply may endure for long
time periods or not. Therefore an “optimization” of inventory levels is difficult.
Because the reasons for supply shortages tend to affect all customers from
suppliers from a certain region at once (as explained before), there tends to be
a “run” on alternative sources in case supply bottlenecks emerge in one region.
That is, alternative sources of supply may possibly be overwhelmed by suddenly
increased demand from various customers.
In case of natural resources such as the non-ferrous metals traded by the case
company, the natural distribution of the resources creates dependencies on cer-
tain regions and countries. In case of tin, for instance, the most important sup-
plier country for European demand is Indonesia. According to one interviewee,
5Deutsche Rohstoffagentur – German Raw Material Agency, part of the Federal Institute for
Geosciences and Natural Resources
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the dependence on Indonesia is such that supply from all other countries would
not be able to compensate for a lack of supply from that country.
Weight, amounts, and geographic distribution of the material traded require
that the material is shipped on cargo vessels from overseas. This rules out the
option of faster modes of transportation in case inventory levels turn out to be
insufficient to bridge a gap in supply or simply unexpectedly high demand.
Because events that interrupt supply may occur instantaneously as, for in-
stance, in the case of natural disasters, even perfect exchange of supply related
information will not provide a guarantee that measures can be taken in order to
minimize adverse business effects. Although this limitation generally holds in
all cases examined in this project, the prominence of weather and climate con-
ditions on supply reliability for this case company is particularly high, which is
why this limitation is emphasized in this analysis.
6.2.10.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.9 presents a graphical summary of the case company’s bottleneck
management activities.
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6.2.11. Case Study 10
6.2.11.1. Short Description
The case company is an international trading firm for commodities, among them
coal and various non-ferrous metals. The company is headquartered in Europe.
Customers come from diverse industries and are of different size, reaching from
SMEs to large corporations.
6.2.11.2. About the Data Collection
The interview was conducted on the phone as a physical meeting for the inter-
view was not possible for organizational reasons. Interview notes were taken
manually and sent to the interviewee for sign-off on the day following the inter-
view. The interviewee’s responsibility in the case company is global trade with
lead and zinc. Contact to the case company was established during a meeting at
one of the case company’s customer’s production sites. A short introduction to
the research project was given during that meeting; more detailed explanation of
the bottleneck management concept preceded the interview on the phone. The
interview was focused on the market for lead and zinc.
6.2.11.3. Market Situation
The case company is a big player in the commodity market. Business processes
in this market have remained mostly stable over time, albeit with increasing
dynamics. Commodity trade was strongly affected by the crisis following the
credit crunch in 2008. Depending on the commodity, the number of competitors
reaches from zero to “many”. Lead is offered in many different brands, many
of which are also offered by competing trade firms. Global supply for zinc is
currently short due to high demand from developing countries such as China,
India, and countries in South East Asia.
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6.2.11.4. Supply Situation – General Information
Ore is extracted in the mine and brought to a smelter. From there, it is shipped
directly to customers without intermediate stay in warehouses. Throughput time
for raw material consists of the following elements (by the example of lead): ex-
traction and transportation from mine to port – about three months; transporta-
tion from port to smelter – about 40 days; smelting – about three days; delivery
from there to customers depends on customers’ and smelters’ location.
The case company keeps only low inventories; about seven days of supply
can be covered by lead that is kept in the case company’s warehouses. Order
throughput process requires some weeks of lead time as orders are not normally
served from stock. When customers order very specific material which has to
be produced to order, order lead time will be about two months before month of
delivery.
According to the interviewee, supply shortages are a frequent topic which he
has to deal with about two to three times per week. Problems of this kind can
normally be solved, so that the company has a reputation for being a reliable
source of supply for its customers.
6.2.11.5. Production Process
Although the company does have some own production capacity, the production
process of lead and zinc preceding the sale is not of interest in this context.
Besides rare exceptions, material is delivered from the case company’s sources
right to customers’ conventional warehouses without intermediate stop. Due to
high cost incurred consignment warehouses are maintained only with a few very
large customers.
6.2.11.6. Bottleneck Emergence
Delays and interruptions in supply do occur on a frequent basis. The interviewee
states that he has to deal with this kind of problem about two to three times a
week for lead and zinc.
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Severe weather conditions are the most frequent cause of delays. 80% of all
raw material (not only zinc and lead) is shipped from overseas, 20% comes by
truck on the road way. Weather conditions may prevent cargo ships from putting
out to sea or from mooring; high waves may make loading and discharging cargo
temporarily impossible.
Other, less frequently occurring reasons are diverse: International trade in-
volves customs authorities and delays sometimes occur because of customs
procedures. Suppliers’ machines occasionally break down. Sometimes ship-
ping companies do not have enough empty containers available for cargo in the
respective part of the world.
There are suppliers which are generally reliable and some which tend to let
the case company down. As an example for the latter the interviewee refers to a
smaller African supplier (whose largest customer is, in fact, the case company).
Large suppliers tend to be in the first group and are generally reliable, delays
due to Force Majeure notwithstanding.
6.2.11.7. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
The most important measure to prevent the existence of bottlenecks that impact
on availability of supply is the use of multiple sources. In Europe alone the case
company uses more than seven sources for lead and four sources for zinc; sev-
eral more sources are available in Africa and Asia. The high number of sources
allows the case company to keep inventory to a minimum while maintaining a
very high service level for customers.
The interviewee states that more reliable demand forecasts from customers
would be helpful. While some customers’ forecasts are quite good, the case
company is aware that others’ are not helpful at all. Because throughput time
of raw material from the mine through to the customer is high (see example in
section “Supply Situation – General Information”), forecasts are an important
tool to make supply processes more efficient.
Probably contributing to the case company’s ability to reliably secure supply
and maintain a high service level with customers is the long-term character of
the relationships the company maintains with its suppliers. For zinc and lead,
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the interviewee states that there have been no changes for six years until some
additional suppliers were included in the portfolio just recently.
Furthermore some suppliers belong to the same corporate group as the case
company which may play a role for reliability of supply and communication.
6.2.11.8. Bottleneck Management: Identification
Suppliers are expected to notify the case company as soon as bottlenecks emerge.
Although the interviewee remarks that he cannot really know for how long the
suppliers has known about the problem before notification, he thinks that this
process is generally reliable. New suppliers are trained to adapt to this proce-
dure very quickly.
6.2.11.9. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
No specific measures of bottleneck exploitation were mentioned during the in-
terview. The interviewee does suggest, however, that both the company’s rep-
utation as a reliable long-term partner and the company’s market power as a
sizeable customer contribute to the stability of supply processes.
As an example for an activity that contributed to the stability in the company’s
supply relationships the interviewee mentions that during the global financial
crisis beginning in 2008 the case company supported suppliers by purchasing
raw material that was not covered by customer orders and put it on stock, which
according to the interviewee helped some suppliers survive the crisis.
6.2.11.10. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
The most prevalent measure to eliminate a bottleneck in supply is to switch to
another supplier of which the company maintains several for much of its product
portfolio. According to the interviewee, switching to another supplier is a matter
of one minute (one phone call or one email).
6.2.11.11. Bottleneck Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement could not be applied to this case study.
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6.2.11.12. Bottleneck Management Limitations
As a large and powerful customer, the case company faces only few constraint
in the management of its suppliers and its bottlenecks.
As with all companies that are dependent on sea freight over large distances,
there is little the case company can do about weather conditions which impact
on the schedule of cargo vessels. Generally, causes for bottleneck emergence
that lie outside organizational boundaries and reach pose limitations, such as
machine break down or fire outbreak in supplier facilities. Likewise, unreliable
forecasts from customers pose a limitation to the company’s ability to do better
supply planning.
6.2.11.13. Summary of Activities (Graphical)
Figure 6.2.10 on the facing page presents a graphical summary of the case com-
pany’s bottleneck management activities.
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6.2.12. Summary
This section introduced the reader to the individual case companies and pre-
sented the information gathered in the multiple-case study individually for each
case. More precisely, the information presented was extracted from the data
collected at the case companies. For each case company, the information was
structured along elements of the conceptual model created in Section 4.6 as
these had been incorporated into the interview questionnaire (for an explanation
of the structure of the interview questionnaire see Section 5.5.1).
This first part of the data analysis presented the information as they were
created from the data received from the case companies. It represents the explo-
rative and descriptive character of the empirical study.
6.3. Analysis of Interview Data Phase II:
Cross-case Analysis
6.3.1. Introduction
The second part of the data analysis draws together the individual causes of bot-
tleneck emergence, the case companies’ measures of bottleneck management,
and the limitations they face when managing bottlenecks. These elements were
described individually for each case company in the first part of the data anal-
ysis. The second part can be understood as a cross-case summary and as a
different way of presentation of the findings. Hence, this section does not in-
clude interpretation; it is descriptive and provides an account of the exploratory
findings of the case studies.
6.3.2. Bottleneck Emergence
In this section, the various causes for bottleneck emergence are summarized
that have been identified in the case study interviews. As it is visible from
the illustrations 6.2.1 through 6.2.10, the causes for bottleneck emergence have
been divided into three groups:
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1. physical causes,
2. organizational causes, and
3. operational causes.
The reason for this division is that the causes are so diverse that a more detailed
description appears to be helpful in order to better be able to understand and
solve the problem and prevent it from happening in the future. Deficient quality
of the goods delivered by the supplier, for instance, require an approach that is
different from coping with interruptions due to national holidays schedule in a
supplier’s country. The nature of the causes is so different that it is believed
these causes deserve separate labels. The three categories will be explained
below.
Physical causes for bottleneck emergence describe those occurrences which
cause a bottleneck because physical goods or production capacity are not avail-
able in amounts sufficient to keep up production (or trade) of the case company
at desired levels. Often, there is no conscious decision involved that cause the
bottleneck. When a supply vessel sinks, production equipment catches fire, or a
supplier ceases production because it files for bankruptcy and does not have the
means to continue, then there is reason to believe that the supplier did not make
a conscious decision that directly leads to this situation. When we follow up root
causes by asking “Why?” we may be able to trace the supplier’s bankruptcy to
wrong management decisions in the past just as we may be able to attribute the
fire on production equipment to incomplete fire safety instructions for workers
or skipped maintenance. Likewise, the supply vessel might not have sunk had
the supplier contracted a more expensive freight company that takes better care
of its vessels’ safety, or if the case company had sourced the supply locally in-
stead of to a remote part of the world so that no sea freight was involved. So
there have been decisions along the chain of causes and effects that have led to
the very consequence that the case company’s production is starving as supply
does not arrive. Yet, no one has directly and consciously decided to invoke pro-
duction workers to set their facility on fire and no one usually decides to make
an operational supply vessel sink for any good reason. These are unwanted
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physical consequences of past decisions.
Organizational causes are those where the reason why the case company suf-
fers from delays or interruptions in supply can be directly attributed to a con-
scious and deliberate decision by someone in the supply network. Other than
a supplier firm’s bankruptcy which is caused by a long chain of causes and ef-
fects, the supplier decides not to deliver the goods to the case company. A good
illustrative example is a supplier’s decision in the face of limited capacity to
supply another company first and let the case company starve. The supplier
would have sufficient capacity to perfectly fulfill the case company’s order, but
it decides not to. Even clearer might be the case where the market for a specific
good experiences increasing prices and the supplier decides not to fulfill the or-
der now and to wait instead until prices have increased even more and then to
sell the material to another customer with a more recent order who is willing
to pay the price. Also, deliberate decisions underlie strikes (the very purpose
of which is to increase pressure in negotiations by causing operations to halt)
and political inventions of governments, as in the case of the Indonesian gov-
ernment’s decision to force all trade of Indonesian produced tin to the domestic
exchange.
Operational causes exist where no conscious and deliberate decision is in-
volved but man made action causes the problem nevertheless. Dispatchers who
forgot to call off material from suppliers and suppliers that produce and deliver
material which later will fail the case company’s quality tests fall into this cat-
egory. Likewise, high scrap rates that reduce effective production output are
considered operational problems. Also, cultural differences between suppliers
in remote countries and the case company can be considered an operational
problem as there is no law that dictates that such problems have to exist and
no one deliberately decides to have communication problems with a supplier
from another country. Very short lead times till order fulfillment requested by
customers are considered operational problems when orders are accepted by the
case company under such terms and cannot be met. In such a case, the respec-
tive company’s judgment as to the feasibility of the order turns out to be weak,
which is human error and hence operational.
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In some cases, the categorization of a cause is not quite unambiguous. That
is, a cause could be seen either as organizational or as operational. Customs
and regulation, for instance, can be expected and missing documents that cause
delay at border control certainly can be seen as an operational fault by the parties
involved in the supply chain. Customs can, however, take time and cause delays
even when shipping documents are complete, as in case routine cargo inspection
is scheduled while customs officials are still busy with other jobs. For the sake
of simplicity, such causes are summarized in one category.
6.3.2.1. Physical Causes for Bottleneck Emergence
Long Lead Time (and Insufficient Forecast Data) Long tooling, pro-
duction, and transportation lead time have led to problems for several case com-
panies.
Due to long tooling time in glass production, glass producers run “cam-
paigns”, i.e., large production batches for one type of glass which they produce
for several weeks before they switch over to the next type of glass. The tool-
ing time required when switching between different types of glass is more than
a week, according to one case company. At the same time, quality of glass
on stock vanishes over time, which requires producers to limit batch size to
amounts they are likely to sell within few months according to sales forecasts.
The implication for customers such as glass manufacturers (i.e., companies that
receive raw glass from glass producers and apply different types of operations to
the glass such as hardening, cutting, printing, and coating) is that they may not
be able to receive a specific type of glass from a certain dealer or manufacturer
once production output of one glass campaign is sold out since the significant
tooling time requires manufacturers to produce to forecast as opposed to actual
customer demand.
The interviewee of another case company reports that occasionally supply of
tires is delayed due to long tooling time of large tires for agricultural machinery.
Although this causes additional effort and thus cost late delivery of tires does not
normally lead to delays or interruptions in internal production processes of the
case company as tractors can be equipped with provisional tires and production
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continued until delivery of the right type of tires.
Due to geographic distance supply from overseas, transportation often takes
several weeks and makes deliberate planning of inventory and reordering cru-
cial. Reliable forecast data is an important asset when a time gap of several
weeks between actual demand and supply of raw material needs to be bridged.
The interviewee of one case company points out that the insufficient availabil-
ity of reliable forecast data in combination with long lead time for supply from
China regularly induces difficulties. Whereas supply of a specific component
from China takes 60 days from the day they order the material until available
to production they do not possess a good base of forecast data. There are two
reasons as to why forecast data is not available as required: customer orders
for the case company’s products tend to be short-term and sales are often gen-
erated through small local independent craftsman who tend not to maintain an
elaborate data base for forecasts.
Some other components the same case company receives from Southern Eu-
rope with equally long lead time. In this case, transportation lead time makes up
only a small fraction of the total lead time whereas production lead time makes
up the largest part. Here, too, the combination of long lead time and insuffi-
cient forecast data creates a difficult situation for procurement and production
planning.
Technical Problems, Machine Breakdowns, and Fire Outbreak Fre-
quently, technical problems and machine breakdowns in supplier facilities have
been named by case companies as reasons for delays and interruptions in sup-
ply, sometimes leading to huge order backlogs. One case company states that
machine breakdown is the most common reason given by suppliers as to why
delivery is delayed. Raw material trading firms which receive material from
smelters have mentioned fire outbreak at furnaces. One interviewee mentioned
that his company does not normally receive details about the exact nature of the
technical problems that lead to the delay.
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Short-term Changes in Demand Three interviewees mentioned short-
term changes in customer demand as one reason why delays occur. When orders
increase on short notice raw material sometimes is not readily available. The
problem is intensified when there are long lead times for material supply.
Supplier Bankruptcy Two case companies were affected by suppliers who
declared bankruptcy and were thus unable to deliver as promised. One intervie-
wee mentioned that they encountered suppliers’ bankruptcy both in cases of
strong dependency (supplier was sole source and a new supplier had to be found
and prepared) and low dependency (supplier was one of multiple sources). For
the other case company, supplier bankruptcy “caused turbulence” but not line
stoppages.
Weather Conditions Weather conditions were cited as the primary reason
for delays by one trade company. The reason is that 80% of all deliveries come
by cargo ship and often from regions that are prone to severe weather conditions.
High waves can delay loading and discharging cargo, as well as putting out to
sea and mooring.
Another trade company mentions that onshore operations, for instance in
mines, are often interrupted during monsoon season. While weather conditions
may play a role in domestic supply networks, they were exclusively mentioned
related to overseas delivery and operations in remote sourcing countries which
experience more extreme weather, such as monsoon seasons.
Availability of Containers for Cargo Transport Two case companies
reported that delays in supply are occasionally caused because of a shortage of
cargo containers in their suppliers’ respective part of the world. The intervie-
wee of one of these two case companies mentioned that distribution of cargo
containers repeatedly is out of balance so that there is a lack of containers in
one part of the world whereas there is an abundance of containers in another
part.
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Ship Sinks One case company reports that a ship with supply from China
sank on its way so that production delay was caused. Another case company has
suffered from a ship going down with more than ten tons of finished products
on the way to the customer in Asia. In this case, the bottleneck shifted to the
internal production of the case company as they had to catch up with production
while also serving other customers.
Recycling Loop Interrupted In Europe, the most important raw material
for production of certain metals is scrap metal. Availability of scrap metal,
however, is not always provided. One case company states that unavailability
of scrap metal is among the dominant reasons as to why supply of pure metal is
delayed.
Reasons Unknown – Problem in Higher Echelon One interviewee ex-
plains that his company’s tier-1 suppliers often claim that they do not have the
pre-material available to fulfill the case company’s orders. Since the case com-
pany does not engage in management of tier-2 suppliers and there is no trans-
parency along the supply chain, the interviewee says that his company does not
have more detailed information as to the reasons why pre-material is missing on
tier-1 stage.
Reasons Unknown One case company reports that there are some – albeit
very few – suppliers that tend to let the case company down. The interviewee
mentions a smaller supplier for which the case company is the largest customer.
More detailed information about this case could not be obtained.
6.3.2.2. Organizational Causes for Bottleneck Emergence
Suppliers’ Material Allocation Five case companies reported that that
they have not received material, have received material of lower quality, or have
received only insufficient amounts of material because their suppliers preferred
to supply other customers first. One company stated that one of their suppli-
ers openly admitted to prioritize another customer higher. Another company
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received delayed shipments and material of lower quality after their supplier
acquired several new customers, and the interviewee assumed there is a connec-
tion. In two cases, the interviewees attributed such decisions to their respective
company’s small size relative to other customers of that supplier. Additionally,
the interviewee of one case company stated in case of material shortages some
of their suppliers prefer to fulfill orders of domestic rather than international
customers. Overall, suppliers’ material allocation decisions are the single most
often mentioned reason as to why a case company has experienced irregularities
in supply.
Business Conduct of Supplier Related to suppliers’ material allocation
decision is their general business conduct. Questionable conduct in some cases
directly lead to allocation decision to the detriment of the case companies.
One case company’s interviewee establishes a connection between the sup-
plier’s winning a new customer and deteriorating quality and reliability of sup-
ply, probably involving a change of tier-2 sources without prior communication.
In this particular case, there had been a successful supply relationship for sev-
eral years before the supplier became unreliable and demonstrated questionable
attitude.
An interviewee from another case company reports that there seems to be a
pattern among Chinese suppliers that in times of increasing raw material prices
deliveries are first held back and then sold to other customers who are willing
to pay the new, higher market prices. Such behavior is clearly incompatible
with commonly accepted European business conduct. Similar behavior is re-
ported by another case company with suppliers from Poland and Russia which,
according the interviewee, held back deliveries in times of rising market prices
and preferably sold to domestic customers in case they had to make allocation
decisions.
In another case the interviewee relates to a single source supplier which after
a while became unreliable both in terms of delivery schedule as well as in terms
of quality of its products. In addition, the supplier firm began to market some
of the products it produced for the case company after the case company’s blue
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print independently, so that legal action had to be taken by the case company.
As the supplier was the single source for an important component, removing the
supplier involved some delay.
Customs and Legislation Three case companies named reasons related
to customs and legislation as causes for delays in supply. One case company
reported that they ran into problems when for the first time importing material
from China while some documents required by customs were missing, which led
to delay of the delivery and eventually to delayed production and order fulfill-
ment. The interviewee from another case company mentioned that cargo ships
are occasionally held back by customs so that deliveries are delayed.
One case company cited REACH regulation as one reason why the supply
base for some materials shrunk which makes the material more difficult to pur-
chase. According to the interviewee, smaller companies fear the cost related to
registration for REACH so that fewer companies than before import such ma-
terials that are covered by the REACH regulation. Limited availability, in turn,
comes with the chance of delays.
Political Intervention and Strikes Strikes in mines have been mentioned
by two trading companies as one reason why supply is delayed. South America
was mentioned by one case company as a region where strikes regularly cause
delays. Australia was mentioned by another case company. The trend towards
the use of scrap metal as raw material for smelting processes is likely to mitigate
the effects of strikes at mines as primary raw material producers for smelters.
Planned Breaks The interviewee of one case company explained that smelters
in Southern Europe take a scheduled summer break each year. Before the break,
they generally try to sell the material they have on stock so they do not have to
carry inventory cost throughout the break. When demand turns out to be partic-
ularly high after the break, problems may occur as the producers are not able to
keep up with the pace while orders cannot be fulfilled from stock.
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Customers’ Ordering Behaviour Several case companies cite customer
order behavior as one of the most important reasons as to why deliveries do
not arrive on time. Late orders or orders with short requested lead time pose
a challenge to production companies and some traders alike. Sometimes the
requested amounts are changed at short notice. One company cites cumulated
orders at the end of the summer break as one reason as to why some materials
can have limited availability and thus might be delayed.
Approval by Classification Body Some products, e.g., containers for
transportation of radioactive substances, require approval by classification bod-
ies (such as DNV-GL) who are authorized to test the containers for safety and
other product properties before they are allowed to be delivered to customers.
Such approval needs to be scheduled since classification bodies like any other
organization have limited resources which they have to allocate to their various
projects. When a producing company falls behind schedule with finishing their
production order so that a scheduled appointment with a classification body can-
not be met, it may happen that no free resources are available at the classification
body so that approval of the products leads to additional delay until the prod-
uct can be delivered to the customer – on top of the delay already incurred by
internal production processes.
Internal Processes In some cases, the reason for delays in the supply net-
work lies in internal processes of the case companies.
One interviewee reports that communication between production and pro-
curement staff is insufficient so that missed delivery due dates of suppliers some-
times are not fed back to procurement and thus are not followed up, possibly in-
creasing the time span until needed material arrives. In another case company,
human error in procurement has led to deliveries arriving late.
Incomplete/Short/Unreliable/No Forecasts The products of one case
company are partly marketed by small handicraft business. In many cases, such
firms do not create elaborate forecasts which they could share with the case
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company. Hence, the case company cannot plan capacity and supply based on
forecasts from its sales partners.
In another case, the case company’s (business) customers claim not to have
forecast data available for more than four weeks which they could share with the
case company. Customers from China provide an even shorter forecast horizon
of only two weeks.
Another interviewee explains that his company would benefit from better
forecasts from customers. While some customers provide useful forecasts, other
customers’ forecasts are essentially useless and cannot be used for planning pur-
poses.
Conflict of Interest with Set Supplier One case company explains that
a customer has contracted a tier-2 supplier, i.e., a tier-1 supplier to the case
company. Because that supplier has a supply contract with the case company’s
customer and not with the case company itself, the options the case company
can pursue to urge the supplier to improve its service level are limited. At the
time of the interview, this set supplier frequently caused problems because of
insufficient production capacity. The reason was that the supplier used much of
its capacity for another project of the same customer. Apparently, communica-
tion and contract constellation caused problems that could not easily be resolved
in this triangle supply relationship.
Short-term Technical Changes The interviewee of one case company
names technical changes that have to be considered at short notice as one reason
why supply irregularities occur. In such cases, existing inventory might be ren-
dered unusable or might require rework, so that all components required have to
be produced by the supplier and inventory cannot buffer demand peaks.
Mismatch of Supply and Demand In one raw material trading firm, the
interviewee explains that because of the multitude of different brands that are
available for some metals such as tin, there is a chance that the wrong brands
are kept on stock and that new customers may order brands that are not readily
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available and have to be shipped from producers overseas first. That is, while it
normally takes only a few days to serve customers, order fulfillment in such a
case will take several weeks.
6.3.2.3. Operational Causes for Bottleneck Emergence
Operational Deficiencies in Overseas Transportation One case com-
pany mentions that during overseas transportation with intermediate handling
of cargo it happens that containers are sometimes left behind in a port so that
arrival of material is delayed. Also, loading of containers on cargo ships in the
source harbor occasionally is delayed. When this happens, transportation lead
time can easily double from four weeks to eight weeks.
Cultural Differences Cultural differences were mentioned by three inter-
viewees as causes that directly or indirectly can lead to irregularities in supply.
A case of questionable business conduct mentioned by one interviewee was
referred to as a “Chinese peculiarity”. Two case companies point out that sup-
pliers from Eastern Europe have caused problem in the past; one interviewee
expresses her dissatisfaction that communication with these suppliers tends to
be dishonest and unreliable.
Quality Problems Quality problems were cited several times by case com-
panies as having caused production delay. Two distinct situations were reported:
1. quality problems of supplied material could be detected by the case com-
pany before internal production processes began
2. quality problems became apparent only after internal production processes
began or were finished
In the second situation not only the material was wasted but also the production
capacity of an entire production line.
In one case, a supplier was removed from the portfolio after having failed
quality audits.
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Short Requested Lead Time In two interviews, short requested lead time
by customers was mentioned as possible cause of bottleneck emergence. This
cause is considered operational for it is up to the case company to reject or-
ders with lead time that would make successful order fulfillment on schedule
unlikely.
In another interview, the interviewee made clear that orders sometimes come
up rather unexpectedly which then can lead to delays. The problems are inten-
sified when lead times for supply are long, which sometimes is the case at this
company with some suppliers.
High Scrap / Low Yield Quality problems of material intended for supply
but detected by the supplier during his own production processes lower the pro-
duction yield. One case company has suffered from delayed delivery because
the effective production yield of the supplier was too low. Occasionally, the
supplier had to scrap entire production batches so that additional time had to be
allowed for to run another production batch.
Transportation Batch Size One case company has faced the situation
that suppliers held back deliveries until completed transportation batches were
completed. The transportation batches were contractually agreed upon to reduce
transportation cost. The interviewee reported that some suppliers repeatedly
waited to complete transportation batches although supply was already delayed
and even partial delivery of material would have helped the case company so
they could have avoided delay in the production process.
Supplier Unable to Meet Product Specifications In one case, a single
source supplier from China was chosen by the case company to produce and
deliver a set of products. After all contracts were signed and the first delivery
was awaited, it turned out that the supplier did not have the technical expertise
to produce the product according to the case company’s specifications. Hence,
the company had to find a new supplier for the respective component, which
caused delay in order fulfillment.
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Late Completion/Forgot Completion/Human Error (at Supplier) One
interviewee mentions that human error at the supplier’s disposition has led to
late orders.
Late Order/Forgot to Order/Human Error (Internally) The same inter-
viewee who reports on human error in suppliers’ disposition explains that hu-
man error at the case company, e.g., forgotten or late material call-off, has led
to delays in supply.
No Problems Known One case company’s interviewee explains that he is
not aware of any supply problems that have occurred in recent years.
6.3.2.4. Some Remarks About the Causes of Bottleneck
Emergence
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, causes for bottleneck emergence
can be found in each of the three categories identified. A summary is provided
in Table 6.3.1.
Not in every case the categorization of causes is unambiguous. Some causes
could be categorized as either organizational or operational, such as one sup-
plier’s inability to deliver according to agreed upon product specifications. This
can be seen as the buying firm’s organizational shortcoming as they did not
make sure the supplier will be able to deliver before making the supplier the
sole source; and it can be seen as the supplier’s operational fault for not being
able to produce in accordance with specifications.
Such ambiguities notwithstanding, the categorization indicates an almost even
distribution of causes for bottleneck emergence across the three categories. What
is remarkable is that both organizational and operational causes are as numerous
as physical causes. Looking at the list of physical causes, this seems to be the
category with the least level of influence for the buying firm. While both oper-
ational and organizational causes in many cases can be prevented or otherwise
resolved, physical causes seem to be mostly outside the focal firm’s reach. Put
differently, a focal firm seems to have plenty of possible levers for intervention
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so that many supply bottlenecks could be resolved more quickly or be prevented
in the first place.
6.3.3. Bottleneck Management: Prevention
6.3.3.1. Preventive Measures of Bottleneck Management
In this section, the measures which were mentioned by the interviewees of the
case companies will be summarized.
It became clear during the course of the interviews that some interviewees did
not mention measures (which in some cases others did mention) because they
were not aware that a specific measure would contribute to the prevention of bot-
tlenecks. The geographic spread of sources, for instance, can simply be seen as
a consequence of the natural geographic distribution of certain resources, such
as tin or copper. At the same time, however, it helps hedge bottleneck risk when
supply from one region becomes unavailable or delayed, for instance because of
natural disasters or political occurrences. This is particularly important as many
of the producing countries of raw material (such as different types of metal)
are considered politically unstable and are, in fact, prone to extreme weather
conditions due to the climate in their geographic location.
Another example are forecasts that case companies provide their suppliers
with. While forecasts were explicitly discussed in some interviews, they re-
mained unmentioned in other interviews although there is reason to assume that
suppliers are provided with forecasts. If it became clear from the context that a
specific measure was actually in place, albeit unmentioned in the interview, the
measure was noted during the interview analysis.
Dual/Multiple Sourcing Nine out of ten case companies state that they are
using dual or multiple sourcing in order to prevent the emergence of bottlenecks.
The one company that hitherto had not made use of multiple sources is currently
planning to do so. Hence, dual/multiple sourcing is by far the most important
measure that could be identified in this study.
Two variations of multiple sourcing could be identified:
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Table 6.3.1. – Summary: Physical, Organizational, and Operational Causes of
Bottleneck Emergence
Physical Organizational Operational
Long lead time (and
insufficient forecast data)
Suppliers’ material
allocation
Operational deficiencies
in overseas transportation
Technical problems,
machine breakdowns, fire
Business conduct of
supplier
Cultural differences
Short-term changes in
demand
Customs and legislation Quality problems
Supplier bankruptcy Political intervention and
strikes
Short requested lead time
Weather conditions Planned breaks High scrap/low yield
Availability of containers
for cargo transport
Customers’ ordering
behavior
Transportation batch size
Ship sinks Approval by classification
body
Supplier unable to meet
product specifications
Recycling loop
interrupted
Internal processes Late completion/forgot
completion/human error
(at supplier)
Reasons unknown Incomplete/short/unreliable
forecasts
Late order/forgot to
order/human error
(internally)
Conflict of interest with
set supplier
Short-term technical
changes
Mismatch of supply and
demand 311
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1. permanent parallel use of multiple suppliers and
2. preparation of of alternative sources that remain passive unless needed.
Most case companies use several sources of supply in parallel. This does not
mean that all sources are used to the same extent: as one interviewee explained,
his company does have one preferred supply relationship yet does source a cer-
tain, smaller share to other suppliers at the same time.
Some of the case companies are, in fact, required by their customers to main-
tain at least two sources of supply for increased supply reliability. In one case
(producer of soldering powder) each source even has to be approved by the cus-
tomer three echelons downstream who is a producer of microchips.
By reference to its specific organizational culture and heritage, one case com-
pany has long insisted on using one source of supply for each component to
foster reliable long-term partnerships with suppliers. The interviewee told, how-
ever, that this dependency on one supplier had occasionally been taking advan-
tage of by suppliers in order to maintain high prices per part. In order to prevent
such dependency in the future, the case company plans on qualifying additional
suppliers for several components.
Four raw material trading companies were part of the study. Whereas these
companies follow different strategies with respect to the amount of inventory
they keep, for all of them multiple sourcing seems to be the most important
measure to prevent bottlenecks. Considering the uncertainties involved in inter-
nal raw material trade, such as unstable political regimes in sourcing countries,
long supply lead time, and sea freight that is prone to delays due to weather
conditions, employing multiple sources of supply has proven to be a success-
ful prevention measure, given the high service level all of these companies can
maintain with their customers.
Geographic Spread of Sources Related to the use of multiple sources is
the geographical spread of sources. It remained unclear if companies are using
sources from different geographic reasons with the aim in mind to avoid de-
pendency on one geographic region – or if they were simply using the sources
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available to them which happen to exist in different parts of the world. Either
way, spreading sources geographically does represent a measure to reduce de-
pendency on sources in certain parts of the world that occasionally are subject
to extreme climate and political instabilities. This measure was not mentioned
in the summary figures of the individual case studies. It was found that all com-
panies source some parts globally and alternative or parallel sources happened
to be located mostly in different countries.
High Incoming Goods Inventory One interviewee mentions explicitly
that his company used to keep high inventory levels in order to buffer irregu-
larities in supply.
Two of the four raw material trading firms seem to serve customers with
goods from stock while one firm hardly keeps any inventory and one keeps only
enough inventory to bridge irregularities in supply. That is, there are three dis-
tinct inventory strategies among four companies that operate (roughly) the same
business model. Overall, the “classic” concept of keeping inventory in order to
buffer irregularities in supply seems not to be widely popular.
Annual Framework Agreements Six case companies state that they sign
annual framework agreements with their suppliers. Such agreements typically
include an forecasted amount of parts to be ordered by the case company and to
be delivered by the supplier during the contract period. Because forecasts are
rarely precise and some flexibility is needed, such frameworks also often require
suppliers to maintain a certain percentage of flexibility on top of the forecasted
amount.6 By using framework agreements, companies can increase chances that
suppliers have the capacity required available.
Supplier Audits Four of the case companies state that they conduct supplier
audits. None of the raw material trading firms do audits, however. As the in-
terviewee of one trading firm put it: “We do not do audits, and we do not like
to be audited.” An interviewee from another trading firm explains that supplier
6Production capacity flexibility (PCF) is counted as a separate measure in this document.
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audits are conducted by the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC),
an non-governmental organization that operates on behalf of organizations in
the electronic and related industries. These audits include (i.a.) human rights
aspect but also logistical questions, according to the interviewee.
Based on an ABC classification (referring to purchasing volume and critical-
ity) one case company conducts quality and logistics audits with all A compa-
nies directly upon closure of the supply contract whereas most B suppliers and
only some C suppliers are audited later. According to the interviewee the aim is
to audit all suppliers, which at the time of the interview was not possible because
of manpower constraints.
One interviewee reports that he would like to audit more suppliers than he
currently does before contracts are signed, yet management is reluctant to ap-
prove travel expenses.
Long-term Relationships Four case companies, three of which are raw
material traders, explicitly mention that their long-term relationships with sup-
pliers help prevent the emergence of bottlenecks in supply. The interviewee of
one trading firm explains that his company helped several suppliers survive the
global 2008 economic crisis by purchasing material for which they did not have
customer orders and put it in stock. The same interviewee states that there have
been no changes in the company’s supplier portfolio for several years.
It should be mentioned, however, that two other case companies experienced
problems with suppliers with which they were doing business for many years.
One interviewee reports that a long-term supplier all of the sudden began to
deliver material of lower quality and several times was behind schedule. The
interviewee attributes these occurrences to the supplier having won some new
customers which it prioritized higher. The supplier had to be removed from
the portfolio eventually. An interviewee of another case company suggests that
some long-term suppliers took advantage of the case company’s dependency and
charged prices per part that were perceived as too high by the case company.
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Standardized Sourcing Criteria The use of standardized criteria for sourc-
ing decisions was mentioned by four interviewees from different case compa-
nies. In one case, such criteria are used to decide on the number of sources
required for a part (i.e., whether single sourcing is sufficient or multiple sourc-
ing required). In another case, it is the requirement for supplier certification that
is always part of the sourcing decision. Yet another case company employs a
standard procedure to test the ordering process and the quality of material deliv-
ered. Furthermore, the fact that some of the products the company receives from
its suppliers are traded on the London Metal Exchange require certification of
the material beforehand so that a certain level of reliability and quality can be
expected.
Penalty Clauses for Non-Compliance Interviewees of three companies
state that at least some of their sourcing contracts include penalty clauses for
suppliers’ non-compliance with terms and conditions. One interviewee explains
that only 10% of all sourcing contracts include penalty clauses. An interviewee
of another case company would like to introduce penalty clauses as a standard
in all supply contracts.
It is conceivable that other case companies which have not mentioned penalty
clauses are using them nevertheless as penalty clauses might not be considered
a measure of bottleneck prevention. The role of penalty clauses in bottleneck
prevention is to act as a deterrent. It remains unclear whether they are effective
as a deterrent and whether they are normally enforced at all. An earlier study of
the automobile industry suggests otherwise as some OEMs claim not to enforce
penalties (Beer 2011).
Buying Power and Reputation Some of the case companies are of con-
siderable size and are major customers to their suppliers. That is, suppliers are
naturally very keen on consistently successful business relationships and are
likely to do what they can in order to prevent bottlenecks in the supply relation-
ship with their customers.
Buying power and reputation are not a measure that firms can employ. They
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are, however, probably one factor – albeit one that cannot easily be measured.
In some cases, firms can increase their buying power by consolidating their
supplier portfolio and reducing the number of parallel sources. This comes at
the risk of dependency and bottleneck emergence, however. Accordingly, most
case companies in this study employ multiple sources for supply.
Consignment Warehouse Two of the case companies maintain a consign-
ment warehouse for incoming goods with one or more suppliers. Case compa-
nies – here in the role of customers – benefit from consignment warehouses
because (1) they do not have to carry capital cost for inventory and because (2)
suppliers tend to have better information access with respect to inventory levels,
so that reordering points can be determined such that supply shortages are less
likely to occur. Two possible points of failure – late ordering by customers and
human error in the customers’ dispatching process – can thus be avoided.
Production Capacity Flexibility (PCF) Agreement Included in some
companies’ framework agreement with suppliers is a certain rate of production
capacity flexibility (PCF). Forecasted demand normally serves as a proxy for the
supplier to install production capacity. Since forecasts tend not to be accurate
customers would like suppliers to maintain some additional production capacity
so as to be able to fulfill orders in case demand turns out to be stronger than
forecasted. Common rates for PCF are 10% to 20% on top of forecasted demand
within a defined period of time.
Sourcing to Professional Traders Production firms can receive raw ma-
terial such as lead, copper, or tin directly from smelters, or they can contract
professional raw material trading firms. The latter normally employ several
sources of supply so that high supply reliability can be expected. That is, pro-
duction firms can decrease the likelihood of supply interruptions by sourcing to
professional traders, albeit for a premium they will have be charged.
Choosing to source to professional traders may not even be a choice but a
necessity. At least one case company in this study receives material from pro-
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fessional traders because the amounts purchased are not large enough to meet
minimum order size of some raw material producers. That is, sourcing to pro-
fessional traders, while certainly contributing to supply reliability, may have
been chosen for other reasons.
Forecast Provided to Suppliers Interviewees of two case companies men-
tion that their companies provide suppliers with demand forecasts.
The data here are not quite consistent, however. It can be presumed that fore-
casts are part of all framework agreements which include production capacity
flexibility rates. Also, more likely than not do companies which provide suppli-
ers with forecasts have some type of long-term or annual framework agreement
as forecasts are unlikely to be provided to suppliers which do not receive more
than one order or only very few orders.
Supplier Development Programs Two case companies employ measures
that might be best described as supplier development programs. One case com-
pany labels suppliers which caused problems that required intervention by sup-
plier managers “focus suppliers”. Focus suppliers are monitored closely by sup-
plier managers until all open issues are resolved. Similar measures are employed
by another case company. Here, quality assurance monitors suppliers as to their
progress on critical orders until delivery.
Close Relationship with LSP Two case companies emphasize their rela-
tionship with LSPs. In one company, all freight contracts for supply are closed
between the LSP and the case company, as opposed to the supplier. The inter-
viewee states that this constellation allows faster communication and solutions
in case of delays. At the same time, the case company can use the weight of
its combined purchases to be an important customer for the LSPs. The other
company, a raw material trader, puts emphasis on good relationships with LSPs
for the outbound stream (the inbound stream is dominated by sea freight) so as
to reduce the chance of delay that due communication errors and misaligned
schedules.
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Information about Supplier Capacity One interviewee tells that his com-
pany (raw material trading) has information about their suppliers’ total capacity
as well as about their total production output. This information represents an
indicator for the shortness of the material on the market so that the company is
warned early should the two converge. Another case company combines has in-
tegrated the purchasing for a fully owned subsidiary. Although the interviewee
did not elaborate on the reasons as to why the purchasing functions of the two
companies are combined, it can be presumed that leveraging economies of scale
or increasing bargaining power have been factors contributing to the decision.
Preference for Suppliers with Short Lead Time One interviewee ex-
plains that one important criterion for supplier selection is short supply lead
time. In this case, the company finds it difficult to obtain good forecast data.
Accordingly, the more important it is to be able to rely on fast and flexible sup-
pliers, which is why lead time has become a primary decision criterion.
Suppliers Maintain Safety Stock One case company expects its suppliers
to maintain safety stock in their facilities. The effect is similar that of consign-
ment warehouses: the supplier bears capital cost and has full access on and
responsibility for inventory. The difference is that consignment stocks tend to
be located closely to the customer’s production site while the safety stock at the
suppliers’ facilities remains untouched during most of the time and is activated
only in case of contingencies.
Combined Purchasing for Higher Buying/Negotiation Power One
case company has combined the purchasing function with a sister company of
the same corporation. The expectation attached to combining the purchasing
functions is higher negotiation power relative to suppliers, which sometimes
are larger or have larger customers with whom the case company competes for
capacity.
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Suppliers Belong to Same Corporation In one case, several suppliers
belong to the same industrial conglomerate as the case company. Although no
evidence is available as to the difference this makes for reliability of supply, it
seems reasonable to presume that companies belonging to the same group will
not show behavior as, for instance, the questionable business conduct described
in the previous section on causes of bottleneck emergence.
Blending of Raw Material One producer of metal blends the material the
company receives from different suppliers. Thereby the company can achieve
a steady and consistent quality of the input material to the production process
which otherwise would need adaption to the specific properties of the raw ma-
terial if these were changing. At the same time, blending of the raw material
reduces dependency on one or very few sources since differences in quality of
material from other sources can be balanced in the blending process.
The blending of raw material can be considered both a preventive measure
and an exploitation measure and is therefore mentioned in both sections.
Scenario Planning One case company conducts scenario planning, thereby
creating awareness of and solution strategies for possible causes of supply short-
ages around the world.
6.3.4. Bottleneck Management: Identification
6.3.4.1. Measures of Bottleneck Identification
In this section, the measures of bottleneck identification that were mentioned
during the interviews are shortly summarized.
As with the previous section on bottleneck prevention, it can be presumed that
certain measures that were mentioned in one interview but remained unmen-
tioned in another interview may still be in place despite its not being mentioned
because some interviewees would not identify certain measures as relevant for
bottleneck identification. An example is the notification of the case company
by the supplier in case of possibly upcoming or already existing bottlenecks in
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supply: although mentioned only in five cases the inference that in the other
five cases notification by the supplier is not common would probably be incor-
rect. Likewise, it may be common practice that suppliers can enter an objection
to an order even when interviewees did not explicitly mention this during the
interview.
Supplier Notifies Case Company Interviewees of five case companies
state that their suppliers generally notify them in case irregularities in supply
will occur. As indicated in the introduction to this section this is one example
of an action that might not be considered worth mentioning by interviewees,
which is why one can presume that notification by suppliers also happens in
cases where this was not explicitly stated.
The impression won from the interviews is that notification by suppliers is
the single most important mechanism for case companies to learn about the
occurrence or possible occurrence of supply irregularities due to bottlenecks.
Networking for Information Acquisition Four case companies have em-
phasized the role of formal and informal networking for the identification of
possibly upcoming bottlenecks. Trade fairs and conferences were mentioned as
events where information can be exchanged between companies within the same
and neighboring industries. The interviewee of one company mentions a sales
office in Singapore from where networking activities are conducted so that all
relevant information concerning supply safety are captured. The interviewee of
another case company states that the company’s industry is known to be densely
tied and that both relevant information as well as gossip spreads quickly among
industry members. Yet another interviewee explains that his company main-
tains informal contact with former suppliers even when there are no new supply
contracts to be signed at that time so as to share industry relevant information.
Companies that depend on supply of raw material such as different types of
metals receive information from government institutions whose purpose it is to
assemble and assess information on availability of raw material on global mar-
kets. Global availability of raw material is of major concern for the raw material
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traders among the case company and it is often long-term global developments
they seem to be most interested in. One interviewee emphasized the importance
of timely information about global developments before such news is aired on
TV news channels or printed in news papers so as to be able to tap the sources
of supply before everybody else will try the same.
Supplier Enters Objection to Order Some companies transmit forecasts
and orders electronically to their suppliers. Suppliers then have the chance to
enter an objection when delivery date expected or amount of goods ordered by
the customer (i.e., the case company) cannot be met. When no objection is
entered within a defined period of time, the order counts as confirmed. This
procedure was described by three of the case companies, all of which are pro-
duction firms (case companies 1, 2, and 3). Interviewees of these firms have
stated that objection entered by suppliers is one common way for them to learn
about bottlenecks in their supply network.
Parts do Not Arrive Without Prior Notification Three case companies,
all of which are production firms, have stated that it happens occasionally that
orders do not arrive without any prior notification by the supplier. One intervie-
wee explains that his company thus plans to contact suppliers more often shortly
before promised delivery date to confirm whether the material will be delivered
as scheduled.
In another case company orders that have not arrived sometimes remain un-
noticed for weeks by the purchasing department which sent the order because
production staff do not provide timely notification of the supply shortage. In this
case, deficiencies abound not only in the supply relationship but also in internal
communication processes which aggravate the problem.
Suppliers are Contacted to Reconfirm Order As a reaction to orders
that were not fulfilled on time without prior notification by suppliers, one case
company decided to contact suppliers more often shortly before promised de-
livery date so as to reconfirm the order.
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ETA of Cargo Accessed Online One raw material trading company can
access estimated arrival time (ETA) of cargo vessels online. This allows the firm
to identify possible slips on the delivery schedule.
Low Inventory Levels Detected One case company states that occasion-
ally low inventory levels are detected that can pose a danger to the production
schedule. That is, in this case the fault lies in insufficient inventory control and
material order mechanisms rather than in the actual supply processes.
Information About Supplier Capacity One case company explains that
it has information about suppliers’ total production output as well as about the
total available production capacity. This gives the company an early warning
indicator should capacity available and capacity used converge too closely.7
Monitoring of Supplier Activity One case company’s quality assurance
team monitors activities of critical supplier for important orders. The moni-
toring process ends with order fulfillment. According to the interviewee, close
surveillance of supplier activity is performed in about 5% of all orders.
SAP Notification Another example of an activity that could be considered
a rather normal business activity but was mentioned explicitly in the context of
bottleneck identification is the notification of the case company’s SAP system
about order delivery due dates. Upon notification by the SAP systems, orders
are traced so that successful order completion can be confirmed or, if this order
was not completed as expected, additional measures can be taken.
Continuous Communication with Suppliers One case company em-
phasizes the role of intense communication with suppliers as a measure to iden-
tify possible bottlenecks. According to one interviewee, the case company com-
municates with suppliers “continuously” even when there is no transaction cur-
rently pending, which is their main means of bottleneck identification.
7The same measure is listed in the section Bottleneck Prevention as it can be counted to either
area, prevention and identification of bottlenecks.
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6.3.4.2. Some Remarks About the Identification Measures
A clear difference could be seen between those companies which depend on
global raw material markets (e.g., for different types of metal) and those com-
panies which receive manufactured, assembled, or otherwise processed compo-
nents from suppliers. In the first case, it seemed that companies were much more
concerned about global developments and natural scarcity of the material than
about actual production capacity of suppliers. Accordingly, networking both in
formal ways (conferences, trade fairs) and informal ways (industry “gossip”,
phone calls) seemed to be higher relevance to the first than to the latter. The
concern about global developments is reflected in this statement by one of the
interviewees of case company 9:
“I think continuous communication [with our suppliers] is the way
we learn about those things. And we have to, so as to be able to act
timely. Once it has been made public on information systems such
as Bloomberg or Reuters it is too late.”8
Information channels such as Bloomberg and Reuters do not normally report on
bottlenecks that emerge due operational or organizational deficiencies in pro-
duction of individual suppliers. These channels are concerned with develop-
ments that are of relevance to a broader audience. This finding is in line with
the causes of bottleneck emergence that are named by companies which depend
on global raw material markets (cf. Section 6.3.2.4 on page 309).
The measures for bottleneck identification described in this section could be
classified into three categories, based on the party that initiates the information
transfer:
1. information pull: information about possible or actual bottlenecks is pulled
by the case company,
2. information push: information about possible or actual bottlenecks is
proactively provided (“pushed”) by suppliers,
8Quote translated by the author.
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Table 6.3.2. – Four Categories of Measures of Bottleneck Identification
Information Pull Information Push Two-way
Information
Transmission
No Activity
Involved
Networking for
information
acquisition
Supplier notifies
case company
Continuous
communication
with supplier
Parts not arriving
without prior
identification
Supplier contacted
to reconfirm order
Supplier enters
objection to order
Low inventory
levels detected
ETA for cargo
accessed online
Information about
supplier capacity
Supplier activity
monitored
SAP notification
3. two-way information transmission: both parties, case companies and sup-
pliers, are active and support the transmission of information.
In addition, some measures are, in fact, no measures but rather reflect the ab-
sence or failure of measures: the detection of low inventory levels as well as
parts not arriving without prior notification are no activities to identify bottle-
necks in supply networks but findings in those cases where bottlenecks were not
identified. The categorization is displayed in table 6.3.2.
Looking at the table, it becomes obvious that there is a clear focus on “in-
formation pull”. That is, companies employ a variety of measures to pull vital
information about supply rather than being informed by suppliers. While “net-
working” could be considered a “two-way activity”, a company’s intent to par-
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ticipate in such networking activities seems to be information gathering rather
than information sharing, so that this activity was classified as “information
pull”.
6.3.5. Bottleneck Management: Exploitation
6.3.5.1. Measures of Bottleneck Exploitation
The concept of bottleneck exploitation is derived from disciplines of Operations
Management such as production logistics and scheduling. More specifically, the
concept is discussed in Goldratt’s business novel “The Goal”, in which bottle-
neck exploitation describes the attempt to maximize throughput at an existing
bottleneck in order to maximize throughout of the entire system. In this thesis,
the concept has been transferred to supply networks and bottlenecks in supply.
In the context of supply networks, the concept of bottleneck exploitation appears
to be completely unknown to date. Not surprisingly, interviewees were not fa-
miliar with the concept. Nonetheless, interviewees did comprehend the idea
behind bottleneck exploitation and in some cases could contribute measures of
bottleneck exploitation from the operational practice of their own company.
Different than in bottleneck prevention or bottleneck elimination, none of the
activities of bottleneck exploitation were clearly dominating among the case
companies. If one activity stood out, it was express delivery. But even express
delivery was only mentioned twice for the supply relationship, and two more
times for the transportation from the case company to the customer. This in-
dicates that bottleneck exploitation has not yet received much attention from
researchers and practitioners so as to support the emergence of standard proce-
dures – other than, for instance, bottleneck prevention, where a large amount of
literature discusses (i.a.) sourcing concepts.
Express Deliveries Express deliveries – that is, the use of quicker trans-
portation modes to accelerate the transfer of material from suppliers to the com-
pany – were mentioned twice by interviewees. Both case companies using ex-
press deliveries to accelerate transportation are production firms and intervie-
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wees referred to relatively small components. Express delivery is no feasible
option for raw material traders and production firms that receive large amounts
of heavy material from distant suppliers. When large amounts of heavy material
are received from overseas, there are no alternative to transportation by cargo
vessels as cost incurred for air freight would render the transportation uneco-
nomical.
Moreover, express deliveries were mentioned twice for the transportation of
material from the case company to the customer, that is, the outbound relation.
Although this does not directly concern the supply relation, this measure de-
serves to be mentioned for it does reduce the overall lead time and helps to
move order fulfillment back on schedule.
Use of Parts from Replacement Stock One case company that maintains
a separate stock of replacement parts for customer service occasionally accesses
this inventory in case suppliers are unable to deliver material on time. In this
particular case, it is mostly components that are delivered JiT or JiS that suffer
from irregularities in supply, so that there is no significant regular inventory
that would buffer such irregularities. Replacement stock is replenished once the
components missing for regular production are received. By making use of this
“passive” inventory the case company can avoid production interruptions due to
stock out.
Use of Parts from Finished Products The same logic that underlies the
use of material from replacement stock is built on when parts from finished
products that were produced to stock are removed and built into products that
are produced to actual customer order. Production interruptions and delays in
customer order fulfillment can thereby be avoided in spite of delays in supply.
Products on stock can be equipped again with the parts that were removed once
supply is back to regular schedule.
Refurbishing of Locked Material One case company speeds up refurbish-
ing of material that had been locked in quarantine store to make it usable for pro-
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duction when suppliers are unable to deliver on time. Material may be locked in
quarantine because it fails quality tests. In some cases, material can be manually
refurbished so that will pass quality tests and becomes usable for production.
Reduction of Transportation Lot Size One interviewee reports that in
the past some suppliers have held back deliveries of material because the amount
of goods finished did not meet the minimum order batch size that was agreed
upon in the sourcing contract. These suppliers ignored or were unaware that
even a partial delivery of material would help the case company continue pro-
duction, which is almost always preferable to minimized transportation cost due
to optimal transportation batch size. The interviewee suggests that some suppli-
ers are ignorant of this fact and thus need to be reminded that even incomplete
transportation batches should be delivered rather than no delivery is made.
The same concept was mentioned by the interviewee of another case com-
pany for the transportation relation between the case company and its customers.
When a cargo vessel sank with ten tons of finished goods on their way from the
case company to one large customer, the bottleneck shifted to the case com-
pany so that additional work shifts had to be added and the company began to
fly smaller batches of finished goods to its customer so as to let him continue
regular production.
Access to “External Inventory” One case company is active in trading of
metal while a sister company uses the same material as input material for pro-
duction. The interviewees explain that the case company would be able to access
material on stock of the sister company – actually intended for production – in
order to avoid delays in customer order fulfillment should a bottleneck in supply
emerge and inventory in the case company’s two warehouses be insufficient to
meet orders.
Rescheduling of Orders (Internal) One interviewee reports that when a
bottleneck shifted to his company, several customers were approached so as
to renegotiate the promised delivery date for their orders. Talking to different
327
6. Findings and Discussion
customers it turned out that the delivery of the product was not time critical
for some of them, so that production for these orders could be postponed. The
purpose was to allow the case company to reschedule internal production in a
way that optimizes throughput of a specific product by minimizing change-over
time which in this company normally consumes considerable amounts of time
due to cleaning necessary before another product can be produced on the same
production line. By optimizing production schedule with respect to throughput
of one product, the company was able to resolve the bottleneck and reduce the
delay for the respective product.
Blending of Raw Material One case company that receives input material
from several sources blends the material before it is fed into the company’s pro-
duction process. By blending the material the company creates a steady quality
to which the (chemical) production process is adapted for optimal throughput
results. Furthermore, the company reaches a certain independence of specific
sources of supply as the blending process is able to balance differences in the
material from the various sources. This allows the case company to maintain a
high inbound stream of material for its production process even in the case that
one or several sources of supply would be affected by bottlenecks.9
Additional Work Shifts (Internal) In one case company, additional work
shifts (weekend work) were set up when a bottleneck shifted to the case com-
pany. Obviously a bottleneck in supply cannot be exploited by adding additional
work shifts to the production process of the case company. It is conceivable,
however, that a bottleneck in supply is resolved so that all the material needed
becomes available and the bottleneck shifts downstream to the case company
which now would not have enough capacity available to catch up with delayed
orders on its normal production schedule.
9The blending of raw material can be considered both a preventive measure and an exploitation
measure and is therefore mentioned in both sections.
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6.3.6. Bottleneck Management: Elimination
6.3.6.1. Measures of Bottleneck Elimination
Bottleneck elimination describes the removal of the bottleneck, which conceptu-
ally is the same as pushing the bottleneck to another place with higher through-
put limits. The measures described in this category “solve the problem” – dif-
ferent than exploitation measures which provide temporary remedy against the
imminent risk of supply shortage and interruption of production processes with-
out pushing the physical limits of the bottleneck. Bottleneck elimination goes
after physical limits. It either pushes them in an attempt to increase physically
possibly throughput at the bottleneck, or it reroutes the material stream so as to
benefit from less rigid constraints at another place.
What measures are possible in this category to a good extent depends on
the specific context of the focal firm. The ad hoc substitution of material, for
instance, is not an option for many firms further downstream in the supply net-
work. Likewise, in-house production of certain components may be constrained
by technical ability or patents held by supplier firms. The switching of sources
of supply, possibly the least surprising measure of all, is also the most dominant
measure. It does require, however, that preventive measures were taken in due
time and possible alternative or additional sources were prepared.
Switching of Supply Sources In the discussion of prevention measures
it has been indicated that most case companies maintain multiple sources of
supply, which decreases their dependence on one source and allows them to
balance irregularities so they can avoid being affected by bottlenecks in the first
place.
From the case companies’ perspective, the use of multiple (parallel) sources
is not only a preventive measure but can as well considered a measure of bot-
tleneck elimination. The availability of multiple sources allows case companies
not only to avoid bottlenecks in their inbound material stream but also to switch
from one source of supply to another source of supply. The “bottleneck elimina-
tion character” is more obvious when the company maintains a set of alternative
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sources that are prepared and qualified for supply but remain passive until acti-
vated in case of a bottleneck in the main source. Activating suppliers which have
been prepared as alternative sources eliminates the bottleneck in the company’s
inbound stream.
Switching between different sources of supply is the most dominant measure
of bottleneck elimination identified in the interviews.
Substitution of Material Interviewees of four case companies explain that
sometimes they are able substitute one material that is available for another one
that is in short supply. For the raw material trading companies, substitution
of material can be achieved, for instance, by offering customers material with
higher (and sometimes even with lower) purity or from a different brand. For
a production company, substitution can be used when quality tests confirm that
the new material meets the same quality criteria as the material in short supply.
A more expensive (and therefore not normally used) material can sometimes be
used as a substitute for a less expensive material.
Validation of Promised Delivery Date Interviewees of three case compa-
nies suggest that when a bottleneck in supply emerges, one thing the case com-
pany should do is find out if a possible delay would actually create a problem
both for (1.) the case company’s ability to continue production on normal levels
and (2.) for customers. When a supplier fails to deliver a particular component
on time, it would not bother the case company unless changes in the produc-
tion schedule are required. When the material in question is not scheduled for
production before the actual, delayed delivery date, delays in supply can be ac-
cepted before costly exploitation or elimination measures are invoked. By the
same token, customers may not actually need the material right on the originally
agreed delivery date but might be comfortable with a postponed delivery date.
Although validation of delivery dates does not affect the existence of the
causes for the bottleneck, it might eliminate the need to invoke costly emer-
gence measures.
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In-house Production In two case companies there is capacity available to
take over production of certain components should suppliers be unable to de-
liver. Although in-house production requires some lead time and might be more
expensive than sourcing the parts to suppliers, it is a feasible option in these
companies which they can use to maintain their production output level and
thus their service level with customers.
Buying from Competitor Interviewees of two raw material trading compa-
nies say their companies can buy material from competing traders should their
normal suppliers be unable to deliver on schedule. In both cases, interviewees
state that procurement cost would be higher and that their company might even
lose money when they buy material from competitors in order to fulfill their
customers’ orders. According to the interviewees, fulfilling customer orders has
higher priority than being profitable in these particular orders so that buying
material from competitors is one of several options they can pursue.
Escalation to Management One interviewee explains that management is
informed when no solution for a supply bottleneck can be found on a lower
hierarchical level. Management of the case company then gets in touch with the
supplier’s management in order to discuss and negotiate possible solutions or
remedies for the supply situation.
Escalation to management may initiate a variety of actions both on part of the
case company as well as on part of the supplier that is causing the problem.10
Use of Contract Manufacturer (Internal) When the bottleneck in sup-
ply is resolved and shifts to the case companies’ internal production, one case
company makes use of a contract manufacturer with whose help the company
is able to double its production capacity so that a backlog in production can be
resolved.
10Obviously though, the escalation itself does not affect material flow, which is why the cate-
gorization under “bottleneck elimination” is somewhat arbitrary as it could be equally well
categorized under “bottleneck exploitation”.
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Use of Production Capacity of Sister Plant (Internal) One case com-
panies runs a production plant in Europe and one in China. The interviewee
explains that in the past when significant delays could be expected due to insuf-
ficient capacity in the European plant, production capacity of the Chinese plant
could be utilized to some extent to support the fulfillment of customer orders in
Europe.
As with the use of contract manufacturers, tapping the sister plant’s produc-
tion capacity does not affect the availability of supply and the inbound material
stream (although it could if the material in need were available in China but not
in Europe). That is, this measure is only of value when the bottleneck shifts to
internal production capacity – which is easily conceivable when a bottleneck in
supply has created a backlog of orders for production.
6.3.7. Bottleneck Management: Placement
The concept of bottleneck placement was included in the interview question-
naire so as to probe if case companies employ activities that correspond to the
concept in the context of supply networks. The responses received from inter-
viewees suggest that while interviewees did comprehend the logic underlying
bottleneck placement they were unable to name situations or activities from
their companies’ practice that reflected the concept. Without excluding the pos-
sibility that there are in fact organizations which do use this concept in their
supply network, it can be inferred that bottleneck placement is not common a
concept in the management of supply networks. The concept was thus removed
from the tentative model as originally conceptualized in Section 4.6.
6.3.8. Limitations to Bottleneck Management
The case companies face a variety of different limitations to their ability to
manage bottlenecks. Some of these limitations are specific to the respective
company’s industry or network setup whereas others are rather general; some
limitations are imposed from the outside whereas others are self-inflicted. Such
limitations hinder organizations from effectively achieving their goal – that is,
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from managing their bottlenecks.
One of the most prevalent limitations that were identified in the case study
was the general shortage of the material in demand on the market, which was
either directly or indirectly indicated by six case companies. In some cases, this
shortage was natural; that is, the material is subject to natural scarcity on the
planet (as compared to scarcity because of intense demand from industry). This
problem is faced by some of the raw material traders (cases 4, 9, and 10) as
well as the manufacturer of metal products (case 8). The problem refers both
to rather rare materials such as lead with high purity and low radiation as well
as to more “mundane” materials like tin, the demand for which is approaching
global mining and smelting capacities. In case 1, scarcity of raw material is
(occasionally) caused by the way suppliers organize their production process:
certain qualities and types of glass are produced in large batches, put on stock,
and sold from there, while production of another quality or type of glass is
continued. When one specific type of glass is sold out, it can take weeks before
production of this type can be commenced. In all of these cases, companies are
severely limited in their actions once the bottleneck emerges.
Another important restriction is due to the properties of the raw material or
product. Properties that were mentioned that represent limitations are weight
and shelf life. Weight represents a limitation for it excludes fast transportation
modes (air freight). Different types of metal are subject to this limitation. Such
raw materials from overseas can only be economically transported by cargo
vessels, which excludes expediting transportation via the selection of air freight
as a means of bottleneck exploitation.
Shelf life, on the other hand, refers to the deterioration of product quality
over time while the product or material is on stock. Fresh food may be the
best-known example for products that are subject to this limitation, but indus-
trial products, too, can deteriorate over time. Case company 1 has to cope with
the shelf life of glass. As mentioned earlier, the company faces the problem
that producers of raw glass produce in large batches of one type, and when
one type of glass is sold out delays may occur until a new production batch of
that type is run. Because the quality of glass deteriorates over time, the most
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obvious counter-measure to the limitation posed by this production logic – in-
creasing production batches and putting more finished glass on stock – is not
an option for producers. Likewise, the case company cannot sensibly buy up
large amounts of raw glass to keep them on stock “just in case”. The combina-
tion of shelf life, production logic (batches with significant lead time), and the
trade-offs involved is which makes this a typical “newsvendor problem”.
In five cases, interviewees express that they perceive their company’s power
position as relatively weak compared to at least some of their suppliers, to which
they attribute supply-related problems in the past. The interviewee of case com-
pany 1 remarks that problems are more likely to emerge with powerful suppli-
ers. Case company 3’s interviewee states that suppliers openly admitted that
other customers have higher priority in resource allocation decisions. While
not admitted by suppliers, case company 6 experienced disadvantages in mate-
rial allocation decisions, too. Case company 7 received delayed deliveries and
quality of lower quality material at the time their long-term supplier acquired
additional customers. The interviewee of case company 8 expresses concerns
that some larger suppliers may cease supply for the amounts purchased by the
case company are too small. That is, the entire sample of SMEs among the case
companies is subject to perceived or actual disadvantages due to a weak relative
power position.
The natural geographic distribution of raw material imposes limitations and
requirements on those companies that demand such resources. On many occa-
sions, industrial firms cannot choose a geographic region or a country to which
they want to source raw material. Raw material traders – whose profession it
is to make raw material available to industrial customers – thus tend to employ
a broad variety of sources of supply on different continents, requiring long-
haul transportation. The amounts and properties of the material requested (see
example “weight” above) exclude air freight so that the only economically vi-
able transportation mode remains sea freight. Sea freight is slow, vulnerable
to weather conditions, and normally cannot be significantly expedited. That is,
sea transportation tends to make the supply chain vulnerable, slow, and inflex-
ible. Yet, the distribution of natural deposits of certain raw materials make it
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necessary.
Also, besides difficulties attached to physical transportation, European and
American companies receiving raw material from overseas have to cope with
diverse and often difficult political, natural, and social circumstances which are
prevalent in some sourcing countries. The interviewee of one raw material trader
describes difficulties related to sourcing from Kongo and the attempts of indus-
try organizations to establish tracking systems for conflict-free resources.
Three case companies are financially constrained so that they cannot pursue
all bottleneck management measures they would like to. One interviewee de-
scribes that his travel budget does not allow supplier audits which he thinks
could have avoided some supply-related problems the company has faced. An-
other interviewee expresses that significant funds were necessary to grow the
business and safeguard supply. One interviewee states that the case company’s
entire industry is going through difficult times and that additional measures to
prevent bottlenecks in light of decreasing volumes may be perceived as inad-
equate or unnecessary by management, which leads to the next limitation two
case companies face: low purchasing volume.
Low purchasing volume may render the use of multiple sources unfeasible
so that companies may be forced to rely one one source of supply for certain
materials. This is the situation faced by case company 3. Also, relatively low
purchasing volume – as compared to other customers of the same supplier –
may decrease the relative importance and power position of the company for
the supplier, which may result in disadvantages.
In three cases, limitations are related to forecasts received from suppliers. The
interviewee of case company 10 states that unreliable forecasts from customers
pose a problem. Case company 7, on the other hand, receives forecasts with a
horizon of only two weeks for some products, which provides little time to react
and plan capacity usage. The customer providing the short-horizon forecast
claims not to have available better data. Case company 3 attributed the low
availability of usable forecast data to a lack of professionalism of sales partners
who tend to be small craft business.
For three case companies, the reasons as to why bottlenecks emerge tend to
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lie outside their company’s reach. Examples are weather conditions or political
events in sourcing countries that can impede supply for raw material traders, but
also fire outbreaks in supplier facilities. “Outside organizational reach” can thus
be seen as a category of limitations rather than as a limitation itself.
Other limitations identified were more specific to the individual companies
and did not apply to several cases at once. One interviewee mentions the case
company’s organizational culture as a reason why the company has mostly relied
on long-term single sourcing and not pursued multiple sourcing to a greater
extent. One interviewee states that high capital cost for raw material makes
higher inventory levels as a means to buffer variability in supply and demand
economically unfeasible. The same company has to cope with the fact that
irregularities in the quality of the raw material received do not become visible
until the lengthy production process is started, so that preventive quality control
is not possible.
The conceptual model proposed in Section 4.6 contains references to supplier
market, buyers’ market, organizational factors (technology, strategy, product
characteristics, ability), and competition as determinants, parameters or influ-
encing factors for the selection of bottleneck management measures in each of
the categories proposed. Limitations are but one type of parameters that influ-
ence decisions (requirements or needs are another), yet it might be worthwhile
trying to relate the limitations discussed above to the conceptual model so as to
find evidence for the model’s categories’ validity.
With one exception, all limitations could be sorted into the categories pro-
posed in the conceptual model: Above it was mentioned that some companies
stated that causes for bottleneck emergence lie outside their respective organi-
zations’ reach, which represents a limitation to the organizations’ action and
influence. Because this statement is so imprecise and could refer to anything
that happens outside the narrow legal organizational boundaries of the case
companies, it has been excluded from the categorization. The categorization
is displayed in Figure 6.3.1.
Certain differences emerged concerning limitations to bottleneck manage-
ment between organizations upstream and downstream in supply networks. Such
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difference revolve around the type of material they receive as supply, i.e., whether
they receive natural raw material or manufactured goods. The analysis was sup-
ported by information from an expert interview. As described in Section 5.3, one
interview was conducted with an expert for raw material markets at the German
Raw Material Agency (DERA). The information provided in this interview can
further augment the understanding of limitations in bottleneck management.
The interviewee (expert 3) mentioned the substitution of raw material as one
rather common measure to eliminate bottlenecks at companies either receiving
(natural) raw material, such as NF metals, or supplying it to customers. This
points to a limitation that some manufacturing companies face. While compa-
nies which are receiving and manufacturing natural, mostly unprocessed and ho-
mogenous raw material often do have the ability to substitute the material (e.g.,
by choosing the same metal with a different level of purity or an entirely dif-
ferent metal with similar chemical characteristics), companies whose inbound
material stream consists of manufactured, and thus “artificial”, parts that are
engineered to fit into, and represent one distinct part of, an assembled product,
such as an engine, are unlikely to be able to do this for a variety of reasons:
• the supplier may use specifically designed tools to produce that part,
• the part may require extensive quality testing, especially if it is a complex
assembly itself whose properties and behavior might not diverge from
the original part in any obvious, but possibly in more subtle, ways and
possibly only after a certain period of time in use,
• if unable to produce the original part, the supplier might not be able to pro-
duce an alternative part either, so switching the part may require switching
supplier, who in many cases has to be audited and approved first, which,
in turn, can take more time than is available when trying to prevent pro-
duction processes from starvation.
Because the processing of natural raw materials is to be found upstream in sup-
ply networks rather than downstream, the limitations outlined above are more
likely to be faced by organizations downstream in supply networks, i.e., in a
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later value-adding phase. While the limitation exists for obvious reasons, it
does indicate that the vertical position in the supply network broadly correlates
with limitations as to the substitutability of goods. This finding is worthwhile
mentioning as the multiple-case study did not reveal many bottleneck manage-
ment limitations that companies seem to be facing depending on their vertical
position alone; it was often the influence of lateral, and often non-adjacent, rela-
tionships that was said to constitute an important parameter as, for example, in
the discussion of power and dependency (cf. Section 6.4.2). In the example of
substitutability, it is not the vertical position per se that causes the limitation but
instead the fact that state and properties of supply depend on the vertical posi-
tion in that companies upstream in the network receive supply that has not, or to
a lower extent, been processed and thus is more natural and broader in its possi-
ble application, whereas manufactured and assembled products are customized
to fit very specific requirements (unless they are standard parts, such as screws
or bolts).
Another difference, albeit not as stark, between manufacturers of natural and
of engineered products can be derived from the natural distribution and scarcity
of raw material. There are monopolies in many branches of industry, partly
based on patents, partly based on unique technical capabilities, and partly be-
cause of successful marketing. Generally, such monopolies were created by the
companies which hold them. With natural raw material, however, companies
may hold a natural monopoly if they possess the exploration license for the only
one, or one of very few, profitable sources for that specific material that exist
and are known. The exploration of such a raw material is often naturally limited
by the magnitude of the deposit – by natural scarcity, that is. Thus, it is not
only the monopolist exploration company’s marketing strategy that determines
price and availability of the good but also there mere natural limits of its deposit.
While with an “artificial” monopoly, the manufacturer has the ability to scale up
production, to invest in additional capacity, or to license production to a third
party or to the customer itself, the natural monopoly may constitute natural, and
possibly stricter, boundaries to production volumes. For a manufacturer, being
dependent on a natural monopoly thus appears to be even less desirable than
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being dependent on an artificially created monopoly for supply.
Another limitation for receivers of natural raw material is based upon the
market characteristics of such material. Raw material prices tend to be volatile
for they are often strongly influenced by economic cycles. Many raw material
are traded on spot markets, such as the LME. Since prices indicate scarcity,
companies do face the immanent risk of not being able to continually receive
large enough amounts of a specific material. Companies may be able to hedge
against price fluctuation; they may also, in a way, hedge against unavailability
of the material by closing long-term contracts with a supplier. As any hedg-
ing, long-term contracts come at a cost. The cost in this case is the price risk
which consists of the chance of having to pay significantly higher prices, as de-
termined in the contract, than the company would otherwise have to pay on the
spot market.
Obviously, price fluctuation might also work in favor of the buying company
that may benefit from lower than market prices. Depending on the prevalent
power regime, though, suppliers in such cases may demand renegotiation of
contract terms and conditions.
That is, receivers of natural raw material have to trade off price risk against
supply risk. The situation is different for most manufacturing companies. Man-
ufactured goods, too, depending on market supply and demand are subject to
fluctuating market prices themselves, and because they consist of natural raw
material, they also to a certain extent reflect its market prices. Possibly because
they consist of several different components, each of which subject to individ-
ual price fluctuation, possibly because long-term contracts are more common,
which may have a taming effect, the fluctuation of prices of manufactured goods
downstream in the supply network often appears not to be as significant as for
natural raw material. Hence, manufacturers downstream in supply networks
closing long-term supply contracts with suppliers seem not to be as concerned
about price risk as receivers of raw material further upstream in supply net-
works. Therefore, long-term contracts seem to represent an instrument of bot-
tleneck prevention that is more suited for downstream than for upstream com-
panies; the price risk is not as immanent for downstream companies.
340
6.4. Analysis of Interview Data Phase III: Reference to Literature and Conceptual Model
Another notable difference between receivers of natural raw material and re-
ceives of manufactured goods is the ability of the former to tap another im-
portant source of supply: recycling. For some metals, the share of recycled
material is quite significant. As an example, according to expert 3 and DERA
(2012), 43% of all copper processed in Germany was recycled. Receivers of
natural raw material may choose to invest in recycling capacity so as to be able
to tap additional sources of supply whereas receivers of manufactured goods
may have fewer options to do so.
6.3.9. Summary
This section drew together much of the information from the individual case
companies and presented the in summarized form across all cases. This includes
the causes of bottleneck emergence, the case companies’ measures of bottleneck
management, as well as the limitations they face when managing bottlenecks.
As with the first part of the data analysis, this section does not contain inter-
pretation but description and categorization of information.
6.4. Analysis of Interview Data Phase III:
Reference to Literature and Conceptual Model
6.4.1. Introduction
The third part of the data analysis relates the findings from the multiple-case
study to the literature and to the conceptual model proposed in Chapter 4. It
tries to explain the emergence of bottlenecks in some case companies’ supply
network by reference to non-adjacent power regimes. Moreover, it relates bot-
tleneck management measures chosen by the case companies to the concepts
of power, flexibility, and risk, all of which were identified in the literature re-
view. It is asked if lack of power in supply relationships on part of a company
can limit the company in its options for bottleneck management and if the case
companies appear to aim for a more powerul stance in their supply relationships
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by selecting measures that may help them increase their relative power. These
analyses address research questions 5 and 6.
Research question 7 is addressed in the last part of this section. It investigates
into the terms supply chain and Supply Chain Management and extends the
theoretical discussion that began in Section 2.4.4 with empirical evidence from
the company exemplars.
6.4.2. Bottleneck Management, Power and Dependence
6.4.2.1. Power Regimes as a Cause of Bottleneck Emergence
In Section 6.3.2, three categories of causes of bottleneck emergence were dis-
cussed: physical, organizational, and operational. The data analysis suggests
that organizational causes play an important role. Organizational causes of bot-
tleneck emergence are related to conscious and deliberate decisions (mostly)
made by the supplier. Power seems to have played an important role in the way
some case companies were treated by suppliers. In this respect, power seems to
determine to some extent what activities the case companies can pursue when
attempting to manage bottlenecks their supply network. That is, the discussion
that follows is likely to contribute to an answer to research questions 5 and 6.
Cox et al. (2001) point out that power is largely ignored in the SCM litera-
ture although it does represent an important factor in the way value is appro-
priated in supply networks. In their analysis of power regimes, they look at 16
different power setups in double-dyadic relationships (i.e., buyer – supplier –
sub-supplier). Each of these actors can be either more powerful or less pow-
erful than the other actors, independent of them, and interdependent with them
(which causes power to be about equal). The authors refuse to adopt the notion
of chains and they refuse to believe that supply networks are meant to provide
customers with the greatest value. Instead, they suggest supply chains are re-
ally supply networks and that supply networks exist in order for the companies
involved to create value for themselves (i.e., to make money).
Although these insights are refreshing because they are notably different and
set the paper apart from the larger part of SCM literature, the authors fail to
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address some aspects. In their discussion of power regimes, they do not spec-
ify what constitutes power and how it allows companies to appropriate value.
Presuming that power exists without specifying these two details might be ac-
ceptable; in this case, however, these details have implications for the authors’
conclusions.
These points are addressed by Crook & Combs (2007). They derive the exis-
tence of power from the RDT notion of the possession of important resources.
Furthermore, they use Thompson’s (1967) conception of task interdependence
to identify in what setting (pooled interdependence, reciprocal interdependence)
power can be appropriated to what extent by the more powerful actor in the
supply chain (cf. Section 2.5.5.2). It is this notion of interdependence that is
missing in the paper by Cox et al. (2001), which results in an overly simplified
model of value appropriation.
Different from either paper, however, the data analysis suggests that it is not
the dyadic power regime within which the case companies are located but the
power of a company outside the dyadic supply relationship of the case com-
panies that has implications for the material or capacity allocation decisions of
their suppliers. It is the lateral relationship of an organization in the network that
is not directly connected to the focal case company but merely to its supplier. It
is the relative power of the competing buyer in comparison to the case company
that influences the supplier’s capacity allocation decisions. Although intervie-
wees repeatedly indicated that unfavorable allocation decisions were made by
suppliers larger than the respective case company, the analysis suggests that it is
the power (for which size is merely a proxy) of the competing buyer that seems
to make the difference.
If power of the supplier is of relevance at all for such allocation decisions,
then the opposite case might even be true: the larger the supplier, the less likely
it will cause supply interruption of the smaller case company, the reason being
that a larger supplier is more likely to be able to afford letting a larg (compared to
the case company) customer carry part of the burden of insufficient total supply
capacity which is then shared by the competing buyers instead of exclusively
being carried by the smaller, less powerful firm.
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Focal 
Firm
Competing 
Buyer
Supplier
Dyad 1
Dyad 2
Figure 6.4.1. – Non-adjacent Power Regimes in a Supply Network
So the neglected point in existing literature is that many authors – sometimes
in spite of their acknowledging the complex web-like structures of supply net-
works – base their analysis on a linear chain-like model. Some might do this for
the sake of simplicity; and for questions of value appropriation it might actually
be a valid approach. Yet they do miss the important fact that power regimes
outside the direct dyadic supply relationship of the focal firm can influence the
supply relationship of the focal firm. One contribution of this work therefore is
that it emphasizes that the role of power regimes with firms that are not adjacent
to the focal firm can have important implications for the focal firm – such as
the interruption of the inbound material stream. Moreover, this emphasizes the
importance of maintaining a mental model that actually allows for such rela-
tionships to exist, which is likely to be supported by the description of a supply
network rather than supply chain.
Figure 6.4.1 illustrates the case. Both dyad 1 and dyad 2 are subject to sepa-
rate power regimes. While existing literature as well as the perception of some
interviewees at the individual case companies (represented by the focal firm in
the illustration) attribute supply shortages to the power regime between their
firm and the supplier (represented by dyad 1 in the illustration), there is reason
to believe that the relation of a non-adjacent organization that is competing with
the focal firm for resources or capacity at the supplier and the power regime
resulting from the relation between that firm and the supplier is causing the
adverse effect on the focal firm. The power regime of dyad 1 might not even
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function the way some interviewees suggest: it might, in fact, be the lack of
power on part of the supplier and thus its dependence on the more powerful
competing buyer rather than the relative power of the supplier over the focal
firm that contributes to the situation.
Moreover, non-adjacent power regimes can be related to the discussion of
network theory and its impact on performance in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3. Den-
sity was one measure that was shortly discussed. Arguably, in networks of lower
density – i.e., networks that contain more structural holes – indirect performance
effects may be less likely to be transmitted than in dense, interwoven networks.
More specifically, structural equivalence, or at least similarity, on the supply
side of two or more firms is a precondition for non-adjacent power regimes
to be able to impact on the supply relationship of the focal firm. In a supply
network where the ties of interest are supply ties, structural equivalence, even
partial, represents a risk factor for the stability of supply for a firm – and mostly
for a firm that relative to its equivalents is less powerful with respect to, or is
otherwise less important for, the suppliers they have in common.
Another possibility is that the firms that report to have been disadvantaged by
suppliers’ allocation decisions are outside of what was referred to as cohesive
subgroups. In Section 2.5.3.2, cases were cited where embeddedness in a cohe-
sive subgroup had advantages for the firm, such as better information sharing,
trust, and quick collaboration to solve urgent problems. Higher prioritization
might be another benefit of strong cohesion; accordingly, members of the co-
hesive subgroup would prioritize organizations outside that group lower when
they have to make allocation decisions. It cannot be stated with any certainty
that cohesion did have any impact on the outcome of supply allocation decisions
for the case companies, yet this theorizing opens up additional worthwhile re-
search venues where network theory can be applied to analyze the behavior of
supply networks.
Similarly, the connection between the supplier and the competing buyer could
be described as a strong tie (cf. Section 2.5.2.2), one that includes higher “emo-
tional intensity” (e.g., because of cultural proximity) or which was built on
“reciprocal services” (Granovetter 1973, p. 1361). The interviewee at case
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company 6 suggested that supplier in Eastern Europe tend to grant preferential
treatment to other suppliers in Eastern Europe, which indicates that the cultural
context may indeed be of influence.
In Section 2.5.3.1, some of the potential performance advantages attached to
centrality were discussed. Among the advantages of different types of centrality
are better capability to extract value from the network as well as higher power
(e.g., due to control of information flows). It is conceivable that power advan-
tages of competing customers, leading to non-adjacent power regimes, may to
some extent be attributed to their central position in the wider supply network.
In case of economic networks (supply networks are one type of economic net-
works) the centrality of a firm may correlate with its economic power as the
firm does business with more companies and requests goods in larger amounts
and from a more a diverse set of suppliers. Hence, the direction of causality may
rather be such that high centrality follows from high economic power. Yet again,
in-depth investigation into the network characteristics was not possible so that
a possible link between power configurations observed in the case companies’
network and centrality must be considered speculative and a starting point for
further research.
The data set does not allow to draw convincing inferences about group co-
hesion, strength of ties or centrality; power has shown to be a prominent and
repeatedly surfacing concept, however. Where power originates and why re-
mains unclear and requires further investigation.
6.4.2.2. Bottleneck Management Measures as a Means to Alter
Power Relations in Supply Networks
From the data analysis, it appears that the case companies have to deal with a
broad variation of reasons for bottleneck emergence. In some cases, the differ-
ences are obvious: companies in whose supply network there is no transporta-
tion by cargo ship cannot be affected by the sinking ships. Likewise, companies
that buy domestically do not have to deal with customs regulation and supply
will not be held back by customs.
Other differences are less obvious and require further investigation. Suppli-
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ers’ material allocation decisions stand out as the single most-often mentioned
cause of bottleneck emergence, affecting five out of ten case companies. At
the same time, the other five case companies seem to be completely worry-
free about allocation decisions of suppliers. At first sight, this bottleneck cause
seems to have affected mostly small and medium-sized companies. Case com-
panies 1, 3, 6, and 7 all fall into this category. Case company 2, however, does
not fit here with revenue of several billion Euro (2013). For case company 2,
the interviewee expresses that problems with reliable supply are more likely to
emerge with larger, powerful suppliers than with smaller ones. Also, tires and
engines stand out among the components that have caused problems in the past.
Both, tires and engines, are supplied by powerful large suppliers which also
supply other customers which are, in fact, even larger than the case company
and thus are more important customers. That is, despite the large size of case
company 2, its relative size as compared to competing customers is, although
not insignificant, rather small.
At the same time, four out of five case companies which are not adversely af-
fected by suppliers’ material allocation decisions – case companies 4, 5, 9, and
10 – hold leading positions in their market or are even world market leaders.
The interviewee at case company 8 does not mention suppliers’ material alloca-
tion decision as a cause for supply shortage although there are competitors for
most products the company offers. Reasons may be that case company 8 either
receives parts from suppliers that are available in abundance so that limiting al-
location decisions do not have to be made by suppliers, that parts received are
customized so that finished parts cannot be diverted to other destinations, and
that the case company despite its not being very large still is an important cus-
tomer for its suppliers. Furthermore, supply shortages due to suppliers’ material
allocation decisions do not have to occur in each case, which does not mean
that they cannot occur. Summarizing, the cases seem to provide evidence for
a relationship between the relative power position of a firm in its network and
suppliers’ material allocation decisions. As emphasized in the previous section,
the notion of non-adjacent power regimes might help explain the situation.
If the relative power of a firm as compared to its suppliers and to other cus-
347
6. Findings and Discussion
tomers of its suppliers plays an important role in suppliers’ material allocation
decisions, it is worthwhile investigating the factors that increase or reduce a
firm’s power, respectively. Some interviewees explicitly mention power as one
factor for successful supply relationships (from the perspective of their firm).
One case company (case 7) combines purchasing with a sister company in the
same industrial group in order to improve their power position in the network. In
another case company (case 3), the interviewee states that one supplier openly
admitted to have preferred another customer over the case company in an allo-
cation decision because of the other customer’s higher importance for the sup-
plier’s business, which can be translated into the other customer having more
power than the case company. That is, power is recognized as a factor by the
case companies and some seem to try improve their supply situation by improv-
ing their power position. In case 7 which was just cited, power apparently is
equated with buying power, (that is, purchasing volume) and thus relative im-
portance for suppliers’ revenue stream.
Another example for the limiting influence of (other organizations’) power
in the network is provided by case company 8. Case company 8 finds itself
in something that could be roughly described as a “sandwich configuration”
between large and powerful suppliers and large and powerful customers. The
company produces anodes for customers. The anodes come with copper support
rods of which there are many different types and which the company receives
from its suppliers. The electrolysis at the customer site is a continuously running
process; in many cases, this production process is interrupted for as few as three
days per year for scheduled maintenance activities. The start up phase for the
electrolysis usually lasts several days. Hence, enormous cost due to production
loss is incurred if the production process is interrupted. The case company’s
customers maintain an inbound stock of about 300 anodes. The average con-
sumption is ten anodes per day. That is, the inbound stock represents a buffer
of 30 days of inventory. The case company’s lead time for copper support rods
often is more than three weeks and occasionally more than 30 days. Upon de-
livery of the copper support rod, the anode will be produced. That is, the order
lead time for anodes tends to exceed customers’ inventory buffer. Because there
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are so many different profiles for copper support rods, for cost reasons the case
company cannot maintain large inventories of each type. Customers of the case
company refuse to increase their inventory of finished anodes from the case
company to prevent production outages and instead expect the case company
to be reliable. Supply of copper support rods for anode production at the case
company tends to be unreliable and lead time is long. Also, relatively high cost
for copper make large inventories of different support rod profiles at the case
company economically unfeasible. That is, the case company faces both high
demands from its (more powerful) customers and little support from its (more
powerful) suppliers at the same time while facing limitations with respect to
measures it can take to make sure customers will always receive their anodes on
time.
In Section 2.5.5.2, literature on power, (inter-) dependence, and coordination
in organizational networks was reviewed. It appears that organizations pursue
measures to decrease their dependency on individual suppliers or directly aim to
increase their power. The review of literature suggests that buying power is not
the only element that constitutes power in a supply relationship. Kumar (2005)
distinguishes between dependence-based power and power due to punitive ca-
pability. Punitive capability can, in fact, be identified as one element of contract
design in supply relationships in the form of penalty clauses for cases of non-
compliance. Interviewees from three case companies state that penalty clauses
are included in sourcing contracts at least in some cases; one interviewee ex-
presses that he wants penalty clauses to be included in more sourcing contracts
in the future. That is, some case companies apparently aim to increase their
power by increasing their punitive capability. This suggests that the concept of
power due to punitive capability has – at least implicitly – been recognized by
some firms.
As to power based on dependence, Emerson (1962) describes dependence as
the converse of power:
Pab = Dba (6.4.1)
In fact, multiple sourcing is the single most-often employed measure for bot-
349
6. Findings and Discussion
tleneck prevention that could be identified in the case studies and it is a primary
measure to reduce dependency on – and thus power disadvantage – compared
to individual suppliers.
As indicated in Section 3.2, power configurations in the supply network are
examined as one important part of the purchasing portfolio analysis (Kraljic
1983, Wildemann 2001). In the purchasing portfolio matrix, an analysis of the
purchased material with respect to profit impact and supply risk is combined
with a comparative analysis of supply market power and company power to de-
duce supply strategies. This implies that power (and dependency) relationships
in supply networks play an important role in the assessment of supply reliability
as well as in the creation of suitable strategies to prevent supply shortages (PPA
is limited to the prevention aspect of bottleneck management) and that this has
been recognized by some researchers .
It is possible to look at bottleneck management measures through power and
dependency lenses and frame the measures in terms of power increase and de-
pendency reduction. Preventive measures are likely to play a more important
role than reactive measures for the mutual adjustment of power positions as they
provide the actors with the time necessary to react and actually make adjust-
ments. Table 6.4.1 provides an overview of preventive measures of bottleneck
management and explanations as to how they can affect power and dependency.
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Table 6.4.1. – Measures of Bottleneck Prevention and How They Can Affect
Power Relations
Measure Aims at Power
/ Dependency
Mechanism Case
References
Multiple
sourcing
Decreases
dependency,
increases
power (can
decrease
power)
Decreases dependency on
reliability and goodwill of
individual suppliers, increases
negotiation power of focal firm.
At the same time, however, if
multiple sources are used in
parallel, purchasing volume for
each source is lower which
might decrease power position
compared to individual
suppliers.
all
Multiple
sourcing
(alternative)
Decreases
dependency
The preparation of alternative
sources decreases dependency
on individual suppliers.
unclear
Annual
framework
agreements
Decreases
dependency
Decreases dependency on
suppliers’ market situation by
providing information about
needed capacity upfront.
1, 2, 3, 6, 7,
8
351
6. Findings and Discussion
Long-term
relationships
Levels power
and
dependency
Long-term relationships can
increase asset specificity on
either side which creates
interdependence and thus
reduces one-sided power
advantage.
3, 4, 9, 10
High incoming
goods
inventory
Decreases
dependency
Decreases dependency on
supplier’s service level and
allocation decisions by
allowing for some slack in
delivery process.
3, 5, 6, 9
Penalty clauses
for non-
compliance
Increases
power
Penalty clauses for
non-compliance can be seen as
an attempt to increase power
based on punitive capability.
1, 3, 8
Sourcing to
professional
traders
Decreases
dependency
Professional traders tend to
maintain a broad portfolio of
suppliers so that dependency
on individual raw material
suppliers can be reduced.
7, 8
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Close
relationship
with LSP
Increases
power (but can
increase inter-
dependence
and thereby
level power)
Consolidation of the portfolio
of LSPs and close, long-term
relationships may increase
power of focal firm due to its
funneling of additional
business to selected LSPs. At
the same time, there is a
possibility that interdependence
increases and power is levelled
due to increasing asset
specificity and switching cost.
2, 4
Combined
purchasing
Increases
power
Increases power by increasing
purchasing volume and thus
negotiation power and relative
importance for the suppliers’
business.
7, 8
Blending of
raw material
Decreases
dependency
Blending of raw material
supports independence of raw
material quality and thus of
individual suppliers.
5
The geographic spread of sources is not mentioned in table 6.4.1 although it
might be seen as a measure to lessen dependency. The dependency this mea-
sure can lessen is on geographic regions, which is important if the question is
how geographically confined interruptions, such as natural disasters or politi-
cal turmoil, can be avoided. It does not, however, address questions of power
and dependency in relation to other organizations like suppliers beyond what is
already covered by multiple sourcing as such.
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Table 6.4.2. – Measures of Bottleneck Identification and How They Can Affect
Power Relations
Measure Aims at Power
/ Dependency
Mechanism Case
References
Networking for
information
acquisition
Decreases
dependency
Each of these measures aims to
improve the information
available for the focal firm,
thereby decreasing dependency
on information provision by
suppliers.
5, 6, 7, 9
Information
about supplier
capacity
Decreases
dependency
4
Monitoring of
supplier
activity
Decreases
dependency
8
Measures of bottleneck exploitation are reactive in nature and tend not alter
the relative power position of a firm; the same is true for most measures of
bottleneck elimination. Bottleneck identification provides some measures that
aim to create advantages due to better availability of information which serves
both preventive and reactive needs. An overview of measures of bottleneck
identification and elimination and how they matter in terms of the relative power
position of a firm is provided in tables 6.4.2 and 6.4.3, respectively.
6.4.2.3. Lack of Power and Low Importance as a Limiting Factor
After bottleneck management measures were described in terms of how they
affect power and dependency, it seems worthwhile taking a closer look at the
case studies in which company representatives state that a weak power posi-
tion constitutes a limiting factor for their management and reliability of supply.
More specifically, it can be asked whether these companies seek to improve
their power position (or reduce their dependency, respectively) by employing
effective measures as indicated above, and if so: to what extent. Moreover, if
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Table 6.4.3. – Measures of Bottleneck Elimination and How They Can Affect
Power Relations
Measure Aims at Power
/ Dependency
Mechanism Case
References
Substitution of
material
Decreases
dependency
Decreases dependency on
individual suppliers by tapping
an alternative set of suppliers.
3, 4, 6, 8
Produce
in-house
Decreases
dependency
In-house production of
components that are normally
sourced to suppliers represent a
contingency action that reduces
the company’s dependency on
individual suppliers.
3, 8
Escalation to
management
Increases
power
Escalation does not alter power
relations between two
organizations but instead aims
to make use of power relations
within organizational
hierarchies.
3
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they do not attempt to alter power relations, it would be worthwhile speculating
on the reasons why this is so.
Case companies 1 (manufacturer of glass-based products), 3 (producer of so-
lar power based heating systems), 6 (raw material trader), 7 (producer of sol-
dering powder), and 8 (producer of radiation shields and anodes) directly or
indirectly express that their relatively weak power position has been a problem
in the past. Each of these firms counts as a small or medium-sized company
according to the definition provided by the European Union (European Com-
mission 2005). For case company 8, the interviewee did not elaborate on the
relatively weak power position as compared to its suppliers. The relative power-
lessness was mostly mentioned in the context of the installation of consignment
warehouses with larger suppliers. Therefore, case company 8 will not be part of
the sample of companies with a relative lack of power as compared to suppliers
and competitors. Table 6.4.4 provides an overview11.
Case company 1 employs six preventive measures on a regular basis and plans
to increase the use of a seventh measure (penalty clauses for non-compliance)
in the future. Four out of seven preventive measures can serve to either increase
power or reduce dependency. Other measures used by the company, for ex-
ample those that fall into any of the categories identification, exploitation, and
elimination, have not been associated with power or dependence. Most of these
measures which case company 1 employs and which stand in relation to power
or dependency aim to reduce the company’s dependency on individual suppliers
in general or on individual supplier’s service level: Multiple sourcing reduces
dependency on the individual supplier, and so does the preparation of alterna-
tive suppliers. Annual framework agreements reduce dependency on individual
suppliers’ current market situation as the purchase of a certain amount of supply
normally is guaranteed by such agreements. Moreover, multiple sourcing can
increase negotiation power while penalty clauses for non-compliance increase
punitive power.
Five out of eight preventive measures which case company 3 employs have
11The total number is indicated excluding exploitation measures for reasons explained in Section
6.4.2.2.
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Table 6.4.4. – Measures That Can Affect Power/Dependency Employed by Case
Companies Which Appear to Hold Weak Power Positions
Case Company Reference Measures Affecting Power /
Dependency
Share of Measures
that Affect Power /
Dependency
1 –
manufacturer
of glass-based
products
Section 6.2.2
on
page 225
Multiple sourcing, preparation
of alternative suppliers, annual
framework agreements, penalty
clauses for non-compliance
(planned)
Total: 4/11
Prevention: 4/7
Identification: 0/3
Elimination: 0/1
3 – producer of
solar
power-based
heating systems
Section 6.2.4
on
page 239
Multiple sourcing, high
incoming goods inventory,
annual framework agreements,
long-term relationships,
penalty clauses for
non-compliance (infrequently
used), substitution of material,
in-house production
Total: 7/18
Prevention: 5/8
Identification: 0/4
Elimination: 2/6
6 – raw
material trader
Section 6.2.7
on
page 259
Multiple sourcing, high
incoming goods inventory,
annual framework agreements,
networking for information
acquisition, substitution of
material
Total: 5/9
Prevention: 3/4
Identification: 1/2
Elimination: 1/3
7 – producer of
soldering
powder
Section 6.2.8
on
page 266
Multiple sourcing, annual
framework agreements,
sourcing to professional
traders, combined purchasing,
networking for information
acquisition
Total: 5/9
Prevention: 4/5
Identification: 1/1
Elimination: 0/3
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been identified as affecting the company’s relative power position. In addition to
the measures explained above for case company 1, long-term relationships can
level power relations. With substitution of material case company 3 also makes
use of one bottleneck elimination measure which aims to decrease dependency
on supply of particular material from a supplier.
Case company 6 makes use of three preventive measures which decrease de-
pendency or increase power, out of four preventive measures in total. Also, this
company uses social networking as a means to improve its information base by
which the company reduces its dependency on information provision of individ-
ual suppliers. Moreover, in some cases the company would offer its customers
alternative material if the material originally demanded is not available. In-
house production capabilities reduce the company’s dependency on supply of
certain components from individual suppliers.
Four out of five preventive measures that are used by case company 7 ei-
ther reduce dependency or increase power. Sourcing to professional traders –
who tend to maintain a broad set of supply sources – reduces dependency on
individual producers of raw material. Also, the company combines purchasing
activities with a sister company in the same industrial conglomerate, which the
interviewee describes as a means to increase purchasing power and negotiation
weight.
The share of measures as presented in the right-hand column of table 6.4.4
on the preceding page is rather misleading, however, as it compares the number
of measures that affect power or dependency with the total number of measures
the company employs for each category of bottleneck management activities
– although the number of measures in the categories identification and elimi-
nation is low in general. That it, the comparison might create the impression
that the case companies tend not to employ many measures that will alter their
relative power position. As tables 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 on page 355 show, however,
only three out of 11 identification measures and three out of eight elimination
measures affect power or dependency. That is, case company 3 employs two out
of three possible elimination measures that affect power or dependency. There-
fore, when trying to make a comparison of companies that state to be holding a
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Table 6.4.5. – Measures That Affect Power/Dependency Employed by Case Com-
panies Which Hold a Powerful Position
Case Company Reference Measures Affecting Power /
Dependency
Total Number of
Measures Affecting
Power /
Dependency
4 – raw
material trader
Section 6.2.5
on
page 247
Multiple sourcing, long-term
relationships, close relationship
with LSPs, information about
supplier capacity, substitution
of material
Total: 5
Prevention: 3
Identification: 1
Elimination: 1
5 – metal
production
Section 6.2.6
on
page 253
Multiple sourcing, high
incoming goods inventory,
blending of raw material,
networking for information
acquisition
Total: 4
Prevention: 3
Identification: 1
Elimination: 0
10 – raw
material trader
Section 6.2.11
on
page 290
Multiple sourcing, long-term
relationships
Total: 2
Prevention: 2
Identification: 0
Elimination: 0
relatively weak power position with companies that hold a powerful position in
their network, it seems more sensible to compare the absolute number of mea-
sures that affect power/dependency rather than the share of measures that affect
power/dependency.
Case companies 4, 5, and 10 can be considered powerful companies due to
both the absolute size in terms of revenue and their importance as key actors in
their respective industry. Table 6.4.5 provides an overview of measures these
companies employ which may affect their power position.
The number of measures employed that address power or dependency are
higher for the sample of relatively powerless companies. The sample of case
359
6. Findings and Discussion
studies is too small to make valid statistical inferences. The purpose of this first
comparison is to get an overview.
The comparison still seems too simplified though and thus needs additional
refinement. A question that remained unaddressed until so far is the case com-
panies’ intent to employ a particular measure. Simply put: Does a case company
employ a particular measure in order to alter its relative power position or for
other reasons, with possible alteration of the relative power position merely be-
ing a side effect? To answer this question, each of the measures discussed above
needs to be revisited with respect to its being a necessity, a deliberate choice to
increase power (or decrease dependency), or a deliberate choice for other rea-
sons than power. 11 preventive measures, three identification measures, and
three elimination measures were identified in the case studies as possible levers
for power relations in supply networks. Each measure shall be shortly revis-
ited, in some cases separately for the sample of companies which are described
as powerful and for the sample of companies that hold relatively weak posi-
tions in their network. As they were used above, the two samples were created
from selected case companies so as to support the comparison of “powerful”
and “less powerful” companies and the measures they pursue. Because no ob-
jective measure of power is available, the selection was made upon subjective
yet careful assessment of each company’s market position and purchasing vol-
ume as well as of statements made by interviews that relate to the respective
company’s power to suppliers or competitors. While it will be difficult to make
any definite statement as to which company employs what measure for what
reason, it seems worthwhile putting forth arguments for one choice or another
to shed a light on some of the possible reasoning behind decisions to employ
one particular measure or not.
Multiple Sourcing Multiple sourcing is the most prevalent measure iden-
tified in the study. Multiple sourcing can be either, a mere necessity for the
case company or a deliberate choice. It is a necessity if one source of supply
is unable to provide the focal company with the full amount of goods needed,
so that additional sources of supply are required to meet the focal company’s
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demand. Multiple sourcing can also be required by customers, as in the case of
case company 7, some of whose customers make multiple sourcing mandatory
for their suppliers. On the other hand, it can be a means to lessen dependency
on one particular supplier and to improve negotiation power. For case company
3, this is the intent behind increasing the use of multiple sourcing in the future
after it had been felt that some suppliers took advantage of their position as sole
sources. That is, the role of multiple sourcing in this study has been three-fold:
1) to open up several channels so as to be able to receive enough supply to meet
demand, 2) to meet customers’ contractual requirements, and 3) to improve the
company’s negotiation position by decreasing dependency on individual suppli-
ers. The reasoning behind the decision to make use of multiple sourcing might
even consist of a combination of these reasons, or include all three reasons at
once.
As to the preparation of alternative sources, it is unclear which of the case
companies use this option – with exception of case company 1 for which the in-
terviewee states that the company plans to increase the preparation of alternative
suppliers which will remain passive until needed. At case company 4, the in-
terviewees explain that their company often uses one primary source and some
secondary sources in terms of purchasing volume, which is similar to the idea
of maintaining a set of suppliers that are prepared to chime in as a contingency
option.
Because it is unclear to what extent the other case companies are preparing
alternative sources that remain passive, no inference can be drawn from this
point.
Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position For raw material
traders, the use of multiple sources comes rather naturally. Not every producer
is able to deliver all different qualities of a particular raw material such as lead
or tin, so that relationships with several suppliers exist at once, which, in turn,
creates redundant sources for other qualities of the same raw material. Three of
the four raw material trading firms that participate in the study are either large
or even leading in their industry (two of them listed in table 6.4.5) whereas
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one firm (case company 6) is rather small and takes a niche role. The three
larger firms are not likely to use multiple sourcing as a means to increase their
negotiation power. They are important players in their field and maintain long-
term relationships with a variety of suppliers. Furthermore, the price they pay
suppliers for the raw material which they make available to their customers has
barely any direct financial implication as it is passed through to their customers
(with a “service charge” added). Much of the material these companies buy
and sell is traded at the London Metal Exchange, so that information about
price is publicly available. Therefore, attempts to increase negotiation power
are unlikely to play an important role behind the raw material traders’ decision
to use multiple sources of supply.12
Similar reasoning can be applied to case company 5, the producer of metal.
The company is one of one of the world’s largest producers for that type of
metal. Hence, the use of multiple sources of supply seems to be a logistical
necessity rather than a means to improve the company’s power position. Also,
the sources used for the (primary) raw material the company receives are located
according to the natural distribution of this material on the globe.
Therefore, if anything can be said at all about the sample of case companies
which were labeled powerful and its the use of multiple sources, often located
in diverse geographic areas, then it seems to be largely unrelated to questions of
power and dependence and instead seems to be a necessity or a prudent business
decision so as to receive the amounts of raw material needed for their day-to-
day business. However, because of the industries the respective case companies
from this sample are active in and because of the implication this has on the way
they structure their supply network, a conclusion shall not be inferred.
12By the same token, geographic spread of sources – excluded from the set of measures that have
the potential to influence power relations anyway – seems to be a natural consequence of the
raw material traders’ use of multiple sources rather than a deliberate choice to hedge against
the risk of locally confined disruption of the supply chain. The use of raw material that is ex-
tracted from naturally distributed sources involves the use of suppliers from different places,
often different continents. Moreover, some geographic areas are dominating the availability
of supply to an extent that would render replacing these sources difficult or impossible. One
example is tin from Indonesia.
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Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position One raw
material trader – case company 6 – is part of the sample of companies that have
been identified as holding a relatively weak power position in their network.
Nonetheless, the arguments outlined above for the three more powerful raw ma-
terial traders hold for this case company, too. The use of multiple sourcing is
unlikely to represent a measure to increase power (or lower dependency) relative
to the case company’s suppliers.
Case company 1 is a manufacturer of glass-based products and as such faces
limitations inherent to the production logic of glass producers as outlined in
Section 6.2.2 (the “newspaper vendor’s problem”). Maintaining more than one
source of supply (and having some more sources prepared for contingency) thus
appears like a prudent business decisions in order to increase reliability of sup-
ply. Indeed, the need to increase reliability of supply is emphasized by the
interviewee. At the same time, the interviewee remarks that there is a tendency
that it is the more powerful suppliers which let the case company down. Thus,
multiple sourcing seems to fulfill a dual role: as a means to cope with the unpre-
dictability of supply in the case company’s industry as well as means to lessen
dependency on powerful suppliers which occasionally let the case company feel
its relative lack of importance as a customer.
Case company 3 has a tradition of using single sourcing with long-term sup-
pliers. After the company experienced disappointment with suppliers which
took advantage of their position as sole sources, the company plans to increase
the number of sources for some components, according to the interviewee.
Thus, for case company 3 the use of multiple sources seems to be clearly as-
sociated to questions of power and dependence.
For case company 7, the use of multiple (dual) sourcing in some cases is
mandatory because of the requirements imposed by some customers. Hence,
the use of multiple sourcing clearly is a necessity for this company. Because
multiple sources are required by some customers, they are available to be used
for production for other customers, too. The interviewee states that forecasts
received by some customers only cover a period of two weeks starting from the
day the forecast is received. This stresses the importance of flexibility on part
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of the case company, and thus underlines the need for multiple sources. The use
of professional trading firms as source for raw material follows the same logic
as trading firms tend to maintain a broad portfolio of sources.
Annual Framework Agreements Annual framework agreements include
an estimated amount of parts or material the focal company will purchase from
the supplier with whom it has signed the agreement. The commitment attached
to such an agreement often is bidirectional. That is, the buying firm will expect
the supplier to be able to provide the amounts stated in the agreement just like
the supplier will expect the buying firm to call off roughly the amounts stated in
the document. In practice, forecasts are often wrong and suppliers might build
up production capacities that remain largely unused when the amounts fore-
casted and stated in the framework agreement were too optimistic. When actual
call-offs significantly diverge from the amounts agreed upon, the relative power
position and quality of the supply relationship become important. In an earlier
study (Beer 2011), one interviewee from an automotive supplier described the
large discrepancies that sometimes exist between framework agreements and ac-
tual call-offs. In many cases, car makers – as the usually more powerful entities
– do not have to face consequences when demand estimations are far off.
One of the most important benefits of framework agreements is that they re-
duce surprises by fostering planning and communication about expected de-
mand. Suppliers can thereby adjust their capacity (and possibly scale up pro-
duction capacity) and customers do not have to fear that suppliers will be unpre-
pared for orders that fluctuate around the agreed upon baseline. For the buying
firm, this implies that it is less dependent on suppliers’ goodwill since an agree-
ment has already been reached.
Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position As outlined in the
previous paragraph, framework agreements provide both entities with some se-
curity in their planning. Buying firms in particular reduce the significance of
the “power element” from the relationship unless suppliers are willing to vio-
late terms and conditions of the framework agreement. Accordingly, one would
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expect that framework agreements play a less important role for powerful com-
panies. Indeed, none of the three case companies from the sample of powerful
companies has stated to be using annual framework agreements with their sup-
pliers. A study of the automotive industry (Beer 2011) reveals, however, that
framework agreements are most common for car makers and their suppliers.
One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that OEMs in the car indus-
try make extensive use of single sourcing, whereas all three companies from
the sample of powerful case companies use multiple sourcing extensively. With
single sourcing, car makers are more dependent on each individual supplier’s re-
liability so that they may try to make sure the supplier has had enough time to set
up production capacities according to the OEM’s needs, which such an agree-
ment facilitates. Powerful companies with multiple parallel sources of supply
are less dependent on each individual supplier’s reliability. Moreover, two of
the three case companies in this sample are raw material traders. While they
have framework agreements with some of their customers (so that the amounts
included in such agreements with customers can be “mirrored” into the agree-
ments with their suppliers), they may receive orders from other (new) customers
which they cannot foresee and which are more difficult to be considered within
framework agreements with their suppliers.
It should be noted again, however, that just because interviewees from this
sample of companies did not mention framework agreements with their suppli-
ers it does not necessarily mean that they do not make use of them. It could be
that interviewees did not consider framework agreements a measure of bottle-
neck management so that they remained unmentioned.
Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position Based
on the previous explanations, one would expect that companies with a relatively
weak position as compared to their suppliers make use of framework agreements
with their suppliers. In fact, within the sample of companies with a relatively
weak position in their network, all four companies use framework agreements
with their suppliers (whereas from the sample of powerful companies none of
the three companies states to be using framework agreements). This stark divi-
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sion between the two samples could suggest that annual framework agreements
are indeed understood as a means to alter, or at least to better cope with, unfavor-
able power relations. None of the interviewees, however, elaborated on the use
of framework agreements, nor on the intent behind their use. That is, the intent
remains unclear; accordingly, a causal relationship between the use of frame-
work agreements and attempts to alter power position cannot be established for
this sample.
Framework agreements indicate that supply relationships are not ad hoc and
“arm-length” but will persist for an extended period of time. In the automotive
sector, for instance, supply relationships often exceed the production life cycle
of the car (often about seven years) as small amounts of parts are delivered
during development and ramp-up of production and additional parts may be
requested as replacement parts after the regular production life cycle has ended.
That is, framework agreements often indicate long-term relationships, which
may level power and dependency, as Cook (1977) points out with reference to
Emerson (1972).
Long-term Relationships Four case companies have emphasized their ef-
fort to maintain long-term relationships with their suppliers. As pointed out
previously, the implication of long-term relationships on power constellations is
that they might level power differences to some extent. One reason why power
differences may decrease over the long-term is that companies possibly increase
their asset specificity. Asset specificity may lead to higher switching cost for ei-
ther party, possibly contributing to either party’s inclination towards stability
and endurance of the relationship.
Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position Case companies 4
and 10 have emphasized good and long-term supply relationships as a key mea-
sure to the prevention of bottlenecks in their supply network. Both companies
have considerable negotiation power due to their purchasing volume and the
leading position they hold in their respective industry segment. Both, case com-
pany 4 and case company 10 are raw material traders. Also, case company 9 –
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not part of this sample, but with considerable transaction volume nevertheless –
has stressed the importance of long-term relationships. This suggests that long-
term relationships may play a particularly important role for companies active
in raw material trade. One possible explanation is that the number of suppliers
of certain raw materials is limited by the natural distribution of such resources
and by the exploitation licenses granted by the governments of the respective
countries. Some suppliers thus hold a natural monopoly for a particular mate-
rial. Hence, long-term relationships might indeed be a means to secure access
to (sometimes scarce) resources, thus indeed addressing aspects of power and
dependence – in spite of the case companies’ impressive size and transaction
volumes.
Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position The only
company from this sample that emphasizes the importance of long-term rela-
tionships is case company 3. The interviewee at case company 3 explains that
long-term relationships with suppliers are an important part of the company’s
culture as sustainable and long-term thinking has been one of the pillars the
company was founded on. Hence, the choice to maintain long-term relation-
ships seems not to be primarily motivated by aspects of power and dependency.
High Incoming Goods Inventory Incoming goods inventory provides a
buffer against irregularities in supply. At the same time, such a buffer incurs
capital cost. Value of the material thus is one of several factors that are normally
taken into consideration when deciding about the level of incoming goods inven-
tory. By buffering irregularities in supply through inventory (instead of time),
firms increase their resilience. Although the power configuration in the network
as such is not altered, the buying firm reduces its vulnerability to supply glitches
and thus its dependency on the reliability of the supplier. The buying firm be-
comes less vulnerable to problems resulting from power disadvantages in the
supply relationship.
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Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position From the sample
of powerful firms, only case company 5 uses high incoming goods inventory.
Case company 10 does not keep any significant inventory. Case company 4
keeps enough inventory to bridge irregularities such as delayed arrival of over-
seas shipments. Because case company 4 offers a broad variety of brands it
cannot keep high inventory levels of many of them. Case company 5 uses an ex-
ternal service provider to take care of incoming material, which includes blend-
ing of material from different sources so that consistent quality is ensured when
the material is fed to the production process. An association to power or depen-
dence is not known to play a role for case company 5 in its decision to keep high
inventory.
Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position Among
this sample, two companies state to be keeping high inventory levels of incom-
ing goods.
For case company 6, keeping relatively high inventory levels is part of the
business model as it allows the company to react quickly to customer orders.
The capital cost incurred is considered in the pricing of the company’s services,
and customers seem to be willing to pay the premium in exchange for almost
immediate access to the products they need. Hence, power or dependency seem
not to be important drivers for the decision of case company 6 to keep high
levels of incoming goods inventory.
The situation is different for case company 3. The company has a tradition
of single sourcing and experienced that individual suppliers took advantage of
their position as sole sources, leading to higher prices they charged for supply
as well as to irregularities in delivery. The interviewee mentions that in one case
a supplier admitted that another customer was prioritized higher so that deliv-
ery of the material ordered by the case company were be delayed. In order to
deal with irregularities in supply, the company has kept high levels of incoming
goods inventory, according to the interviewee. Thus, it can be concluded that
power disadvantages led to the decision to keep high levels of incoming goods
inventory.
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Penalty Clauses for Non-Compliance Kumar (2005) mentions punitive
capability as one type of power. Penalty clauses for non-compliance can be
considered one way to formalize punitive capability in supply contracts. Non-
compliance can refer to the supplier’s inability to deliver according to the frame-
work agreement, e.g., too low amounts, insufficient quality, or too late. By the
terms of the contract, suppliers could be held responsible for financial losses
that the buying firm has to bear because of the supplier’s performance.
In some cases, penalty clauses for non-compliance exist but are not actively
enforced. In the automobile industry, car manufacturers tend to include penalty
clauses in contracts with suppliers. If automotive suppliers had to bear the (often
enormously high) cost for production interruptions at car makers, however, they
might be forced to file for bankruptcy, which would cause even more severe
irregularities in supply. Also, interviewees in an earlier study suggested that
in spite of penalty clauses in contracts, the buying firm might rather seek a
“cooperative” solution with the supplier (Beer 2011).
The interviewee at case company 8 (not part of either sample) raises the point
that buying firms dealing with much larger suppliers might not be able to include
penalty clauses in supply contracts against the will of the supplier. That is, com-
panies might have to possess a certain amount of power in the first place so as to
be able to include penalty clauses; the power gap must not be too large. On the
other hand, the power advantage, e.g., due to company size and turnover, must
not be too large, either, so as to not risking the supplier survival. Accordingly,
penalty clauses seem to be an effective instrument only in network configura-
tions where buying firm and supplier are of comparable size and power.
Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position None of the com-
panies from this sample (nor any larger company not part of the sample) has
stated to be using penalty clauses in supply contracts. As in other cases, it does
not mean that penalty clauses are never used but merely that they remained un-
mentioned by the interviewees. One possible explanation is that two of the case
companies from this sample are raw material traders and the third company, too,
receives raw material directly from mines. Possibly, it might not be common to
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have penalty clauses in such supply relations. None of the other raw material
traders that are not part of this sample states to be using penalty clauses, either.
Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position Two com-
panies from this sample state to be using penalty clauses for non-compliance in
supply contracts.
The interviewee at case company 1 emphasizes that he would like to expand
the use of penalty clauses and include them in a greater number of new sup-
ply contracts. At case company 3, the interviewee says that 90% of all supply
contracts do not include penalty clauses, which may be explained with the com-
pany’s emphasis on good and long-term supply relations which would probably
not be supported by punitive action. This is in spite of the fact that the company
was adversely affected by suppliers’ material allocation decisions in the past (cf.
Section 6.2.4).
Hence, it is not possible to draw any clear conclusion about the use of penalty
clauses in supply contracts by companies with a relatively weak position in their
network. One company plans to increase the use of penalty clauses while the
other company uses them only infrequently (and does not indicate that this about
to be changed).
Sourcing to Professional Traders By sourcing to professional traders,
companies tap the ability of such suppliers to ensure reliable supply from a
broad variety of sources. Also, as the interviews with four raw material traders
suggest, professional traders tend to maintain a very high service level with their
customers for this is one key requirement to be successful in their business. The
strategies the traders employ differ with respect to inventory they keep. Two
traders maintain extensive inventory so as to be able to serve customer orders
from stock at short notice. One trader does serve orders from stock, too, but
notes that the inventory level is not particularly high and serves to bridge irreg-
ularities in supply. One trader does not keep any significant amounts of material
on stock but passes through material from suppliers to customers (with higher
order lead time than the other traders). In either case, interviewees emphasize
370
6.4. Analysis of Interview Data Phase III: Reference to Literature and Conceptual Model
that reliable order fulfillment is key in their business so that customers can be
sure to receive the material on schedule as ordered.
Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position Two of the three
companies from the subset of powerful companies are professional traders them-
selves and receive their material directly from producers of that material. Case
company 5, the one remaining company in this set, has not mentioned sourc-
ing to professional traders. That is, the data base for this sample is not suited
to make any inference about the relationship between sourcing to professional
traders and the intent to alter power relations in the network.
Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position Sourcing
to professional traders was mentioned by two companies from the total set of
companies and by one company – case company 7 – from the subset of compa-
nies with a relatively weak position in their network.
For many products, case company 7 receives demand forecasts only for a
very short time period. Some of the company’s customers stress the importance
of reliable supply, which is why they make sourcing to at least two suppliers
(which they will have to approve prior to contract closure) mandatory for the
case company. Professional raw material traders – at least those which keep
much of their material on stock so as to be able to meet customer orders at short
notice – provide flexibility and a high service level which the case company is
dependent on. Moreover, the amounts of material the case company receives
from its suppliers are likely to be considered “insignificant” by some larger sup-
pliers, which might make sourcing to professional traders necessary for smaller
amounts can be ordered. Though the latter argument is rather speculative and
inferred by analogy to case company 8, it seems likely that case company 7 has
made the decision to use professional traders out of necessity or prudence rather
than with respect to alter power relations.
Close Relationship with LSP Two case companies stressed the impor-
tance of good relationships with logistics service providers (LSPs). The under-
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lying logic as to why a close relationships with an LSP may alter power relations
is analogous to framework agreements and long-term relationships. The parties
become invested with each other so that power differences may decrease.
Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position One firm from the
sample of powerful companies emphasizes good relationships with their LSPs
as being important for their business. In addition, case company 2 which is not
part of this sample but also of considerable size points out that they take care
of the contract with LSPs even for their supply – and do not leave this to their
suppliers.
There is no clearly visible evidence, however, that the decision to maintain
a close relationship with an LSP has to do with attempts to increase power or
lower dependency.
Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position None of
the case companies from this sample mentions close relationships with LSPs as
an important instrument. This creates the appearance that close relationships
with LSPs are not considered a common measure to elevate the power position
of the firm as compared to their LSPs or even suppliers.
Combined Purchasing Combined purchasing was mentioned by two case
companies (one of which within the sample of weak companies) and was de-
scribed as a direct attempt to increase the company’s negotiation power as com-
pared to its suppliers by increasing the purchasing volume at stake.
Sample of Companies Holding a Powerful Position None of the in-
terviewees at companies from the sample of powerful companies mentions the
use of combined purchasing, e.g., with other companies of the same conglomer-
ate. The most obvious possible explanation is that companies which are already
powerful and purchase large volumes do not need to further increase the pur-
chasing volumes by combining the purchasing process with other entities.
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It can be noted, however, that there are cases where even powerful companies
teamed up for combined purchasing. There are cooperation projects for com-
bined purchasing between large car makers, which are usually limited, however,
to certain components (such as hybrid batteries) or regions (e.g., NAFTA region
or China) (Beer 2011).
Nonetheless, there is no evidence that such a strategy is pursued by any of the
powerful case companies in the sample as a means to increase power.
Sample of Companies Holding a Relatively Weak Position Case com-
pany 7 is combining some of its purchasing activities with a sister company from
within the same industrial conglomerate. As the interviewee explains, the de-
clared goal is to increase negotiation power as compared to suppliers through
higher purchasing volumes at stake. Therefore, this is a clear case of a company
with a relatively weak position in the network making an attempt to decrease
the power disadvantage to suppliers by combining purchasing activities with a
third party.
Blending of Raw Material The blending of raw material prior to its feeding
to the production process is a measure with very limited application outside a
range of chemical processes and companies, which is why the discussion of this
point is not further divided into the sample of powerful and relatively weakly
positioned companies.
When raw material from different sources is blended – whether it is vine
grapes, olives, or copper concentrate – the operator is able to create a stan-
dardized quality that lets him run the actual production operation without much
variation of the parameters he would otherwise have to adjust if the quality of
the raw material varied. At the same time, it makes the company more inde-
pendent of any specific source of its raw material. Theoretically, the company
would then be able to use greater amounts from a supplier with more beneficial
terms or better pricing.
Although it cannot be stated with certainty that greater independence has not
been one aspect, it is much more likely that the decision to blend raw material
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from different sources prior to the production process of case company 5 is
to support stability in the – somewhat inflexible – production process so that
production parameters do not have to be varied.
Measures of Bottleneck Identification (Networking, Information About
Supplier Capacity, Monitoring) Three bottleneck identification measures
were identified which can be associated with the altering of power configura-
tions in the supply network. Generally, all such measures aim to improve infor-
mation access and thereby create an information surplus for the case company.
Good and actionable information provide advantages for decision-making at the
companies – regardless of possible advantages for the configuration of power
that might be attached. It might be too far a stretch to argue that any of the ac-
tions that fall into the category of bottleneck identification and that were asso-
ciated with potential power advantages – networking activities for information
acquisition, collecting information about supplier capacity, and monitoring of
supplier activity – are selected for reasons of gaining power advantage. There is
no evidence from the interviews with the case companies that increase of power
or decrease of dependency have been important aspects behind the decision to
put such measures into action.
Measures of Bottleneck Elimination (Substitution of Material, In-
house Production, Escalation to Management) The substitution of
material is a bottleneck elimination measure that is chosen by four of the case
companies, one from the sample of powerful companies, two from the sample
of companies with a relative weak position in their network, and one company
from outside either sample. The underlying mechanism is that another com-
ponent or raw material replaces the component or raw material originally de-
manded when for some reason these are not available (in sufficient amounts).
Raw material (such as different types of metal) of lower purity, for instance, can
often be replaced by raw material of higher purity which would normally not be
chosen for the higher purity tends to come at higher (purchasing) cost and might
not provide an advantage for the particular application. Companies can thereby
374
6.4. Analysis of Interview Data Phase III: Reference to Literature and Conceptual Model
reduce their dependency on an particular supplier or a particular raw material.
The substitution of material does usually not come for free. New material
might have to be approved for production by quality auditors, the company may
not have time for extensive testing and thus runs the risk of disappointing cus-
tomers should the material turn out not fulfill quality expectations, and – in case
of purchase of raw material – material of higher purity tends to be more expen-
sive than material of lower purity Therefore, material substitution can be con-
sidered a contingency measure that under most circumstances would be avoided
and becomes only reasonably applicable should the material or component orig-
inally demanded be unavailable in sufficient amounts, i.e., should the original
material be subject to a supply bottleneck. It is clearly a reactive measure; it
does not alter power configurations upfront so as to prevent supply bottlenecks
in the first place. Instead, the substitution of material is a reaction and aims to re-
solve bottlenecks. As such, although it does reduce the company’s dependency
on the availability of supply from one or more particular source(s), power and
dependency appear to be secondary rather than primary aspects. Moreover, the
ability to substitute material seems to be influenced too much by the industry the
respective company is operating in: Three of the four case companies that state
to be using substitution of material in bottleneck situations are purchasing raw
material (as opposed to manufacture/assembled goods); homogenous material
– arguably – is easier to replace with another homogenous material with simi-
lar characteristics than assembled or manufactured components to whose shape
and configuration often many different companies have contributed and which
might stand in complex interdependency with other components to which they
will be mounted, welded, or otherwise attached.
Therefore, it must be concluded that based upon the data from this study no
evidence can be found that the substitution of material is – consciously – asso-
ciated to questions of power by the firms employing this measure. This does
not exclude the possibility that in other cases, firms may choose to develop
contingency options such as the substitution of material so as to increase their
independence from particular suppliers or particular types of raw material – and
thereby reduce possible disadvantages that result from a “power gap” to suppli-
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ers or “competing” customers of the same suppliers. For the case data at hand,
however, such a causal connection cannot be established for the substitution of
material.
The same applies to the two other bottleneck elimination measures that were
found to have a possible relation to power or dependency, in-house production
of components that are normally produced and delivered by suppliers, and es-
calation to management.
In many cases, production firms are able to produce a component in-house
that for reasons of efficiency was outsourced to an external supplier. The pro-
duction of material in-house – as opposed to receiving the same material from
a supplier – can be considered a special case of “switching sources”, with the
specialty being that the new source of supply is internal. Also, it is similar
to the substitution of material in that it allows the company concerned to con-
tinue production and sales. In-house production was mentioned by two case
companies as an option that can be pursued in case of insufficient supply, one
of which is part of the sample of companies with a relatively weak position in
their network. As with the previous measure, the two samples of companies are
not suited well to draw any conclusion as to a possible causal relation between
thinking in terms of power and maintaining the capability to produce in-house.
For one thing, two of the three case companies from the sample of powerful
companies and one company from the sample of companies with a relatively
weak position in their network are raw material traders and do not possess any
production capacity – they buy and sell. For another thing, the third company
from the sample of powerful companies receives natural raw material from its
suppliers as input to the production process which has to be mined and thus
cannot be produced in-house. Therefore, a clear statement as to a possible rela-
tionship between power or dependence and in-house production cannot be made
based upon the case data.
As to the escalation to management, it is clearly a way to harness the power
of hierarchy and to improve the organization’s negotiation position as compared
to the counterpart. It is merely leveraging the power the organization already
has, however, rather than improving its power position as a whole. The rela-
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tive power of the organization as such is not altered. The interviewee at case
company 3 – from the sample of companies with a relatively weak position in
their network – mentions this options as a way to increase pressure on the ne-
gotiation counter-part at the supplier so as to achieve higher prioritization of
the case company’s needs on the supplier’s “agenda”. It can be speculated as
to whether companies with a weak power position in their network would need
to involve management to increase pressure in negotiations about the continu-
ation of supply more often than powerful companies would. Though it would
appeal to reason, the data won through the interviews in this study do not pro-
vide enough evidence for a clear answer. While there is only one company in
this study that explicitly mentioned that management sometimes is involved to
resolve problems that are impossible to solve or take too much time to solve
on a lower hierarchical level, in an earlier study (Beer 2011) it became evident
that even large car manufacturers with high reputation and market power retreat
to involving higher management hierarchies to resolve problems with suppliers
should the situation be such that critical parts cannot be delivered on time and
there is explicit risk of production line stoppage at the car manufacturer due
to lack of supply. That is, even company’s possessing a high power position in
their network “escalate” problems to management to accelerate the development
of a solution when negotiation with suppliers.
Summary and Critical Review The review of bottleneck management
measures with respect to their meaning for power and dependence was intended
to shed light on the question as to whether a causal connection can be estab-
lished between a company’s relative power position in its supply network and
measures of bottleneck management it employs. The results of this review are
mixed.
The review suffers from a variety of constraints, so that the conclusion has
to be formulated with caution. The overall number of companies involved in
the case study is small, and so are the numbers of companies selected for each
of the two samples. Hence, valid statistical inferences are impossible. The ap-
proach has therefore been to look at the situation of each individual case com-
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pany within the samples so as to better understand the reasoning or intent be-
hind choosing to perform a certain measure. More specifically, the question was
whether the intent behind choosing a measure was (1.) merely a business neces-
sity (or at least a prudent business decision), (2.) an attempt to improve the case
company’s power position in the network, or (3.) deliberate for other reasons
than power.
For some of the measures, a light could be shed on the intention by separately
analyzing and then comparing the two samples of companies. For other mea-
sures, this was not possible because other factors or properties of the entities
were likely to influence the outcome too much so that an isolated analysis of
aspects of power would have lead to distorted results. Two of the most power-
ful case companies, for instance, are both active in raw material trade, while the
third one is also purchasing raw material (as opposed to manufactured or assem-
bled components) as input to its production process. This makes the sample un-
suitable for the analysis of measures such as “sourcing to professional traders”.
By the same token, no statements about a causal relationship between “blend-
ing of raw material” and power or dependence can sensibly be made since this
is an option that companies that purchase assembled or otherwise manufactured
components (as opposed to homogenous raw material) cannot pursue. Other
factors that inhibited the analysis of bottleneck management measures and their
relationships to power and dependence are incomplete information about bot-
tleneck management activities (not every interviewee responded with the same
level of detail; not every interviewee was aware of all measures – or might not
consider certain activities as related to bottleneck management) as well as the
lack of an objective measure of power, so that the creation of the samples of
powerful and less powerful companies was based on the researcher’s subjective
assessment won through the interviews. The review is summarized in Table
6.4.6.
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Table 6.4.6. – Summary: Review of Bottleneck Management Measures That
Seem to be Chosen for Reasons of Power
Measure [A] Sample of
Firms with
Powerful
Network Position
[B] Sample of
Firms with
Relatively Weak
Network Position
Summary
Multiple
Sourcing
Necessity: 4, 5,
10
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: 1, 6, 7
For power: 1, 3
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Sample [B] provides
evidence that firms with low
power in their supply
network choose multiple
sourcing to reduce
dependency. No conclusion
can be drawn about sample
[A], however.
Annual
Framework
Agreements
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: 1, 3, 6,
7
Framework agreements were
not mentioned in sample [A]
while all interviewees from
sample [B] state to be using
framework agreements. This
division might suggest that a
company’s power position
and its decision to use
framework agreements are
not independent of each
other. More detailed
information could not be
obtained, so that a clear
conclusion can be drawn
with certainty.
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Long-Term
Relationships
Necessity: 4, 10
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: 3
Unclear: –
That no entity of sample [B]
associates this measure with
power suggests that
relationships are not
normally maintained over
the long term for reasons of
power. For the two entities
of sample [A] that
emphasize long-term
relationships they seem to be
mostly a business necessity.
High
Incoming
Goods
Inventory
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: 5
Unclear: –
Necessity: 6
For power: 3
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
The interviewee at case
company 3 indicated that
high inventory levels have
been a measure that was used
to cope with irregularities in
supply. For case company 3,
irregularities in supply are at
least partly related to power
disadvantage. Thus, there is
evidence that the use of this
measure was motivated by
reasons of power.
Penalty
Clauses for
Non-
Compliance
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: 1, 3
No conclusion can be drawn
about the use of penalty
clauses and its relationship
to power and dependence.
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Sourcing to
Professional
Traders
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: 7
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Because two of the three
companies from sample [A]
are professional traders
themselves, the sample is not
suited to draw any
conclusion about a possible
causal relationships between
sourcing to professional
traders and power. For
sample [B], too, the data
does not allow any clear
conclusion.
Close
Relationship
to LSPs
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: 4
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
The data does not provide
any evidence as to a possible
causal relationship between
the power position of a firm
in its supply network and its
maintaining a close
relationship to LSPs.
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Combined
Purchasing
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: 7
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
For case company 7, the
interviewee made clear that
the intent behind the use of
combined purchasing with a
sister company is to increase
the companies’ negotiation
power. While other reasons
are certainly conceivable,
too, to combine purchasing
functions, increased power
may well be among the
dominant reasons.
Blending of
Raw Material
Necessity: 5
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Only one case company
blends the raw material prior
to using it in the production
process. In this case, it
seems to be a prudent
business decisions rather
than primarily an attempt to
alter power relationships.
Measures of
Bottleneck
Identification
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
No evidence can be found to
establish a causal
relationship between the
three measures of bottleneck
identification priorly
identified in this context and
the intent to alter power
relations.
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Measures of
Bottleneck
Elimination
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
Necessity: –
For power: –
Other reasons: –
Unclear: –
The samples are not suited to
establish a possible causal
relationship between the
intent to use these measures
and power/dependency.
In short, the proposition which was discussed – and which continues to be
up for testing – is as follows: A relatively weak power position in supply net-
work leads a buying firm to the selection of bottleneck management measures
that improve its relative power as compared to, or lessen its dependency on,
suppliers.
Some evidence for this proposition could be identified from the case study
data, yet the data set is too sparse and the samples are less than optimal. The
analysis of the intent behind chosing specific bottleneck management measures
does, however, provide a fruitful basis for further study of this proposition.
6.4.2.4. Summary
The preceding discussion demonstrates that many measures of bottleneck man-
agement, especially those that are preventive in nature, can serve to alter existing
power relations in supply networks in favor of the focal firm and in some cases
are recognized and employed by case companies for this purpose. This implies
that power relations play a more important role in supply networks than the
body of literature on Supply Chain Management suggests. Non-adjacent power
regimes were identified as important constructs that can influence the outcome
of the focal firm. Literature on SCM still tends to emphasize the primacy of co-
operation while many measures firms employ in practice to make their supply
situation work in fact aim to increase their power or reduce their dependency,
respectively.
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6.4.3. Bottleneck Management and Risk
6.4.3.1. How Bottleneck Management Aims to Control Risk Factors
In Section 3.6, risk was defined as “uncertainty about and severity of the con-
sequences of an activity” (Aven 2010). The bottleneck management activities
identified in this thesis can be related to this definition of risk.
As it is apparent from the definition chosen for this thesis, risk consists of
two main factors. The first factor is uncertainty. Uncertainty in this context
refers to the incomplete information an organization has with regard to the pos-
sible emergence of a bottleneck. The second factor is the severity of the con-
sequences. Provided a bottleneck emerges, the consequences may be severe or
not, depending on contingency plans, the measures the organization has taken,
chance, et cetera. Organizations can choose to tackle each of the two factors
with their bottleneck management activities, so as to reduce the uncertainty as
well as the severity of bottlenecks in their supply. The data analysis has shown
that organizations indeed tackle both factors. Table 6.4.7 provides an overview
of preventive bottleneck management measures and how they affect each of the
two constituting factors of risk.
Table 6.4.7. – Preventive Bottleneck Management Measures and How They Af-
fect Risk
Measure Risk Factor
(Uncertainty /
Consequences)
Explanation Case
References
Multiple
sourcing
(parallel)
Uncertainty Use of multiple sources in
parallel decreases the chance
that supply interruptions will
occur and affect production
capability.
all
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Multiple
sourcing
(alternative)
Consequence Preparation of alternative
sources allows the firm to
switch sources at short notice
and thereby mitigates adverse
effects of supply bottleneck at
original source.
unclear
Annual
framework
agreements
Uncertainty Framework agreements prepare
suppliers for estimated demand
and thereby reduce uncertainty
concerning production capacity
reserves.
1, 2, 3, 6, 7,
8
High incoming
goods
inventory
Consequence Incoming goods inventory
allows the firm to continue
production for some time
should supply interruptions
emerge.
3, 4, 5, 6, 9
Supplier audits Uncertainty Supplier audits reveal potential
shortcomings at suppliers’
production sites and provide
the basis for improvement
measures that will help avoid
emergence of bottlenecks.
Awareness both of suppliers
and focal firms is increased.
1, 2, 7, 8
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Long-term
relationships
Uncertainty Long-term relationships
support trust, mutual
understanding of, and
communication between the
parties involved, thereby
decreasing the chance of
interruptions.
3, 4, 9, 10
Standardized
sourcing
criteria
Uncertainty Standardized sourcing criteria
are meant to define a proven
standard for sourcing decisions
that will help reduce the chance
of supply interruptions.
1, 2, 8, 9
Buying power
and reputation
Uncertainty Suppliers seem to be less likely
to let down customers who are
considered important.
4, 5, 10
Consignment
warehouse
Uncertainty Consignment warehouses
provide transparency as to
actual height of inventory at the
customer’s site and thus
decrease the chance of
understocking.
6, 8
PCF agreement Uncertainty PCF agreements help cope with
variations in demand and
thereby help avoid physical
bottlenecks.
1, 3
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Sourcing to
professional
traders
Uncertainty Professional traders maintain a
broad supplier portfolio and
thus are less likely to be unable
to deliver as promised.
7, 8
Suppliers
receive forecast
data
Uncertainty Providing suppliers with
forecast data reduces
uncertainty and thus the chance
of irregularities in supply.
2, 3
Supplier
development
programs
Uncertainty Supplier development and
training aims to improve
suppliers’ operational
capabilities and thereby
contributes to decreased chance
of supply interruptions.
2, 8
Close
relationships
with LSPs
Both Close relationships foster
communication and
cooperation with LSPs and
there reduce the chance of
irregularities in delivery. At the
same time, close relationships
open up the venue for
improved options for recovery
in case of contingencies.
2, 4
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Preference for
suppliers with
short lead time
Both Short lead time facilitates
catching up with production
and delivery schedule should
irregularities arise and
decreases the chance of
irregularities in the first place.
3
Suppliers
maintain safety
stock
Consequence Safety stock at supplier sites
provides a buffer against
slipping supply schedules.
2
Information
about supplier
capacity
Uncertainty Information about capacity
available at suppliers’
production sites helps firms
plan for contingencies and
thereby reduces uncertainty.
4
Combined
purchasing
Uncertainty Higher buying/negotiation
power increases customer’s
importance for the supplier and
supports preferred treatment.
7
Suppliers
belong to same
corporation
Both Choosing suppliers which
belong to the same
organization is likely to enable
the focal firm to exploit the
strong ties and thereby reduce
chance of irregularities and
invoke preferred treatment
should irregularities arise.
10
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Blending of
raw material
Consequence Blending of raw material from
different sources enables the
firm to compensate the loss of
one source of supply by
increasing the share of supply
it sources to another supplier,
which increases resilience
against production
interruptions.
5
Scenario
planning
Uncertainty Scenario planning increases the
awareness of the firm for
possible sources of
interruptions and thus supports
the identification of suitable
measures to prevent
unfavourable incidents.
5
The table shows that among preventive measures there is a strong focus on re-
duction of uncertainty while mitigation of consequences plays a rather marginal
role. Mitigation measures can be found instead in the bottleneck exploitation
and elimination categories: all measures of these categories aim to mitigate
the adverse effect of bottlenecks once they have emerged or eliminate bottle-
necks, respectively, which is only logical given that exploitation and elimina-
tion measures can only be employed reactively – once the bottleneck is already
there. Bottleneck identification as such does neither affect uncertainty nor con-
sequence but rather provides the basis for exploitation and elimination mea-
sures. Table 6.4.8 provides a short summary.
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Table 6.4.8. – Summary: Bottleneck Management Activities and Risk Factors
Bottleneck Management
Activity
Risk Factor (Uncertainty / Consequence)
Bottleneck Prevention Mostly reduction of uncertainty, partly
mitigation of consequences
Bottleneck Identification Provides information base for mitigation of
consequences (exploitation or elimination)
Bottleneck Exploitation Mitigation of consequences
Bottleneck Elimination Mitigation of consequences
6.4.3.2. Summary
The short analysis of the relationship between bottleneck management mea-
sures and risk suggests that bottleneck management measures as identified in
the multiple-case study provide the means to tackle both of the factors that con-
stitute risk: uncertainty and severity of consequences. Bottleneck management
thus can represent a valuable building block to risk management in supply net-
works, often referred to as Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM). Measures
of bottleneck prevention predominantly aim to reduce uncertainty. As explained
in Section 3.6, uncertainty includes – but is not limited to – probability. Several
bottleneck prevention measures aim to reduce the probability of the emergence
of unplanned bottlenecks. Bottleneck exploitation and bottleneck elimination
address the second factor of risk which is severity of consequences. These mea-
sures aim to decrease the severity of supply bottlenecks. Bottleneck identifica-
tion provides the information basis therefor.
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Hence, risk management and bottleneck management are not exclusive. In-
stead, each discipline approaches an overlapping set of objectives from different
angles and with different conceptual foci. A bottleneck management perspec-
tive is likely to provide value to and augments risk management as it introduces
additional viewpoints. By the same token, research on risk management is likely
to add additional value on bottleneck management.
6.4.4. Bottleneck Management and Flexibility
6.4.4.1. How Bottleneck Management Increases Flexibility or
Reduces Variability
Lean, agile, and leagile supply setups for supply networks were discussed in
sections 3.3 and 3.5, respectively. Reduction has been said to be one core con-
cept of Lean. To make a system lean, reduction efforts are directed towards,
for instance, complexity, variability, batch size, inventory and – more generally,
but maybe most importantly – waste. What is considered slack in a more con-
ventional production paradigm, or flexibility in an Agile paradigm, is seen as
waste in a Lean system. The absence of capacity and inventory buffers makes
Lean systems more likely to retreat to using a time buffer should irregularities
arise. Using time as a buffer is a more elegant way to express that production
and delivery are delayed.
From the analysis of the case studies it appears that buffering through time
is not favored by the companies participating in this study. This inference is
made based upon the number of bottleneck management measures that aim to
increase flexibility as a means to cope with variability and irregularities. This
does not imply that companies do not aim to reduce variability at the same time.
It becomes clear from the data analysis, however, that the case companies in
this study do not rely on a stable environment but instead seem to anticipate
variability and prepare for it. Table 6.4.9 provides an overview. The table shows
that the case companies employ a variety of preventive measures that directly or
indirectly aim to decrease variability whereas some measures seem to emphasize
flexibility.
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Table 6.4.9. – Preventive Measures of Bottleneck Management That Aim to In-
crease Flexibility or to Reduce Variability
Measure Increases
Flexibility /
Reduces
Variability
Explanation Case
References
Multiple
sourcing
Increases
flexibility
The use of multiple sources in
parallel as well as the
preparation of one or several
alternative sources is a measure
to cope with variability for it
increases flexibility.
all
Annual
framework
agreements
Reduces
variability
Annual framework agreements
provide suppliers with
information about demand and
requirements they can expect
from their customers, which
enables them to be prepared
and smoothen operations.
1, 2, 3, 6, 7,
8
High incoming
goods
inventory
Increases
flexibility
High incoming goods inventory
allows the company to react to
unexpected surge in demand
which suppliers might have
difficulties to be responsive to.
3, 4, 5, 6, 9
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Supplier audits Reduces
variability
Supplier audits as a preventive
measure are to increase the
likelihood that the supplier
meets requirements as
demanded by the customer.
1, 2, 7, 8
Long-term
relationships
Reduces
variability
Long-term relationships
support trust and facilitate
communication, thereby
improving information
transmission which stabilizes
supply relationships.
3, 4, 9, 10
Standardized
sourcing
criteria
Reduces
variability
Use of proven, standardized
sourcing criteria helps avoid
“surprises” in sourcing
decisions and support stability,
thereby reducing variability.
1, 2, 8, 9
Consignment
warehouse
Reduces
variability
By supporting transparency as
to actual inventory levels
consignment warehouse
contribute to smoother, less
variable material flow.
6, 8
PCF agreement Increases
flexibility
PCF agreements include
flexibility requirements for
suppliers.
1, 3
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Sourcing to
professional
traders
Increases
flexibility
By sourcing to traders who
maintain multiple sources of
supply the focal firms makes
use of traders’ flexibility.
7, 8
Suppliers
receive forecast
data
Reduces
variability
Forecast data enables suppliers
to plan their capacities so that
variability in the process can be
reduced.
2, 3
Supplier
development
program
Reduces
variability
Supplier development and
training aims to improve
suppliers’ operational
capabilities and thereby reduce
variability in operations.
2, 8
Close
relationships
with LSPs
Increases
flexibility
Close relationships with LSPs
support finding solutions in
case of contingencies.
2, 4
Preference for
suppliers with
short lead time
Increases
flexibility
Short lead time enables
suppliers to respond quickly to
fluctuations, e.g., in demand,
and the selection of suppliers
with short lead time thereby
increases the focal firm’s
flexibility.
3
Suppliers
maintain safety
stock
Increases
flexibility
Inventory of finished goods can
provide additional flexibility in
case of fluctuating order
call-offs.
2
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Information
about supplier
capacity
Reduces
variability
Availability of information
about supplier capacity
prepares the focal firm for
possible delays in the supply
process so that contingency
plans can be devised well in
advance and variability can be
reduced, e.g., by tapping
additional sources of supply.
4
Blending of
raw material
Increases
flexibility
Blending of raw material
increases flexibility as to the
exact proportions of raw
material received from the
individual suppliers.
5
From the discussion above, it can be inferred that none of the case compa-
nies relies on Lean/JiT as the dominant paradigm in their supply network. Eight
measures that aim to reduce variability are accompanied by nine measures that
aim to increase flexibility. Flexibility is normally created by some sort of redun-
dancy, slack, or extra capacity, each of which would be considered waste in a
Lean environment. What could be shown is that instead of confining themselves
to measures that aim to reduce variability, the case companies seem to seek a
balance between decreasing variability and improving their ability to cope with
variability, that is, to increase flexibility.
Either way, the implications are worthwhile noting. In the literature review
of Chapter 2, different types of manufacturing systems (Section 2.2) as well as
different types of supply networks (Section 2.5.6), and how they match, were
discussed. In Chapter 3, the concepts of Lean (Section 3.3), Agile, and Leagile
(both Section 3.5) were reviewed. Flexibility and variability are key concepts
and parameters to both production strategies and supply network strategies. It
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appears that the selection of bottleneck management measures, through their
addressing of flexibility or variability, respectively, can shape the organization’s
profile in a way that influences its match with both the internal production as
well as with the supply network. It shall not be inferred that case companies
have chosen particular meausures for that purpose, yet it can be said that bottle-
neck management measures provide another lever to improve an organization’s
strategic fit with management of production and supply.
6.4.4.2. Summary
This section illustrated the use of bottleneck management measures in their role
of either increasing flexibility in order to cope with variability – or of decreas-
ing variability in the first place. That is, by framing the discussion of bottleneck
management measures in terms of flexibility and variability, another dual role
can be identified in addition to the two identified in previous sections (address-
ing power or dependency and addressing uncertainty or severity of outcome).
Relating bottleneck management to flexibility enhances the literary discourse on
supply network strategies and their fit with manufacturing system paradigms.
6.4.5. Summary: Roles of Bottleneck Management Measures
The preceding discussion demonstrates that companies can make a variety of
decisions when they design and maintain their supply network and manage bot-
tlenecks. Among these decisions, three different choices companies have to
make could be distilled from the case study data and were related to the relevant
literature. Preventive measures appear to fulfill different roles, each of which is
dual in nature. They can increase the focal company’s power in a supply rela-
tionship (or reduce its dependency), reduce uncertainty (or increase mitigation
capability), and increase the company’s flexibility (or reduce variability). Some
measures fulfill multiple roles at once, others affect only one parameter. Table
6.4.10 provides an overview. These different roles make certain measures suit-
able for some environments rather than for others. The discussion of different
types of manufacturing systems in Section 2.2, of different types of supply net-
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works in Section 2.5.6, as well as of Lean and Agile in Sections 3.3and 3.5,
respectively, indicate different requirements for bottleneck management which
measures with certain roles can meet better than others. Agile environments,
for instance, may invoke the use of measures that increase flexibility, whereas
measures that reduce variability would be favored in lean environments.
The table also shows that the most popular measures that could be identified
among the case studies tend to serve different purposes at once. They do, for
instance, at the same time decrease dependency on individual suppliers, reduce
uncertainty in the process, and increase the focal company’s flexibility.
Table 6.4.10. – Summary: Roles of Preventive Bottleneck Management Measures
Measure Power
Relations:
Increases
Power or
Reduces
Dependency
Risk: Reduce
Uncertainty or
Cope with
Consequences
Increase
Flexibility or
Reduce
Variability
Case
References
Multiple
sourcing
(parallel)
Decreases
dependency,
increases
power (can
decrease
power)
Reduces
uncertainty
Increases
flexibility
all
Multiple
sourcing
(alternative)
Decreases
dependency
Helps cope
with
consequences
Increases
flexibility
unclear
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Annual
framework
agreements
Decreases
dependency
Reduces
uncertainty
Reduces
variability
1, 2, 3, 6, 7,
8
Geographic
spread of
sources
Decreases
dependency
Reduces
uncertainty
Increases
flexibility
4, 6, 8, 9,
10
High incoming
goods
inventory
Decreases
dependency
Helps cope
with
consequences
Increases
flexibility
3, 4, 5, 6, 9
Supplier audits Reduces
uncertainty
Reduces
variability
1, 2, 7, 8
Long-term
relationships
Levels power
and
dependency
Reduces
uncertainty
Reduces
variability
3, 4, 9, 10
Standardized
sourcing
criteria
Reduces
uncertainty
Reduces
variability
1, 2, 8, 9
Buying power
and reputation
Reduces
uncertainty
4, 5, 10
Penalty clauses
for non-
compliance
Increases
power
1, 3, 8
Consignment
warehouse
Reduces
uncertainty
Reduces
variability
6, 8
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PCF agreement Reduces
uncertainty
Increases
flexibility
1, 3
Sourcing to
professional
traders
Decreases
dependency
Reduces
uncertainty
Increases
flexibility
7, 8
Suppliers
receive forecast
data
Reduces
uncertainty
Reduces
variability
2, 3
Supplier
development
programs
Reduces
uncertainty
Reduces
variability
2, 8
Close
relationships
with LSPs
Increases
power (can
increase inter-
dependence
and thereby
level power)
Both Increases
flexibility
2, 4
Preference for
suppliers with
short lead time
Both Increases
flexibility
3
Suppliers
maintain safety
stock
Helps cope
with
consequences
Increases
flexibility
2
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Combined
purchasing for
higher buying
power
Increases
power
Reduces
uncertainty
7
Information
about supplier
capacity
Reduces
variability
4
Blending of
raw material
Decreases
dependency
Increases
flexibility
5
Scenario
Planning
Reduces
uncertainty
5
6.4.6. About the Validity of the Supply Chain Model and
Supply Chain Management
The last (three-parted) research question relates to the discussion in Section
2.4.4 where the validity of the notion of supply chains as well as the related
and popular field of Supply Chain Management was questioned. The proposi-
tion was that the mental model generated by the name supply chain does not
adequately reflect the interorganizational structure that is created based on the
requirements of buying (receiving) and selling (supplying) companies.
Research question 7a was: Is the notion of supply chains (as opposed to sup-
ply networks) useful and does it represent interorganizational structures which
the case companies are part of?
A tentative claim was put forth in Section 2.5.4 that negates this research
question. The data analysis following the case study interviews has provided ad-
ditional evidence that support this claim. In particular, the fact that case compa-
nies experienced supply shortages because suppliers prioritized other customers
higher speaks to the importance of the notion and the understanding of net-
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works:
“[Suppliers tell us] sometimes that we are too small as a customer
so that we are not of high importance and that orders for larger
customers have to be finished first” (interviewee at case company
3).
“So several times we had to stop our machines because of lack of
material and after we had a problem with the quality. (...) What I
understood is that they found new customers. Not really competi-
tors of us, but using the same material. And in order to supply them,
they did some change on our supply” (interviewee at case company
7).
“If a furnace breaks down those that order higher quantities will be
preferred over us as a small customer” (interviewee at case com-
pany 6).
The quotes clearly indicate that organizations from outside the direct supply
relationships of the case companies potentially influence the availability of sup-
ply for the case companies and in extreme cases cause supply shortages. This
finding confirms the proposition made earlier that the notion of supply chains
does not adequately represent the interorganizational structures of demand and
supply. Concepts identified in this project, such as non-adjacent power regimes,
are alien to SCM and supply chain thinking. The notion of supply chains seems
not to be useful and, in fact, appears to be detrimental to the understanding of
the processes and events in such networks, possibly leading to supply shortages,
the causes of which should not even exist – and therefore cannot be understood
– within a supply chain paradigm.
Research question 7b was: Is Supply Chain Management a pointed descrip-
tion of the activities organizations perform or seek to perform in order to ensure
the stability of their inbound material streams?
SCM has been called a “simplistic method” and “means of selling manage-
ment consultancy” (Johnsen et al. 2008, p. 71). The close cooperation and
integration it proposes require somewhat stable requirements which many re-
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searchers in SCM in the introductions to their papers suggest do hardly exist in
“today’s constantly changing economy”. In fact, the very notion of the man-
agement of supply chain can be questioned as many firms might cope with their
network rather than manage it (Harland & Knight 2001) – quite besides the fact
that it was concluded in the previous paragraph that the notion of supply chains
seems to be mostly inadequate.13 Therefore, it was tried to understand to what
extent the case companies that were interviewed pursue activities that could be
roughly described as “managing” their supply chain/network. Given the previ-
ous findings, the question could therefore be rephrased as: To what extent can
the activities organizations perform or seek to perform in order to ensure the
stability of their inbound material streams be described as managing?
The fact that definitions of SCM are numerous and often divergent (cf. Mentzer
et al. 2001) suggests that a common understanding has not evolved. Chopra &
Meindl (2010), for instance, suggest “effective supply chain management in-
volves the management of supply chain assets and product, information, and
fund flows to maximize total supply chain surplus” (p. 23, emphasis added).
If that definition were adopted, it could be stated that the case studies provided
no evidence that SCM exists at all as the interviews did not suggest in any way
that maximizing supply chain surplus was on the agenda of either the case com-
panies or their suppliers. There appears to be a tendency that authors in SCM
insinuate an altruistic intent of SCM for which empirical evidence seems to be
scarce. The quotes that were brought in the discussion of research question 7a
underline this notion. Another interviewee remarks:
“The whole idea, the whole concept of the supply network is for me
a bit more theoretical than I can see in practice. So I’m just starting
13Even the Supply part of Supply Chain Management is, in fact, not unambiguous (but of course,
this applies to supply networks, too). While the buying firm does care about the supply for
its production, it is, in most cases, the demand that triggers all actions along the chains or
networks. Hence, more suitable terms would arguably be demand chain and Demand Chain
Management which would allow to better distinguish chains and networks where demand
(customer order) is the trigger for action from chains or networks where material is pushed
into the system because supply is the trigger, as it is the case with waste management and
wind or solar power. Such systems have been coined supply-driven chains (see, for instance,
Hull 2005).
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with Martin Christopher14 and Cranfield and the theory behind it,
but I still miss, at least in my real experience, just to see any kind
of application” (interviewee at case company 5)
The quote indicates that the interviewee – who is the head of external logistics
at his company and not unfamiliar with the essential processes of supply and
logistics – perceives SCM as a rather abstract, theoretical concept.
Some of the concepts discussed in this thesis suggest that the general no-
tion of managing a supply network is only applicable in very specific situa-
tions. Managing in general has multiple meanings; management in the context
of supply chains or networks is poorly defined, and the answer to the research
question may suffer from this limitation. Authors who discuss the term Sup-
ply Chain Management often attest ambiguity (Bechtel & Jayaram 1997, Tan
2001) and “considerable confusion as to its meaning“ (Mentzer et al. 2001).
Also, existing definitions are often so vague that they could easily be applied to
anything, which indicates they do not provide much new insight. These defi-
nitions often state that SCM “deals with” (Jones & Riley 1985) or “integrates”
(Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) 2010) the flow
of goods, without really specifying what activities this would involve.
Accordingly, the vague nature of the term renders any statement as to whether
a firm conducts activities that could be described as SCM almost arbitrary. Any
firm that receives material from suppliers has to manage “assets, product infor-
mation, and fund flows” (Chopra & Meindl 2010). Likewise, any firm “[plans]
and [manages] activities in sourcing, procurement, conversion, and logistics”
(Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) 2010). What
sets traditional purchasing and supply management apart from SCM? High-level
terms such as “integration” (of demand and supply) and “management” do not
contribute to clarity unless these terms are defined as well. One may state that
many definitions of SCM do seem fail to meet the definition of definition (cf.
14Martin Christopher is professor emeritus at Cranfield University and the author of many arti-
cles and textbooks on Supply Chain Management, some of which have become very popular.
The interviewee uses the term supply network most likely because it was used by the inter-
viewer throughout the interview. The mentioning of Martin Christopher makes clear that the
interviewee really refers to Supply Chain Management.
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Fowler et al. 1995). They are simply imprecise as to the meaning or the nature
of the activities they aim to define.
Two approaches could be followed to find an answer to the research question.
Following a comprehensive review of definitions of SCM one could aim to
identify repeatedly surfacing elements in these definitions and compare them
to the activities that were identified in the case studies (top-down approach).
This approach suffers from the limitations outlined above, in particular from the
vagueness and general character of the terms used in those definitions (such as
planning and integration).
The second approach would be to analyze the interviewees’ responses to se-
lected questions that were designed as a probe into existence of and informa-
tion about activities, techniques, and tools that demonstrate a high level of un-
derstanding of supply-related processes and caution about supply-related risks.
This approach can be characterized as bottom-up. It seems more promising than
the first one and will be followed.
Several questions aimed at activities commonly associated with SCM, such
as tier-n management, supplier audits and training, and delivery modes. The
responses from the interviewees indicate that most case companies – with the
notable exception of case company 2 – do not have an elaborate plan, let alone
a strategy, as to how they can improve the stability of their inbound material
stream. This does not imply, however, that they do “nothing”; the individual
case analyses in Phase I of the data analysis demonstrate that each case com-
pany performs several bottleneck management activities. The case analyses also
demonstrate significant differences between the firms, though.
When it comes to the management of supply, firms seem to operate on differ-
ent layers. The existence of these layers also provide an additional explanation
as to why both terms, supply management and supply network (or chain) man-
agement, appear to suffer from some vagueness – neither term addresses all
layers at once.
All organizations seem to be able to fully control and adjust the way they
respond internally – i.e., within their organizational boundaries – to the inbound
material stream and to possible irregularities. The internal response represents
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the first layer of activities.
On the next layer, organizations influence the inbound material stream itself.
They can, for instance, aim to adjust the frequency of deliveries, the delivery
mode, or packaging. It is important to note that they influence on this layer, they
do not fully control. Any change on this layer requires consensus with direct
suppliers for both echelons are involved. That is, change on this layer require
communication and possibly involve compromise.
On the third layer, the organization influences the characteristics of its supply
network as such. Again, this includes communication and – probably to an even
greater extent than before – compromise. It is on this layer that influencing
factors such as the existence of relative power differences or power regimes
make most difference.
The description of these three layers help understand the management of sup-
ply networks (or Supply Chain Management), and it enables us to address the
research question.
Figure 6.4.2 illustrates the three-layer model.
Starting from the presumption – derived from the empirical data gathered in
the ten case studies – that SCM, however vaguely defined a term it is in the lit-
erature, addresses these three layers, it is possible to answer research question
7b by stating that each case company performs activities that can be related to
at least one layer of this three-layer model. Addressing the different layers in-
volves a set of requirements that not all organizations meet to the same extent.
The most dominant example is the existence of power regimes, both adjacent
and non-adjacent , that enable organizations to exert – or prevent them from
exerting – influence on more “distant” layers. The term Supply Chain Manage-
ment suffers from a severe lack of conceptual clarity, which would make it easy
to argue that most of the case companies – and arguably most other companies,
too – do not perform activities that neither could nor should be described as
SCM. If we, however, let loose of this rather rigid interpretation and look at
the activities organizations perform on the three different conceptual layers out-
lined above, then it can be concluded that these activities which they perform
and which have been subsumed under bottleneck management in this thesis, can
405
6. Findings and Discussion
Focal Firm
S1 S2 S3 S4 S...n
1) Change the way the 
focal firm responds to/
deals with inbound 
material stream
Inbound Material Stream
2) Change properties of 
inbound material 
stream
3) Change properties of supply network
Figure 6.4.2. – Three Layers of Supply Network Management
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indeed be considered to be adequately described by what is commonly referred
to as Supply Chain Management and, in this thesis, is referred to as supply
network management, as bottleneck management can be seen as representing a
more specific set of activities which are part of this broader concept.
The three-layer model defined above for supply network management can
also serve to put the different roles of bottleneck management measures (cf.
Section 6.4.5) in perspective. The different roles that emerged from the data
analysis are related to power (increase power/decrease dependency), risk (de-
crease uncertainty/increase mitigation capability), and flexibility (increase flex-
ibility/reduce variability). Each role is dual in character, i.e., it addresses a
concept and its converse (power/dependency), or problem cause and mitiga-
tion (variability/flexibility and uncertainty/mitigation capability). The three dual
roles thus include six distinct strategies. These strategies address different lay-
ers of the three-layer model, as illustrated in Figure 6.4.3. How they relate can
be best derived from Table 6.4.10.
The third sub-question (7c) was: How does the understanding of supply rela-
tionships change if the notion of supply networks (as opposed to supply chains)
is adopted?
The point that supply network is a better description of the interorganizational
structure from where the focal firm’s inbound material flow originates was made
by several authors (e.g., Harland et al. 2001) and was stressed in this thesis
with references to both theoretical concepts as well as empirical data. This last
research question provides the opportunity to wrap up some of the arguments
made before and to present some additional arguments that will point to new
venues that can be explored if the notion of supply networks is adopted and
replaces the faulty metaphor of the chain.
One of the prominent themes that emerged from both the review of litera-
ture and the data analysis is the concept of power. As was pointed out earlier,
power can arise from different circumstances, such as the possession of impor-
tant resources (e.g., Crook & Combs 2007), a central position in the network
(e.g., Gulati et al. 2002, Kim et al. 2011) or the ability to punish (e.g., Kumar
2005). Power seems not to be a very prominent concept in the field of SCM
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Focal Firm
S1 S2 S3 S4 S...n
Inrease flexibility
Increase mitigation 
capability
Decrease dependency
Inbound Material Stream
Reduce variability
Reduce uncertainty
Increase power/reduce dependency | Reduce uncertainty | Increase mitigation capability | 
Reduce variability
Figure 6.4.3. – Roles of Bottleneck Management in the Three-layer Model of
Supply Network Management
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(Cox et al. 2001), which is understandable given that many writers in this field
emphasize the imperative of cooperation and holistic optimization rather than
optimization of individual organizations (e.g., Lockamy III & Draman 1998,
Simatupang et al. 2004, dos Santos et al. 2010, Chopra & Meindl 2010, , to
name just a few), as is recognized and criticized by again others e.g., (e.g.,
Lonsdale 2001). Also, interviewees at case companies 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 referred
to power differences between their companies and suppliers or to such differ-
ences between their companies and competitors (i.e., competing customers of
the same supplier) to explain occurrences of supply interruptions. Power is an
enormously wide concept, and was merely touched upon in this thesis. And
yet, it has become obvious that its implications are significant for the supply
relationships of some firms. The network perspective helps embrace and sup-
ports understanding of the significance of power and of its impact in supply
relationships. The concept of non-adjacent power regimes was discovered and
discussed. Such non-adjacent constructs seem to have had adverse impact for
the stability of some case companies’ inbound material stream. Such concepts
can only exist if a wider, and somewhat more complex, network perspective is
adopted.
Another important concept that was discussed in the literature review but re-
mained largely unaddressed later in the empirical data analysis is complexity.15
The implications of complexity have to be understood in the context of the dis-
cussion of networks that preceded this section. As it could be shown that the
interorganizational structures behind a given firm’s inbound material stream can
be best described as a network – not a chain – the question about possible impli-
15The interview questionnaire used at the case companies did not address complexity. One rea-
son why the concept was omitted in the data collection is that complexity has become so
ubiquitous a term – while its use tends to be only remotely connected to its meaning in the
scientific context – that it would have required much effort to explain the concept to intervie-
wees. One could argue the concept could be probed for in the interviews without explicitly
mentioning it, thereby avoiding any hassle with definition and conceptual clarification. It was
expected, however, that organizations tend not to be aware of many of the properties that in-
dicate complexity in, or induce complexity into, a system, mostly because supply networks
are not even recognized as a system but most commonly conceived of as linear relationships
(if at all) or merely as independent dyadic relationships with suppliers, decoupled from the
wider context of networks.
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cations give rise to the importance of concepts such as complexity that are most
relevant in such interconnected environments. Also, it is more intuitive to refer
to networks as systems rather than to chains which by the nature of their struc-
ture show only limited interaction, involve fewer agents, and arguably contain
fewer feedback loops – some of the defining properties of Complex Adaptive
Systems.
Some authors were cited who suggest that supply networks should be under-
stood as CAS (Choi et al. 2001, Pathak et al. 2007). One property of CAS is
emergence, i.e., the ability of the system to bring about effects that can neither be
explained with the properties of any individual part of the system nor with their
sum. The existence of emergence, however, runs counter to the ability to predict
outcomes of the system. Predictability, however, has been argued to be a core
assumption underlying the ability to manage a system; lack of predictability of
a system’s outcomes thus questions the possibility of it to be managed (Stacey
et al. 2000). Obviously, this is an important aspect that adds to the discussion of
research question 7b, too. A discussion of complexity and its implications for
the management of supply networks in general and of bottlenecks in particular
would not be possible without understanding and acknowledging the existence
of supply networks.
Even if the idea is rejected that supply networks are Complex Adaptive Sys-
tems, a subgroup of systems with special properties, they are nevertheless sys-
tems. A conceptual system comparison between supply networks and factory
systems was conducted in Section 3.7. There, it was argued that supply networks
are open systems: they receive energy and matter and they release energy and
matter. And very much so, as they often span over long distances and therefore
are subject to impact from a variety of sources external to the system. Arguably,
there is a big difference between the impact a network of organizations, with
both vertical and lateral relations inside as well as across system borders, can
experience and the impact to which a simple chain, spanning over the tiers in a
linear fashion, is subject. Again, acknowledging the existence of lateral – and
cross-border – relationships provides a richer perspective on the management of
supply.
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Another field of research that can be tapped if the network model is accepted
is network theory. Network theory provides tools for the conceptual description
of networks in terms of nodes and ties. It allows to describe a firm’s position in
a network relative to other firms’ positions and it allows to describe properties
of ties as well as of the network as a whole. The conceptual description of the
network levels the way to its analysis (as, for instance, in the branch of Social
Network Analysis).
The structure of a network and the type of ties between organizations can
have implications for the outcome of the individual organizations directly in-
volved – but also for non-adjacent entities, as it was concluded from the data
analysis. Concepts such as centrality provide a useful angle to look at potential
consequences for the event of irregularities. Authors have already applied it to
the identification of bottlenecks in supply networks (e.g., Mizgier et al. 2013).
Network theory provides a toolbox so rich that it could not possibly be treated
in all its facets in this work. Nonetheless, it shall be emphasized that it does open
up venues that are likely to yield new insights into the management of supply,
and it shall be stressed that it its application is most promising if the conception
of complex interorganizational structures on higher echelons is not trimmed to
a “supply chain”. Borgatti & Li (2009) point out that it is “a fundamental axiom
in network analysis that actors are not independent but rather influence each
other” (p. 9). Hence, network analysis explicitly allows for such concepts as
non-adjacent power regimes whereas the notion of indirect influence remains
largely disguised in SCM.
It can be concluded that replacing the notion of supply chains with supply
networks comes with a host of implications, both practical and theoretical. Con-
ceiving of the interorganizational structures behind the supply of goods and ser-
vices as a network provides opportunities to better understand and analyze these
structures as well as potential and actual events, such as the interruption of the
supply stream. It enables the practitioner to act upon information about the
network that hitherto remained disguised by the widely accepted management
textbook parlance of Supply Chain Management. For researchers, it opens up
additional venues that seem to have remained overlooked by many, as judged by
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the number of publications covering topics like network analysis or complexity
in supply networks. Therefore, the general understanding of supply relation-
ships is likely to change a lot if it is acknowledged and understood that these
relationships represent only the periphery of much wider and more complex
networks.
6.4.7. Summary
This section represented the interpretive and explanatory part of the data anal-
ysis. Information from the multiple-case study was related to elements of the
conceptual model created in Section 4.6 and, more generally, to the literature
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3.
First, the information was related to power. Power and dependence were
discussed in Section 2.5.5.2 and power has also been found to be an important
component of the purchasing portfolio analysis (Section 3.2). It was inferred
that a triadic network setup with power imbalance to the advantage of another
buying company can increase the chance of bottleneck emergence for the focal
buying firm if the common supplier has to make capacity allocation decisions.
This setup was termed non-adjacent power regimes.
Next, an inquiry into bottleneck management measures as a means to alter
such power relations followed. For all relevant measures of bottleneck manage-
ment, it was outlined how they can possibly affect power and dependency in
a supply network. It was then investigated if some of the case companies are
making use of measures that affect power and dependency for this purpose – or
if possible influence on power and dependence are merely side-effects that were
not intended by the case companies which used them. The analysis compared a
sample of relatively powerful case companies with a sample of relatively power-
less case companies and discussed their selection of measures. Indications that
certain measures are, in fact, employed for the purpose of altering power rela-
tions were provided by case study interviewees. Some corroborative evidence
could be found in the analysis while no evidence could be found that would
have lead to refutation of the idea. The limited number of companies which par-
ticipated in the multiple-case study created some limitations, however, for the
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composition of the two samples that were compared, so that for several mea-
sures of bottleneck management a meaningful conclusion could not be drawn as
to the intent behind their selection. Inductive statements cannot be proven right
through corroboration. Hence, the proposition implicitly made when investi-
gating into case companies’ reasoning behind the selection of certain measures
– that weak companies choose to employ certain bottleneck management mea-
sures in order improve their power position in the network – remains a theoret-
ical proposition and not a fact. While the proposition is appealing to common
sense, it is easily conceivable that some companies, both within the set of case
companies as well as outside, employ measures that were said to be able to alter
their power position for entirely different reasons unrelated power. If such ev-
idence were found in future studies, it would enable refinement of the theory’s
boundary conditions.16
Also, the selection of bottleneck management measures was framed in terms
of risk. The concept of risk was discussed in Section 3.6. It was found that
two components of definitions of risk stand out: uncertainty and severity of the
consequences of something happening. Bottleneck management measures were
described in terms of how they address either factor. Different than the previous
analysis of bottleneck management measures and their relation to power, this
analysis did not aim to establish a proposition about the existence of a causal
relationship between the selection of particular measures and its addressing of
either factor of risk. Instead, it was argued that certain measures do have certain
effects, the case companies’ actual reasoning behind their selection notwith-
standing.
The same applies to the following discussion of bottleneck management mea-
sures and flexibility. Measures were said to be able to either increase a focal
company’s flexibility and thus its means to cope with variability, or to decrease
variability in the first place. Relating to the discussion of manufacturing sys-
tems in Section 2.2 and the classification and match of supply networks in Sec-
tion 2.5.6, it can be seen that the portfolio of bottleneck management measures
16In fact, the discussions of the roles of risk and flexibility that followed the discussion of power
already make clear that intent different from power can influence the decision whether or not
to adopt a particular measure.
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a production company employs can be matched with the type of production and
the supply network strategy so as to improve fit. The consideration of flexibility
increasing or variability decreasing, respectively, through the conscious selec-
tion and use of particular bottleneck management measures thus is not merely
an intellectual exercise but is, in fact, very practical and supports organizations’
means to shape their profile and improve strategic fit.
The discussion of bottleneck management in terms of power, risk, and flex-
ibility were summarized as a conception of three distinct roles of bottleneck
management measures. Some measures have only one role whereas other mea-
sures can have two or three roles. The conception of three roles emphasizes an
organization’s ability to manage bottlenecks in supply consistent with its pro-
duction and supply strategies.
The section ended with a discussion of the validity of the supply chain model
and the term Supply Chain Management. The supply chain model and the notion
of Supply Chain Management was first discussed in Section 2.5.4 before the cri-
tique was enhanced in this section with empirical data from the case companies.
It was concluded that the supply chain model does not adequately represent the
interconnected, and often interdependent, structures of firms to which the focal
firm is connected by supply relationships.
In response to the last research question, it was argued that supply network
is a better model than supply chain as it allows for concepts which, according
to both relevant literature as well as case study data, do have important impli-
cations for production companies. Among these concepts are power and com-
plexity. Also, the entire toolbox of network theory can be used if the notion of
networks is accepted.
Also, it was pointed out that the term Supply Chain Management is too vague
to even tell whether a firm does SCM or not. Hence, it was tried to give the
term meaning by pointing out possible levers of the firm and the requirements
attached to using them. The result was a three-layer model of Supply Chain
Management which can represent the activities the participating companies in
the study pursue.
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6.5. Critical Evaluation of Research Approach
6.5.1. Introduction
It might remain unclear throughput a large part of a research project if the par-
ticular research approach chosen for the project is the best one. In particular
the mode chosen for data collection might face criticism since most decisions
involve at least one trade-off (e.g., number of respondents vs. depth of inquiry).
Therefore it seems reasonable to reflect on the data collection mode chosen
and how it seems to have met expectations after the data collection has been
completed. Moreover, validity and limitations of the study shall be shortly ad-
dressed.
6.5.2. Semi-structured Interviews as Primary Data Collection
Method
6.5.2.1. General Impression
A qualitative approach had been selected for this project. Accordingly, statis-
tical evidence was not aimed for in this research which removes the necessity
for a “high” number of respondents. At the same time, however, one objec-
tive of this research was to identify patterns both in bottleneck emergence and
in bottleneck management. Therefore, one or very few in-depth case studies
would have provided too particularistic a view on the issues at hand. Due to the
widely varying circumstances in different industries and for companies of differ-
ent size and market power any attempt to analytically generalize findings might
have become difficult had the number of cases been very small. Semi-structured
interviews represent a compromise between the two extreme poles for breadth
and depth as they can be conducted with reasonable effort and at reasonable cost
with a broader sample of cases than in-depth case study research while allowing
interaction of researcher and interviewee, thus bearing the chance of creating
deeper insights than a survey could. This trade-off was known in advance and
was one reason why semi-structured interviews were selected as data collection
method.
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Possibly one of the strongest arguments against a survey or structured inter-
views is the exploratory nature of the data collection. Therefore, it was neces-
sary that the data collection method allowed for unexpected and new responses
that can be captured and followed up in the discussion. A rigid survey design
with closed questions would require that all, or at least most, answers that would
be given by respondents are known in advance and can be presented as possible
choices in the survey.
Quality of data is another concern when conducting surveys. During the in-
terview process in this project it became clear that interviewees sometimes did
have difficulties answering questions with confidence. The fact that additional
explanation as well as examples for facilitation could be provided improved
the quality of responses in the interviews. The chance to interact with inter-
viewees enabled the researcher to ask questions that are less straightforward to
understand. This does not mean that questions were made more difficult to un-
derstand on purpose, but it does mean that subtle differences could be asked
for without providing lengthy explanations in written form which the respon-
dant should have studied in advance. Subtle differences are, for instance, the
distinction between bottleneck exploitation and bottleneck elimination which
in a survey would not have been feasible without detailed explanation. Even
in the interviews responses to the two different sections were sometimes con-
fused. While this could be expected and did not provide a problem as in the data
analysis the data was structured along the categories originally intended, it did
by times invoke additional explanation, repeated questioning, and the mention-
ing of examples for facilitation. Explanations that could be given verbally and
visually (e.g., with a drawing appended to the interview questionnaire) in the in-
terviews would have required careful reading prior to the response had a survey
been used as an instrument for data collection, which respondents are unlikely
to commit to in a remote survey. Accordingly, the quality of data collected via
interviews is likely to be higher than it could be expected from a survey.
In the interview process answers sometimes were given in “unexpected mo-
ments”. It happened, for instance, that one measure that serves to prevent bot-
tlenecks (asked for in questionnaire section “Bottleneck Prevention”) was only
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mentioned when discussing production capacity flexibility (questionnaire sec-
tion “Bottleneck Placement”). On other occasions, individual causes of bot-
tleneck emergence were confirmed when explicitly addressed but remained un-
mentioned when generally asked for causes of bottleneck emergence (e.g., when
interviewee was asked if bottlenecks in the past occurred because of supplier
bankruptcies).
Also, the interviews allowed to create a personal relationship with the inter-
viewee and several times it had been offered to the researcher to answer ad-
ditional questions on the phone should the need arise. This level of support
cannot be expected from survey respondents. In some cases, the interview was
conducted with more than one participant from the companies at once (up to
three). The reason was that sometimes specialist knowledge was available that
the primary interviewee did not possess. Involving more than one person in the
interviews was neither intended nor asked for by the researcher but was made
possible by the primary interviewees in the respective companies. In such cases,
it was possible to ask more detailed question than with only one interviewee.
Again, this access to knowledge is unlikely to be made available by respondents
of a written survey.
The main difficulty with semi-structured interviews as data collection method
was the low approval rate by companies in the first place. Several interview re-
quests were turned down. It is speculated that two main factors have contributed
to this result:
1. People can he held responsible by peers or superiors for providing internal
and possibly confidential information to people external to the organiza-
tion. Depending on company policies and organizational culture this may
involve personal risk for the interviewee.
2. The interview process takes time of the interviewee which people tend
to claim not to have enough of. Accordingly, a reason frequently given
when interview requests were refused was that people were “too busy”.
Notably, the situation changed and access to interviewees improved immedi-
ately when the researcher became part of an organization that referred the re-
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searcher to its suppliers. In this setting, concerns about confidentiality seemed
to play a less important role and time was made available. Though there is no
certainty as to why this was the case, one probable explanation is that it is com-
mon practice for many suppliers to share information with their customers so
that an interview request coming from a customer was not considered unusual,
in particular since the scope of the research project overlapped with information
interests of the customer firm.
6.5.2.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Semi-structured Interviews
Some of the strengths of semi-structured interviews were mentioned in the pre-
ceding text. These advantages, that were partly anticipated and partly unantici-
pated yet experienced include
• interaction between researcher and interviewee reduces the chance of mis-
understood questions so that responses are likely to yield higher quality
data,
• finer differentiation between questions allows to focus on more subtle
aspects,
• compromise between depth and width of data so that more companies
could be interviewed at reasonable expenditure of time and cost,
• interaction between researcher and interviewee can build trust; enduring
relationship allows quality check of case description and follow-up ques-
tions.
Yin (2009) mentions two additional advantages (p. 102):
• “targeted – focuses directly on case study topics,
• insightful – provides perceived causal inferences and explanations”.
Obviously, interviews do have weaknesses, too. Yin (2009) mentions four weak-
nesses:
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• “bias due to poorly articulated questions,
• response bias
• inaccuracies due to poor recall
• reflexivity – interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear”
These four weaknesses shall be shortly addressed.
Bias due to poorly articulated questions (or poor understanding for other rea-
sons) cannot be excluded; however, chances can be minimized. All interviewees
were sent a short description of the research project prior to the interview data.
Moreover, all interviews began with a short introduction of the research project.
Generally, all interviewees were experienced in their position and – with the
exception of the interviewee at case company 5 – the position they held was
directly or indirectly concerned with inbound material flow. The interviewee at
case company 5 holds a senior position in external logistics but is less concerned
with the supply side of the business. So the interviewees were generally familiar
with potential problems posed by supply and with counter measures, which re-
duces the chance of bias due to poorly articulated (and thus poorly understood)
questions. Furthermore, the same questions were used at all case companies
without this researcher getting the impression that questions generally were un-
clear or misunderstood on several occasions. Also, additional explanations were
provided throughout the interview process. Therefore it can be concluded that
this potential weakness, while it cannot be completely excluded, is unlikely to
have affected the quality of data gathered in any significant way.
Response bias may exist for several reasons. One reason are secrecy require-
ments on side of the organization. Interviewees at the case companies may not
be willing to give away certain information. The fact that some of the interviews
were conducted within one supply network of one focal firm (case company 8)
may have caused reservations on side of some the suppliers as they might have
feared that other, competing suppliers might also participate in the study and
gain useful insights that would provide them with a certain competitive advan-
tage. Although the questions asked in the interviews did not aim at generally
confidential information, such a bias might have existed nonetheless.
419
6. Findings and Discussion
Another possible reason for response bias might be that interviewees do not
like the interviewer and thus might have little motivation to support him in his
research. Although this option cannot be excluded with certainty, the general
impression of the atmosphere during the interviews was friendly and supportive.
In order to reduce response bias, all interviewees and their companies were
guaranteed anonymity. In order to make sure a satisfying level of anonymity
is ensured, case descriptions (as presented in Phase I of the data analysis) were
sent to interviewees for approval. In some cases, information that would have
facilitated the identification of the company name for industry insiders were
removed in this process. Nonetheless, response bias might have existed.
Inaccuracies due to poor recall pose a problem particularly for those studies
were the researcher interviews individuals to learn about events in the past. This
is partly the case for this study. Although the focus clearly is on recurring,
present, and very recent activities and events, interviewees did recall incidents in
the past to illustrate certain problems and make their point. It cannot be excluded
that details about events from the past were inaccurately recalled. Because the
past events of interest – bottlenecks that led to supply shortages – can lead to
critical situations in internal production processes and order fulfillment, such
events are somewhat likely to be remembered by the people directly concerned
with the situation.
Reflexivity refers to the possible desire of interviewees to please the researcher
by giving responses he would likely be fond of. The subject discussed with inter-
viewees can be characterized as emotionally neutral, and the researcher would
not have felt happier with interviewees’ responses that indicated, for instance,
a large number of supply related problems than with responses that indicated
trouble-free supply processes. Moreover, the existence of measures in organiza-
tions in order to stabilize inbound material flow is not subject to interpretation;
measures either exist or they do not. Therefore, reflexivity is unlikely to have
affected the quality of interview data in a negative way.
Table 6.5.1 summarizes the preceding discussion and presents in a short form
the four weaknesses and the researcher’s subjective assessment of their impact
on the data quality in this research project.
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Table 6.5.1. – Summary: Weaknesses of the Interviews According to Yin (2009)
and How They Might Affect the Data Quality of this Study
Weakness Subjective Assessment
Bias due to poorly articulated questions Little or no impact on data quality
Response bias Possible impact on data quality
Inaccuracies due to poor recall Possible (yet low) impact on data quality
Reflexivity Little or no impact on data quality
6.5.3. Rival Explanations
In Sections 6.4.2,6.4.3, and 6.4.3 the selection of bottleneck management mea-
sures was discussed. It was proposed that buying firms choose particular mea-
sures, and decide not to choose other measures, for a reason. Among the many
parameters that can frame the decision process for a firm, some were selected
which appeared to stand out and are which seemed to be backed by the body of
literature reviewed in the earlier part of the thesis. The decisions were framed
within three dual roles that measures of bottleneck management can fulfill: in-
crease power or lessen dependency, reduce uncertainty or improve mitigation
capability, and increase flexibility or reduce variability. The individual mea-
sures of bottleneck management were analyzed with respect to these dual roles;
this analysis concerned mostly preventive measures. A summary was provided
in Table 6.4.10.
Obviously, it is not clear beyond doubt that any organization has chosen its
particular activities and measures for the reasons suggested in this analysis. Ac-
cordingly, there are rival explanations which are worthwhile considering. Table
6.5.2 presents an overview. The terminology used in this table is borrowed from
Yin (2000, p. 249).
Firstly, the selection of the measures could be a product of chance only (null
hypothesis). If this had been the case, no in-depth reasoning about the effects
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Table 6.5.2. – Rival Explanations for the Selection of Bottleneck Management
Measures
Rival Explanation Description
Null Hypothesis The effect observed is due to chance only.
Direct Rival Other reasons and intentions have led to the
effect observed.
Commingled Rival Both other reasons and the reasons cited have
led to the effect observed.
and side-effects of certain measures had occurred. As long as a measure made
the appearance of being able to solve the problem at hand, it could have either
been selected or completely ignored in favor of another measure that made the
impression that it would do just as well. The decision-maker had been indiffer-
ent.
Secondly, the effect observed – the selection of particular bottleneck man-
agement measures – could be due to other reasoning than has been suggested
(direct rival). It is conceivable, for instance, that decision-makers at the case
companies had simply followed organizational policies that remained unmen-
tioned in the interviews, or just gut feeling based on years of experience, when
they made decisions to employ certain measures.
Thirdly, the decisions to employ particular measures might have been influ-
enced by the reasoning outlined in this thesis, yet not completely, and other
factors and reasoning that remained unaddressed in this project might have in-
fluenced the decision, too (commingled rival).
None of these rival explanations can be rejected with full confidence. The null
hypothesis appears to be the least probable explanation as decisions as the ones
discussed in this thesis generally require consciousness. It seems rather unlikely
that decisions just happen to happen when people can be held accountable for
these decisions.
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Neither direct rival explanations nor commingled rival explanations are un-
likely, however. In fact, it can be assumed – as it was stated in Section 6.4.2.2 –
that some measures were a mere requirement for a lack of better options rather
than the product of thoughtful and lengthy reasoning. This does not weaken the
value of this analysis, however. The purpose was to augment the understand-
ing of bottleneck management; and the context within which the individual case
companies operate and the decisions they make were related to derive theory as
to what purpose particular decisions can serve, which includes both explanatory
as well as a predictive power.
The existence of possible rival explanations shall thus be seen as an invitation
to further investigate the topic and to refine and complement the theory.
6.5.4. Validity and Reliability
In social science there are four common tests to judge the quality of the research
design (Yin 2009, pp. 40 et seq.):
• construct validity,
• internal validity,
• external validity, and
• reliability.
While this research project is not located within social science, it does use the
case study method – which is popular in social science – so that the four tests
may contribute to the validity of this project nonetheless. There are many other
types of validity that could be considered (see, for instance, Cronbach & Meehl
1955), yet the ones cited by Yin (2009) appear to be sufficient as they cover
the most important aspects: if the present study is valid and reliable according
to the definitions put forth below, the desire to demonstrate its validity shall be
satisfied.
Construct validity refers to
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“the vertical correspondence between a construct which is at an
unobservable, conceptual level and a purported measure of it which
is at an operational level. In an ideal sense, the term means that
a measure assesses the magnitude and direction of (1) all of the
characteristics and (2) only the characteristics of the construct it is
purported to assess” (Peter 1981, p. 134).
It can also refer to the “usefulness of the construct as a tool for describing or
explaining some aspect of nature” (ibid).
Construct validity may potentially be a weakness in some aspects of this
project. In Phase III of the data analysis, constructs such as power and de-
pendence or flexibility were used. Such concepts are somewhat vague and their
meaning depends to a large extent on the very specific content in which they
are used. At the same time, these concepts emerged from the data analysis so
that definite operational measures to describe them were not developed during
the data collection phase. However, the several incidents that hinted at concepts
such as power are prominent in the case descriptions of Phase I. The case de-
scriptions, in turn, were sent to all case companies for correction and approval.
In fact, this is one tactic Yin (2009) suggests as a means to strengthen construct
validity. That is, the database from which the emergent themes such as power
and dependency were derived were indeed reviewed. Moreover, power was ex-
plicitly and directly or indirectly mentioned on some occasions (e.g., in cases 2,
3, 7 and 8) when adverse effects on the case companies due to suppliers’ mate-
rial allocation decisions were discussed. In the third phase of the data analysis,
power was then approximated with the relative importance of a buying com-
pany for its suppliers (and dependence was defined as the converse of power).
The importance results from purchasing volumes and possible sanctions of the
focal firm and their significance relative to the same measures at other buying
firms. Although no exact operational data in terms of purchasing volume were
obtained, interviewees subjective assessment of their company’s importance in
contrast to other companies’ importance for a particular supplier can be counted
as a valid measure provided that the interviewees can be assumed to have in-
dustry expertise, which is true for every case. Moreover, a description of the
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postion of each case company in the market was requested from interviewees,
which helps understand and assess the companies’ relative importance.
Flexibility is another construct that was used and for which there is no exact
operational measure available. It was defined as a company’s means to cope
with variability and irregularities. This understanding of flexibility is based on,
and in accordance with, the vast literature on agile and leagile in production
environments and supply networks (cf. Section 3.5).
The preceding discussion does not imply that construct validity is not a po-
tential weakness of the study at hand, yet it demonstrates that validation of the
constructs used was sought even in cases were no exact operational measure
was available.
Internal validity is “mainly a concern for explanatory cases” (Yin 2009, p.
42). Phase III of the data analysis (pp. 341 et seq.) is mostly explanatory
and as such seeks to provide explanation for the selection of actions the case
companies take in their effort to stabilize their inbound material flow. In other
words, causal relationships are proposed and they can be considered valid if the
researcher has demonstrated effort to provide evidence that the events that are
supposedly caused by a particular factor are indeed caused by that factor and not
by another. The purpose of ensuring internal validity is not to prove propositions
but to make such propositions as clear and likely as reasonably can be expected
at the given level of abstraction and quality. The most important measure in
this project to address internal validity was the replication of interviews in order
to find convergent evidence. Interviews were conducted at ten different case
companies. Not only were the companies different, but also the industries the
companies were operating in and the positions the interviewees held in their
respective company. The evidence from the various interviews converged to a
surprisingly large extent so that several themes emerged that were taken up in
the data analysis (e.g., the implications of relative power positions in supply
networks).
External validity refers to the degree to which results from a case study “are
generalizable beyond the immediate case study” (ibid., p. 43). To strengthen
external validity, Yin proposes to follow a replication logic which, he empha-
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sizes, is different from obtaining additional respondents in a survey. The gen-
eralizations made in CSR are analytic whereas survey data are used as a base
for statistic generalization. If statistic generalization of survey results were the
benchmark, case studies would hardly be able to provide any valid theoretical
contribution as the “sample size” tends to be one or very few. Although the
multiple-case study in this project included ten cases, generalizing statistically
would still not be an option. The multiple-case design does, however, allow to
compare results from several cases to assess their consistency (cross-case com-
parison; cf. Phase II of the data analysis). Yin (2009) discusses different types
of replication logic, such as literal replication (the case is expected to yield
similar or identical results) and theoretical replication (the case is predicted to
yield contrasting results). The case study design can be planned accordingly to
include such replication logic. It is important to note that this thesis is partly ex-
ploratory and thus by its nature did not (because it could not) involve prediction
about expected results. Importantly, though, in the selection of case studies (cf.
Section 5.4) it was aimed to include companies with different contexts, such as
industries with different characteristics, different company size, different pro-
duction patterns, or different supply network structures. Because hardly any
organization equals a second one in all these respects, the aim to identify case
companies that would meet these requirements was relatively easy to achieve.
At the same time, it was tried not to change too many variables at once so that
valid inferences would not require an even higher number of cases to be in-
volved in the replication logic. That is, the replication logic followed resembles
best, though not completely for the reasons explained above, what Yin describes
as theoretical replication (ibid, p. 54).
Reliability refers to the degree to which the same results can be obtained by
repeating the study. A study is reliable if a researcher would be able to reach the
same findings and conclusions if she followed the procedures described in the
research. According to Yin (2009), the reliability of the study can be improved
by maintaining a case study protocol and by creating a case study database. For
this project, a database was created. The database was created and maintained
in Microsoft Access 2013. The tables include
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• the list of case companies (including pseudonyms and descriptions),
• causes of bottleneck emergence,
• bottleneck prevention measures,
• bottleneck identification measures,
• bottleneck exploitation measures,
• bottleneck elimination measures
• limitations to bottleneck management.
Several junction tables and queries were created so as to be able to retrieve the
relevant information at ease and without the possibility of incorrect operation
that otherwise could possibly lead to distorted analyses. Moreover, the tables
include columns for description, comments, and categorization. The existence
of the database and its use support the possible replication of results independent
of the researcher.
6.5.5. Limitations of the Empirical Study
In spite of all serious effort to strengthen the validity of this study there are
limitations, some of which were externally imposed whereas others are conse-
quences of decisions made by the researcher throughout the project.
The most prominent limitation throughout the empirical data collection was
the difficulty to get access to case companies. A greater number of case com-
panies might have led to additional insights or to the rejection of some of the
propositions or claims made in this thesis. Owing to the support of one partic-
ular case company, access could be gained to several other companies which
were in trustful supply relationships with that case company. Yet even where
access was granted it was still not unlimited; in fact, that some of the case
companies knew about each other might potentially have let to bias on part
of the interviewees, although there have been no indications that this was the
case. Nonetheless, the limited access to case companies let to strong reliance on
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semi-structured interviews as primary and – more often than not – sole method
for data collection. Triangulation with additional data sources was difficult or
impossible to obtain and in some cases not explicitly attempted. One of the rea-
sons that made triangulation difficult was that much of the information sought
after tends not to be codified or documented. In fact, some interview question
aimed to find out about the existence of standardized and codified measures and
the response was generally negative.17 Instead, as indicated in the previous sec-
tion validity was tried to strengthen by increasing the number of interviews with
different companies. It shall be acknowledged, however, that replication can-
not make up for lack of triangulation. Yet it was the decision that seemed most
adequate on the trade-off between exploitation and exploration.
This study has been inductive and thus proposes theory inferred from litera-
ture and empirical data. Therefore, all statements made in this document must
be seen as propositions and possible explanations of reality. The critical realist
perspective adopted prohibits claims of absolute truth. It has been tried to ap-
proximate truth, yet it is acknowledged that reality is much more complicated
than the theory proposed in this project can represent.
6.6. Summary
This chapter presented the analysis of the data gathered in the course of the
multiple-case study. For each case, an individual case description was created
that related that presented the data in ways consistent with the conceptual model.
The case descriptions were created from the interview transcripts by coding
with key words and sorting the relevant data into the categorizes derived in the
conceptual model (and used in the interview questionnaire). This first step of
data analysis, the results of which are presented in Phase I, turned the case study
data into information.
In Phase II of the data analysis, the information previously presented indi-
17Such as the following: “Is there a standardized action plan in place for (1) supply network
design, (2) sourcing options (selection, redundancy, location), and (3) supplier training?”
and “Is there a standardized procedure according to which suppliers will notify you when a
bottleneck has emerged or chances are it will emerge?”
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vidually for each company exemplar were summarized along the same cate-
gories but across all cases. The result is a comprehensive overview of all causes
of bottleneck emergence, all bottleneck management measures (categorized in
four distinct types of bottleneck management activities), and all limitations to
bottleneck management that could be identified at the case companies.
The first two phases of the data analysis are descriptive and present the in-
formation won through the individual exploratory case studies in uninterpreted
form. The only operation on the data applied in order to create usable informa-
tion was their relation to some of the relevant categories from the conceptual
model and their subsequent categorization.
Interpretation of the information created was performed in Phase III of the
data analysis. In this phase, key concepts and ideas from the literature, some of
which part of the conceptual model, were related to the case study information.
Bottleneck management was related to power and dependency, the risk factors
uncertainty and severity of consequences, and flexibility and variability. Also,
case study information were used for an analysis of the supply chain model
and Supply Chain Management, which resulted not only in a detailed critique
of the two notions but also in a model of Suppy Chain Management that can
adequately represent the activities the participating case companies perform.
The chapter ended with a critical posteriori evaluation of the research ap-
proach. The data collection mode and its strengths and weaknesses were dis-
cussed. Rival explanations were touched upon and validity and reliability of the
study, and how these were strengthened, were explained. The evaluation was
closed with the mentioning of the study method’s limitations.
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7. Synthesis: Results
7.1. Introduction
This section draws together the findings of the project. In Section 4, a concep-
tual model for bottleneck management in supply networks was defined based
upon a review of relevant literature. The model served to guide the multiple-
case study. At the end of this section, the model will be reviewed and modified
with respect to the findings from the multiple case study (Section 6).
For the most part, this section refers to the findings from the analysis of the
empirical part of the study. Valuable concepts have been worked out, however,
in the theoretical part as well. These shall also be shortly wrapped up, too.
While the review of literature served as a basis for the data collection and anal-
ysis, it does already include original contributions – and represents an original
and valuable contribution it itself by providing a comprehensive and detailed
overview of relevant literature which often remains unaddressed in the research
of supply networks.
7.2. Conceptual Contributions in the Theory Part
7.2.1. The Concept of Bottlenecks
Before the data analysis began, the concept of bottlenecks was introduced and
investigated. It was found that, in spite of its being widely used in various
branches of research, a satisfying definition that would suit the aims of this
project had not evolved. Therefore, a definition of bottleneck was provided in
Section 2.3.2. The concept of bottlenecks was then further refined with a cate-
gorizations of bottlenecks (Figure 2.3.1 on page 46) as well as of conceivable
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states of a bottleneck (Figure 2.3.2 on page 47). These categorizations were not
used in the later (empirical) part of the thesis, yet it is believed that such refine-
ments of the concepts do represent original and valuable contributions to the
body of knowledge as they add to conceptual clarity. As was pointed out in the
introduction to the review of bottleneck litrerature (Section 2.3.1), categories
of bottlenecks surfaced repeatedly throughout on several occasions throughout
the thesis. The categorization provides a point of reference for the use of such
specifications throughout the document.
7.2.2. Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems
The concepts of complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems were introduced
(Section 2.4 on page 48). It was discussed how these concepts relate to supply
networks and their management. It was concluded that some supply networks
show characteristics of CAS to a greater extent than others, but that a general
statement as to supply networks being CAS is probably invalid, in spite of some
authors’ having suggested otherwise.
Types of complexity were categorized based on the literature reviewed and
an additional category was proposed (systemic vs. induced complexity) (cf.
Figure 2.4.5 on page 65). This review of types of complexity provide a solid
starting point for further investigation into this area of research.
7.2.3. Supply Networks and System Archetypes
System archetypes were introduced and discussed in Section 2.4.6. It was tried
to identify and describe system archetypes in supply network settings. Apart
from the well-known works on the bullwhip effect (Forrester 1958, Lee et al.
1997), there seems to have been little effort to make use of system archetypes
in supply networks, although their recognition would provide great benefits to
those having to cope with such situations and looking for a potential lever to
break out. Therefore, the value of the discussion lies in the acknowledgment
that system archetypes may well have relevance in the management of supply
networks; it is hoped for that this section will spark further research, both con-
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ceptual and empirical.
7.2.4. Flow of Agents and Degree of Freedom
Based on the discussion of systems and of networks, those lines of thinking
were combined into a discussion of variable and static components of systems
in Section 2.5.5.3. Again, these thoughts were not followed up explicitly in
the empirical part of the work, yet they remain valuable as they add clarity and
refinement to the conception of networks as a system, which was built on in
many different places in this thesis.
7.3. Causes of Bottleneck Emergence and
Categorization
This section refers to the first and the second research question: “What are some
of the reasons why supply shortages occur in supply networks?” and “Can the
causes of bottleneck emergence be structured in a useful way?”
The interview findings with respect to the causes of bottleneck emergence
were listed and described in Section 6.3.2 and the reader is referred to this
section for a complete overview and thus for a comprehensive answer to the
first research question. While the causes of bottleneck emergence identified are
certainly not complete and other organizations may experience different or addi-
tional reasons for supply shortages, the list does represent a good sample for two
reasons: the companies which participated in the study partly have very differ-
ent profiles and the causes identified can be structured into several meaningful
categories.
The definition of bottlenecks proposed in Section 2.3.2 already hints at a first
possible categorization of bottlenecks:
• physical,
• organizational, and
• operational.
433
7. Synthesis: Results
Essentially, this categorization refers to whether supply is interrupted for (1.)
actual physical reasons, for (2.) reasons of policies or rules, or (3.) accidentally,
because of inability or malice. The value of this categorization is obvious: It
can provide guidance for a prioritization of resources for bottleneck manage-
ment. More specifically, it can suggest whether an actual increase of physical
capacity is necessary or not; possibly, a more stable inbound material flow can
be achieved at lower cost – for instance, with a modification of organizational
rules.
Other categorizations are conceivable, too. Attempts to create different cate-
gories in the course of this study ended up as a refinement of the three previous
categories rather than new and independent categories.1 It can therefore be con-
cluded that the categorization of causes of bottleneck emergence as hinted at in
the definition of bottlenecks early in this thesis provides a good foundation for
further work and that it can remain a useful constituent of the resulting theory.
7.4. Bottleneck Management Activities Performed
at the Case Companies
This section refers to the third and the fourth research question: “What do orga-
nizations do about bottlenecks in their supply networks?” and “Can the bottle-
neck management measures of organizations be structured in a useful way?”
Section 6.2 provides an analysis of all measures or activities each individual
case company performs in order to manage bottlenecks in its respective sup-
ply network. Section 6.3 provides a cross-case overview about the measures,
structured along four general categories of bottleneck management activities.
Five categories of bottleneck management activities were initially defined in
the conceptual model: prevention, identification, exploitation, elimination, and
placement. The analysis of the multiple case study has confirmed the usefulness
1It had been tried, for instance, to make use of these categories: market conditions, environ-
mental conditions, technical/technological reasons, human error, variability, and legislature.
While certain causes of bottleneck emergence could certainly be described as related to mar-
ket conditions or legislature, these categories merely represent additional – more detailed –
information rather than independent information.
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of four of the five categories – prevention, identification, exploitation, and elim-
ination – whereas no empirical evidence could be found for the practical use of
bottleneck placement. The concept of bottleneck placement was explained to
each of the interviewees and examples were provided for the use of bottleneck
placement in a factory environment. In spite of the conceptual similarities be-
tween material flow in factories and supply networks (cf. Section 3.7) it was not
possible to identify or construct situations that would fit into the category of bot-
tleneck placement. Therefore this category has been removed from the revised
model, which should not limit its validity in other contexts, such as production
planning and control in a factory.
Most bottleneck measures identified in the individual case studies fall un-
der the category of bottleneck prevention. All case companies use preventive
measures in order to avoid supply shortages. In some cases, the emphasis on
prevention was particularly strong as compared to other measures.
Some type of bottleneck identification measures is employed by all of the case
companies. It became apparent, however, that bottleneck identification, more
often than not, is not part of a systematic process but tends to be comprised of a
combination of informal communication with suppliers and with other members
of the industry network. Little technical support is used; there is no (online,
live) tracking of deliveries or similar activities. In some cases, it might not be
technologically feasible to introduce advanced identification measures, in other
cases it might not be feasible for other reasons (lack of support from supplier) or
it might simply be unnecessary because communication with suppliers is well
established and reliable.
Bottleneck exploitation has been shown to be a useful concept for companies
with production capacity. Four case companies in the sample are raw material
traders. For them, bottleneck exploitation is of limited use, as indicated by the
number of measures they employ which fall into this category.
The options for bottleneck elimination often depend on the preventive mea-
sures the company employs. In many cases, the case company uses alternative
or parallel sources so that one elimination measure is to switch to an alternative
source or increase the share of material sourced to a parallel source. In other
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cases, elimination measures depend more on “ad-hoc” availability of options,
such as the possibility to substitute a particular material or buy from a compet-
ing company.
Because the four remaining categories of bottleneck management activities
enhance clarity and facilitate discussion of actions to secure and stabilize supply,
it can be concluded that the four categories identified will represent a useful
element of the theory.
7.5. Decision Variables for Bottleneck
Management at the Case Companies
This section refers to the fifth and to the sixth research question: “What can
organizations do about bottlenecks in their supply networks?” and “Are there
parameters that influence or determine what organizations can do in order to
stabilize inbound material flow? How do organizations choose their measures?
And what seem to be the parameters?”
It is not possible to determine with any certainty all the activities any one
organization could perform to manage bottlenecks in its supply network, nor
would such a hypothetical setup in practice exclude the chance of interruptions
due to supply bottlenecks. Moreover, because most companies face a rather
unique combination of internal and external parameters and determinants, it
seems unlikely that a one-size-fits-all approach exists and suffices all require-
ments. Simply put: organizations have reasons to perform the differentiated
activities they chose to perform.
This does not imply, however, that gaps do not exist in companies’ portfolio
of activities. If parameters could be identified that make certain action suitable
or unsuitable for a specific company in a specific situation, this would allow us
to tell whether there is gap in a specific organization’s plan and how it could be
closed.
In Section 4.6, a conceptual model was proposed that includes four broad ar-
eas of influence: the supply market, the buyers’ market, competition, and inter-
nal organizational parameters such as strategy, ability, technology, and product
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characteristics. These areas of influence were derived from the literature.
Because there are so many factors that can determine the appropriateness of
specific bottleneck management measures, it might be too difficult a goal to
identify all individual parameters, especially since the time that could be spent
with each case company was limited. In some cases, limitations were explicitly
named by interviewees, in other cases limitations could be derived from the
information available. The limitations that could be identified in the process of
the multiple-case study interviews were categorized according to the areas of
influence in the conceptual model and the result is displayed in Figure 6.3.1 on
page 337.
Limitations are not the only type of parameters and not all decisions for or
against certain actions can be explained with limitations. It has been tried in
Section 6.4 to refer the interview data to the literature reviewed in the first part
of the thesis. Particular emphasis was put on power and dependency since it
was – directly or indirectly – mentioned by five of the case companies. In Sec-
tion 6.4.2 on page 342, the relationship between causes of bottleneck emergence
and power/dependency as well as the relationship between the selection of par-
ticular measures of bottleneck management and power/dependency was inves-
tigated. Although the investigation suffered from a variety of constraints, the
conclusion can be carefully drawn that an organization’s power position relative
to its suppliers and relative to other customers of the same suppliers does play
a role for the selection of the portfolio of bottleneck management measures.
Moreover, non-adjacent power regimes were introduced and it was explained
how they potentially impact on the focal firm’s supply relationship.
In Section 6.4.3, measures of bottleneck management were related to risk
management in supply networks. It was shown that bottleneck management ad-
dresses both factors of risk: uncertainty and severity of consequences. It was
concluded that risk management and bottleneck management have an overlap-
ping set of objectives which they approach from different conceptual angles,
so that bottleneck management is likely to augment risk management (and vice
versa). The discussion and conceptualization of bottleneck management can
therefore add to theory and the body of knowledge in risk management.
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In Section 6.4.4, the discussion of Lean, Agile, and Leagile from Sections
3.3 and 3.5 was picked up and related to the bottleneck management measures
from the case studies. Variability is at the heart of the problems Lean, Agile,
or Leagile approaches deal with. Unintended variability tends to “complicate
things” and as such can be considered a detriment to the management of inbound
material flow. It was shown that some of the measures companies employ have
the potential to decrease variability in the supply network while others enable
the case companies to increase their flexibility and thus cope with variability.
The research questions asked at the begin of this section refer to the measures
organizations can employ and inquire into the reasons as to why they choose
the measures they choose. It could be shown that measures of bottleneck man-
agement can fulfill multiple roles and serve multiple purposes. This finding
suggests that when bottleneck management measures are selected one should
be aware of the implications of each measure. The different roles of bottleneck
management measures represent decision variables that influence the efficacy
of each measure for the purpose it is intended to serve and thus represent an im-
portant part of the theory. Together with the limitations organizations face such
parameters can account for the differences between the actions different organi-
zations pursue. That is, the discussion of limitations and variables is intended to
provide both guidance as to what measures ought to be chosen as well as an ex-
planation as to why differences exist in the portfolio of bottleneck management
measures of different companies.
7.6. Supply Chains and Supply Chain Management
Also in Phase III of the data analysis, the adequacy of the terms supply chain
and Supply Chain Management was discussed in Section 6.4.6. The research
question was three-parted:
Concerning the adequacy of the terms supply chain and Supply Chain Man-
agement:
• Is the notion of supply chains (as opposed to supply networks) useful and
does it represent interorganizational structures which the case companies
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are part of?
• Is Supply Chain Management a pointed description of the activities or-
ganizations perform or seek to perform in order to ensure the stability of
their inbound material streams?
• How does the understanding of supply relationships change if the notion
of supply networks (as opposed to supply chains) is adopted?
It was concluded that the term supply chain is likely to create a mental model
that inhibits the understanding of the vertical and lateral relationships between
organizations that create the inbound material stream for the focal firm. The
term Supply Chain Management obviously suffers from the conceptual weak-
ness of supply chains. Even if we, in our minds, replace “chain” by “network”
(so it becomes Supply Network Management), there remains a problem attached
to the term management. It was argued that concepts such as power regimes
and complexity provide natural impediments to anyone’s ability to manage a
network. The concept of management was further dissected and a three-layer
model of supply network management was defined, initially solely as an aux-
iliary so as to be able to find an answer to the research question. The model
turned out to complement well the concepts identified and discussed hitherto,
so that the different roles of bottleneck management measures could be related
to it (Figure 6.4.3 on page 408).
Finally, it was discussed how a network perspective opens up several venues
for better understanding and analysis of supply. Several concepts discussed
in the course of this thesis were referred to as having the potential to provide
benefits if – and only if – a network perspective is embraced.
7.7. Summary: Bottleneck Management in Supply
Networks
The various findings from the review of literature and the three phases of case
study analysis were drawn together in the previous sections and will be shortly
summarized here.
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Original contributions from the theoretical part of the thesis were shortly re-
capitulated. These contributions relate to a thorough development of the con-
cept of bottlenecks and bottleneck management in supply networks (later com-
plemented by empirical data), complexity, complex adaptive systems, system
archetypes, and degrees of freedom in system setup.
The bottleneck of a system was defined in Section 2.3 as “the element (node
or edge) that limits the system in attaining higher throughput beyond a certain
threshold. This threshold is determined by the bottleneck’s physical throughput
capacity, organizational rules, or operational practices.” This definition served
as the foundation for the categorization of causes of bottleneck emergence.
Causes of bottleneck emergence were categorized into physical, organizational,
and operational causes. All causes of bottleneck emergence that were identified
in the course of the multiple-case study could be sorted into these categories. A
classification of causes provides first indication as to what levers are available
to the organization to improve or stabilize the supply situation.
The multiple-case study helped create a comprehensive list of bottleneck
management measures which are pursued by the case companies. These mea-
sures can be categorized into four distinct types of activities: bottleneck preven-
tion, bottleneck identification, bottleneck exploitation, and bottleneck elimina-
tion. These categories – and one additional category that was dropped in the
course of the data analysis – were derived from a review of various streams of
literature and they provided the structure for the case study interviews.
Limitations and parameters for the selection of bottleneck management mea-
sures were analyzed and discussed. Limitations to the case companies’ bottle-
neck management were identified in the case interviews. The limitations were
structured along the same categories that were suggested as general areas of in-
fluence on the selection of bottleneck management measures in the conceptual
model: supply market, buyers’ market, competition, and organizational fac-
tors. In addition, different parameters were identified based on the case data.
The analysis of parameters suggested that bottleneck management measures
can serve multiple purposes. Bottleneck management measures were related
to power and dependency, reduction of uncertainty and mitigation of contin-
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gencies, as well as increase of flexibility and reduction of variability. These
parameters and limitations help explain the differences between the bottleneck
management portfolio of different organizations and they provide guidance for
the selection of an organization’s right bottleneck management measures.
Taken together, all the contributions mentioned above provide the basis for
a theory of bottleneck management in supply networks. The theory adds to
the body of knowledge in the wider field of supply network management, of-
ten referred to as Supply Chain Management (SCM), and to other branches of
research at its interface. Moreover, it has the potential to support organizations
concerned with the stabilization of their supply with a useful and rich perspec-
tive in which to frame their problems and potential solutions. The explanations
of causes of bottleneck emergence as well as the discussion of specific bot-
tleneck management measures and how they relate to different roles provides
guidance for organizations seeking to select the right course of action to prevent
and alleviate supply-related problems.
Figure 7.7.1 displays an overview of the most relevant contributions related to
bottlenecks and bottleneck management. It is not a representation of the entire
theory but illustrates some of its important concepts discussed up to now that
were supported by the empirical assessment.
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Purpose: Stabilize Inbound Material Flow
Causes of Emergence
States
Classification
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Parameters & Dual Roles
Limitations
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CompetitionBuyers‘ MarketSupply Market Organization (Product, Ability, Strategy, Technology)
Definition
The bottleneck of a system is the element (node or edge) that 
limits the system in attaining higher throughput beyond a 
certain threshold. This threshold is determined by the 
bottleneck’s physical throughput capacity, organizational rules, 
or operational practices.
Figure 7.7.1. – Overview of Conceptual Contributions to Bottleneck Management
in Supply Networks
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8.1. Introduction
In Section 1.2, the general aim of this thesis was defined as follows:
The general aim of this PhD dissertation is (1) to complement
and enrich the knowledge on and understanding of bottlenecks in
general and of bottlenecks in supply networks in particular, (2) to
lay the groundwork for a theory of bottlenecks in supply networks,
(3) to create structured and methodological access to the manage-
ment of bottlenecks in supply networks, (4) thereby facilitating ac-
cess to this field for industrial organizations.
Various streams of literature were reviewed with respect to relevant contribu-
tions to bottleneck management in supply networks. From the review of liter-
ature, a conceptual model was derived in Chapter 4 that provided the structure
for the collection of empirical data. The data were collected through a multiple-
case study consisting of ten individual cases. The primary data collection tool
were semi-structured interviews with qualified personnel.
The literature review and the resulting conceptual model also served as a basis
for the research questions. The research questions were defined as follows (cf.
Section 4.7):
1. What are some of the reasons why supply shortages occur in supply net-
works?
2. Can the causes of bottleneck emergence be structured in a useful way?
3. What do organizations do about bottlenecks in their supply networks?
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4. Can the bottleneck management measures of organizations be structured
in a useful way?
5. What can organizations do about bottlenecks in their supply networks?
6. Are there parameters that influence or determine what organizations can
do in order to stabilize inbound material flow? How do organizations
choose their measures? And what seem to be the parameters?
7. Concerning the adequacy of the terms supply chain and Supply Chain
Management:
a) Is the notion of supply chains (as opposed to supply networks) use-
ful and does it represent interorganizational structures which the
case companies are part of?
b) Is Supply Chain Management a pointed description of the activi-
ties organizations perform or seek to perform in order to ensure the
stability of their inbound material streams?
c) How does the understanding of supply relationships change if the
notion of supply networks (as opposed to supply chains) is adopted?
The data analysis in Chapter 6 was conducted in three phases: First, each indi-
vidual case was analyzed separately (cf. Section 6.2). In the second phase, the
interviewees’ responses were compared across the cases (cf. Section 6.3). In
the third phase of analysis, selected parameters that can influence the selection
of bottleneck management measures were analyzed and discussed (cf. Section
6.4). Moreover, the third phase related the case study data to the terms supply
chain and Supply Chain Management. It was discussed how the data match the
concepts behind the terms and what follows both for theory and practice of the
management of supply networks.
In Chapter 7, the results of the project were drawn together and summarized.
Together, they represent the foundation of a theory of bottleneck management
in supply networks, which has been one of the aims stated at the outset of this
project.
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8.2. Contribution to Theory
This section is to explain the contribution to the literary discourse on the man-
agement of supply and interorganizational material flow. In spite of the vast
amount of literature in the field of supply (chain) management and procurement,
a consistent body of knowledge on the management of supply bottlenecks has
not evolved. One of the aims of this research project has been to introduce the
foundation of a theory of bottleneck management to the academic discourse. In
Section 1.4.1, it has been said that a theory requires four constituents: What,
How, Why, and boundary definitions. These constituents could be defined in the
course of this project.
As to the constituent What, strategies, measures, and limitations in the man-
agement of inbound material flow as well as the causes of bottleneck emergence
were defined as the units of analysis. These units of analysis were extracted
from the multiple-case studies and useful structures were worked out for these
elements.
The discussion of the units of analysis not only concerned the constituent
What, but also the constituent How. For each of the elements, it was elaborated
on how exactly it functions and thus, more specifically, how certain events lead
to irregularities in supply, how the organizations analyzed achieve their objec-
tive of stable supply by the means of the measures they employ, and how certain
limitations may prevent them from doing so. The elements What and How were
addressed predominantly in research questions 1 through 5.
The third constituent, Why, was addressed in the analysis of decision vari-
ables. It was tried to explain why organizations chose the measures they employ
(and not others) and why some organizations are subject to limitations other
organizations are free of. This analysis also involved certain contextual infor-
mation which represent the boundary definitions. The constituent Why as well
as boundary definitions were addressed predominantly in research question 6,
although some facets of the latter were addressed also in previous research ques-
tions.
It can be concluded that the elements that constitute theory were addressed.
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They are not complete; the theory proposed in this thesis is intended to represent
a base frame for further research. It is believed, however, that it does have
reasonable explanatory power and the potential to make useful predictions.
The definitions of the elements of the theory raised questions about some core
concepts of the wider theoretical setting which were addressed in research ques-
tion 7. While the scope of research question 7 is covered by the general research
aim defined at the outset of the thesis, it was recognized with some surprise that
both the review of literature and the data analysis downright invoked a critique
of widely accepted conceptions, which is now believed to represent a valuable
corollary to the theory defined hitherto.
Some of the conceptual contributions that were made in the theoretical part of
the thesis include a classification of bottlenecks and of bottleneck states. These
elements provide the basis for a taxonomy, which enriches the clarity and ex-
planatory power of the theory.
The most relevant individual contributions this research provides can be sum-
marized as follows:
• A consistent definition of bottlenecks that meets both practical and aca-
demic requirements was provided as the review of relevant literature re-
vealed that such a definition had not evolved to date.
• Types of bottlenecks and bottleneck states were categorized.
• The concept of bottleneck management in supply networks was intro-
duced.
• Three categories of causes of bottleneck emergence were derived from
the literature and validated through empirical study.
• Five categories of bottleneck management activities were derived from
relevant literature. Four of these categories could be empirically validated
through case studies.
• Specific measures of bottleneck management were identified in the anal-
ysis of the ten case exemplars.
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• The individual measures of bottleneck management were related to liter-
ature on power, Lean/Agile, Supply Chain Management, manufacturing
systems, and risk management. Roles were identified that specified the
effect specific measures have and which make them suitable for specific
taks and environments.
• Together, the definition and categorization of bottlenecks, the categoriza-
tion of causes of bottleneck causes, the four general bottleneck manage-
ment activities, the specific bottleneck management measures, and the
attribution of measures according to their distinct roles constitute a tax-
onomy of bottleneck management in supply networks.
• An empirically grounded contribution to the ongoing discussion as to
whether it is more appropriate to refer to supply networks rather than
to supply chains was provided.
• A critique, rooted in a review of relevant literature as well as in empirical
data, of the field of Supply Chain Management was formulated.
• The study tested the adoption of concepts from bottleneck management in
factory systems in supply networks and outlined the commonalities and
differences.
• The study created structured, methodological access to valuable knowl-
edge for the management of bottlenecks in supply networks.
• In essence, this research introduced new aspects to and a new perspective
on the management of supply and laid the groundwork for a theory of
bottlenecks in supply networks.
According to Mills et al. (2004), the field of SCM contains only very limited
original theory. Most theoretical concepts have emerged outside SCM and are
applied not to describe or to solve “chain” or “network” problems but for orga-
nizational problems or problems in a dyad. SCM, however, is said to be much
more. A core claim is that SCM takes into account the entire chain or network
and not merely a small portion of it. Mills et al. (2004) claim that there are “only
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two theories of supply chains or networks”: the bullwhip effect (Forrester 1958,
Lee et al. 1997) and postponement strategies for differentiation of products as a
means for more efficient marketing 1.
A theory of bottleneck management in supply networks augments existing
concept and contributes to the body of theory in Supply Chain Management
research. It provides a different angle from which to look at problems of the
management of supply.
8.3. Contribution to Practice
This study has taken up the concept of bottlenecks and contributed to the clarity,
the understanding, and the applicability of the bottleneck metaphor in the con-
text of supply networks. The bottleneck metaphor is a powerful aid and facili-
tates both the selection of appropriate measures for the management of inbound
material flow as well as the communication of material flow-related problems.
Moreover, the management of inbound material flow is methodologically
supported by the categorization of bottlenecks, bottleneck states, causes of bot-
tleneck emergence, activities for bottleneck management, limitations to bot-
tleneck management, and roles of bottleneck management measures, each of
which contributing to a better understanding and methodological access to the
management of supply.
The categorization of causes of bottleneck emergence helps organizations un-
derstand the source of their supply-related problems. The understanding of the
causes enables them to better choose the most appropriate counter-measures.
A comprehensive list of bottleneck management measures was derived from
ten company exemplars in a multiple-case study. Although the list is by no
means complete or representative, it is rich in detail and together with contex-
tual information about the case companies can serve as the basis for interor-
ganizational benchmark. The list of measures and their description can help
organizations evaluate their own set of measures.
1Bucklin (1965) credits Alderson (1950) for his early work on postponement of product differ-
entiation.
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The measures identified in the case studies were categorized according to
four general bottleneck management activities. Such categories provide a quick
overview and access to the measures available so that potential gaps in an orga-
nization’s portfolio of measures can be identified more easily.
Additionally, measures of bottleneck management were related to important
concepts from both, theory and organizational practice, such as risk (probabil-
ity and consequences), Lean (efficiency and flexibility), and interorganizational
power relations. In the discussion of these concepts and how they relate to
the empirical data gathered from the ten case companies, it was explained how
bottleneck management measures can serve multiple purposes at once. This re-
quires careful selection of the right measures, which is supported by the analyses
in this thesis.
The discussion of the popular yet imprecise notions of supply chain and Sup-
ply Chain Management has emphasized the need to alter the understanding of
supply-related interorganizational structures. It provides an aid for organiza-
tions aiming for better control of their inbound material streams by pointing out
possible sources of disturbance from outside the direct contractual relationships
so as to enable decision makers to take appropriate preventive measures in due
time.
Finally, a theory of bottlenecks in supply networks provides a point of refer-
ence for organizations aiming for improved management of supply. This project
provides the basis for additional research in this field, both in theory and in prac-
tice, hopefully providing more tools, concepts, and methodological access for
organizations.
8.4. Research Limitations
This research project is subject to a variety of limitations, some of which nec-
essarily follow from the choice of research approach. The limitations shall be
shortly addressed in this section.
The time spent with each case company was limited, and it was difficult to get
access to companies that would cooperate with the researcher in the first place.
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More time with each case company, analysis of archival data, participation in
meetings with suppliers, observation, and additional interviews with the same
as well as with other members of the respective organization would support the
strength of the claims made in this document. Such in-depth investigation might
have been possible with one or very few case companies; instead it was decided
to go for breadth and talk to more different organizations. While it is believed
this was the right approach for this project, it had to be traded off against depth
of investigation, which certainly is one limitation.
The analytic generalizations made in this thesis could be improved with an
even greater number of cases in different industrial settings. There are, for in-
stance, additional measures of bottleneck management that are known to the
researcher but remained unmentioned by the case study participants. Likewise,
a multitude of additional situations is conceivable that would lead to interrup-
tions of supply. Additional cases could thus have enriched the theory proposed
by suggesting, for instance, additional parameters and conditions for the selec-
tion of certain activities and measures (that is, additional cases would support
more elaborate boundary conditions of the theory).
Because the study involved ten case companies with partly overlapping, yet
partly also very different industrial background, it is conceivable that a replica-
tion of this study with different companies from different backgrounds would
lead to partly differing propositions. It is believed that the core of the theory can
suite a wide variety of different industrial settings, yet emphasis on a different
set of particular measures might result.
The study is qualitative. Data sets (e.g., from the International Manufacturing
Strategy Survey) exist that could be used to add a quantitative component to the
project. Because it had put a strain on the scope of this project, quantitative
data was not included. It is encouraged, however, to complement this work with
analysis of quantitative data.
This study is inductive in nature. That is, it does not present validation of
facts but theory. While a consequence of the research approach, it must be
acknowledged that all claims made in this thesis represent propositions rather
than facts and that this thesis is subject to the general limitations of induction.
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Obviously, the entire research project is subject to the limitations inherent
to a PhD project, such as rigid time frame and financial constraints. Research
approach and scope were defined accordingly, yet more time and funding would
have provided the means to investigate certain aspects in greater detail.
8.5. Need for Further Research
In this project, an entirely different perspective on the management of inbound
material streams was adopted than is generally taken in the relevant literature.
This different perspective on well-known problems may stir up some research
fields – and if it does indeed this will be considered a success. The material
flow or bottleneck perspective on the management of supply has implications
for adjacent and overlapping research fields.
In Section 6.4.2, the relationship of power, dependency and bottleneck man-
agement measures was investigated. The number of data points limited the
ability to draw strong conclusions from the analysis. Additional research that
includes and compares larger samples of firms so as to derive more definite con-
clusions about, for instance, the relation of relative power (or lack thereof) and
how it enables (or limits, respectively) the use of certain bottleneck management
measures could provide valuable insights and extend the theory put forth in this
project.
One adjacent field of research and practice is supplier management. More
specifically, it can be asked what follows from the insights into bottleneck man-
agement methodology and power relations for the selection of suppliers, sup-
plier training, supplier audits, and the design of supply contracts. All other
things being equal, should a firm prefer to choose a less powerful supplier rather
than a more powerful supplier? Should a supplier be preferred that does not sup-
ply more powerful firms that compete in the same segment as the buying firm?
How can supply contracts be designed to cover potential supply shortages aris-
ing from preferential treatment of the supplier’s other customers? How would
scripts and questionnaires for supplier audits need to be modified to account for
increased demands on bottleneck prevention or bottleneck exploitation? Can
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opportunities for bottleneck exploitation replace the need for alternative or par-
allel sources? Can possible organizational causes of bottlenecks be identified in
supplier audits and changes be demanded prior to contract closing?
Another adjacent field is transportation and logistics. How do transportation
networks need to be designed so as to enable firms to quickly change transporta-
tion modes and get maximum throughput at bottlenecks? How do decisions
regarding local or global sourcing change given that global sourcing excludes
quicker transportation and thus bottleneck exploitation, as it happens to be the
case for some of the companies of the empirical study? What are the implica-
tions for the selection of the right production location?
Risk management was mentioned before as being a research field that can ben-
efit from the conceptual work on bottleneck management. How should power
relations be considered in risk prevention and mitigation strategies? Should
business with powerful suppliers be considered risky? Can the four categories
of bottleneck management activities enhance risk management methodology?
Where are bottleneck management, as presented in this thesis, and risk manage-
ment are at odds and where is overlap? In practice, will there be a need for both
concepts in parallel at the same organization or will one be sufficient (provided
risk management is mostly concerned with the risk of supply and production
outages)?
There are also some more subtle relations to other topics. One example is
maintenance. With regard to opportunities for bottleneck exploitation (and pos-
sibly bottleneck placement, although this category was removed in the course of
the study), how should maintenance activities be prioritized? What are the im-
plications for the maintenance budget? Does reactive maintenance still suffice
the organization’s needs or do the insights from this study suggest that pre-
ventive maintenance should be considered mandatory? In supplier audits, what
maintenance documentation should be checked at the supplier’s production site?
Should a maintenance strategy be mandatory for a supplier to be granted the
contract? What if the supplier is actually too powerful to accept these condi-
tions and rejects any such demands?
In Section 2.5.2, it was touched upon concepts from network theory to con-
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ceptually describe networks between organizations. The empirical investigation
carried out in this thesis did not include a complete analysis of the network
structures of the case companies. Such an analysis could, however, provide ad-
ditional insight if related to both causes of bottleneck emergence and concepts
of bottleneck management. First attempts to advance these directions have al-
ready been made (cf. Cox et al. 2001, Craighead et al. 2007, Choi & Kim 2008,
Mizgier et al. 2013), yet is clear that more work needs to be done in order to be
able to derive reliable conclusions.
In Section 7.5, it was stated that the identification of parameters influenc-
ing the selection of viable bottleneck management measures was limited in this
project. Additional research on the selection of the appropriate measures for
bottleneck management is encouraged. It seems likely that value can be derived
from a better understanding of the relation between an organization’s internal
and external parameters and limitations and the selection of the right bottleneck
management measures.
Generally, the entire theory of bottleneck management in supply networks de-
veloped in this thesis is open to additional testing, extension, and modification.
The inductive nature of this project makes it likely that the theory will not fit to
every organization in every context. Additional context-specific refinement of
the theory may enhance its value and its validity.
8.6. Summary
Only limited literature exists on bottlenecks in supply networks. This thesis
aims to fill gaps in theory and to address industrial needs.
Different streams of literature were analyzed and useful concepts extracted
so as to derive a structure of bottleneck management in supply networks.
An empirical data collection served to explore concepts used in practice. Data
from the multiple-case study was related to theoretical concepts extracted from
the literature review. The data analysis supported the concepts devised earlier
and helped refine them. Moreover, it suggested the existence of three dual roles
of bottleneck management measures, providing a framework for the selection
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of measures in different contexts.
Based on the literature review, commonly accepted concepts such as supply
chains and Supply Chain Management were subjected to scrutiny. The notion of
their misrepresentation of industrial practice was supported by the data analysis.
In summation, this project brings forth the foundation of a theory of bottle-
neck management in supply networks, thereby enriching both the literary and
the non-literary discourse, and providing insights and guidance for decision-
makers in the management of supply of industrial organizations.
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A. Literature Review: Definition of
Bottleneck
The literature referenced in the review below is listed in the bibliography.
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Literature Review: Definition of Bottleneck 
 
Reference Scientific Discipline/ 
Subject Area 
Definition or  
Statement Point to Definition 
Suri (1986) 
 
Production planning and 
control, Lean, Kanban 
No explicit definition 
Lawrence & Buss 
(1995) 
Production planning and 
control, bottleneck 
analysis, economic analysis 
of bottlenecks 
“A survey of the research and pedagogical 
literature finds that there exists no clear 
consensus as to the definition of a 
"bottleneck" resource.” (p. 342) 
 
“Summarizing, there appear to be three 
principal definitions for bottleneck 
resources currently in use: A bottleneck 
resource is one for which (1) short-term 
demand exceeds capacity; (2) work-in-
process (WIP) inventory is maximum; or (3) 
production capacity is minimum, relative to 
demand (i.e., capacity utilization is 
maximal). (…) Since none of these 
definitions considers costs, revenues, or 
profitability of the firm, but focuses solely 
on the output of the process, we will refer 
to them as production bottlenecks.” (pp. 
342-343) 
 
“[A]n economic bottleneck [is] defined to 
be that workstation which most severely 
increases costs or limits profits.” (p. 355) 
Ivens & Lambrecht 
(1996) 
Production planning and 
control, production job 
scheduling 
“The bottleneck 𝑚 is the resource with the 
largest makespan for problem 𝑃(𝑘, 𝑀0), 
i.e. the resource m for which 𝑃(𝑚, 𝑀0) =
max
𝑘∈𝑀  𝑀0
𝑃(𝑘, 𝑀0). 
Kuo et al. (1996, p. 
234) 
Production planning and 
control, bottleneck 
identification in serial 
production lines 
“[A] machine that impedes system 
performance (…) in the strongest manner 
(…) is typically referred to as the bottleneck 
(BN).” 
Bergamaschi et al. 
(1997) 
Production planning and 
control, order release 
strategies 
No explicit definition 
Chiang et al. 
(1998) 
Production planning and 
control, bottleneck 
identification in production 
systems 
Intuitively, bottleneck (BN) of a production 
line is understood as a machine that 
impedes the system performance in the 
strongest manner.” (p. 352) 
 
Reference Scientific Discipline/ 
Subject Area 
Definition or  
Statement Point to Definition 
“Even the definition of BN is unclear” (p. 
352) 
 
“A machine is a UT-BN (or DT-BN) if an 
increase of its uptime (respectively, a 
decrease of its down-time) leads to the 
largest increase of the system production 
rate. (…) A machine is the BN if both its up
-
time and its down-time are the most 
critical for the system 
performancProduction planning and 
control, bottleneck identification in 
production systemse.” (p. 353) 
 
“Bottlenecks in Markovian production lines 
can be defined as partial derivatives of the 
system production rate with resp
ect to 
machines’ up- and down-time.” (p. 355)
 Hopp & Roof (1998, p. 
871) 
Production planning and 
control 
In a production line, the bottleneck is the 
slowest station the capacity of which is 
below targeted throughput. 
Hendry et al. (1998) Production planning and 
control, simulation of 
workload control 
No explicit definition 
Laure (1999) Production planning and 
control, semiconductor 
production 
No explicit definition 
Nakata et al. (1999) Production planning and 
control, semiconductor 
production 
No explicit definition 
Jain et al. (2000) Supply chain planning, 
semiconductor production 
Workstation with highest utilization
 
Chiang et al. (2000, p. 
567) 
Production planning and 
control, bottleneck 
identification in production 
systems 
„The bottleneck of a production line is the 
machine that impedes the system 
performance in the strongest manner”.
 
Chiang et al. (2001, p. 
543) 
Production planning and 
control, bottleneck 
identification in production 
systems 
“The bottleneck of a production line is
 
the machine that impedes the system
 
performance in the strongest manner”.
 
Roser et al. (2002, p. 
1079) 
Production planning and 
control, bottleneck 
detection methods 
“There are numerous definitions as to 
what constitutes a bottleneck (Lawrence 
and Buss 1995). Within this paper, we 
define a bottleneck as a stage in a 
Reference Scientific Discipline/ 
Subject Area 
Definition or  
Statement Point to Definition 
production system that has the largest 
effect on slowing down or stopping the 
entire system.” 
Lee et al. (2002) Production planning and 
control, semiconductor 
production 
No expicit definition 
Roser et al. (2003, p. 
1192) 
Bottleneck detection, AGV 
systems 
“We define a bottleneck as a machine 
whose throughput affects the overall 
system throughput, and the magnitude of 
the bottleneck as the magnitude of the 
effect of the machine throughput onto the 
system throughput. In summary, the 
sensitivity of the system throughput to the 
machine throughput determines the level 
of constraint of the machine.” (adapted 
from Kuo et al. 1996) 
Haller (2003, p. 185) Production planning and 
control, semiconductor 
production 
A bottleneck is a process step (i.e., a 
machine) that limits over-all throughput. 
Goldratt & Cox (2004, 
p. 139) 
Production planning and 
control, Theory of 
Constraints 
“A bottleneck is any resource whose 
capacity is equal to or less than the 
demand placed upon it.” 
Wang et al. (2005, p. 
3) 
Production planning and 
control, bottleneck 
detection methods 
“Bottlenecks are generally recognized as 
some resources or utilities, which heavily 
limit the performances of a production 
system”  
 
“[T]here is still not a consensus definition 
of bottlenecks.”  
 
“A common sense of bottleneck is 
'something' that limits system’s production 
rate.” 
Lu et al. (2006) Production planning and 
control, study of shifting 
bottlenecks 
“So far, there is no uniform bottleneck 
definition in academe.” 
Li et al. (2007, p. 76) Production planning and 
control, Markovian 
statistics 
“Bottleneck is a machine that impedes the 
system performance in the strongest 
manner.” 
Aske et al. (2007, p. 
65) 
Production planning and 
control 
“A unit is a bottleneck if maximum 
throughput (maximum network flow for 
the system) is obtained by operating this 
unit at maximum flow (with no available 
capacity left). In some cases the bottleneck 
Reference Scientific Discipline/ 
Subject Area 
Definition or  
Statement Point to Definition 
can not be located to a specific unit, but 
rather to a system of units (”system 
bottleneck”).” 
Hopp & Spearman 
(2008, p. 486) 
Production planning and 
control, 
manufacturing principles 
A bottleneck is the process with the 
highest long-term utilization. 
Malkowski et al. 
(2009, p. 119) 
E-Commerce, computer 
system performance 
analysis 
“The common understanding of a system 
bottleneck (or bottleneck for short) can 
intuitively be derived from its literal 
meaning as the key limiting factor for 
achieving higher system throughput.” 
Stevenson et al. 
(2011) 
Production planning and 
control 
No explicit definition 
Liu (2011, p. 39) Production planning and 
control 
“Hence, bottlenecks are defined as the 
most prominent, physical hindrances (e.g., 
workstations, production systems and 
customer orders) that impede 
achievement of target performance 
measures of a manufacturing system (i.e. 
primary bottlenecks).” 
Mizgier et al. (2013, p. 
1477) 
Supply chain risk 
management, network 
theory 
“[F]irms that induce high losses due to 
supply chain disruptions in a focal firm or 
the supply chain network as a whole.” 
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Jakob E. Beer  Centre for Industrial Asset Management at the University of Stavanger, Norway  
 Phone +47 944 287 73   jakob.e.beer@uis.no 
 
 
 
Bottlenecks in Supply Networks:  
A Systematic Approach to Prevention, Detection, and Management of Bott lenecks  
Background to the Project 
This research is part of a PhD project being undertaken at the Centre for Industrial Asset 
Management at the University of Stavanger, Norway. The research project involves several in-
depth case studies that are intended to augment the theoretical research conducted in this 
project.   
Project Description 
Reliable supply is imperative for manufacturing firms; interruptions have posed major 
challenges in the past. A workable methodology to deal with bottlenecks in supply networks 
has not evolved, however. This PhD project seeks to provide a reference for thorough 
understanding of the emergence of bottlenecks in supply networks, their impact on 
manufacturing, their prevention, detection and management. 
Empirical data are necessary to identify relevant problem sets as well as to validate theoretical 
propositions. The case studies conducted in the course of this project thus serve multiple 
purposes: to extend the knowledge base provided by the relevant literature, to identify the most 
urging problems for industrial supply networks, and to discuss, test, and validate solutions with 
professionals from industry. Desired output of the case studies is of qualitative nature. 
Format & Procedures 
Semi-structured interviews have been chosen as main method for data collection. The 
interviews will be conducted preferably on-site or, if not possible otherwise, on the phone. The 
settings chosen for the case studies include automotive, agricultural machinery, oil & gas, and 
food production. 
Confidentiality 
The use of the data collected in the case studies is subject to the following terms and 
conditions: 
 Participating companies will not be mentioned in the dissertation nor in other 
publications of any kind if not agreed on otherwise, i.e., all participants remain 
anonymous.  
 The dissertation as main outcome of the PhD project will be disclosed to public. 
 Besides in the monograph that is to be released by September 2014, findings may be 
published through scientific journals and conferences under the same conditions as 
stated for the dissertation, i.e., participants remain anonymous if not agreed on 
otherwise.  
 Field data and interim findings are not to be made available to other participating 
companies beyond what is going to be published anonymously. 
 Field data and interim findings are not made available to other researchers before 
official publication through scientific journals, conferences, and the dissertation with 
exception of the PhD researcher’s primary and secondary supervisors who are involved 
in the study.   
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1 
 
Interview Questionnaire: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks 
This interview questionnaire aims to identify causes for bottlenecks as well as approaches to manage 
them. To make the analysis consistent, it may be necessary to select some of the company’s most 
important or most critical products, respectively. Importance refers to significance the product has 
for the company’s current or future bottom line. Criticality refers to the product’s propensity to be 
subject to supply shortages (bottlenecks). 
The information provided in this interview will be treated confidential. All information will be used 
only anonymously and the company name will not be mentioned to other case study participants nor 
will it be used in publications of any kind.  
The outcome of the case study and the research project as a whole are likely to include useful 
guidance for all participants. The goal is to assemble state-of-the-art knowledge and best practices to 
provide industrial companies with practical solutions and remedy for supply-related problems.  
This research project is funded by the European Union’s 7th Framework Program.  
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Part I: Industry Characteristics, Firm Characteristics, and Product Characteristics 
1. Do you have direct competitors for a significant share of your products? If so, how many? 
 
 
 
2. How would you describe your industry in terms of dynamics/routine? 
 
 
 
3. How would you describe your products in terms of complexity? 
 
 
 
4. How would you describe your production process in terms of complexity? 
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Part II: Bottlenecks in the Supply Network: General 
1. As how severe do you perceive the problem of bottlenecks in your supply network in terms of 
frequency and impact? 
 
 
 
2. Do you think your perception of bottleneck severity is generally shared by management and 
those concerned with material management? 
 
 
 
3. Where in your supply network do bottlenecks normally emerge for your most important/most 
critical products?  
 
 
 
4. What are the most common reasons for bottlenecks emerging in your supply network? 
(mention examples for facilitation) 
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Part III: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Prevention 
1. What actions does your company take in order to prevent the emergence of unplanned 
bottlenecks? 
 
 
 
2. Is there a standardized action plan in place for (1) supply network design, (2) sourcing options 
(selection, redundancy, location), and (3) supplier training? 
 
 
 
3. In your opinion, what actions should be taken (which are currently not being taken) in order to 
prevent the emergence of unplanned bottlenecks? 
(If there is a mismatch between what is being done and what should be done: why?) 
 
 
 
4. Does your company engage in tier-n management? If so, to what extent? If not, why not? 
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Part IV: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Detection 
1. How does your company normally learn about bottlenecks emerging in your supply network? 
 
 
 
2. Is there a standardized procedure according to which suppliers will notify you when a bottleneck 
has emerged or chances are it will emerge? 
 
 
 
3. How long in advance (i.e., before supply shortage starved your production) does your company 
normally learn about bottlenecks emerging? 
 
 
Part V: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Exploitation 
1. In case a bottleneck has emerged, what actions does your company take in order to exploit it 
(i.e., get maximum throughput out of it)? 
 
 
 
2. Do you have employees trained in exploitation of bottlenecks? 
 
 
 
3. In your opinion, what actions should your company take in order to exploit bottlenecks? 
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Part VI: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Elimination 
1. In case of a bottleneck has emerged, what actions does your company take in order to eliminate 
it? 
 
 
 
2. What actions to eliminate bottlenecks in supply networks can you think of? Which should your 
company take? 
  
 
 
 
Part VII: Bottlenecks in Supply Networks: Placement 
1. Can you make sense of the concept of planned bottlenecks? 
 
 
 
2. Do you know – or have an idea about – how much flexibility your company maintains in 
production capacity? 
 
 
 
3. Do you know – or have an idea about – how much flexibility your company expects suppliers to 
maintain in production capacity? 
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Part VIII: Supply Network Characteristics 
1. How many direct suppliers do you (approximately) have for your most important and most 
critical products? 
 
 
 
2. What is the most common delivery mode for material you receive from suppliers? 
(JiT, JiS, conventional warehouse, consignment warehouse) 
 
 
 
3. In your opinion, does the delivery mode seem to make a difference for severity (frequency and 
impact) of bottlenecks emerging? 
 
 
 
4. As compared to the most critical suppliers (in terms of bottleneck frequency), how do you 
perceive your company’s power (in terms of influence on suppliers’ management decisions, 
negotiation power…)? 
 
 
 
5. In your opinion, how important is your company as a customer for your most critical suppliers as 
compared to their other customers? What do you base your assessment on? 
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Appendix 
Terminology 
Bottleneck: Bottleneck is defined as the element (node or graph) that limits the system in attaining 
higher throughput beyond a certain threshold. This threshold is determined by the bottleneck‘s 
physical throughput capacity, organizational rules, or operational practices. In the context of this 
interview, a bottleneck is generally indicated by a supply shortage of material needed for production 
Importance of product: Importance of a product refers to the significance a product has for the 
company's current or future bottom line. 
Criticality of product: Criticality of a product refers to the product's propensity to be affected by 
supply shortages (i.e., bottlenecks). 
Unplanned bottleneck: Unplanned bottleneck refers to a bottleneck that emerges in the system 
without being consciously designed into it.  
Dynamic industry: Refers to the number of new product launches in the industry, the number of 
competitors offering similar products, number of companies entering and leaving the industry, and 
innovation being created in the industry. 
Routinized industry: Refers to a mature, efficiency-focused industry, as opposed to dynamic industry 
(see above).  
Bottleneck severity: Bottleneck severity refers to the combination of the number of bottlenecks 
occurring in a supply network (frequency) and the impact they have on the business of the focal firm. 
Tier-n management: Refers to a company managing its suppliers not only on tier-1 stage but also on 
tier-2, tier-3, etc. stage. Tier-n management may include supplier selection, training, quality 
assurance, audits, and intervention in case of conflicts between suppliers. 
Product complexity: Refers to the number of different parts a product consists of. 
Process complexity: Refers to the number of process steps involved to produce a particular product 
as well as to difficulties (technical, operational, or organizational) to execute them.  
Power (over suppliers): Refers to the focal company's ability to influence individual suppliers. Power 
may be determined by a combination of the market positions of both the supplier and the focal firm, 
the ease of switching, the significance for each other's business activities in terms of volume or 
competencies, and other stakes each company may possibly have.  
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Bottleneck 
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Bottleneck Classification 
 
 
